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ABSTRACT 
Although it may seem ironic that a policy affecting so few children should engage so 
much political and social attention, the symbolic significance of intercountry adoption far 
outweighs its practical import. This fact is partly demonstrated by the polarised views on 
intercountry adoption, and opinions continue to be divided over the necessity and 
propriety of the practice. 
 
At present, there can be few who would quibble with the fact that African children are 
attracting an increasing attention from prospective adoptive parents living in other parts 
of the world. Celebrity adoptions (the adoptions of Angelina Jolie and Madonna) have 
contributed to this increased interest in African children. While intercountry adoption 
from African countries is still quite modest compared to adoptions from the top four 
countries of origin, there are concrete reasons to believe that interest in adoption from 
African countries will continue to increase. 
 
Thus, while Africa is “the new frontier” for intercountry adoption - it is highly 
questionable if the continent is equipped to provide its children with the necessary 
safeguards in respect of the practice. A central thesis of this study was to explore how 
the best interests of the African child can be upheld in intercountry adoption.  In 
connection with this thesis, a number of related research questions were raised, such 
as: does the African context present any peculiar situations that are relevant to 
intercountry adoption? Does the African Children’s Charter (ACRWC) add any value to 
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the provisions of the CRC in addressing African realities relevant for intercountry 
adoption? What are some of the challenges, lessons, and opportunities for the 
regulation of intercountry adoption on the African continent? 
 
Five themes are considered in dedicated Chapters of this study. They are the African 
context; the international legal framework; adoptability; the principle of subsidiarity; and 
illicit activities in respect of intercountry adoption. It is argued that context matters, and 
there are historical, cultural, social, religious, and legal contexts that are relevant for 
intercountry adoption in Africa. Since human rights issues are at the core of the current 
debate over intercountry adoption, international children’s rights law is also very crucial 
for the discussion.  
 
Four countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and South Africa) are used in this study in 
supplementary fashion to demonstrate African countries’ experiences. The study 
identifies the role of various stakeholders for the promotion and protection of children’s 
rights in Africa in respect of intercountry adoption. It is concluded that as a 
predominantly sending continent, Africa’s views on intercountry adoption issues should 
be seriously considered and taken into account, if a socially and legally sound, and 
child-centred, intercountry adoption regime is to be formed on the continent. 
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CHAPTER 1 
       INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 1      BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
 
Tracing the history of intercountry adoption leads one to the conclusion that the practice 
is identified as a post-World War II phenomenon.1 Its association with post-war activities 
is indicative of the benevolent humanitarian solution it had initially represented.  
 
Currently, however, it seems that intercountry adoption has evolved from its roots as a 
humanitarian act into a widely accepted option for childless people who wish to create a 
family.2 Since World War II Western societies have changed, so that the “supply” of 
domestically adoptable children has become scarce. The increased use of 
contraceptives, the increase in infertility among families in developed countries, and the 
growing acceptance of single parents have contributed to this Western “baby 
shortage”.3 These facts and the notion that it is somehow less difficult to adopt 
internationally have encouraged more Westerners to look to other countries for 
adoptable children.4  
 
The increased popularity of intercountry adoption since its arrival on the international 
legal scene following World War II is not anything recent. What is recent, however, is 
the increased attention African children are attracting from prospective adoptive parents 
                                                
1  Bergquist, (2004), 343; Bartholet, (2007), 159; UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 2.  
2  Kleiman, (1997), 333; Kane, (1993), 313.   
3  Katz, (1995), 287. 
4  Kleiman, (1997), 333. 
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living in other parts of the world. Amongst other factors, there is no doubt that this 
recent interest is fuelled by the expanded media coverage which continues to bring the 
plight of abandoned and orphaned children from Africa to audiences all over the world, 
coupled with recent news stories that have chronicled high profile intercountry adoption 
cases from Africa: the intercountry adoptions by Angelina Jolie (from Ethiopia) and 
Madonna (from Malawi) spring to mind. 
 
Opinions are divided over the necessity and propriety of intercountry adoption. It is not 
an exaggeration to state that intercountry adoption has impacted on public 
consciousness in two incompatible ways.5 On the one hand, intercountry adoption is 
presented as a heart-warming act of goodwill that benefits both a child and an adoptive 
family.6 To consider the practice as a panacea for children without parents and parents 
without children is a prevalent view.7 Intercountry adoption as an opportunity to deliver 
children from destitute lives is also a perception held by many.8   
 
On the other hand, critics characterise the practice as “modern-day imperialism, 
allowing dominant, developed cultures to strip away a developing country’s most 
precious resources, its children”.9 They argue that children adopted internationally will 
have difficulties adjusting to their new languages and cultures.10 It is also contended 
that intercountry adoption is a paternalistic solution, one in which the children who are 
                                                
5   Smolin, (2005), 403. 
6   Smolin, (2005), 403; Bartholet, (2007), 158. 
7  Dillon, (2003), 179 (discussing how to transform the Hague Convention in such a way as to 
facilitate intercountry adoptions). 
8  See generally Strong, (1995), 163 (discussing adoption as a human right). 
9  Martin, (2007), 174 citing Kleem, (2000), 325-326.  
10  Perry, (1998), 131. 
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being adopted are viewed as needing “rescue” from their plight,11 echoing the welfarist 
approach to children that preceded ideologies based on children’s rights as 
incorporated in the CRC and the ACRWC.  
 
In addition, contrasted with the positive face of adoption are some scandals and 
irregularities concerning the practice – and at its worst, adoption is portrayed as child 
trafficking or child selling.12 The statement about the two contradictory perceptions of 
intercountry adoption is perhaps as equally valid in Africa as elsewhere. Some African 
countries have decided to restrict intercountry adoption to certain narrowly defined 
situations,13 and, at the extreme end, there prevails a preference to prohibit intercountry 
adoption altogether.14 Interestingly, both advocates for and against intercountry 
adoption use the “best interests of the child” as the basis for their positions.  
 
Since human rights issues are at the core of the current debate over intercountry 
adoption,15 international children’s rights law is crucial for the discussion. For this 
purpose international children’s rights law is composed of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC),16 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC),17 and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation 
                                                
11  Martin, (2007), 176. 
12  Smolin, (2004), 281; Smolin (2005), 404; Van Bueren, (1995), 96; Goodwin, (2006), 68. 
13  For instance, some countries like Botswana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have a residency 
requirement for prospective adoptive parents. 
14  For instance, Nigeria. 
15  Bartholet, (2007), 151-52. 
16  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter “CRC”), entered into force 2 September 
1990. 
17  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter “ACRWC”), entered into force 
29 November 1999. 
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in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the Hague Convention).18 Despite these 
instruments, a number of answers, particularly, how to define the best interests of the 
child in the context of intercountry adoption remain vague and controversial.  
 
1.2   TITLE OF THE STUDY 
 
The title of this study is “Intercountry adoption in an African context: A legal 
perspective”. 
 
1.2.1    Why “an African context”? 
The debate over intercountry adoption is dominated by views from the West, where the 
majority of traditionally receiving countries are located.19 This is so despite the fact that, 
currently, most children available for intercountry adoption come from less-developed 
countries where factors including the stigma of illegitimacy, the minimal use of 
contraceptives, stringent laws on abortion, conflict, poverty,  and health problems (such 
as HIV/AIDS) contribute to the population of homeless children.20 One writer who 
recognises this problem is King. He uses the phrase MonoHumanism “to underscore 
the ethnocentric and myopic failure to include discourses that have their origins in the 
lives, cultures, and vocabulary of historically oppressed peoples…”.21 As a 
predominantly sending continent, Africa’s views on intercountry adoption issues should 
                                                
18  The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption (hereinafter “the Hague Convention”), entered into force 1 May 1995. It is important to 
note that the Hague Convention is not a human rights convention per se, but is an agreement on 
the standards to be observed where intercountry adoption occurs. However, it is important to note 
that human rights issues are at the core of the current debate over international adoption. See, for 
instance, Bartholet, (2007), 151-152. 
19  See, generally, King, (2009). 
20  Katz, (1995), 287. 
21  King, (2009), 414. 
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be seriously considered and taken into account, if a socially and legally sound, and 
child-centred, intercountry adoption regime is to be formed on the continent.22  
 
The use of the indefinite article “an” African context instead of “the” African context is a 
conscious one. While the latter seems to insinuate that there is a monolithic African 
context when it comes to intercountry adoptions, the former approach (which is adopted 
by this study) seems to imply a more limited scope of generalisation which is mainly 
(but, of course not exclusively) applicable to the four countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, 
South Africa) that are used as add-ons in the study.23  
 
1.2.2    Why “[a] legal perspective”? 
Issues pertaining to adoption generally tend to require an interdisciplinary approach 
spanning law, sociology, psychology, and anthropology to name a few disciplines. As a 
result, there are a number of issues pertaining to intercountry adoption which go beyond 
the scope of this study. The phrase “[a] legal perspective” in the title of this study is 
intended to demarcate this scope. Moreover, the sub-title “[a] legal perspective” also 
reflects that the study relies heavily on the applicable legal texts provided for at the 
global, regional and national level.  
 
1.3   TERMINOLOGY 
                                                
22  See section 1.5 below for the aims of this study. 
23  See section 1.7 below on the choice of jurisdictions for a detailed explanation of the four case 
studies. 
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A number of terminological choices have been made throughout this study. In order to 
simplify the text, unless the context requires otherwise, this study shall try to use 
consistent terms throughout. Some of these terms are explained below. 
 
The notion of “adoption” covers a great variety of legal approaches, customs and 
practices.24 As used in this study, it is “the legal practice through which a person 
acquires new family ties that are defined as equivalent to biological ties and which 
supersede the old ones, either wholly or in part”.25 Adoption, as understood in this 
study, creates a permanent legally recognized parent-child relationship. 
 
The phrase “domestic adoption” is used to refer to an adoption that takes place between 
a child and an adoptive parent who are habitual residents of the same place.26 
“Intercountry adoption” refers to the practice where a child who is habitually resident in 
one country has been (is being) adopted by a person(s) who is (are) habitually resident 
in the receiving State, or for the purposes of such an adoption in the receiving State or 
in the State of origin.27 Unlike domestic adoption, intercountry adoption entails a change 
in the child’s habitual country of residence.28 In this study, as it is also the case in 
international law treaties,29 the term “intercountry adoption” has been chosen in contrast 
to “international adoption”, in order to avoid the impression that there is a uniform set of 
substantive adoption rules globally.30  
                                                
24  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 19. 
25  As above. 
26  Usually the child and the adoptive parent(s) have the same nationality. 
27  See Art. 1 of the Hague Convention on which this description is based. 
28  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 2. 
29  The CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention use the phrase “intercountry adoption”. 
30  Van Bueren, (1998), 96 citing Delupis, (1975), 27, 28. 
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“Informal adoption” is understood as the practice (usually under customary law) of a 
traditional kinship care arrangement which does not go through a formal legal process 
but nonetheless offers children a family environment. Kafalah of Islamic Law entails the 
acceptance of children without families in what is tantamount to a permanent form of 
foster care, but without the children concerned taking on the family name or enjoying 
the right to inherit from the family with which they are placed.31  
 
The phrase “full adoption” connotes a situation where the child is totally and exclusively 
integrated in the (extended) adoptive family.32 In contrast to this, “simple adoption” is:  
…one in which the parent-child relationship which existed before the adoption is not 
terminated but a new legal parent-child relationship between the child and his or her 
adoptive parents is established, and those adoptive parents have parental 
responsibility for the child.33 
It is observed that simple adoption often attracts those who cannot imagine a total 
breach between the parents of origin and the child, and this is often the case in the 
majority of African countries.34 The Hague Convention applies to simple and full 
adoptions.35 Also, related to “full adoption” and “simple adoption” are notions of “closed 
adoption” and “open adoption”. “Open adoption” implies room for informal future 
relations among all parties to the adoption while “closed adoption” does not make such 
allowance. 
                                                
31  See Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 295–296. For a detailed discussion of the practice of kafalah, 
see Assim, (2009). 
32  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 16. 
33  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 16. 
34  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 17. 
35  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 121. However, it is worth noting that the 
Hague Convention does not cover “adoptions” that “are adoptions in name only and do not lead 
to the establishment of a permanent parent-child relationship and the transfer of parental 
responsibility of the child to the adoptive parents”. Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, 
(2008), 121. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
The notions of “independent adoption” and “private adoption” are used in this study as 
understood in the Guide to Good Practice developed by the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau). Accordingly, 
“independent adoption” is: 
…used to refer to those cases where the prospective adoptive parents are approved as 
eligible and suited to adopt by their Central Authority or accredited body. They then travel 
independently to a country of origin to find a child to adopt, without the assistance of a 
Central Authority or accredited body in the State of origin.36  
“Private adoption” refers to a practice “where arrangements for adoption have been 
made directly between a biological parent in one Contracting State and prospective 
adopters in another Contracting State”.37  Under the Hague Convention, while 
independent adoptions do not constitute good practice, private adoptions are not 
compatible with the Convention.38 
 
“Matching” is the process of identifying, assessing and determining the prospective 
adoptive parents who would best meet the needs of the child.39 This is differentiated 
from “entrustment”, which is the “actual [physical] placing of the child in the care of the 
the prospective adopters” (insertion mine).40 
 
On the one hand, “sending countries” are the States from which most of the children are 
adopted, and it is used synonymously with “countries/States of origin”. On the other 
hand, “receiving countries” are those States to which a child is taken through an 
                                                
36  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 16. 
37  As above. 
38  As above. 
39  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 86. 
40  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 119. 
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intercountry adoption process (irrespective of whether the adoption is finalised in the 
country of origin or in the receiving country). 
 
1.4  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
Although it may seem ironic that a policy affecting so few children should engage so 
much political and social attention, the symbolic significance of intercountry adoption far 
outweighs its practical import. This fact is partly demonstrated by the polarised views on 
intercountry adoption that are mentioned above. 
 
The popularity of the CRC and the ACRWC suggests a high level of normative 
consensus among the various nations of the world on the idea and content of children's 
rights as human rights. However, what constitutes the best interests of the child in the 
context of intercountry adoption continues to be highly emotive and controversial.41 This 
pervades despite the fact that, arguably, the best interests of the child principle has 
been the subject of more academic analysis than any other concept included in the 
CRC.42 Sometimes, the principle might connote very polarised and contradictory 
notions.43 For instance, as Exon notes, “[s]ome may think that blood is thicker than 
water”, and hence “a biological relationship is superior in the adoption realm”.44 Yet 
                                                
41  See, for instance, Vite and Boechat, (2008), 23. 
42  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 41. However, writing in the context of the U.S., Kohm observes that 
“[t]he dearth of scholarship, however, on the foundations of this best interests standard for 
children in American family law jurisprudence does not make the judge's job any easier”. Kohm, 
(2008), 337. 
43  See, generally, Parker, (1996), 26; Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008b), 23-25.  
44   Exon, (2004), 3-4. 
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others might place “precedential value on geography, nationality, religion and culture” or 
“money and prestige”.45 
 
There is still considerable divergence of opinion about the nature of the relevant rights, 
their foundation and practical implications, their content, scope and, increasingly, the 
locus of the duties and responsibilities, that correlate with the rights. The competing 
rights and duties of biological parents, adoptive parents, children, and the state continue 
to create disharmony which ultimately can prejudice the rights of children in adoptions.46 
While it is not the objective of this study to reach conclusions regarding the “true” 
meaning of words and phrases in the substantive Articles of the CRC and the ACRWC, 
a reasonable construction of provisions is required. 
 
The list of issues that seem to defy consensus in the context of intercountry adoption is 
a long one. For instance, one area of child law where the “turf” between “cultural 
imperialism” and “cultural protectionism” looms large, is in the field of intercountry 
adoption. The answer to the question “what should be the place of the right to cultural 
identity in the intercountry adoption?” continues to elude agreement.47 On the subject of 
the right to life, it is not uncommon to regard intercountry adoption as a “life saving” 
act.48 However, can not allowing intercountry adoption in a specific case lead to the 
inference that the right to life is violated? While the specific phrase “family environment” 
                                                
45   Exon, (2004), 4. 
46  Steltzner, (2003), 152; DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
47  Martin, (2007), 174. 
48  In “Lie or let die: Could intercountry adoption make the difference?”, as the title itself intones, 
Olsen ends the article by posing the question: “Should the orphaned children of the world live, or 
should we let them die? Intercountry adoption could be the vehicle through which many children 
have the chance to live”. Olsen, (2004), 525. 
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appears in Article 20(1) of the CRC, and subsequently in the ACRWC,49 what 
constitutes a family environment for the purpose of adoptions is also not clear. Even the 
seemingly basic questions of whether there is a right to be adopted and if there is a right 
to adopt are two other issues where disagreement pervades.50 
 
In addition, the debate over intercountry adoption is dominated by views from the West, 
which constitute the majority of traditionally receiving countries. A coherent schema for 
articulating children's rights in adoptions in an African context is conspicuously missing 
from the debate. The practice continues to pose difficult legal and ethical complexities 
for the international community at large, and for African countries in particular. Apart 
from substantive law issues, there remains confusion as to the methods for successful 
implementation of such reforms to an adoption system in the African context. 
 
1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE AIMS OF THE STUDY  
 
The main question this study attempts to ask is: 
• How is it possible to promote the best interests of the African child in intercountry 
adoption? 
Within this main question are a number of sub-questions, such as: 
• Is there a particularly different African context that is relevant for intercountry 
adoption? 
                                                
49  Preamble, Arts. 2(a), 3, 23, and 25 of the ACRWC. 
50  Woodhouse, (2005), 297.Van Bueren, (1995), 94. Letsas , (2008). 
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• What are some of the legal mechanisms that could be set in place in order to 
steer the practice of intercountry adoption back onto the right path of finding 
families for children, as opposed to finding children for families in Africa? 
• Does the ACRWC offer any added standards in regulating intercountry adoption 
in Africa? 
• What are some of the measures necessary to combat illicit activities in 
intercountry adoption in an African context? 
 
By attempting to answer these research questions, the study aims to contribute towards 
the further elaboration of the use of intercountry adoption in the best interests of the 
African child. The study also aims to propose theoretical and practical (policy and 
legislative) recommendations in paving the way forward for upholding children’s best 
interests in intercountry adoption in Africa. 
 
The study will identify the systemic vulnerabilities and gaps in the current intercountry 
adoption systems found in Africa that make adoption irregularities and scandals, to a 
degree, predictable. Therefore, one of the general purposes of this study will be to 
examine and analyse the experience of other countries, and the lessons learned, so 
that “sending” African countries can use them and propose policies and legal 
interventions to uphold the best interests of the child in intercountry adoption processes. 
 
The study does not aim to achieve a full understanding of the detailed legal framework 
governing intercountry adoptions, nor to reveal the full picture pertaining to children 
deprived of their family environments in Africa. Rather, it seeks to broaden a debate and 
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discussion that is often binary and under-inclusive in that it fails to include all the voices 
that should be heard regarding the interests of African children.  
 
1.6  METHODOLOGY  
 
A number of methodologies are employed in order to answer the central questions 
posed in the study. Emphasis is placed on an analysis of a range of literature, which 
includes both primary and secondary sources pertinent to the subject of discussion. 
These include international law (both “soft” law and “hard” law) as well as national laws 
(composed of Constitutions, Acts, Bills, Regulations, Directives, case law, and so forth). 
In the former category are conventions and charters, resolutions, declarations, general 
comments, State Party reports under the various international and regional human 
rights instruments. In particular, the Concluding Observations of the CRC Committee 
are given detailed examination.51 
 
Inevitably, the study also places considerable reliance on secondary sources including 
books and academic articles. Various internet sites have been consulted for relevant 
data and information. The study also relies to a limited extent on interviews and 
observations during visits to the countries that form the basis of the study, especially in 
respect of Ethiopia and Kenya. 
 
                                                
51  For a detailed discussion of the role of concluding observations in the context of the CRC 
Committee, see Verheyde and Goederties, (2006), 29-30. An interview with Jaap Doek, (26 
August 2009 in Lisse, Amsterdam) who is the former Chairperson of the CRC Committee has 
confirmed the strong value of concluding observations in understanding the interpretation of the 
provisions of the CRC.  
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1.7  CHOICE OF JURISDICTIONS 
 
The selection of different legal systems by a researcher necessarily depends on the 
subject chosen, the aims of the research and the accessibility of the legal systems.52 
Four countries have been chosen for the purpose of this study: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi 
and South Africa (hereafter referred to as “countries in the study”). It should be 
mentioned at the outset that the countries in the study are used in supplementary 
fashion to demonstrate African countries’ experiences. The study is not intended to be a 
detailed examination of the intercountry adoption laws and practices of the countries in 
the study. As a result, the countries in the study augment the discussions.53 As 
appropriate, the experiences of a number of other countries (both African and 
otherwise) are used in the study. 
 
The choices of the countries in the study were made on the basis of a combination of 
predominantly thematic and, to a lesser extent, practical factors. These criteria are 
summarised next. First, as a common feature, all these countries experience high levels 
of HIV/AIDS and poverty, which in turn has led to a large number of children being 
deprived of their family environment.54 Secondly, after the latest submission of their 
State Party Reports to the CRC Committee, all the countries in the study have been 
identified by the CRC Committee to be in need of reforming their legal frameworks 
                                                
52  Curry-Sumner, (2005),12. On a pragmatic level, the selected countries are English speaking 
ones, and this is a factor that to a lesser extent has influenced the choice of jurisdictions.  
53  It is also important to mention that not all the countries in the study will be used for every thematic 
issue in the Chapters. For instance, because the law in Malawi does not regulate adoptability in 
any meaningful manner, the country is excluded in the discussion in Chapter 4. 
54  See Chapter 2 below discussing in detail the magnitude of the problem of HIV/AIDS and its 
subsequent deprivation of children’s family environment in the four countries under the study. 
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pertaining to intercountry adoption in the light of Article 21 of the CRC, and the Hague 
Convention.55   
 
In addition, all these countries in the study have ratified both the CRC and the ACRWC; 
this implies the legally binding nature of these instruments on all the countries. South 
Africa56 and Kenya57 have both ratified, and started implementing, the Hague 
Convention. This is not the case for Ethiopia and Malawi. Furthermore, Ethiopia and 
Malawi have not completed a consolidated children’s rights law, while South Africa and 
Kenya have completed such legislation. As a result, the choice of jurisdictions was 
decided to ensure that the countries selected were representative of both of these 
categories of countries. Although not ultimately determinative, countries have, as far as 
possible, been selected to be representative of the traditional legal systems present in 
Africa.58 
 
Ethiopia seemed an interesting jurisdiction for a number of additional reasons. First, 
with a population of close to 85 million,59 the number of children deprived of their family 
environment is relatively high. The country is currently the number one sending African 
                                                
55  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: South Africa, (February 2000), para 26; Ethiopia 
(November 2006), paras. 41-44; Kenya, (June 2007), paras. 40, 41; Malawi, (January 2009), 
paras. 45, 46. 
56   Ratified on 21 August 2003. 
57   Ratified on 12 February, 2007. 
58  Civil law (Ethiopia); a mix of statutory law, English common law, tribal law, and Islamic law 
(Kenya); a mix of Roman-Dutch law and English common law, and customary law (South Africa); 
and English common law and customary law (Malawi). 
59  CIA, “The World Factbook: Ethiopia”, (2009). 
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country to the U.S. - a country that in turn has an intake of half of the number of children 
adopted globally on an annual basis.60  
 
1.8  LEGAL FRAMEWORKS WHICH FORM THE BASIS FOR THE STUDY 
 
A very complex legal framework governs intercountry adoption.61 This includes the 
domestic laws of sending and receiving countries, and international law.62  
 
1.8.1    International law 
 
Central to this study are the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention. Before the 
adoption of the CRC, “children’s rights” were viewed as a quest for charity. The CRC, 
adopted in 1989,63 was ratified by 100 States within two years of its adoption,64 and to 
date has been ratified by 193 States.65 In the words of Doek, the former Chairperson of 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee): “No other human rights 
treaty comes that close to universal ratification” and “the CRC is at the same time the 
human rights treaty with widest coverage”.66 The CRC Committee monitors compliance 
                                                
60  U.S. Department of State “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia”, (December 2008). While Ethiopia is 
among the 15 or so countries in the world that have reported to the CRC Committee three times, 
it is lagging behind in harmonising its laws and practices (in a consolidated child law statute) in 
accordance with the CRC and the ACRWC.  
61  See, for instance, King, (2009), 452; Bartholet, (1996), 186-196 (offering a brief discussion of the 
complex legal framework governing international adoption in the U.S. and internationally). 
62   King, (2009), 452; Bartholet, (1996), 186-196. 
63   The CRC was the culmination of a decade of work and negotiations between governments and 
non-governmental organisations. 
64  Doek, (2003a), 126. 
65  Two countries, namely Somalia and the United States, remain to ratify it. Although the CRC is 
the second youngest of the seven human rights treaties, it is the most successful one. Firstly, it 
took less than ten months to enter into force. In 1990, Kenya, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe 
were amongst the first countries in Africa to ratify the CRC. Malawi ratified the instrument on 
January 2 1991. 
66   Doek, (2003b), 235. 
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with the CRC.67 The CRC Committee, amongst other functions, considers States 
Parties reports and issues Concluding Observations; holds Days of General Discussion; 
and publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions, in the form of 
General Comments on thematic issues.68 
 
It was in order to give the CRC specific application within the African context that the 
ACRWC was adopted by the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU).69 The 
adoption of the ACRWC is congruent with the UNs’ recognition of regional 
arrangements for the protection of human rights.70 The monitoring organ for the 
ACRWC is the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Committee) which has the mandate to receive individual complaints 
(communications), undertake investigate missions and consider States Parties 
                                                
67  For the mandate and composition of the CRC Committee, see Arts. 42-45 of the CRC; and, see 
generally, Verheyde and Goedertier, (2006). 
68  As above. See, too < http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm>. 
69  One of the reasons for a separate African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child was that 
during the drafting process of the CRC, Africa was underrepresented. Only Algeria, Morocco, 
Senegal and Egypt participated meaningfully in the preparatory meetings. Furthermore, specific 
provisions on aspects peculiar to Africa were not sufficiently addressed in the UN instrument. For 
a detailed discussion of the ACRWC, see Olowu, (2002); Chirwa, (2002); Viljoen, 1998); Viljoen, 
(2000); Mezmur, (2006b); Lloyd, (2002a); Lloyd, (2002b); Lloyd, (2002c); Lloyd, (2003); Lloyd, 
(2004a); Lloyd, (2004b); Lloyd, (2008); Mezmur, B. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009). For a discussion 
and comparison of the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC, see Mezmur, (2008a).  
70  At its 92nd Plenary Meeting in December 1992, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that 
“regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights may make a major 
contribution to the effective enjoyment of human rights …”.Regional arrangements for the 
promotion and protection of human rights were sanctioned by UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/47/125. The following year, in June 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights (held in 
Vienna) also reaffirmed the fundamental role that regional and sub-regional arrangements can 
play in promoting and protecting human rights and stressed that such arrangements should 
reinforce universal human rights standards as contained in international human rights 
instruments. 
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Reports.71 The ACRWC enjoys the ratification of 48 countries,72 including all the 
countries under this study.73 
 
The aim of the Hague Convention is to uphold the best interests of the child in 
intercountry adoption law and practice;74 and  it was adopted to fill the legal void that is 
present when intercountry adoption occurs by ad hoc process or sometimes even in a 
legal vacuum.75 The CRC is the foundation for the Hague Convention.76 Deciphering the 
objectives of the Hague Convention is not a difficult task. Article 1 puts up front what it is 
that the Convention seeks to achieve: to establish safeguards to ensure that the best 
interests of children will be protected in intercountry adoption; and to establish a system 
of co-operation77 so that safeguards are respected thereby preventing thereby prevent 
the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children; and to ensure recognition of intercountry 
adoptions.78 Apart from preventing illicit activities, the Hague Convention is intended to 
reduce “delays, complications and considerable costs” in intercountry adoption.79 
Worldwide acceptance of the Hague Convention has been extraordinary.80 As of 14 
                                                
71  See Arts. 42-45 of the ACRWC for the mandates of the African Committee. For a detailed 
discussion of the work of the African Committee see Lloyd, (2002b); Lloyd, (2002c); Lloyd, 
(2003); Lloyd, (2004a); Lloyd, (2004b); Lloyd, (2008); Mezmur, (2006a); Mezmur, (2007a); 
Mezmur, (2007b); Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur (2008a); Mezmur and Sloth-Nielsen (2008a); Sloth-
Nielsen and Mezmur, (2009). 
72  Available at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm>.  
73  See section 1.6 below for a discussion on these countries. 
74  It features six times in the CRC - in the Preamble, and in arts. 1, 4, 16, 21 and 24. 
75  Carlson, (1994), 244; Parra-Aranguren, (1994), 545.   
76  See, generally, Duncan, (1994) for a discussion of how the CRC informed the Hague Convention. 
77  See, Duncan, (1996) for a discussion of how States of origin and receiving States cooperate to 
resolve problems of conflict.  
78  Art. 1 of the Hague Convention. 
79  Duncan, (2000), 47. 
80  See, generally, Duncan, (2000). 
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October 2009, 81 countries (including Kenya and South Africa) have become 
Contracting States to the Hague Convention.81  
 
Other international documents that are relevant for this study include the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography (OPSC)82; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol)83; 
and the 1986 UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection 
and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption 
Nationally and Internationally (1986 UN Declaration).84 
 
1.8.2    Domestic law 
 
A variety of domestic legislation and case law is also relied upon in this study. Law and 
practice from countries around the world (and where relevant and accessible, from 
Africa) are used. In particular, pieces of legislation (understood in its wider sense 
including regulations and guidelines) and case law from the countries in the study are 
highlighted.  
 
In Ethiopia, while the 1960 Civil Code initially regulated adoption, its provisions on the 
practice have been repealed and replaced by the Revised Family Code of 2000 
                                                
81  Available at <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69>. 
82  Adopted on 25 May 2000 and entered into force on 18 January 2002. 
83  Adopted in 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 25 December 2003. 
84  Adopted on 3 December 1986. Other international documents include the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966); the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR)(1981);  
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(RFC).85 Until 2008, the monitoring of intercountry adoption fell under the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) by using the MOLSA Intercountry Adoption 
Guidelines (former MOLSA Guidelines). However, intercountry adoption currently falls 
under the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) and the practice is governed by the 
MOWA Intercountry Adoption Guidelines (MOWA Guidelines) of 2008.86 
 
In Kenya, the Children Act No. 8 of 2001 (Children Act)87 sets out the legislative 
framework for children’s rights in general, and incorporates provisions on intercountry 
adoption. The Children Act is supplemented by the Children (Adoption) Regulations of 
2005.88 The Department of Children’s Services (DCS)89 is the Government agency 
mandated to provide services for the rights and welfare of children as stipulated in the 
Children Act. 
 
Malawi’s appearance on the international plane as a country of origin for intercountry 
adoption is fairly recent. In October 2006, Malawi’s High Court granted Madonna and 
her filmmaker (ex) husband Guy Ritchie an interim order allowing them to take custody 
of a boy identified as infant DB, who lived in an orphanage. On 28 May 2008, through a 
                                                
85  Proclamation No. 213/2000. The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1996) 
and the Revised Penal Code (2004) (Proclamation No. 414/2004) are also used in this study. 
86  Unfortunately this study does not deal with any case law from Ethiopia. This is mainly because a 
consideration of about 350 court cases in the last two years by this writer do not illuminate any 
issues (none of these cases are contested) as the First Instance Court often approves the 
adoption contract upon receiving MOWA’s opinion. 
87  The Children Act came into force on 4th January 2002. 
88  Adopted on 20 May 2005 as Legal Notice No. 43 and Legislative Supplement No. 21. 
89  Formerly in the Office of the Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs, it is currently operating 
under the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. 
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judgment of Malawi’s High Court (Infant DB case)90 an adoption order was granted to 
permit Madonna and her (ex) husband to adopt the child permanently.91  
 
In 2009 Madonna returned to Malawi in a bid to adopt another Malawian child (Infant CJ 
Case).92 The Infant CJ case was precipitated by the launch in the High Court of 
Blantyre93 of an application for an adoption order in respect of a girl child who was living 
in an orphanage. The High Court placed emphasis on two provisions of the the 
Adoption of Children Act (the Adoption Act)94 - Section 3(5), which provides that “[a]n 
adoption order shall not be made in favor of any applicant who is not resident in 
Malawi”;95 and Section 4(b), which provides that “[t]he court before making an adoption 
order shall be satisfied… that the order if made will be for the welfare of the infant....”.96  
 
In the result, the High Court rejected Madonna’s petition to adopt the child in April 2009 
(High Court Infant CJ case) as she was not considered to be a resident of Malawi and 
the adoption was found to be not in the best interests of Infant CJ.97 Madonna appealed 
this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA). The SCA handed down a 20 page 
long judgment in June 2009 which upheld the appeal and allowed Madonna to adopt 
                                                
90  Adoption Cause No. 2 of 2006 In the Matter of the Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 26:01) and In 
the Matter of David Banda (A Male Infant) (hereinafter “Infant DB case”) 
91  For a detailed discussion of this case, see Mezmur, (2008b); Mezmur, (2009a). 
92  For a discussion of this case, see Mezmur, (forthcoming, 2010). 
93  Blantyre is the commercial capital of Malawi. The capital city is Lilongwe. 
94  CAP.26:01 of 1968. 
95  Sec. 3(5) of the Adoption Act. 
96  Sec. 4(b) of the Adoption Act. 
97  Adoption Cause No. 1 of 2009 In the Matter of the Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 26:01) and In 
the Matter of CJ (A Female Infant) (unreported) (hereinafter “High Court infant CJ case”). 
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(SCA Infant CJ case).98 These cases received extensive media attention and have 
attracted the attention of the public at large inside and outside of Malawi. 
 
In Malawi, the Child Care, (Protection) and Justice Bill of 2005 (“the Malawi Child Bill”), 
once promulgated, will regulate intercountry adoption.99 In 2009, a Discussion Paper100 
and an Issues Paper101 on adoption has been developed by the Special Law Reform 
Commission of Malawi. The Government organ which is currently playing the role of a 
Central Authority in Malawi is the Ministry of Women and Child Development 
(Department of Social Welfare). 
 
In South Africa, intercountry adoption was not allowed until 2000.  In 2000, the fact that 
Section 18(4)(f) of the Child Care Act102 absolutely proscribed the adoption of a child 
born of a South African citizen by a non-citizen103 was challenged by a British couple 
who wanted to adopt a child found abandoned (Fitzpatrick case).104 After a thorough 
examination, the Court found that Section 18(4)(f) was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with Section 28 of the South African Constitution which enumerates the rights 
                                                
98  Adoption Cause No. 1 of 2009 In the matter of Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 26:01 and in the 
matter of Chifundo James (a Female Infant) (unreported) (MSCA Adoption Appeal No. 28 of 
2009) (hereinafter “SCA Infant CJ case”). 
99  Of note in the Malawi Child Bill is a provision requiring the applicants or one of them, if not a 
relative of the child, to have fostered the child in Malawi for a period of one year. Sec. 3A(2)(d) of 
the Malawi Child Bill. Furthermore, the Malawi Child Bill then goes on to require that “the 
receiving country is a signatory to and has implemented the [Hague] Convention on protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption” (insertion mine). This is so 
despite the fact that Malawi itself is not yet a Contracting State to the Hague Convention nor is 
there, as far as can be ascertained, any process of ratification underway. 
100  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009). 
101  Malawi Special Law Commission, Issues Paper, (2009). 
102  Act 74 of 1983. 
103  Or by a person who has the necessary residential qualifications for the granting of South African 
citizenship but has not applied for a certificate of naturalization 
104  Fitzpatrick v Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions 2000 (3) SA 139 (C) (Fitzpatrick High Court 
case). Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC) 
(Fitzpatrick Constitutional Court case). 
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of the child.105 The Constitutional Court confirmed a finding of unconstitutionality 
pertaining to Section 18(4)(f) of the Child Care Act,106 and reasoned that  an absolute 
prohibition on adoptions by non-citizens was contrary to the best interests of the child 
since it deprived the court of the flexibility needed when assessing what is in the best 
interests of each child.107 The Constitutional Court struck down those provisions of the 
Child Care Act that permitted an adoption to be effected only by South African citizens, 
thereby opening the door to intercountry adoptions taking place in respect of South 
African children for the first time. 
 
Another interesting case,108 was started by the launch in the Johannesburg High Court 
of an application for an order granting American applicants guardianship over a minor 
baby girl (Baby R) of South African birth, who had been abandoned and was in foster 
care.109 Further, it was common cause that, once armed with a guardianship order,110 
the applicants were intending to depart the country, and to pursue an adoption order in 
the relevant domestic forum in the U.S.. 
 
                                                
105  The Court focused its inquiry on the child’s best interests and found that Section 18(4)(f) was too 
limiting in that it categorically prohibited adoption of a South African citizen by a noncitizen 
without considering the best interests of the child.  Fitzpatrick Constitutional Court case Para. 16 
of Judgment). 
106  According to the Court, the facts of the case clearly illustrated that the best interests of a child 
born to South African parents may well lie in such child being adopted by non-South African 
adoptive parents. Fitzpatrick Constitutional Court case para. 19. 
107  Fitzpatrick Constitutional Court case para. 16.  
108  For a commentary on the SCA judgment of this case, see Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007b).  
109  The “respondents” were opponents in name only: they were the child’s existing foster parents, 
and they did not oppose the proposed order. They had become friends of the prospective 
adoptive parents, who had formed a relationship with the child while visiting her in their care. 
110  Without which they would have had great difficulty proceeding beyond the borders of South Africa 
with an unrelated infant. 
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The initial judge became concerned about the lack of effective opposition in the case, 
and invited the intervention of an amicus, the Centre for Child Law (CCL), a public 
interest litigation unit based at the University of Pretoria. The arguments of the amicus 
won the day in the High Court and, subsequently in the SCA,111 the appellants were 
also unsuccessful in their pursuit of an order granting them guardianship of the child. 
The majority in the SCA judgment held that while the eligibility and suitability of the 
applicants as prospective adoptive parents was not in dispute, the application for an 
order declaring them to be the guardians of the child constituted the incorrect 
procedure; questioned the manner in which the principle of subsidiarity was being 
complied with; and indicated that the appropriate avenue would have been to seek an 
adoption order in the Children’s Court.112 
 
Appealing to the Constitutional Court, the applicants sought an order setting aside and 
replacing the order of the SCA with an order awarding sole custody and sole 
guardianship of Baby R to the applicants.113 After the hearing commenced in the 
Constitutional Court, an agreement was reached to direct the Children’s Court to hear 
on an expedited basis the application for adoption of Baby R by the applicants, to which 
the Department of Social Development and the amicus curiae recorded that they would 
express no opposition to such adoption.114 The Court made the agreement an order of 
                                                
111  De Gree v Webb (Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria, Amicus Curiae) 2006 (6) SA 51 
(W) (hereafter “De Gree High Court case); De Gree v Webb (Centre for Child Law, University of 
Pretoria, Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 184 (SCA) (hereafter “De Gree SCA case”). These cases 
will be referred to as "the De Gree case" when used jointly. 
112  See, De Gree SCA case, para. 27. 
113  AD v DW (Department of Social Development Intervening; Centre for Child Law, Amicus Curiae) 
2008 (3) SA 183 (CC) (“the AD v DW case"), para. 12. 
114  AD v DW case, para. 17. 
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court by consent.115 Subsequently the adoption was granted by the Children’s Court. 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court went on to interrogate the principle of 
subsidiarity116 and the best interests of Baby R.117 The Court held that: 
Although the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the application for sole custody and 
sole guardianship had not been ousted as a matter of law, this [the AD v DW case] was 
not one of those very exceptional cases where by-passing the Children’s Court procedure 
could have been justified (insertion mine).118  
It also indicated that “the subsidiarity principle itself must be seen as subsidiary to the 
paramountcy principle”.119 
 
As far as legislation is concerned, drafted during apartheid, the Child Care Act120 gave 
little or no recognition of international children’s rights.121 As a result of this, the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (the Children’s Act), parts of which are already operational, 
will eventually replace the Child Care Act. The chapters on adoption and intercountry 
adoption are yet to come into force.122 Since the future application of the chapters of the 
Children’s Act on adoption and intercountry adoption is certain,123 this study mainly 
focuses on these provisions. The Children’s Act is supplemented by the Children’s 
                                                
115  As above. 
116  AD v DW case, para. 49, 54-55. 
117  AD v DW case, para. 38. 
118  AD v DW case, para. 34. 
119  AD v DW case, para. 55. 
120  Act 74 of 1983. 
121  Skelton and Proudlock, (2007), 1-11. 
122  Until it does, the Child Care Act will regulate adoption in South Africa. It was observed in AD v 
DW case that “Section 315 of the Children’s Act provides for a progressive implementation of the 
Act, with different provisions of the Act coming into force on a date indicated by the President by 
proclamation in the Government Gazette. By Proclamation 13 in Government Gazette 30030 on 
29 June 2007 the President established 1 July 2007 as the date on which sections 1-11, 13-21, 
27, 30, 31, 35-40, 130-134, 305(1)(b), 305(1)(c), 305(3)-(7), 307-311, 313-315, and the second, 
third, fifth, seventh and ninth items of Schedule 4 to the Act become operative. The remainder of 
the Act, including the parts relevant to adoption and sole custody and sole guardianship orders, 
has not yet entered into operation” AD v DW para. 53 footnote 57.  
123  See, for instance, Couzens, (2009), 54, who airs the same view. 
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Amendment Act of 2007124 and the Draft Consolidated Regulations pertaining to the 
Children’s Act.125 
 
1.9  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study has limitations. In the interest of brevity, time and more importantly space, 
the study covers only four African countries. It is not assumed that the four countries in 
the study do justice to the diversity of the African experience when it comes to 
alternative care in general, and intercountry adoption in particular. Despite this 
limitation, it is safe to assert that the main issues pertaining to intercountry adoption in 
Africa are predominantly similar, and the discussions in the context of the four countries 
under the study are generally applicable to other sending African countries. 
 
Every possible attempt is made to ensure that substantial uniformity exists in the 
discussions of the country case studies. However, there is a dominance of information 
from particular countries in the study, in particular, from South Africa.126 This imbalance 
is ascribed to a number of factors. While the location and research reach of the writer 
has been as balanced as possible, there are some disparities created as a result of 
factors such as the availability of more resource materials in relation to some countries 
than was available for others. In addition, information on Malawi is relatively limited. 
This is mainly because while the other three countries have undertaken their law reform 
                                                
124  Act No 41 of 2007. 
125  Consolidated Draft Regulations Pertaining to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
126  This state of affairs can be explained; for instance, the debates on South African legal system 
and its accompanying judicial decisions pertaining to intercountry adoption are well documented 
and more articulate than that of other countries. 
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pertaining to adoptions in general, Malawi has not. Furthermore, the history of Malawi 
as a sending country is perhaps only as old as Madonna’s first arrival in the country to 
adopt (2006). 
 
Finally, this study is not a comparative study as understood in its strict sense where the 
three (in some respects, five)127 successive stages of description, comparison and 
explanation128 are employed.129 While at some stages, comparisons are made in such a 
way as to reflect what the jurisdictions may learn from each other, the aim is to assess 
the domestic laws, policies, and practices of the countries in the study against the 
backdrop of the international legal framework. All these limitations must be taken into 
account when using the outcomes of the study.  
 
1.10  OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS OF THE STUDY 
 
Chapter 1 describes the background to the study, the research questions, the statement 
of the problem, the aims of the study, the limitations of the study, choice of jurisdictions, 
and so forth. 
 
Chapter 2 will provide a detailed discussion of the “African context” that is relevant for 
intercountry adoption. This Chapter, apart from providing the relevant historical 
background, it also includes social, cultural and economic realities that are deemed to 
have a bearing upon intercountry adoption. The legal context that should inform 
                                                
127  Orucu, (2007), 37-40. 
128  Kokkini-Iatridou, (1988), 187-190. 
129  For a discussion of what comparative family law entails see, generally, Boele-Woelki, (2009), 3-
36. 
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intercountry adoption on the African context will also interrogated in detail. The 
conclusion sums up the relevance of these contexts in relation to intercountry adoption 
in Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 highlights the international legal framework relevant to intercountry adoption. 
The instruments that are the central focus of the Chapter are: the CRC, the ACRWC, 
and the Hague Convention. Throughout this chapter, an attempt is made to look at the 
content of the right in question, its scope, as well as the nature of the corresponding 
State Party obligations. Such discussions anchor the right in question in intercountry 
adoption. Other instruments are also mentioned where relevant. Furthermore, the 
jurisprudence of the CRC Committee is relied upon in order to better understand the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the CRC. 
 
Chapter 4 considers adoptability. In this Chapter an attempt is made to answer the 
question: “who is adoptable?”.  A detailed examination of the concept of adoptability that 
serves the best interests of the African child will be undertaken. After a brief overview of 
the concept of adoptability, the main reasons why a proper determination of adoptability 
is very important are investigated. This will be followed by an examination of the 
relevant international legal frameworks pertaining to adoptability. Subsequently, 
different themes such as termination of parental rights including through a decision of a 
competent authority, abandonment, and relinquishment; Orphanhood and poverty as 
grounds for adoptability; as well as the adoptability of refugee children, special 
needs/hard-to-place children, and children who have a Muslim background form some 
of the issues for examination.  
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Chapter 5 investigates the principle of subsidiarity - which in general requires that 
intercountry adoption should be a measure of last resort. As subsidiarity is a central 
principle in intercountry adoption, some of its implications are scrutinised. Some of the 
issues discussed in this Chapter include: what is meant by “last resort”; the hierarchy 
and ranking of various alternative care options; and, in particular, the place of 
institutional care for children in the general scheme of alternative care. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the legislative and institutional responses necessary to prevent 
and address illicit activities related to intercountry adoption in Africa. Central to this 
Chapter will be the argument that for intercountry adoption to be conducted in 
compliance with the best interests of the child, it is important to prevent and address 
illicit activities that are associated with it. The absence, or incompetency, of institutional 
structures necessary to prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry adoption 
might result in the best interests of the children involved in intercountry adoption being 
compromised. The Chapter will scrutinise the role of these institutions in countering 
illegal activities, such as child selling and buying, trafficking, and improper financial 
gains, in the context of intercountry adoption. 
 
The final Chapter (Chapter 7) will highlight the main conclusions that can be distilled 
from the various themes examined in the study. A number of recommendations will be 
made with regard to African countries, regional and international bodies, such as, the 
African Committee and the CRC Committee, as well as the international community at 
large. 
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      CHAPTER 2 
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE IMPORTANT AFRICAN CONTEXTS IN INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION? 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Some of the main questions that might spring to mind from reading the title of this study 
are: “What is an African context in connection with intercountry adoption?” and “Does 
this African context have any peculiar bearing on intercountry adoption?”. These and 
related questions, however formulated, could be answered from different perspectives 
with varying depth. They involve not only legal issues but also a range of social, 
political, economic, cultural, religious, anthropological, and other factors.  
  
Therefore, the main thrust of this chapter is to appraise the underlying historical, social 
and cultural, religious, economic and legal contexts on the African continent in relation 
to child care, adoption and other related matters. Put differently, this chapter sets the 
platform for an informed appraisal of intercountry adoption as viewed through an African 
lens.  
 
Reinforcing the motivation behind this Chapter, it is argued that context matters. In 
“Child care in context”1 the authors demonstrate aptly that economic, political and 
cultural forces drive the provision of child care. In order for this study to add value to 
studies which already exist on intercountry adoption, there is a specific need to address 
context. Therefore, the need to prepare a Chapter on an African context emanated from 
the basic premise that a sound and effective alternative care option, including 
                                                 
1  Lamb et al. (1992). Most professionals who work internationally and across cultures appreciate 
the fundamental importance of culture and context. 
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intercountry adoption, must be grounded firmly in an African context, taking African 
realities into account.2  
 
It becomes all the more important to investigate the African context with regard to 
intercountry adoption in order to capture the bigger picture of the arguments for and 
against the practice. If one does not appreciate the number of factors that inform child 
care (including alternative care) and social services in Africa, it may be more 
challenging to understand the basis of some of the arguments of proponents and 
detractors of intercountry adoption in Africa. 
 
For ease of exposition, an in-depth analysis of the majority of the factors that have 
direct and indirect bearing on children’s rights in the context of Africa is not embarked 
upon. A prioritisation of issues is undertaken on the basis of relevance: the history of the 
continent (including slavery and colonialism); some of the relevant cultures and values 
(for instance, the role of the extended family and kinship care); social realities (the 
challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic); both the financial and human resource 
challenges faced by African governments; and some of the legal realities on the African 
continent are examined. Some of the issues discussed below are challenges the Africa 
continent at large is facing, and addressing these challenges could reduce the number 
of children who are deprived of their family environment. 
 
                                                 
2  In part this Chapter has the nature of a report that is often referred to as a “situation analysis”. It is 
an exposition of the reality, and presents such reality as it is. For instance, in the sections dealing 
with the value of children in African societies, culture, HIV/AIDS and so forth, there is a reiteration 
of previous studies and facts and very little room for analysis except to synthesise and draw 
together previous studies and facts. 
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This Chapter is divided into six sections: historical context; social and cultural context; 
religious context; economic context; and legal context. This division is not a watertight 
one and some overlap is necessary. The conclusion sums up the relevance of these 
contexts in relation to intercountry adoption in Africa. 
 
2.2  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
2.2.1    Slavery, colonialism and imperialism: General 
 
Present day Africa is partly forged from a shared history among countries on the 
continent – a history which includes slavery, followed by colonialism.3 Events that 
happened in the past, such as slavery and colonialism, continue to have an impact 
(both positive and negative), and their investigation provides insight into the realities, 
and attitudes of contemporary Africa.4  
 
In relative terms Africa’s colonial relationship with Europe lasted a short period.5 
However, colonialism has exerted enormous influence on Africa’s post-colonial 
economic, social, cultural, legal and political performance. In a number of respects the 
underdevelopment of the continent is attributed to its past - namely, slavery and 
colonialism.6 
 
                                                 
3  This includes institutionalised discrimination. See Geiss, (1974), 7-8. 
4  See generally, Gann and Duignan (eds.), (1969). For discussions of the impact of the slave trade 
on women and their children, and of the profound economic, political, and social impact of 
colonialism on Africa as a whole, see Boahen, (1985). 
5  Mostly from the 1880s to the 1960s. 
6  In his book Economics and world history, economic historian Bairoch indicates that “there is no 
doubt that a large number of structural features of the process of economic underdevelopment 
have historical roots going back to European colonization”. Bairoch, (1993), 88; See, too, 
Graziella and Canova, (2002), 1851-1871 for a similar view. 
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Spitzer reminds us that “[f]or many Africans... slavery remains an unhealed wound that 
is frequently, if not constantly, reopened by feelings of continued oppression, 
manipulation, and discrimination”.7 Even the debate whether Europe should pay 
reparations for the slavery and colonialism in Africa looms large today in some 
quarters.8  
 
It has been asserted that the implementation of colonialism was meant to create a 
powerless, helpless and destitute people.9 As a result of colonialism, it is argued, 
“...African cultural values suffered and continue to suffer as the colonising powers 
forced Africans to abandon their religious beliefs, governmental systems, and a host of 
other traditional ways of doing things”.10 Some writers believe that not only has 
colonialism had economic, legal and political ramifications, but that it also had 
psychological impacts which bent the minds of the colonised “to make them the 
servants of their own exploitation”.11  
 
The psychological impact of colonialism on its own has defined the kind of reaction a 
significant number of people on the continent have towards the West in general, and 
Western culture, values and goals in particular. Slavery compounded with colonialism 
                                                 
7  Spitzer, (2002), 1313. 
8  For the issue of reparations for the negative effects of slavery and colonialism see Harring, 
(2002), 393; Camponovo, (2003), 659; Lantos, (2002), 31; Maisel, (2002), 739; Morris, (2003), 
49; Feagin, (2004), 49; McDougall, (2002), 135; Brophy, (2003), 497; Alves, (2003), 971. 
9  For some of the reasons that colonisers used as a justification for colonisation, see Matua, 
(1995), 1113, 1126-27, 1130, 1137-1142; see, too, Wilson, (1977), 116 (where it is argued that  in 
the late nineteenth century Europe's imperialism was locked in a symbiotic relationship with its 
intense nationalism). 
10  Pwiti and Ndoro, (1999), 143-153. 
11  See, for instance, Gladwin and Saidin, (1980), 1.  
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has created a mindset of suspicion in present day Africans towards the West.12 In 
addition, the majority of present day Africa does not sympathise with, or relate to, the 
culture and thinking of the west.13  
 
It is true that in Africa social, economic, and legal ties have become intertwined between 
former colonisers and former colonies. As a result the term “neo-colonialism” has been 
coined describing the continuing presence of influence, and sometimes control, which is 
exercised by former colonial powers over former colonies.14 However, it needs to be 
noted that such control is exercised from a distance15 and that it is less overt.16  
 
The psychological impact aside, the effect of colonialism on the laws and legal 
institutions of Africa is also very significant. In describing this situation Merry writes that: 
[c]olonialism typically involved the large-scale transfer of laws and legal institutions from 
one society to another, each of which had its own distinct sociocultural organization and 
legal culture. The result was a dual legal system: one for the colonized peoples and one 
for the colonizers. ... Postcolonial countries are now grappling with this legacy as they 
                                                 
12  For instance, in the context of religion, Adjei argues that “[t]he establishment of Christian missions 
in Africa has been an act of spiritual aggression; they operated on the principle that everything 
African and indigenous is contrary, while everything European and foreign is acceptable, to the 
will of God. The glaring contradiction between the religious theory and the economic and political 
practices of Christians has made Africans distrust the Christian church, and it is losing ground 
through its own fault”. Adjei, (1944), 189-198. Current events can also testify to these facts. For 
instance, the so called “Brown-Mugabe” standoff is one. There is a feeling among many Africans 
that Zimbabwe is a victim of an imperialist conspiracy and the treatment meted out to Zimbabwe 
is then seen in the larger context of the north-south dialogue, a rich-poor relationship, and, finally, 
the lack of accountability and responsibility for the colonial injury inflicted on colonial subjects for 
the benefit of the colonial powers. 
13  Even the so-called “new generation”, which is charged with assimilating to western culture does 
not form any significant portion of the African population. 
14  According to Nkrumah “Neo- Colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who 
practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means 
exploitation without redress". Nkrumah, (1965), XI. For a discussion of the relationship between 
former colonial powers and former colonies, see generally Donovan, (2002-2003), 3. 
15  Nkrumah, (1965), XI. 
16          As above.  
 
 
 
 
 35
debate how to fashion a unified legal system out of this duality and how to resurrect and 
implement the remnants of indigenous, precolonial law.17 
By implication the institutional and legal frameworks that inform post-colonial Africa are 
often a direct inheritance from Europe. This legal context is discussed in section 2.6 
below.  
 
2.2.2    Slavery, colonialism and imperialism: Intercountry adoption 
 
Transposing the suspicious mindset of many Africans outlined above to the context of 
intercountry adoption, it could be contended that some of the arguments advanced by 
detractors of intercountry adoption, labelling it as “imperialism”18 and “neo-colonialism”, 
are not completely baseless.19 
 
Current practice shows that a number of African countries of origin tend to send their 
adopted children predominantly to countries that were their respective former 
colonisers. For instance, a significant number of adoptions from French speaking Africa 
go to France.20 In addition, there is evidence that adoptions from Guinea-Bissau are 
                                                 
17  Merry, (1991), 889 and 890. 
18  Landes describes imperialism as an imbalance of power between two social groups which the 
stronger one tries to exploit to the detriment of the weaker. See Landes, (1961), 510-511. 
19  These arguments include those that view intercountry adoption as being a form of modern day 
imperialism as well as constituting the deprivation of a cultural heritage. Critics who deplore the 
practice of intercountry adoption as “modern-day imperialism, allowing dominant, developed 
cultures to strip away a developing country's most precious resources, its children”19 are in 
abundance. Referring to Buti, Martin further observes that: 
   [t]he intercountry adoption debate is suffused with the concept of culture, on 
both an individual and a societal level. Individually, critics of intercountry 
adoption believe that the loss of a child’s cultural heritage (which inevitably 
occurs during intercountry adoption) leads to the loss of the child’s identity. 
Martin, (2007), 203 citing Buti, (2006), 6. 
20  See, for instance, CRC Committee, State Party Report: Burkina Faso, (February 2002), para. 
212. 
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frequently destined to Spain.21 This fact, if not addressed sensitively, could be risky, as 
there is a high probability of it being labelled as “a new form of colonialism” or 
“imperialism”. 
 
A recent example of this sentiment occurred in Chad. On 25 October 2007 police 
arrested nine French citizens in eastern Chad, near the Sudanese border, as they 
prepared to fly 103 African children to France (the “Zoe’s Ark case”). Seven Spaniards, 
who formed the crew of the chartered plane, were also detained.22 Immediately after the 
arrests were made Chadians chanting "no to the slave trade, no to child trafficking" 
protested against the French group.23 These remarks made during the protest lend 
support to the existence of the sentiment that slavery and colonialism (and imperialism) 
continue to inform opinions about intercountry adoption. It also indicates the delicate 
nature of the practice, especially when undertaken between former colonisers and their 
former colonies.  
 
Reviewing the continent’s historical background, particularly slavery and colonialism, it 
is proposed that any intervention (legal, social and policy) with regard to intercountry 
adoption would be incomplete if these attendant circumstances and some of their 
present day ramifications are not taken into account. 
 
 
                                                 
21  At least until early 2008, when the Government of Spain decided to suspend adoptions from 
Guinea-Bissau as a result of reports of illegal and irregular adoptions from that country. See 
Adoptantis, (March 2008). See too ISS, Monthly Review, (February 2008), 2 and 3. 
22  Reportedly a number of parents were waiting in an airport in France in the hope of getting a child 
to adopt. See Reuters (31 March 2008); See, too, Mail and Guardian Online (31 October 2007). 
23  See Reuters, (31 March 2008). 
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2.3  CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
The potency of culture in political, legal, and social discourse in Africa is enormous. 
Africa is a continent so rich and diverse in its culture; it not only changes from one 
country to another, but within an individual country many different cultures can be 
found.24 Across the continent, traditional practices and modern structures are strongly 
combined and intertwined in the African social and legal systems.  
 
The importance of taking into account the local culture and social context in drafting 
laws that regulate adoption has been commented upon. In the context of Brazil, for 
instance, evidence has been furnished by Fonseca that even though Brazilian laws are 
often touted as being at the forefront of progressive international legislation, these same 
laws pay very little heed to local values, culture and social dynamics.25 This fact has led 
to a scenario in which: 
...foreign adopters conform more closely to Brazilian legal directives than do national 
candidates, since the laws, rather than being based on and adapted to an accurate 
assessment of local reality, derive from the abstract principles that dominate 
international debates.26 
There are a number of cultural practices that have direct implications for the care, and 
alternative care of children on the African continent. Those with greater relevance and 
ramifications (be they positive or negative) for this study are highlighted below.  
 
                                                 
24  Certainly, these "traditional" practices are not without their complications, and they could invite 
State assistance and/or supervision. No attempt is made herein to construct “culture” as an 
undifferentiated and homogenised across the African continent. It is not, and different societies 
might subscribe to either similar or different cultures depending on the specific culture/cultures in 
question. 
25  Fonseca, (2002), 397. 
26  Fonseca, (2002), 398. 
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2.3.1    The value of children in African societies 
 
Some of the main reasons why African couples are encouraged to have as many 
children as possible, and the subsequent ramifications thereof, include:  
1) to perpetuate lineage lines and assume family positions and titles;  
2) to provide assistance in times of illness and old age;  
3) to distribute the future burden of family obligations and responsibilities between a 
large number of siblings; and  
4) to provide many daughters who would bring bridewealth to the family and enable the 
male members of the family to arrange advantageous marriages.27 
 
In their appraisal of child care in traditional East Africa, Harkness and Super have 
observed how the perception that children (like cows and wives) are a form of wealth, 
prevails.28 This is one of the reasons why, where a successful birth occurs, it is indeed a 
time for celebration by the family and the community. In contrast, this scenario 
underpins the main reason why childlessness continues to be regarded in many 
quarters as one of the greatest of all personal tragedies.29 For instance, Makec 
contends that “a marriage which is childless in Dinka society lacks a ‘sound 
foundation’”.30 In addition, because they are regarded as a treasure, children are “to be 
guarded against the consequences of the ‘evil eye’ of jealous neighbours or 
                                                 
27  See, generally, Asirifi, (1977), 114-118.  
28  Harkness and Super, (1992), 444. Furthermore, the woman who produces and brings to maturity 
many children acquires a social seniority in the community that is not available to women less 
fortunate in relation to fertility and child survival. 
29  A similar observation has been made by Fortes, (1950), 262. 
30  Makec, (1986), 50 as cited in Rwezaura, (1994), 88. 
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strangers”.31 The view that children are a gift from God resonates very strongly among 
Africans.  
 
Apart from the symbolic and emotional factors that elevate the status enjoyed by 
children in African communities, there is also the functional element – namely, that 
children usually assist their parents (and sometimes their communities) with their 
occupational and household chores.32 Article 31 of the ACRWC mirrors this fact in its 
entrenchment of the duties of the African child,33 a provision that is domesticated in a 
number of African countries.34 
 
The proposition that “[c]hildren may be central players in the demolition of the traditional 
family, but they are also the greatest hope for revitalization and reconstitution of the 
family”35 holds very true in African societies. This stance is evident in a number of 
practices and cultures on the continent.36 
 
                                                 
31  Harkness and Super, (1992), 446. It is also interesting to note that sometimes the name given to 
a child is intended to protect the child from evil and harm. In Burkina Faso, for instance, a name 
chosen for a child is believed to protect the child from evil forces. See Belembaogo, (1994), 208. 
32  See Belembaogo, (1994), 212. 
33  For a discussion of the responsibilities of the African child under Art. 31 of the ACRWC, see 
Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008c). 
34  See, for instance, Art. 17 of the South African Children’s Act and Art. 29(5) of the Constitution of 
Swaziland (2005) which expressly provides that “children have the duty to respect their parents at 
all times and to maintain those parents in case of need”. 
35  Woodhouse, (1993), 511. 
36  To mention but one: the presence or lack of a child or children in a marriage has its own 
implications for the stability of marriage in a number of African communities. Amongst the Dinka 
of Sudan, for instance, Makec observes that “the offspring of the union stand in the middle of the 
two families. They hold both sides of the marriage ... together”. Makec (1986) 50 as cited in 
Rwezaura, (1994), 88. This is an opinion aired in the context of various countries and 
communities, such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. See, generally, Ruel, (1982), 54; 
Welch and Sachs, (1987), 374. Among the Maasai, there is a specific prayer “ENKAI Aomon 
Entomono” (Lord, I pray for maternity) that signifies the status children bring to their mother. See 
Tarayia, (2004), 193. 
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Even those practices that are classified as “harmful cultural practices” are often, if not 
always, undertaken in good faith with the intention of promoting the welfare of the child. 
A good example is female genital cutting (also known as female genital mutilation or 
“FGM”).37 Research has found that one of the reasons why parents allow the 
performance of FGM on their children is to give the child a better chance of getting 
married in the future.38 
 
With this as background, the need for alternative care legislation and policy to take this 
context into account is patent. The predominant attitude towards the value of children 
partly explains why abortion is not a practice accepted by custom, and the success of 
family planning interventions (for instance, use of contraceptives) on the continent 
remain slow. It addition, when parents are involved in child selling and other similar 
activities, it is often a manifestation of extreme poverty – which could be reduced by 
supporting parents with the necessary resources to raise their children.   The view that 
highly values children should also dictate, amongst others, when adoption is to happen, 
what form adoption should take (for instance open or closed/ simple or full), and the 
hierarchy of alternative care options to be prioritised. 
 
2.3.2   The extended family (kinship care) and the African child 
 
                                                 
37  A definition of female genital cutting adopted by the WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA indicates that the 
practice involves the “…partial or total removal of the external genitalia or other injury to the 
female genital organ…”. See WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA, (1997), 3.  
38  Wheeler, (2004), 258 citing a wide range of works such as Dorkenoo, (1994), 34. See, too, 
Belembaogo, (1994), 212-213 (arguing that “[o]nly a girl who has been excised can marry a man 
and maintain sexual relations with him”).  
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A proper understanding of the extended family is of relevance to a wide array of policy 
concerns.39 For instance, in the context of economic development policies as well as 
effective healthcare delivery, Pilisuk and Froland share this view.40 The same is true, for 
instance, in the area of the assimilation of immigrants.41 
 
Before entering into any discussion, however, two questions that require an initial 
response are: What is meant by an “extended family”? and What is “kinship care”?.  
 
The notion “extended family” suggests “[a] family group that consists of parents, 
children, and other close relatives, often living in close proximity”.42 As an alternate 
definition, the same dictionary provides that an “extended family” is “[a] group of 
relatives, such as those of three generations, who live in close geographic proximity 
rather than under the same roof”.43  
 
These two definitions are very restrictive, since they prescribe very specific 
requirements, viz. of being a “close relative”, living in “close geographic proximity”, and 
being part of “three generations”, which do not necessarily relate well to the 
understanding of the notion in Africa. This is because, as will be demonstrated below, 
the notion of the extended family in Africa covers more groups of people than those 
which the above definitions offer. 
                                                 
39  This augurs well with the fact that the issue of the extended family is not the preserve of any 
particular field but a concern of a continuum of specialisations, including anthropology, 
demography, and social work. A list of literature covering these fields include Castillo, et al. 
(1968), 1-40; Chen, (1985), 193-202; Goldstein and Warren, (2000), 382-404; Gunda, (1982), 40-
51; and Halpern, and Anderson, (1970), 83-97. 
40  See Pilisuk and Froland, (1978), 273-280.  
41  See, for instance, Glick, (2000), 179-198; Benson, (1990), 9-29. 
42  Available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/extended+family>. 
43  As above. 
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After reminding us that there is no agreement on a standardised definition of “extended 
family”, Ezewu provides a more reflective understanding of the concept in Africa: 
…from actual practices in the various societies in Africa, the following characteristics can 
be observed: 1. The extended family system is a combination of several nuclear, 
polygamous, or polyandrous types of family, and the relationships between the members 
are biological and social. 2. The members through biological relationships usually trace 
their origin to a common ancestor, lineage and a common genealogical line. 3. The 
members usually occupy a specific geographical location in a village or city as a home 
place for all members even if they live in other parts of the world, returning to it from time 
to time. 4. The members have a common identity and group feelings, looking up to one 
another for help at times of disaster or misfortune and sharing one another’s happiness.44 
 
Ezewu’s definitional observations provide for a more inclusive and wider ambit, which 
will be used throughout this study.45  Such an understanding is not contrary to either the 
provisions of the CRC or the ACRWC. For instance, Article 5 of the CRC embraces the 
role of the extended family.46  
 
Directly related to the concept of the extended family are the notions of “kinship” and 
“kinship care”. By definition, “kin” are “[o]ne's relatives; family; kinfolk”.47 “Kinship care”, 
according to Karp, generally refers to situations in which a relative other than a parent 
lives with, and becomes the primary caregiver of, a child, typically because the child's 
only parent is unable or unwilling to care for the child.48 However, this is a simplistic 
                                                 
44  Ezewu, (1986), 222. 
45  Ezewu’s understanding of an “extended family” in Africa, especially the first characteristic outlined 
above, is also shared by Shimkin et al., who describes an extended family as one in which 
individual relationships extend beyond the conjugal or biological family -spouses and children-and 
include daily interaction with, and responsibilities for, other family members such as aunts, 
uncles, grandparents, and cousins. See Shimkin et al., (1978), 66. 
46  See discussion of Art. 5 of the CRC in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.1 below. 
47  Available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Kin>. In other words, it is “a person's relatives 
collectively”. 
48  Karp, (January/February 1994), 10. 
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definition and seems oblivious of some of the disagreements and questions over what 
constitutes “kin” and “kinship care”.  
 
Some of these questions include: Who qualify as kin? Should one be a blood relative to 
qualify as kin, or can others, such as, godparents or neighbours, be included? In other 
words, as long as there is a close personal and emotional tie, can one qualify as “kin”? 
Should there be fulltime nurturing for care to qualify as “kinship care”? Or can care on a 
part-time basis qualify as “kinship care”?49 
 
Bilchik provides a broader definition of “kin” which is designed to be inclusive and 
respectful of cultural values and ties of affection. Accordingly, Bilchik defines “kin” as 
"relatives, members of their tribes, godparents, stepparents, or any adult who has a 
kinship bond with a child”.50 
 
In the context of the U.S., the role of the extended family amongst the African-American 
community is a fact that does not need much elaboration.51 Such prevalence is mainly 
                                                 
49  For an investigation of some of the definitions that are provided in different contexts see Takas, 
(1994); Bilchik, (2005); Kinship Care Resource Centre, (2005);  Generations United, (2005) 1; 
Davis and Chiancone, (1997), 103; 
50  Bilchik, (2005). 
51  See, for instance, Holmes, (1995), 1649 (highlighting the role of the extended family among the 
Black American communities and further arguing that the difference between the family 
constellation of adopted children and children in birth families mandates a social policy and legal 
process that address the complexity of adopted children's family and kinship structures and 
elevate the interests of adopted children when they conflict with the interests of birth and adoptive 
parents). See too, Hill, (1993), 95-98 as cited in Holmes, (1995), 1659 (where it is argued that 
“[t]he extended family experience in African-based communities is a comprehensive social 
system that affects all aspects of individual and community activities. Within African-based  
communities,  and particularly in the African-American community, this social system includes 
pooling of financial resources, maintaining  family  businesses and property, providing lodging 
and employment opportunities, and caring for the elderly as well as the physical, emotional, 
educational, financial, and  child  -rearing support of  children, through the cooperative efforts of 
the adults in the  community  and the  family”). 
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as a result of the practice’s highly valued significance in Africa.52 Holmes reminds us, 
referring to a number of studies by sociologists,53 that both the African and the African-
American communities have three fundamental characteristics that affect child rearing.54 
The first is the practice of fostering children with kin and non-kin households; the 
second relates to the expansion of the family through fictive kin (also known as 
“relatedness”);55 and the third one mirrors a situation where child rearing and parenting 
responsibilities are shared for the benefit of children.56 Often, these three characteristics 
have contributed to promoting the best interests of the child.  
 
There are a number of studies57 with regard to the African continent  that highlight the 
role of the extended family and kinship care in promoting the rights and welfare of 
children deprived of their family environment. There is a substantial amount of literature 
to support the argument that, despite growing smaller through time, the extended family 
continues to provide support for children deprived of their family environment as a result 
of the death of biological parents or other legal guardians. For instance, writing in 2008, 
it is commented that in South Africa many children in alternative care arrangements 
                                                 
52  Holmes, (1995), 1649. 
53  Such as Oppong, (1994), 68-70; Hill, (1993), 97; Billingsley, (1992), 381-383; See, too, Ford and 
Harris, (1991), 71-83. 
54  Holmes, (1995), 1659. 
55  As above. 
56  As above. 
57  See, for instance, Drew et al., (1996a) 79-86; Drew et al., (1996b), 42; Foster, (2002a), 91-115;  
   Foster, (2002b), 1907-1910. Foster et al., (2002); Foster et al. (1996), 389-404; Tim et al., (2002), 
459-470; Neil, (1997); Gillian, (2002); Seeley, et al., (1993), 117-122 (suggesting that there is a 
need to question the assumption that the extended family, in the culture under study, is able to 
provide adequate support for AIDS patients). See, for instance, Foster, (2005); Roeland and 
Boerma, (2004), S55-S65 (where it is concluded that the extended family takes care of over 90% 
of the double orphans). 
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never go through a Children's Court proceeding but are simply informally incorporated 
into an extended family system.58  
 
In some parts of the continent, statistics show that kinship support structures absorb a 
lion’s share of the children in need of alternative care.59 After conducting an analysis of 
national surveys from 40 countries, one study highlights that: 
For 13 countries, information is available on the relationship to the head of the household 
of double orphans and single-parent orphans not living with a surviving parent ... . The 
(extended) family takes care of nine out of 10 of these children.60 
The importance of recognising the role of the extended family and kinship care in Africa 
in the context of children deprived of their family environment (and intercountry 
adoption) should be fairly obvious. For instance, in the context of orphans, ensuring that 
these children have alternative family care arrangements is an essential initial step to 
ensuring the wellbeing of the child following the loss of parents. Such alternative care 
could, and sometimes should, be effected preferably through the extended family. 
 
One of the practical, as well as legal, implications of the recognition of the role of the 
extended family as well as kinship care in Africa might be that willing kinship caregivers 
would need to be informed that a child who is a relative is being placed in foster care, 
adopted and so forth. A mandate requiring relatives to be informed of the need for 
alternative care for a child in such circumstances would be a culturally and socially 
conscious decision. 
 
                                                 
58  Bessler, (2008), 80 citing Davel and Mungar, (2007), 77. 
59  For instance, see Roeland and Boerma, (2004), S55-S65. In addition, a 1997 study has found 
that in rural Tanzania 95% of orphans are cared for by relatives. See Boerma, et al. (1997), 141-
153.  
60  Roeland and Boerma, (2004), S55-S65. 
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Another ramification that the connection between the child and the extended family 
would have on the adoption process calls for a serious re-evaluation of laws that 
attempt to sever completely the ties that existed between children and their family, 
including the extended one. In fact, some resistance existed in the 1990s on the part of 
South American sending countries to try to force receiving countries to recognise open 
adoptions that do not sever ties between an adopted child and the family of origin.61 
 
In sum, it could be asserted that the role of the extended family in Africa is not lightly to 
be ignored in finding alternative care for children deprived of a family environment. The 
meaningful recognition (or lack thereof) of the extended family in Africa has an 
implication for the meaning of “adoptability”, consent to adoption, the nature of adoption 
(open or closed), cultural heritage, and so forth; all of which are issues that are central 
to intercountry adoption. 
 
2.3.3    “Customary adoption” in Africa 
 
Adoption, as understood in its legal sense, cannot be considered an established 
practice of African customary law.62 Customary adoption is an arrangement in traditional 
circles where a child is placed in the care of a family member or a friend of the family. 
The child might be placed in such care either because he or she has lost caregivers, or 
to generally facilitate the child’s well-being and access to nutrition, shelter, education, 
training in a trade, or health care.63  
                                                 
61  See, generally, Jaffe, (1995), Chapters 7-12 where South American countries’ laws are 
examined. 
62  Bennett, (1995), 107. 
63  Bennett, (1995),107. 
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In customary adoption, the child almost always maintains his contact with his family of 
origin, and legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities does not take place. 
Customary adoption is conducted by agreement between families as the custom 
requires, and not through the courts.64 
 
Customary adoption is a practice that continues to exist in a number of African 
countries. These countries include Burkina Faso,65 Cameroon, Ethiopia,66 Ghana,67 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone,68 South Africa, Swaziland,69 and Uganda. For 
instance, in Ethiopia, while different forms and rules existed in relation to customary 
adoption, depending upon the ethnic, religious and regional groupings involved,70 the 
practice occurs still now. The Government of Ethiopia has called it “a very deep-rooted”, 
and “highly valued and socially endorsed act”71 which signifies the role of the practice in 
offering children a family environment.  
 
In Swaziland, despite the fact that the 1952 Adoption of Children Act recognises 
customary law of adoption, it has been pointed out that the Act has not tried to integrate 
it.72 In 1994, one writer reported that since the enactment of this Act in 1952, he had not 
come across a single case of domestic adoption.73 The fact that customary adoption is 
widely practiced could be the main reason why domestic adoption is not common. 
                                                 
64  See CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (September, 1995), para. 87. 
65  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Burkina Faso, (July 1993), para. 46(b). 
66  Beckstorm, (1972), 145. 
67  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ghana, (December 1995), para. 74. 
68  See Lisk, (1992), 28-42. 
69  Bhalla, (1994), 356-357. 
70  See, generally, Beckstrom, (1972). 
71  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 121. 
72  Bhalla, (1994), 356. 
73  Bhalla, (1994), 363. 
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In the context of Cameroon, it has been argued that “…the slow-paced attitude to 
legislate on adoption in Cameroon resulted from the objection that statutory adoption 
runs counter to the African concept of the family where the acquisition of membership is 
by birth”.74 In addition, it is contended that the resistance to adoption has its own 
economic perspective - that “statutory adoption could enable a ‘stranger’ to control 
family property, especially landed property”.75 
 
Therefore, the notion of adoption might not always tie well with customary adoption in 
mainly traditional African societies. The presence of customary adoption in a number of 
African countries can explain partly why domestic (civil law) adoption is not widely 
practiced. 
 
This indicates too that it is not only a child’s parents that are interested in his or her 
upbringing.76 It is a common practice that the social group to which a child belongs may 
also want to retain him or her.77 This is sometimes done under the guise of ensuring the 
perpetuation and survival of a group’s culture.78  
 
The fact that customary adoption does not usually involve State institutions makes it 
difficult to know how many children are being afforded a family environment through the 
practice. At times, the view that “[t]radition considers reporting adopted children to third 
                                                 
74  Ngwafor (2006), 128 citing Kasunmu and Salacuse, (1966), 243. 
75  Ngwafor (2006), 128 
76  Bennett, (1995),107. 
77  As above. 
78  As above. 
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parties as a form of discrimination abominable to God and man”79 contributes towards 
the lack of data on this group of children.  
 
Nonetheless, as will be argued in detail in Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.2, supporting the 
practice of customary adoption (through legislation and policy interventions) should be a 
crucial strategy African countries should adopt to cater for the needs of children 
deprived of their family environment. The presence of the practice can also facilitate a 
State’s efforts to adhere to the principle of subsidiarity before embarking on intercountry 
adoption. It is highly doubtful if eliminating the practice, as the CRC Committee has 
sometimes recommended,80 would be in the best interests of African children. 
 
2.3.4    Discrimination against “illegitimate” children 
 
Children generally referred to as “illegitimate” children are those that are born outside of 
wedlock. The constitutions of at least six African countries explicitly entrench the 
equality of children born within or outside of marriage.81 However, de jure and de facto 
discrimination against illegitimate children, sanctioned by culture and religion, continues 
to be a present day reality in Africa.82 
 
                                                 
79  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 122. 
80  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observation: Niger, (June 2009), paras. 49 and 
50. 
81  These are the Constitutions of Central African Republic, Congo, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Swaziland, and Togo. See Heyns and Kaguongo, (2006), 704. For instance, Art. 40 (2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Congo states that "children, whether born in or out of wedlock, 
shall have the same rights", while Art. 29(4) of the Kingdom of Swaziland’s 2005 Constitution 
provides that “[c]hildren whether born in or out of wedlock shall enjoy the same protection and 
rights”. 
82  It needs to be noted that discrimination against illegitimate children had existed (and continues to 
exist) in other parts of the world, too. For further reading on “illegitimacy” in Europe and North 
America, see Hartley, 1975; Teichman, 1982; Levene, et al. (eds.), (2005). 
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When children are discriminated against on the basis of their parent’s marital status, 
they are often denied their rights to maintenance, succession/inheritance, birth 
registration, and other similar rights. Discrimination in these respects is tantamount to 
violating the best interests of the child principle.83 The violations of the rights of 
illegitimate children can facilitate the risk of depriving them of their family environment. 
For instance, it is argued that, in Africa, the social stigma as well as the “legal 
disability”84 that accompanies illegitimacy may lead to the assumption that a number of 
children who are conceived outside of wedlock are abandoned at, or soon after, birth. 
The fact that mothers cannot claim maintenance or inherit property for and through their 
illegitimate children exacerbates these children’s difficulty to survive and thrive.85 This in 
turn could lead a mother, apart from the possibilities of abortion and infanticide,86 either 
to abandon her child(ren) or relinquish parental responsibilities.87 Therefore, it is argued 
that addressing discrimination on the ground of birth status can contribute towards 
keeping children within their family environment, and the question of adoption would 
possibly not arise.  
                                                 
83  It needs to be noted at this juncture that “illegitimate” children (by definition, as provided above, 
as “those born outside of wedlock”) and children born via donor sperm generally share similar 
status and discrimination. Children born from donor sperm are considered to be not related at all 
to their genetic father, and courts generally regard donor conceived children to have no legal 
rights of support from biological parents except for the support that parents agree to provide. 
However, for the purpose of this Chapter (and the study) the latter is omitted since it is not a 
significant problem in present day Africa.  
84  In its consideration of States Parties reports, the CRC Committee has often recommended to a 
number of African countries to address both de jure and de facto discrimination of children born 
outside of wedlock. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone, (June 2008), para. 
63; Kenya, (June 2007), paras. 24 and 30: Mali, (May 2007), paras. 31 and 32; Senegal, (October 
2006), paras. 23 and 24; Swaziland, (October 2006), paras. 25 and 26. 
85  Especially on a continent where it is a well known fact that the economic dependence of women 
on men, as a result of both law and culture, is rampant. 
86   In some countries, mainly Muslim ones, the possibility of “honour killing” of a mother (who gives 
birth outside of marriage) by her father, brother, or any other male relative is a real danger. 
87  See IRIN, (16 April 2006) which reported that “[t]he mothers of illegitimate children also face 
social stigmas. In many cases, young women who become pregnant outside of marriage must 
choose between either having illegal abortions or abandoning their children, or facing the stigma 
of unwed motherhood”. 
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The very limited status that illegitimate children are accorded also has the negative 
effect of exposing these children to practices that are illegal and irregular in the contexts 
of both national and intercountry adoption. To illustrate this, mention can be made of the 
fact that the identification of potentially vulnerable mothers (in this context those 
mothers who are single) and “inciting them to give up their future or new born baby” is 
one of the major abusive methods identified that is used to secure children for 
adoption.88  
 
The refusal by State institutions to register illegitimate children at birth also contributes 
to the violation of their rights, and exposes them to a wide array of violations, including, 
trafficking, illegal adoptions, and deprivation of the right to service delivery. If they are 
abandoned, the possibility of being deprived of a family environment is exacerbated by 
the lack of a birth certificate which could have facilitated reunion with the biological 
parent(s). Even when illegitimate children are allowed to register at birth, stringent 
conditions might apply leading to a birth certificate that does not contain information 
similar to that contained in one issued for children born in wedlock.89  
 
Unfortunately the position under Islamic law also falls short of promoting the best 
interests of the child principle. For instance, in Comoros, not only does legislation make 
                                                 
88  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 6. It is further argued that “[i]n some cases, it is ostensibly 
founded on the moral or religious opinion that a mother who has a child out of wedlock is not the 
most suitable person to bring up a child properly; in others, on the conviction that the child will 
necessarily be better off with a couple, especially if they are wealthier”. UNICEF Innocenti Digest, 
(1998), 6. 
89  See, for instance, Secs. 6 and 19 of the Birth Registration Act, (No. 48 of 1968) of Botswana 
which discriminate against a child born out of marriage. The rights of the father, even to visitation, 
are not recognised, consequently denying the child access to his or her father.  
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a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children90 for birth registration purposes 
but the child is also referred to as “a child born of a prohibited relation”.91 Positive 
change is also often faced with resistance. A recent example is Mali, where the new 
Draft Family Code attempted to re-define children’s rights within families, for instance, 
by allowing non-marital children to enjoy rights similar to those of marital children.92 This 
attempt was opposed by Islamic organisations in the country.93 
 
Therefore, it is contended that addressing the discrimination against illegitimate children 
would contribute towards reducing the number of children deprived of their family 
environment. The law should regulate whether the father of a child born outside wedlock 
can qualify in any way for notice of an adoption proceeding.94 Not only is such 
regulation in the best interests of the child,95 it is also one means of protecting the rights 
of the adoptive parents who otherwise might find themselves involved in custody 
disputes with an alleged putative father.  
 
2.3.5    Other cultural practices 
There are other cultural practices that have a bearing upon the care of children in the 
majority of traditional societies in Africa. Some of these practices are outlined below. 
                                                 
90  Comoros Act No. 84-10 of 1984 on Civil Status and the Family Code.  
91  Djabir, (2007), 23. It is further reported that a child born out of wedlock “…may not have legal 
relationship with his [her] biological father, including inheritance, under Islamic law, even with the 
consent of all parties”. Djabir, (2007), 23. 
92  Afrik.com, (5 May 2008).   
93  Afrik.com, (5 May 2008).   
94  In this regard, questions, such as, “does the biological connection between the unwed father and 
the child suffice to create a protected interest for the father or should the unwed father have 
grasped the opportunity to form a relationship with his child for there to be a protected right of the 
father?” need to be addressed.  
95  For instance, it helps to reduce the chances of disruption, if the adoption is declared void and the 
child is required to be returned to his or her country of origin. 
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One cultural practice in Africa that has a direct bearing on child care (and by implication 
alternative care) is the practice of polygamy. By definition “polygamy” involves plural 
marriage. However, for the purpose of this Chapter it is used in its broader sense which 
includes “the practice of plural marriage, as well as the practice of entering into plural 
marriage-like relationships simultaneously”.96 At least historically, by far the most 
common polygamous arrangement was where a male had several wives (polygyny), as 
opposed to a female having several husbands (polyandry).97  
 
Parts of Africa represent a present day proof that the notion of a monogamous 
matrimonial union as the basis of family relationships is not universal. Although to 
varying degrees, polygamous marriages are practised in all corners of the continent, for 
example in Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia,98 Eritrea, Cameroon, Cote D’ Ivoire,99 The 
Gambia, Nigeria, Rwanda,100 Sudan, and Egypt. In polygamous marriages, children 
who lose their mother are often taken care of by the other wife or wives of the father and 
are often not deprived of their family environment. 
 
The practice of widow inheritance, prevalent amongst African countries101 such as, 
Nigeria,102 Uganda, Kenya,103 Tanzania, and Zimbabwe104 also has implications for 
                                                 
96  Campbell, (2005), 1. 
97  See Banda, (2005), 116-119, for a discussion of the practice of polygyny in Africa. 
98  The RFC provides in Art. 11 that a “...person shall not conclude a marriage as long as he is 
bound by bonds of a preceding marriage”. 
99  Despite the fact that the practice of monogamy was outlawed as far back as 1964. 
100  The practice of polygyny in Rwanda continues despite the fact that its 1991 Constitution provides 
in Art. 25 that “[o]nly monogamous marriages shall be recognized within the conditions and forms 
prescribed by law”. 
101  Wing and Smith, (2003), 39; Ewelukwa, (2008), 214-215. 
102  For a detailed discussion of widow inheritance in Nigeria, see Babatunde and Owasanoye (eds.), 
(2001); Umeasiegbu, (1977). Fasoranti and Aruna, (2007). 
103  See Shu-Acquaye, (2004), 55. 
104  See, for instance, Chirawu, (2006), 26, 37. 
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child care, particularly the care of orphans who have lost their father. The practice 
commonly requires the widow to marry her husband's brother, or another family 
member, after her first husband dies. Without taking a position on the implications that 
this culture has on women’s rights,105 an issue beyond the scope of this study, 
historically widow inheritance is envisaged and implemented as a tradition allowing a 
man to take responsibility for the wellbeing of his brother's (or close relative’s) wife and 
child(ren).106 The practice of widow inheritance has implications in the determination of 
adoptability, and for the status of orphanhood, as in these circumstances death does 
not necessarily lead to children’s deprivation of a family environment. 
 
2.3.6    Attitude of unquestioning submission to authority 
 
Donohugh observes that certain definite attitudes of the African native are discoverable, 
since the “African native is conditioned in his responses by his cultural background”.107 
Amongst these, “unquestioning submission to authority”, also sometimes referred to as 
"natural benign docility", could be singled out. Although Donohugh’s observation was 
made decades ago, it still holds some truth in a number of communities in Africa. 
 
Some African scholars argue that, “culturally, it is as if the traditional African script of 
‘submit to family and community authority and immerse yourself in and partake of all 
                                                 
105  Such as, exposing the women to HIV/AIDS, its violation of the rule against discrimination under 
international law, and so forth. For a detailed discussion of widow inheritance, and its implications 
for human rights, see Loftspring, (2007), 253-255; Potash (ed.), (1986); Nyindo, (2005), 40-46; 
Okeyo and Allen (1994), 20-25; Okeyo, (1994), 433.  
106  Human Rights Watch, (2003), 34. 
107  Donohugh, (1935), 329-339. See too, Lassiter, (1999), 1 where the writer attempts to identify and 
assess the nature, range, quality, and utility of research and writing by selected African scholars 
on African culture and personality and recurring African responses to indigenous social life and 
Western acculturation. The writer does so by reviewing and analysing a sampling of works by 
African scholars published since the mid-1960s. 
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group values and norms’ was rewritten during the colonial period”.108 Unquestioning 
submission to authority, according to Donohugh, “contribute[s] towards a group 
solidarity, a recognition of common interests, which would be of the greatest advantage 
in the altered situations under other political control or administration” (insertion 
mine).109  
 
In 1997 Nyasani argued that the “child in Africa was muzzled right from the outset and 
was thereby drilled into submission to authority from above".110 If this conclusion is to be 
embraced fully, then it is a logical assumption that children who have been raised all 
their life to respect authority figures and to never challenge them, would not find it easy 
to become adults who question authority. There is also an overwhelming body of 
literature, and other evidence, to indicate that the emphasis on the group - the idea of 
communitarianism - is indeed a distinct feature of traditional African culture,111 which in 
turn contributes to the attitude of unquestioning submission to authority.112  
 
There is a strong argument that can be made that, generally, African individuals are not 
accustomed to challenging authority, and that, in fact, such an act would be considered 
as aberrant and not sanctioned by society. In connection with this, it is also important to 
                                                 
108  Isiguzo, (undated). 
109  Donohugh, (1935), 329-339. 
110  Nyasani, (1997), 129. 
111  See, for instance, Quashigah et al. (1999), 190-191. 
112  The notion of protection of the individual is a great advance over its absolutist antecedents, but 
the African concept of human rights highlights that it needs to be balanced by the 
acknowledgement that the individual is embedded within a community. Thus the African concept 
of human rights, both traditional and contemporary, recognises the importance of the group 
simultaneously with the significance of the individual. See, for instance, Quashigah et al., (1999), 
190-191. 
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make the point that such an attitude towards authority has direct implications for all 
parties that are involved in intercountry adoption on the continent.  
 
It would not be correct to characterise an unquestioning attitude to authority as being 
solely African. There are other parts of the globe where a similar attitude is embraced 
and entrenched as part of a certain community’s culture.113 Although a study of the 
issue of Africans’ reluctance to challenge/question legitimate authority in the context of 
intercountry adoption has not yet been undertaken, studies in the context of other 
communities exist, such as one conducted by Roby which highlights the impact of this 
attitude in the context of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific ocean.114  
 
In describing the situation of a mother who had been solicited to bring her children to 
the U.S. to place them with an adoptive family and relinquish her parental 
responsibilities, Roby writes:  
She also did not know that it was morally and legally permissible for her to decline signing 
the papers at that moment. Not signing those papers would be a breach of a promise in her 
mind. In addition, she had been raised all her life to respect authority figures and to never 
challenge directives by someone in a higher social class than herself. Even though things 
felt strangely awry, she had signed the papers. Without understanding, she had 
"voluntarily" relinquished all her parental rights in her children.115 
Roby makes further observations that have far reaching application beyond the Marshall 
Islands: 
In their zeal for international adoption, American adoption agencies are often reluctant to 
acknowledge the foundational forces that are reflected in the sending jurisdictions' 
policies, often responding with hostility to anything they consider a hindrance to their 
                                                 
113   For example, in South America. As discussed further below, such an attitude can also be 
deciphered from some of the communities who live in the Marshall Islands. 
114  Roby, (2004), 303. 
115  Roby, (2004), 304. 
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desired goal. But an understanding of those factors is critically important in a mutually 
respectful and dignified adoption process and to avoid any legal or cultural pitfalls. In 
addition, other critically important factors include cultural traditions, religious beliefs, 
national family and child welfare policies, the capacity development of sending countries, 
and the history between the sending and receiving jurisdictions.116 
 
Similar scenarios are inevitable in Africa. For instance, mothers who relinquish their 
parental responsibilities and sign papers under the supervision of government 
authorities (or any legitimate authority, for that matter) do not usually question the 
content or the short and long term implications of their acts. In the best interests of the 
child as well as families of origin, amongst others, the kind of administrative and judicial 
frameworks set in place to regulate adoptions, as well as the nature and standard of 
consent required for adoption, need to take this reality in Africa into account. 
 
2.3.7    Attitudes to sexual orientation in Africa  
 
Previously considered to be a complete taboo, issues pertaining to gays and lesbians 
are becoming more and more current subjects of public discussion and controversy on 
the African continent.117  
 
In Africa, like some other places in the world, those who view the practice as “evil”, 
“unnatural”, and “contrary to God’s will” exist. A common belief that homosexuality is 
                                                 
116  As above. 
117  See Cameron, (2001), 642 (discussing the rights of gays and lesbians in the Southern Africa 
context particularly drawing lessons from South Africa and criticising the positions taken in some 
countries in the region). For instance, in Kenya, it was reported that “[a] new phenomenon is 
gaining currency in the country: Lesbians, gays and transsexuals are coming out openly to 
demand their rights”. The Nation (25 January 2007). 
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somehow un-African also resonates well within a large sector of the population of 
Africa.118 Some even regard it as a vestige of colonialism.  
 
To dispel this view writers have shown that homosexuality had existed even before 
colonisation of the African continent. For example, Murray119 mentions cases of 
homosexuality in traditional Africa from “Nubia to Zululand on the East Coast of Africa 
(and offshore on Zanzibar and Madagascar, as well)”.120 
 
Nonetheless, not only do religious leaders continue to deplore homosexuality on the 
continent, government leaders, too, have aired, and continue to vehemently express 
their disapproval.121 Those who stand out in this regard are Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe,122 former president Sam Nujoma of Namibia,123 and President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda.124 
 
The legal status of homosexuality on the African continent also mirrors this sentiment. 
The practice continues to be illegal in the majority of African countries, and what is 
                                                 
118  Boykin, (2001). The writer cites specific examples from Egypt, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and 
Uganda where, after men were accused of setting up a gay website, church leaders and 
presidents aired homophobic comments. According to an anti-homosexuality Bill currently being 
considered by Uganda’s Parliament, life imprisonment is the minimum punishment for anyone 
convicted of having homosexual intercourse. 
119  Murray, (undated). 
120  Murray, (undated), 5. 
121  See, for instance, Amnesty International, (2001); Human Rights Watch, (2003). 
122  Afrol News has reported that “Zimbabwe is more known for its homophobia and extreme 
statements made by president Mugabe, including various claims that homosexuality is not an 
African phenomenon but rather a Western decadency” Afrol News (2002). 
123  It is reported that former president Sam Nujoma had announced in 2001 that Namibia does not 
allow homosexuality or lesbianism and that orders had been given to the police to arrest, deport 
and/or imprison homosexuals. See, for instance, Boykin, (2001).  
124  Reportedly, “[i]n September 1999 president Yoweri Museveni instructed Ugandan police to lock 
up and charge homosexuals”. Afrol News, (2002). 
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commonly referred to as “state sponsored homophobia” is rife.125 According to the 
International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), homosexual acts are illegal in 37 
African countries.126  
 
Though the regional human rights body, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, almost had the opportunity to deliberate on the position to be taken on 
homosexuality under the ACHPR, the opportunity was lost when the communication 
dealing with the issue was withdrawn by the complainant.127  
 
Not only in Africa, which is generally considered to be very conservative, but even in 
Europe and the U.S., adoption by homosexuals or lesbians is a highly controversial 
issue. Only Denmark, the U.K., Germany, Iceland, The Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, 
Norway, Sweden, Quebec and some States in the U.S., authorise adoptions by 
homosexual couples.128  
 
This contextual dimension - namely, the resistance to accept homosexuality and 
homosexuals - has a direct bearing on intercountry adoption on the continent in general. 
First, countries might expressly forbid gays and lesbians, both as individuals and as 
couples, to adopt children. In Kenya, homosexuals are among the four categories of 
                                                 
125  See Ottosson, (2008). 
126  Ottosson, (2008), 45. The practice of homosexuality is not illegal in 10 African countries (Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Equatorial-Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, 
Rwanda and South Africa) while its status is neither illegal as such nor entirely legal in Burkina 
Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt and Niger. In Chad the legal status of homosexual 
acts is unknown. See Ottosson, (2008). 
127  William Courson v. Zimbabwe, Communication 136/94 (1994). 
128  ISS Monthly Review, (February 2008), 2. A judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 
22 January 2008 disallowing homosexual adoption is one example. ISS Monthly Review, 
(February 2008), 2. 
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persons who are expressly not allowed to adopt.129 As regards Ethiopia, the U.S. State 
Department indicates that “[i]n general ... openly gay or lesbian individuals or couples” 
may not adopt.130  However, it is reported that “the Ethiopian government has 
occasionally approved cases involving persons in all of these categories”.131 With the 
exception of South Africa,132 it is concluded that there is no legislation in Africa that 
allows gays and lesbians to adopt.  
 
Secondly, as they have done in the past, homosexual applicants might continue to try to 
evade the system by posing as heterosexual and/or single prospective adoptive 
parents.133 In this regard, it is argued that the role and duty of receiving countries to duly 
inform sending countries of this situation needs to be highlighted. It is argued that: 
The assessment of an applicant must be a transparent process, which commits the 
responsibility of social services and the State, which they represent. If one expects a 
maximum of information and guarantees on the child from countries of origin, 
reciprocity also requires that the social assessments of the applicants be 
comprehensive and compliant with the reality of the situation.134  
In addition, such practice of evading the requisite legal requirement might fall short of 
promoting the best interests of the child. For instance, if the pretext is uncovered at a 
later stage, the possibility of the “disruption” of the adoption might occur, which is 
usually not in the best interests of the child. 
                                                 
129  The other three are “[a] sole male applicant intending to adopt a female child”, “[a] sole female 
applicant intending to adopt a male child “, as well as an “[a]pplicant above the age of 65”. See 
Sec. 158(2) of Children Act; See, too, Child Welfare Society of Kenya, (undated).  
130  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia”, (December 2008). 
131  As above. 
132  Where the principle that the State may not unfairly discriminate against an individual on the basis 
of their sexual orientation is expressly protected in the Constitution. See Sec. 9(2) of the South 
African Constitution.  
133  See ISS Monthly Review, (February 2008), 2 (discussing how in the past, receiving countries 
have managed to “evade the problem by considering homosexual adoption applicants as single 
persons”). 
134  ISS Monthly Review, (February 2008), 2. 
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Thirdly, Hills135 argues that: 
If the goal of the [Hague] Convention is, as its Preamble suggests, to ensure that 
children ‘grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and 
understanding,’ then it must be implemented in such a way as to fully accept the 
eligibility … of homosexual persons as potential adoptive parents (insertion mine).136  
Therefore, if African countries that do not allow homosexual adoption were to perceive 
the Hague Convention as facilitating this,137 reluctance to accede to the instrument 
could be greater. As a result, this issue should be approached with caution. 
 
Fourthly, if legislation is enacted in Africa to allow intercountry adoption by 
homosexuals, the direct and indirect ramifications of such legislation (particularly on the 
best interests of the child) need to be properly assessed. For instance, if the legislation 
is to apply without exception to all adoption service providers, experience from the U.K. 
suggests that such a move could be resisted by faith based organisations (for instance, 
Catholic orphanages) that might go to the extent of suspending or closing down their 
adoption programmes as an indication of their refusal to place children with homosexual 
adopters.138 Such closures, even temporarily, might not be in the best interests of 
children who might otherwise have been able to benefit from a family environment 
through adoption (even without the introduction of legislation allowing homosexuals to 
adopt). 
                                                 
135  Hills, (1998), 237. 
136  Hills, (1998), 238. 
137  The Hague Convention does not introduce a comprehensive uniform international code on 
adoption, and leaves the determination of eligibility to adopt to the competent authorities of 
receiving States (in the first instance) and countries of origin. Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good 
Practice, (2008), 112. 
138  See Christian Today, (08 March 2007) (providing that when “Prime Minister Tony Blair 
announced on January 29 that Roman Catholic adoption agencies should not be exempted” from 
proposed regulations that would have barred discrimination against homosexuals,  “[t]he Roman 
Catholic Church warned it would halt its adoption programs before it would agree to place 
children with gay parents”). See too Ekklesia, (08 March 2007), where it is indicated that, after an 
attempt to secure a permanent opt-out for Catholic adoption agencies, it was decided that they 
should only benefit from a grace period to give the agencies time to adjust.  
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Therefore, the implications of these attitudes need to be taken into account, and ways of 
promoting children’s best interests need to be sought. For any law reform effort or policy 
intervention in respect of intercountry adoption from Africa to be labelled as effective 
and culturally sensitive, the attitudes of governments and communities towards 
homosexuals need to be considered.  
 
2.3.8    HIV/AIDS and Africa’s children 
 
If one were to seek to identify the three main factors that mar the life of the African child 
at present, the answer that would spring to mind would arguably be: poverty, armed 
conflict,139 and HIV/AIDS.140 Since the first clinical evidence of HIV/AIDS was reported 
some 25 years ago, the virus has spread at an alarming rate, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, a region which can least afford the sickness, death, and loss of 
productivity associated with the epidemic. This region has just over 10% of the world’s 
population, but more than two thirds (68%) of all people who are HIV-positive live in this 
region, a region where more than three quarters (76%) of all AIDS deaths in 2007 
occurred.141  
                                                 
139  According to Kaime’s calculation, “[a]t least 23 countries in Africa are either engaged in some 
form of armed conflict or are just emerging from one. The violence in Darfur, the never-ending 
lawlessness in Somalia and the on-going civil wars in the Sahrawi Republic, Uganda, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Chad as well as the recent history of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and the Manu River states of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea make Africa one of the most 
unstable continents on the globe”. See Kaime, (2008),183. 
140  Hence, UNICEF ranks HIV/AIDS as one of the three greatest threats to childhood today. 
141  UNAIDS/WHO, (2007), 15. A recent report (2008) highlighted that “sub-Saharan Africa remains 
the most heavily affected by HIV, accounting for 67% of all people living with HIV and for 72% of 
AIDS deaths in 2007”. See UNAIDS, (2008), 5. Whereas global trends indicate that HIV infections 
have fallen in several countries, this is offset by increases in new infections in other countries. In 
this regard, an example is Kenya where it is reported that “in 2007, HIV prevalence ranged 
between 7.1% and 8.5% - compared with the 2003 estimate of 6.7%”. See UNAIDS, (2008), 5. 
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The total number of people living with HIV in 2008 was estimated at 33.4 million,142 of 
whom an estimated 22.4 million people live in sub-Saharan Africa.143 It is reported that 
in 2007 AIDS killed approximately 330,000 children under the age of 15, and that an 
estimated 2.1 million additional children under the age of 15 were living with HIV.144 In 
2008 an estimated 1.9 million people in the region became newly infected, while 1.4 
million died of AIDS.145 While the total AIDS related deaths in 2008 was around 2 
million, the number of children was estimated at 280,000.146 The number of children 
under 15 years living with HIV in 2008 was estimated at 2.1 million.147  
 
Some further reference to statistics is helpful here in order to demonstrate the dire 
situation that African children infected, and affected, by HIV/AIDS face.  According to a 
2007 Report: 
¾ Only 1 in 10 pregnant women with HIV in low and middle income countries 
is receiving antiretroviral (ARV) prophylaxis for preventing mother-to-child 
transmission (MTCT) of HIV. 
¾ Only 1 in 10 children needing antiretroviral treatment (ART) receives it - 
the others face a bleak and short lived future. 
¾ At most 1 in 25 children born to HIV-infected mothers receive 
cotrimoxazole prophylaxis to prevent opportunistic infections.148. 
¾ Children who have lost both parents to AIDS or any other cause, are 
generally less likely than non-orphans to attend school.149 
                                                 
142  UNAIDS, (2009), 6. 
143  UNAIDS, (2009), 21. 
144  UNAIDS/WHO, (2007), 1. 
145  UNAIDS, (2009), 21. 
146  UNAIDS, (2009), 6. 
147  As above. 
148  Illnesses caused by various organisms, some of which usually do not cause disease in persons 
with healthy immune systems. Persons living with advanced HIV infection may suffer 
opportunistic infections of the lungs, brain, eyes, and other organs. 
149  UNICEF/UNAIDS/WHO, (2007), 3. 
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The scourge of HIV/AIDS has particularly dire effects for children and the fulfilment of 
their rights.150 The succinct words of Pais, former Director of the Innocenti Research 
Centre, describe this aptly: 
AIDS is killing not only parents, but also brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, 
neighbors, teachers and other members of the community. It is emptying schools, 
wiping out families and extinguishing hope.151  
Following this, Pais poses a rhetorical question: “If it takes a village to raise a child, 
what happens to that child when the village is besieged by the dying and the dead?”152 
 
As the implications and effect of HIV/AIDS upon children have come to the fore, most 
notably in the context of Africa, legal and policy responses have adapted to 
accommodate children’s vulnerability amidst the AIDS crisis.153 As the CRC Committee 
has recognised in its General Comment No 3,154 many of these challenges lie at the 
level of policy or practice, especially as regards health services delivery and prevention 
campaigns. However, equally, there are issues of legal import surrounding HIV/AIDS155 
including in respect of intercountry adoption. 
 
                                                 
150  See, generally, Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008d); Sloth-Nielsen, (2005). 
151  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (2006), 6. 
152  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (2006), 6. 
153  It is observed that “[i]ndeed, the rise of HIV/AIDS and its impact on children has spawned an 
entirely new children’s rights ‘language’: the ‘orphan generation’, OVCs (orphaned and vulnerable 
children), MTCT (mother-to-child-transmission), and child-headed households have long since 
entered the everyday lexicon in policy and programming on the continent”. Sloth-Nielsen and 
Mezmur, (2008d), 279.  
154  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003). See Sloth-Nielsen, (2005), for a detailed 
discussion of this General Comment. At its 17th session in 1998 the CRC Committee held a day 
of general discussion on the theme of HIV/AIDS and children’s rights, in which it recommended 
that a number of actions be taken, including facilitating the engagement of States Parties on 
HIV/AIDS issues in relation to the rights of the child.   
155  See, generally Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008d); Sloth-Nielsen, (2005). 
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One of the devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on children is to deprive them 
of their family environment.156 In 2001 a UNAIDS report indicated that of the more than 
13.2 million children who have been orphaned157 by the AIDS epidemic, 95% were from 
sub-Saharan Africa.158 In 2008, more than 14.1 million children in sub-Saharan Africa 
were estimated to have lost one or both parents to AIDS.159 This statistic on its own 
speaks volumes about the magnitude of the challenge that African governments face.  
 
Even though it would be wrong to make the assumption that the problem of orphanhood 
in Africa is created solely by HIV/AIDS, a study conducted in 17 sub-Saharan countries 
has found that orphan prevalence is related to adult HIV prevalence estimates.160 This 
clearly supports the interpretation that the orphan crisis is, in large part, AIDS-related.161 
 
There are a number of factors that make the lives of orphans and vulnerable children 
more difficult in Africa.162 Apart from being orphaned, the diverse effects of HIV/AIDS on 
children can include: growing up in low capacity households; children heading 
                                                 
156  Obviously the sexually transmitted nature of HIV/AIDS is also likely to affect the rate of the 
increase of double orphans disproportionally compared with the increase of single parent 
orphans, leading to a higher probability that it would cause the death of both parents than most 
other conditions. 
157  There is some controversy surrounding the definition of the word “orphan”. Whereas a 2004 
report by UNIADS/UNICEF/USAID defined the word as “any child under the age 18 who has lost 
one or both parents”, some have criticised this definition as “unusual” and “even somewhat 
perverse”. Such criticisms are based on the argument that “in no other context are children with 
one surviving parent called orphans”. UNAIDS, UNICEF, USAID. (2004); Richter and Rama, 
(2006), 18. For further discussion of the notion of “orphan” and its implication for adoptability, see 
Chapter 4, section 4.5.2 below.  
158  UNAIDS, (2001), 6. 
159  UNAIDS, (2009), 21. 
160  George et al. (2003), 1235-1247.  
161  As above.   
162  The human rights of the child placed at risk in the context of HIV/AIDS include: the right to life; the 
right to the highest attainable standard of mental and physical health; the right to non-
discrimination, equal protection and equality before the law; the right to privacy; the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion and the right to freely receive and impart information; the right 
to equal access to education; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to social 
security, assistance and welfare; and the right to parental care. 
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households;163 dropping out of school; being forced into child labour; failing to access 
health services; facing severe emotional burdens occasioned by the illness and death of 
kin; and social stigma. Thus it is clear that, for large parts of Africa, “Aids is beginning to 
reverse decades of steady progress in child survival”.164 In addition, it has become 
evident that property transfers for the benefit of surviving children is an especially thorny 
issue when factors, such as the applicability of customary law and communal ownership 
of properties, arises, since children are, by and large, not beneficiaries after the death of 
caregivers.165 To add to this, property grabbing and dispossession by relatives have 
been an unwelcome features of the rise of HIV/AIDS, which lawmakers have of 
necessity had to attempt to address.166 For women and children, widowed and 
orphaned by AIDS, this is particularly devastating as they are most likely HIV infected 
themselves and will need all of their resources for medical treatment.167 
 
The most critical area of concern for Africa that HIV/AIDS raises is the issue of 
children’s rights to parental or family care, or to alternative care when deprived of a 
family environment, due to the growing number of orphaned children.168 While the 
majority of orphans are absorbed by the extended family, a significant number are 
                                                 
163  The General Comment breaks new ground insofar as it accords recognition at the international 
law level to the phenomenon of childheaded households. See Sloth-Nielsen, (2005), 76 for further 
discussion. 
164  UNAIDS, (2001), 11. 
165  See Sloth-Niselsen and Mezmur, (2008d), 2910291; Loftspring, 2007; Strickland, (2004); Preble, 
(1991), 862-964. 
166  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008d), 291-292. 
167  See, Loftspring, 2007; Strickland, (2004); Preble, (1991), 862-964.  
168  In relation to alternative care and OVCs, the stance adopted in the General Comment is that 
communities (and not governments alone) are at the forefront of the fight against the epidemic, 
and hence that community absorption of orphans is the preferred and first response. “[O]rphans 
are best protected and cared for when efforts are made to enable siblings to remain together, and 
in the care of relatives or other family members”. CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, 
(2003), para. 31. 
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institutionalised. The debate over the institutionalisation of children who are HIV/AIDS 
orphans is controversial. 
 
Antiretroviral therapy has made a significant impact in preventing new infections in 
children as more HIV-positive mothers gain access to treatment preventing them from 
transmitting the virus to their children.169 Notwithstanding the high cost of the treatment 
for HIV/AIDS, a number of studies point out that there are attractive options for 
countries with very limited resources,170 provided that the political and social will is 
present. A 2007 UNAIDS report declares that: 
Substantial progress has been achieved in bringing essential HIV services to those in 
need in the low- and middle-income countries where 95 per cent of all people living with 
HIV reside. The number of people receiving antiretrovirals in these countries increased 
five-fold between 2003 and 2006, and declines in HIV prevalence have been reported in 
several countries following the implementation of strong HIV prevention measures.171 
Experience in countries such as Botswana and Uganda is showing that timely initiation 
of antiretroviral therapy significantly reduces HIV-related orphanhood.172 Despite these 
breakthroughs in treatment and their relative affordability, African governments still trail 
behind, and find it difficult to provide these treatments to their large number of HIV 
infected children and/or parents. The decline for funding for prevention measures in a 
number of countries, such as, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Ghana because of lack of 
financial resources is also contributing to the negative impact of the epidemic.173 
Unfortunately, even with the significant gains that have been achieved through 
                                                 
169  UNAIDS, (2009), 25. 
170  See, for instance, Goldie et al., (2006) 1141-1153; Stover et al., (2006), 1474-1476; Hogan et al., 
(2005), 1431-1437. 
171  UNAIDS, (2007), 1. 
172  UNAIDS, (2009), 25. 
173  UNAIDS, (2009), 26. 
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treatment scale-up, sub-Saharan Africa’s epidemic continues to outpace the 
response.174  
 
Twenty-five years into the epidemic, it is a well settled position by now that: 
No single intervention, or type of intervention, will result in sufficient or sustained 
support for the well-being of the very large numbers of children affected by HIV/AIDS 
over the extended timescale of the epidemic.175  
Addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic through prevention and treatment efforts is one 
major way of minimising the number of children who may be deprived of their family 
environment in Africa. The magnitude of the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS forces 
governments to devise a range of response mechanisms for the care of their orphans. 
One of these care options, it appears, is intercountry adoption.  
 
Thus, whether to accept or reject intercountry adoption as one means of alternative care 
in Africa requires, at a minimum, an appreciation and understanding of the challenges 
that the AIDS pandemic poses to the continent. Taking into account the current and 
projected orphan numbers on the continent is also a crucial part of this appreciation. 
Any meaningful and concerted intervention to introduce intercountry adoption as one 
means of alternative care demands that all stakeholders take into account the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and its impact, trends and context at grassroots level. 
 
2.4  RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 
 
2.4.1    Sharia, African countries, and adoption 
                                                 
174  As above. 
175  Richter and Rama, (2006), 16. 
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For some, the information that there are more Muslims in Africa than in the Middle East 
may come as a surprise. However, out of a population of almost one billion people, 
estimates put the figure of the followers of the Islamic religion on the African continent at 
a staggering 446 million.176 Thus, Africa is home to 27% of the world Muslim 
population.177 As a result, Sharia, which is said to be a religious set of principles based 
on the four pillars of Islam (namely, Qu'ran178 (Islamic holy text), the Sunna (teachings 
of the Prophet Mohammed), the Ulama (religious scholars) and the Qiyas (case law))179 
is applicable many countries on the continent. 
 
One can find Islam as the religion mainly practised (sometimes as a State religion) in 
any number of countries in almost all corners of the African continent. The Islamic 
region traditionally recognised on the continent is North Africa, which is composed of 
Algeria,180 Morocco,181 Egypt,182 Tunisia,183 Mauritania,184 and Libya.185 The Islamic 
inclination of some of these countries is partly reflected in their official names. For 
                                                 
176  See Kettani, (2009), 1. 
177  The existence of such a significant number of Muslims is understandable if account is taken of 
the fact that the Islamic religion has been present on the continent for a long period of time. A 
number of writers agree that the presence of Islam in Africa can be traced to the seventh century 
when the prophet Muhammad advised a number of his early disciples, who were facing 
persecution by the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the region, to seek refuge across the Red Sea in the 
Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia (present day Ethiopia).  See Kane, (2007), 64-68. 
178  Believed to be a collection of God's revelations to Muhammad, and Islam's sacred scripture, the 
Qur'an delineates the core beliefs of Islamic society and establishes the criterion for being a 
Muslim. The Qur'an is divided into surahs, or chapters, which are arranged according to length 
rather than chronology, so that the longer chapters which represent later revelations actually 
precede the shorter and earlier revelations. See, for instance, Esposito, (1991), 8-9, 19 and 27. 
179  See Khan, (2002), 279; Zarifis, (2002), 22.  
180  Sunni Muslim (State religion) 99%, and Christian and Jewish 1%. See CIA, “The World Factbook: 
Algeria”, (2008). 
181  Muslim 98.7%, Christian 1.1%, and Jewish 0.2%. See CIA, “The World Factbook: Morocco”, 
(2008). 
182  Muslim 90%, Coptic 9%, and other Christian 1%.  See CIA, “The World Factbook: Egypt”, (2008).  
183  Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish and other 1%. See CIA, “The World Factbook: Tunisia”, 
(2008).  
184  Muslim 100%. See CIA, “The World Factbook: Mauritania”, (2008). 
185  Sunni Muslim 97%, and other 3%. See CIA, “The World Factbook: Libya”, (2008).  
 
 
 
 
 70
instance, Libya is officially called “the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” 
while Egypt officially goes by the name of “the Arab Republic of Egypt”.186  
 
Other countries on the continent that apply Sharia to varying degrees include Nigeria, 
Senegal, Somalia, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Kenya. In some 
of these countries, Sharia might apply (to the Muslim community) even in cases where a 
good portion of the population adheres to a religion other than Islam.187  
 
The application of Sharia varies from one country to the other.188 Khan observes that:  
The Shar’ia law broadly influences the legal code in most Islamic countries, but the extent 
of its impact varies widely. In Africa, most states limit the use of Shar’ia to “personal-
status law” for issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody.189 
Therefore, as opposed to areas of taxation and penal law,190 the personal status law 
aspects of Sharia continue to bind the majority of Muslims throughout Africa.  
 
The issue of adoption, which fits squarely within personal status law, remains not only 
an unrecognised institution in Sharia but, through interpretation, a prohibited one.191 
                                                 
186  There is no misconception on the part of this writer that "Arab" is defined independently of 
religious identity, and pre-dates the rise of Islam, with historically attested Arab Christian 
kingdoms and Arab Jews. However, it is a fact that the Arabic language gained greater 
prominence with the rise of Islam in the 7th century AD as the language of the Quran, and Arabic 
language and culture were more widely disseminated as a result of early Islamic expansion. As a 
result, in present day ordinary parlance, the notion “Arab” is usually directly related to “Islam”. In 
1980 the Egyptian Government amended Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which presently 
reads that "Islamic sharia will be the principle [sic] source of Egyptian legislation”. For further 
details on this, see Lombardi, (1998), 81. 
187  A good example is Nigeria, where approximately 50% of the Nigerian population is Muslim while 
40% is Christian. CIA, “The World Factbook: Nigeria”, (2008). Sharia forms part of Nigeria’s legal 
system, and it is applied to the Muslim community. The application of Sharia in Nigeria is an issue 
that has drawn a lot of international attention in recent times. See Anyanwu, (2005-2006), 315. 
188  Olowu, (2008), 70;  
189  See Khan, (2002), 277. 
190  See Schacht, (1964), 76. A similar view is shared by Abu-Odeh who observes that Islamic law 
has survived in the modern era primarily through family law. See Abu-Odeh, (2004), 1043. 
191  Sonbol, (1995, 51; Vite and Boechat, (2008), 21. 
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This argument is primarily based on the reason that “Islam has been attentive to 
genealogical clarity and the preservation of the family structure”192 and that, in order to 
“maintain that, Islam nullifies all those practices that may obscure or eliminate the blood 
bond, such as adoption”.193 The Quranic edict that has been interpreted to prohibit 
adoption reads: 
... Nor hath He made those whom ye claim to be your sons. This is a saying of your 
mouth... Proclaim their real parentage. That will be more equitable in the sight of God. 
And if ye know not their fathers, then (proclaim them) your brethren in faith and your 
clients.194  
However, some scholars contend that “... the principles of Islamic law, or Shari’a, do[es] 
not consist of [sic] immutable, unchanging set of norms, but have an in-built dynamism 
that is sensitive … to changing needs of time” (notes omitted).195 Rehman observes that 
since “Sharia and Islamic family laws are likely to remain relevant to Islamic societies ... 
a consistent review and re-interpretation of the Sharia is therefore of utmost 
significance”.196  
 
By transposing these arguments to current day realities (such as an increased number 
of children deprived of their family environment) arguing the case for allowing 
intercountry adoption in Muslim countries (though likely to be unsuccessful) is not 
impossible. In fact, although the Muslim world seems to be virtually unanimous in 
                                                 
192  UNICEF and International Centre for Demographic Studies and Research, (2005), 12. 
193  As above. For a discussion of children’s rights in Islam, see Badamasiuy, (2009); Nasir, (2002); 
Sait, (2000); Olowu, (2008); Rajabi-Ardeshiri, (2009). 
194  The Quran, 33:4/5. 
195  UNICEF and International Centre for Demographic Studies and Research, (2005), 3-4. Some of 
these scholars believe that patriarchal interpretations create conflict for Muslim women who do 
not have the benefit of a religious education. See, for instance, Al-Hibri, (1997), 3. 
196  Rehman, (2007), 108. 
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holding that adoption, as understood in the western world, does not have support under 
Islamic law,197 Nasir has found one exception in Africa - Tunisia. According to him: 
On 4/3/1958, Act No.27 in respect of Public Guardianship Taking into Care and Adoption, 
was promulgated in an obvious attempt to find a remedy for the growing numbers of 
foundlings and children of refugees, according to the Explanatory Note issued by the 
Ministry of Justice. The Act tried to steer a middle course between the social and Sharia 
exigencies. On the one hand, it granted the right to adopt to every adult, whether male or 
female, on complying with the conditions of being married, possessing civil rights, being 
of sound character, mind and body, and capable of looking after the adoptee... On the 
other hand, honouring the Sharia rule, all the prohibited degrees for marriage purposes 
shall remain observable by the child if his relatives are known (Art.15).198 
It could be argued, if indeed the issue of foundlings was considered a significant 
problem in 1958, it is more so in the present day. However, the Tunisian Act is more 
than 50 years old, and there has been no other Islamic country (as far as this writer 
could ascertain) that has followed suit in Africa. This might be an indication of 
disinterest, or unwillingness to do so on the part of other Muslim countries.  
 
It is doubtful if a rights based argument can be formulated in order to legitimise adoption 
under Sharia as an alternative means of care for children deprived of their family 
environment. As will be shown in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.1 below, intercountry 
adoption is not an alternative means of care that every State Party to the CRC and the 
ACRWC is obliged to undertake. The fact that Sharia does not allow adoption (let alone 
                                                 
197  In Algeria, for instance, the Family Law No. 84/1984 (promulgated 09 June 1984), dealing with 
inheritance, guardianship, maintenance, marriage, wills, gifts, and other related issues, expressly 
provides: “Adoption shall be forbidden, under the Sharia and the law” (Art. 46). Art. 83 of Decree 
No 1/57/379 which forms part of the Code of Personal Status and Succession of 1957 entrenches 
that “[a]doption as understood customarily is void and shall produce no legal effect. Adoption for 
the purpose of rewarding or bequeathing, known as according a person the status of one’s child, 
shall not establish a parentage, and shall be subject to the provision of the will”. See too Pollack 
et al., (2004), 732, 733-752 (partly arguing that the Islamic law of foundlings functions as a close 
substitute for adoption, and also identifying the alternatives to a more robust set of rules that 
would be more accommodating to “quasi-adoptive” relationships). 
198  Nasir, (2002), 153-154. 
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intercountry adoption) does not necessarily demonstrate Islam’s lack of commitment to 
dealing with the issue of children deprived of their family environment. In Islam, a 
number of verses in the Quran are interpreted to enjoin society to provide full care for 
orphans. For instance, the Quran reads: 
And they give food, in spite of their love for it [or for the love of HIM], to the MISKIN [the 
poor], the orphan and the captive...199  
So, too, the practice of Kafalah,200 which is recognised by the CRC201 and the 
ACRWC202 offers children a form of alternative care under Islamic law.  
 
Four points can be highlighted from this discussion. First, receiving countries should be 
sensitive towards the position of Sharia on adoption in African countries. This might 
entail, in its extreme form, not initiating any intercountry adoption processes in respect 
of countries that predominantly apply Sharia.  
 
Second, in multi-religious societies, the application of Sharia’s prohibition of adoption 
should not apply beyond the adherents of Islam. A good example in this regard is 
present in Egypt and Lebanon where intercountry adoption within the Christian 
communities is allowed.203 Thirdly, where countries do not allow adoption, other 
alternative care options such as kafalah should be supported and strengthened so as to 
be able to respond to the needs of children deprived of their family environment.  
                                                 
199  Al-Insan or The Human, verse 8 as cited in UNICEF and International Centre for Demographic 
Studies and Research, (2005), 78. 
200  The practice entails the acceptance of children without families into what is tantamount to a 
permanent form of foster care, but without the children concerned taking on the family name or 
enjoying the right to inherit from the family with whom they are placed. See Hodgkin and Newell, 
(2002), 295-296. See Assim, (2009) for a detailed discussion of kafalah. 
201  Art. 20 of CRC. 
202  Art. 25 of the ACRWC. 
203  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.1 below for a brief mention of countries that do not “recognise” but 
“permit” adoption. 
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Fourthly, in very exceptional circumstances, a recognition that the best interests of the 
child may dictate that adoption be allowed in countries that adhere to Sharia would be 
possible. For instance, in Comoros, despite the wide application of Sharia law, courts 
have sometimes resorted to French civil law in order to legitimise adoption in order to 
promote a child’s best interests.204 To sum up, for any intervention (on the part of both 
receiving and sending countries) in the area of intercountry adoption from Africa to be 
meaningful, an appreciation of the status of the institution in Islamic law should be borne 
in mind.  
 
2.5  ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
2.5.1    Economic context: General 
 
Generally speaking, many economic growth indicators put African countries at the 
bottom of the list.205 As is well known, 80% of the highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) are in sub-Saharan Africa.206 In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people who 
live on $1.25 a day rate was 50 % in 2005; the number of poor has almost doubled, 
from 200 million in 1981 to about 380 million in 2005; and future forecasts are also grim, 
since if the trend persists, a third of the world’s poor will live in Africa by 2015.207 
Furthermore, many African countries continue to face difficulties in debt servicing. Even 
                                                 
204  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Comoros, (October 1998), para. 93. 
205  See, generally, UNECA, (2009). Ironically, this is so despite the fact that the continent is endowed 
with natural resources such as oil, and minerals, and has much potential for growth. 
206  See IMF, (2009).  
207  World Bank, (26 August 2008). 
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when HIPCs transfer the debt they owe to creditors, these transfers have been diverting 
resources from investment in human development and economic recovery.208  
 
Inequality and exclusion from basic services continue to be serious and pervasive 
problems. For instance, in 2002, it was reported that Africa alone accounted for 90% of 
malaria mortality.209 As a general rule of thumb, where malaria prospers most, human 
societies have prospered least.210 In addition, Africa’s population continues to soar. Its 
population growth continues to hover at 2.5% per year, twice that of Latin America and 
Asia.211 While this trend might contribute towards Africa’s competitive advantage in the 
long term,212 it is currently adding ecological stresses to the economic strains. 
 
The current global economic crisis might have its genesis in the developed world, but it 
is already hitting Africa hard.213 As a result, growth in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to 
decline from just under 5.5 % in 2008 to 1.5 % in 2009.214 It even threatens to wipe out 
some of the hard-won socio-economic gains in the last decades.215 
 
The majority of African governments do not have sufficient available resources to 
implement the human rights programmes in the social, health, education and welfare 
sectors that are required to ensure sufficient progress in fulfilling survival and 
                                                 
208  UNDP, (2005), 87. 
209  Sachs and Malaney, (2002), 681. 
210  As above. 
211  Commission for Africa, (2009), 16. 
212  As above. 
213  World Bank, (2008), 1. 
214  Commission for Africa, (2009), 12. 
215  Commission for Africa, (2009),12-13. 
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development rights. Available resources include both financial and human resources, 
and unfortunately many African governments have significant deficits in relation to both.  
 
As a result, it is more true in Africa than anywhere else that private sector corporations, 
including multinationals, donors and other international agencies continue to be key 
players in ensuring “available resources”, rather than States being solely responsible.216 
Unless some dramatic change takes place, this state of affairs is likely to prevail for at 
least the immediate future. 
 
The agenda of much “international cooperation” to Africa is sometimes clouded by a 
lack of transparency, welfarism, or by a humanitarian foundation, as opposed to being 
rights-based or viewed as a legal responsibility.217 Some donors continue to attach 
harmful economic policy conditions to aid and debt relief.218  
 
There is some progress in promoting ownership thereby contributing to the development 
of African solutions, for instance, by working with and through African institutions such 
as the AU and the African Development Bank (AfDB).219 This, however, is not a claim 
that can be made by many development partners in the West.220 
                                                 
216  See, generally, Ad hoc working group on available resources, (2007). 
217  See, generally, Riddell, (1999), 309-335; Riddell, (2007) (for a discussion of some of the 
shortcomings of aid). 
218  See generally Riddell, (1999), 309-335; Conyers and Mellors, (2005), 83-89; Bräutigam and 
Knack, (2004), 255-285; Arimoto and Kono, (2009), 276-287; Djankov et al., (2008), 169-194; 
Loots, (2006), 363-381. Ad hoc working group on available resources, (2007).  
219  Commission for Africa, (2009),13. 
220  Although the 2005 Paris Principles have gone some way towards achieving improved co-
ordination of co-operative efforts and increased accountability of recipient governments, it is 
argued that at grassroots level, the Paris Principles are not showing much effect yet, and are 
even having negative unintended consequences (such as interminable inter-donor and 
intergovernmental meetings, to the exclusion of beneficiary communities, and at the expense of 
actual programme delivery). See Ad hoc working group on available resources, (2007). 
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2.5.2    Economic context: Children 
 
The lack of a strong economy in the majority of the countries in Africa has led to grim 
child well-being indicators.221 The “State of Africa’s Children Report of 2008” paints this 
picture vividly. For instance, in 2006, the under-five mortality rate for sub-Saharan Africa 
was 160 per 1,000 live births, meaning that roughly one in every six children failed to 
reach their fifth birthday.222 Around 45% of sub-Saharan Africa’s population does not 
use improved drinking-water sources.223 In addition, more than 60% remain without 
access to improved sanitation facilities as of 2004.224 Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapid 
population expansion translates to 54 million children under five without access to an 
improved drinking-water source.225 Some 52% of children with suspected pneumonia 
have no access to health services, and pneumonia remains the most prevalent of the 
six fatal diseases that are responsible for about 70% of child deaths in developing 
countries.226 
 
According to “State of the World Children 2008”, current inadequate efforts particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa will be grossly insufficient for the continent to meet the health-
related MDGs for children.227 After all, as succinctly put by UNICEF:  
…six of the eight MDGs can best be met as the rights of children to health, education, 
protection and equality are protected. They will only be sustained as the rights of every 
child are realized. These same six match the goals set out in A World Fit for Children.228 
                                                 
221  See generally, UNICEF, (2008a). 
222  UNICEF, (2008a), 4. 
223  UNICEF, (2008a), 9-10. 
224  As above. 
225  UNICEF, (2008a), 10. 
226  ACPF, (2008a), 4. 
227  UNICEF, (2008b), 1. 
228  UNICEF, (2003), 2. 
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At the mid-point in the global effort to achieve the MDGs by 2015, progress in many 
African countries is not on track.229 And unfortunately, as the final date for the MDGs 
approaches, less than six years away, the world finds itself mired in an economic crisis 
that is unprecedented in its severity and global dimensions. Reports have started to 
indicate that the global economic crisis would mean that more African children will die 
and drop out of school, too.230 
 
The CRC Committee has systematically recommended to many African countries that, 
in light of Article 4 of the CRC,231 States Parties should prioritise and increase 
budgetary allocations for children at national, regional and sub-regional levels in an 
effort to improve the implementation of the rights of the child throughout a country.232 
Some States Parties are criticised for their considerable military expenditure when 
compared to allocations to other services such as education and health.233  
 
Even when the resources are available and the will on the part of stakeholders (most 
importantly governments) exists, the lack of a child budget monitoring system for the 
purpose of tracing the way in which the decentralisation of resources for children from 
                                                 
229  MDG Africa Steering Group, (2008). 
230  Associated Press, (31 August 2009). 
231  The corresponding provision of the ACRWC Art 1(1) provides that: 
Member States of the Organization of African Unity Parties to the present 
Charter shall recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrined in this 
Charter and shall undertake to the necessary steps, in accordance with their 
Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Charter, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the provisions of this Charter. 
Unlike the CRC Art 4, no distinction is made between civil and political rights on the 
one hand and socio-economic rights on the other. 
232  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Eritrea (June 2008), para. 17; Sierra Leone (June 
2008), para. 18; Swaziland, (October 2006); Ethiopia, (November 2006), para. 17; Benin, 
(October 2006), paras. 17 and 18; Republic of Congo, (October 2006), paras. 14 and 15. 
233  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations, Eritrea, (June 2008), para.16; Ethiopia 
(November 2006), para. 16;  
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central organs (like Federal Ministries) to local authorities, frustrates efforts.234 In this 
regard, the CRC Committee has recommended to States Parties that they start budget 
tracking from a child rights’ perspective with a view to monitoring budget allocations for 
children, seeking technical assistance for this purpose from, inter alia, UNICEF.235  Of 
the insufficient resources available too, however, corruption limits the amount that 
ultimately reaches children.236 
 
The existence of social services that specifically target children are very minimal.237 
Except for the South African child support grant,238 and a few limited cash transfer 
schemes in countries, such as Kenya, Namibia, Zambia, and Ethiopia, such services 
are absent. It is worth noting that even non-child specific grants might have a positive 
impact on children. A good example in this regard could be the universal social pension 
in Lesotho where reportedly 65% of the cash is spent on children cared for by older 
persons.239 
 
More often than not, government ministries or departments in charge of children’s 
issues receive only a small fraction of the State annual budgetary allocations, and thus 
they lack adequate funding to carry out their work relating to children. It is reported in 
Sierra Leone that: 
                                                 
234  It is usually difficult to identify the amount of resources allocated to children’s issues in a given 
country. This is partly compounded by the fact that issues such as education, health care and all 
social science budgets do not appear to be disaggregated on the basis of age.  
235  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Sierra-Leone, (June 2008), para. 18. 
236  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations, Republic of Congo, (October 
2006), paras. 14 and 15. 
237  For a discussion of cash transfer schemes in a number of African countries, see Sloth-Nielsen, 
(2008c). 
238  As above. 
239  Samson, (2006). 
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In 2006, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs was allocated a 
total of just over 500,000 USD, the smallest budget of any ministry, despite the breadth of 
its mandate, which encompasses all matters relating to children, women and the 
protection of the vulnerable.240 
The Sierra Leone experience is more the rule than the exception in Africa.241 
 
It is not only the lack of economic resources that are affecting the rights of children in 
Africa. Other factors, such as, lack of human resources, the failure to prioritise children’s 
issues, the legacy of conflict, instability, environmental degradation, and corruption have 
a role to play. Nonetheless, the enormity of the challenge of securing the necessary 
economic resources to protect and promote children’s rights in Africa should not be 
underestimated.  
 
2.5.3   Some preliminary observations on the implications of the economic 
context on intercountry adoption  
 
The economic context outlined above has a number of implications for children’s rights 
in general and their opportunities to grow up in a family environment in particular. The 
dim economic forecasts highlight the fact that the current situation which is 
characterised by lack of resources, absence of social security, inequality, and aid 
dependency is to continue for the foreseeable future.  
 
In the context of intercountry adoption, this means that many African countries will 
continue to struggle to put in place the necessary institutional support systems for 
                                                 
240  Teale, (2008), 366-367 citing Ministry of Finance statistics, May 2007. See too Government of 
Sierra Leone Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2008-2010, (2007), 89. 
241  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Eritrea, (June 2008), para. 17; 
Sierra Leone, (June 2008), para. 18; Swaziland, (October 2006); Ethiopia, (November 2006), 
para. 17; Benin, (October 2006), paras. 17 and 18; Republic of Congo (October 2006), paras. 14 
and 15. 
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children’s wellbeing. These include a sound birth registration system; social security; 
institutions that coordinate and monitor intercountry adoption-related matters; qualified 
social workers, judges and other personnel that deal with adoption issues; awareness 
raising on adoption; combating the effects of HIV/AIDS; and so forth. The capacity to 
collect and analyse vital data is also limited as a result of economic resources. 
 
There is no doubt that aid will be a small part of the solution for Africa’s economic 
problems.242 However, the capacity of donors not only to influence but, in some 
respects, to dictate policies that have a direct bearing upon the realisation of children’s 
rights is immense. 
 
The fact that donors are highly involved, for instance, through intergovernmental 
agencies and NGOs might also lead to a risk of government abdicating its main 
responsibility in respect of spearheading policy and law development that caters for its 
children’s needs. Many of child law reform initiatives on the African continent are donor 
driven. UNICEF in particular plays a significant role. In Swaziland, child law reform 
efforts were initiated and largely sustained by NGOs.243  
 
It is argued that the economic context outlined above partly highlights the dire situation 
of many African children, and the number of factors that influence this context. Any 
policy and legislative proposal for alternative child care, including intercountry adoption 
on the African continent should take this economic context into account. 
                                                 
242  The World Bank estimates that even in the European Union, with a combined GDP of about €8 
trillion, annual aid through the structural and cohesion funds will average less than €50 billion 
between 2007 and 2013. World Bank, (2008), 5. 
243  See, generally, Gallinetti, (2007); ACPF, (2008b), 25. 
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2.6  LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
Many African countries have a plethora of legislation relating to matters which affect 
children. A number of factors characterise this legislation in Africa. Some countries 
which did not recognise adoptions at all before their colonial period might have been 
forced to recognise it during the period that colonial legislation was inherited.244  
 
One common theme most African States share in their legal systems is duality and in 
some instances their incorporation of a hybrid system. For many African countries, both 
the duality and hybrid nature of their legal systems were created as a result of 
colonialism. Norms of Western law, which were received in the territories by colonial 
States, apply along with African customary law.245 Following is a discussion of some of 
the important legal contexts in respect of adoption and child care in general. 
 
2.6.1    Outdated and non-comprehensive nature of some children’s rights 
legislation in Africa 
 
It is Article 4 of the CRC and Article 1 of the ACRWC that provide an obvious basis for 
assuring that legal reform is a core obligation that States Parties agree to undertake. In 
                                                 
244  For instance, this is the case of Lesotho and Swaziland. “Colonial governments often 
promulgated regulations concerning land and labor, regulations that frequently extended to 
specifying conditions of marriage and divorce and patterns of dancing, drinking, and 
entertainment”. Therefore, since these legislation touched upon areas of family law, it would be 
safe to assume that the institution of adoption may have been introduced by colonial legislation. 
Merry, (1991), 890. Davel highlights the absence of the common law concept of adoption in 
traditional African communities. Davel, (2008), 270. In the meantime, since the role law played in 
the colonizing process is an instance of its capacity to reshape culture and consciousness, it is 
not surprising that there has been some resistance towards inherited legislation. 
245  See Himonga, (2008), 73-90. A good example of this is Botswana. In Botswana two entirely 
different and potentially conflicting legal traditions namely the Roman-Dutch law and the English 
common law were received. In addition, marking its dualism, the Botswana legal system co-exists 
the pre-colonial customary law system along with its received foreign legal systems.  See 
Fombad and Quansah, (2006), 53-64; See, too, Otlhogile, (1994); Quansah, (2001). 
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this respect it is true that, increasingly, inherited colonial legislation is being overhauled 
and replaced with modern, more accessible, and often more comprehensive, dedicated 
children's statutes. For instance, writing about the Children’s Act of Kenya, Odongo 
alluded to the fact that one of the intentions of the law reform was to repeal statutes 
which were inherited from the colonial legal system and which predated the 
revolutionary notion of children’s rights.246 However, a significant amount of existing 
legislation relating to matters which affect children in Africa is still outdated (and mostly 
predates the CRC and the ACRWC).247 
 
An assessment of children’s rights in Central African Countries (Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe) has found that judicial systems that are still reliant 
on colonial era legislation make implementation more difficult.248 In relation to 
Botswana’s Children’s Act, which was enacted in 1981, questions have been raised 
whether “the Act fulfils the objectives that were paramount in the minds of the legislators 
then, or whether …its provisions are still relevant in the light of today’s 
circumstances”.249  
 
The observation that a number of outdated laws exist is specifically true in the area of 
adoption laws in Africa, too. Malawi’s Adoption Act, for instance, falls within this 
category. Enacted originally as the Adoption of Children Ordinance in 1949 in pre-
                                                 
246  Odongo, (2004), 421. 
247  See, for instance, Sloth-Nielsen, (2008b), 53-56 for a discussion of the outdated nature of 
children’s rights legislation in a number of African countries and the factors that impel legal 
reform. 
248  Ngokwey, (2004), 186. 
249  Maripe, (2001), 340. In June 2009, the Children’s Act No 8 of 2009 of Botswana was enacted and 
it awaits the finalisation of its regulations for its implementation. 
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independence Malawi, it was formally adopted as the Adoption of Children Act, forming 
part of the Laws of Malawi. Zambia’s Adoption Act was enacted in 1958, before Zambia 
attained independence. The Zambian Government admits that the statute conforms to 
the requirements of the CRC only to “some extent”.250 The Adoption Proclamation of 
1952 of Lesotho is also a colonial piece of legislation which is outdated.251 
 
One of the main recommendations of a sub-regional study involving the review of 19 
Eastern and Southern African countries is that States need to undertake a holistic, 
multi-sectoral, and inclusive audit and review of existing legislation on children.252 Even 
where comprehensive assessments have been undertaken, the study recommends that 
there is need for continuous review and revision of laws.253 
 
2.6.2    Recently completed and ongoing law reform efforts regarding child law 
 
There are examples of some child law reform processes that have been completed and 
the final statutes passed by parliament. These are statutes that have been enacted after 
the adoption of the CRC and the ACRWC. Examples of this are found in Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda. The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 of 
South Africa, parts of which still await promulgation, is a good example of a recently 
passed consolidated child statute. Others include the Child Rights Act of Nigeria (2003), 
                                                 
250  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Zambia, (November 2002), para 226. 
251  Ndumo, (2006), 381. 
252  ACPF, (2008b), 108. While harmonisation efforts are underway in a number of African countries 
such as Namibia and Tanzania, they are still absent in others such as, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, 
and Libya. 
253  As above. 
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the Children’s Act of the Gambia (2005), the Children Act of Sierra Leone (2007) and 
the Children Act of South Sudan (2008). 
 
Other pieces of legislation are not yet at the completion stage and are either in drafting 
or in parliamentary processes. Developments in Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland fall 
into this category. In 2007, in both Algeria and Morocco, a Children’s Code was being 
drafted.254 Angola, Lesotho and Malawi have also consolidated bills on children that are 
still pending.  
 
In many countries certain areas of child law and policy are specifically less developed. 
This is the case, for instance, in respect of child trafficking. A study conducted in 2007 
found that all of the five States of North Africa have not developed a specific policy, 
strategy and plan of action to combat trafficking.255 
 
Despite the disproportionate impact of HIV/AIDS on children, as highlighted above in 
section 2.3.8, the extent to which recent statutes address or incorporate HIV/AIDS-
related issues to ameliorate the plight of affected children is very limited.256 While a 
trend has been noted that HIV/AIDS issues crop up at a policy level, for example, with 
regard to OVC policies in place in many African countries, questions remain about the 
extent to which these are filtered into enforceable national legislation. At this preliminary 
stage, there is the impression that generally statutes either do not address issues 
                                                 
254  IBCR, (2007), 172 
255  IBCR, (2007), 186 
256  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007), 335; See too, generally, Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur (2008d). 
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flowing from the HIV/AIDS pandemic, or that, if they do, they do not do so 
comprehensively.257 
 
2.6.3 Institutional structures for coordinating and monitoring child law 
implementation 
 
In light of Article 4 of the CRC and Article 1 of the ACRWC, States Parties have 
obligations to comply with certain general measures of implementation.258 Under Article 
4 of the CRC, as a general measure of implementation, States Parties are required to 
report to the CRC Committee: 
…on existing or planned mechanism at the national, regional and local levels, and 
when relevant at the federal and provincial levels, for ensuring implementation of the 
Convention, for coordinating policies relevant to children and for monitoring progress 
achieved…” (emphasis mine).259  
 
Thus, States Parties should ensure that governmental departments competent in the 
areas covered by the CRC and the ACRWC maintain effective coordination of their 
activities.  In addition, although self-monitoring and self-evaluation is an obligation for 
governments, the CRC Committee also regards as essential the independent 
monitoring of progress towards implementation by, for example, parliamentary 
committees, NGOs, academic institutions, professional associations, youth groups and 
independent human rights institutions.260  
 
                                                 
257  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 335. 
258  Implementation”, according to the CRC Committee, “is the process whereby States parties take 
action to ensure the realization of all rights in the Convention for all children in their jurisdiction”. 
See CRC Committee, General Comment No 5, (2003), para. 1. 
259  Guidelines for periodic reports of the CRC Committee, (1997), para. 18. 
260  CRC Committee, General Comment No 5, (2003), para 46. 
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Effective implementation of the CRC is said to require “visible cross-sectoral 
coordination ... between different levels of government and between Government and 
civil society - including in particular children and young people themselves”.261 In 
addition, the coordinating body must be empowered and supported at the highest 
possible levels of government to allow it to function at its full potential.262 
 
The CRC Committee has noted with concern, however, that most of these bodies and 
mechanisms are not adequately coordinated, and that they often fail to apply the 
comprehensive approach needed to ensure the full realisation of all children's rights.263 
Moreover, they are often in dire need of institutional capacity, skills and financial 
resources to carry out their mandates.264 A similar view is shared by Doek who states 
that where a plan of action also exists, it is critical that a specific body, such as a 
ministry or an inter-ministerial committee, is mandated and adequately resourced to 
coordinate the implementation of this plan of action.265 
 
In respect of monitoring, it is also indicated that monitoring institutions, if not 
constitutionally entrenched, should at least be legislatively mandated.266 The legislation 
should include provisions setting out specific functions, powers and duties relating to 
children that are linked to the CRC and its Optional Protocols as well as the laws 
relating to children’s rights in the country concerned.267  
 
                                                 
261  CRC Committee, General Comment No 5, (2003), para 27. 
262  CRC Committee, General Comment No 9, (2008), para 15. 
263  CRC Committee, Report to the Secretary General, (1998), 19. 
264  CRC Committee, Report to the Secretary General, (1998), 16. 
265  Doek, (2006), 207. 
266  CRC Committee, General Comment No 2, (2002), para. 7. 
267  CRC Committee, General Comment No 2, (2002), para. 9. 
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It is interesting to note that, even if specialist independent human rights institutions for 
children, ombudspersons or commissioners for children’s rights have been established 
in a growing number of countries worldwide, this is not necessarily a requirement. 
Especially, in the context of Africa, where resources are very limited:  
 … consideration must be given to ensuring that the available resources are used most 
effectively for the promotion and protection of everyone’s human rights, including 
children’s, and in this context development of a broad-based NHRI that includes a 
specific focus on children is likely to constitute the best approach.  A broad-based NHRI 
should include within its structure either an identifiable commissioner specifically 
responsible for children’s rights, or a specific section or division responsible for children’s 
rights.268 
 
In Africa, according to Sloth-Nielsen, “no fewer than 20 countries have established 
national human rights commissions/institutions”.269 In addition, “over 10 
ombudsmen/public protectors are also provided for in African constitutions”.270 Mention 
should also be made of the fact that “a little over 45 constitutions of African countries 
provide for an independent judiciary”.271 Despite this, it is common knowledge that the 
degree of success of these institutions in independently monitoring the implementation 
of children’s rights depends on the strength of particular legal, financial, political and 
social factors in a given country.  
 
Unfortunately, finding a country in Africa which fulfils the majority of the indicators of 
good practice for independent monitoring of the implementation of children’s rights is 
                                                 
268  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 2, (2002), para. 6. 
269  Sloth-Nielsen, (2007), 99. 
270  As above. 
271  As above. 
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very difficult.272 Regressive measures, as opposed to progressive ones, such as in 
Ghana, where the specific department dealing with child rights under the Ghana 
Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice was abolished, are notable.273 
In North Africa, it was reported in 2007 that there has been little progress in establishing 
effective independent national institutions to monitor compliance, and to protect and 
promote children’s rights.274 The Botswana experience highlights that, even though 
Government has displayed a reasonable level of commitment to legislative measures to 
protect children’s rights, implementing the legislative innovations in the administrative 
domain has been very limited.275 
 
What is often overlooked is that States Parties neglect that the CRC and the ACRWC 
enjoin them to take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognised in these instruments.276 This seems to be the 
reason why it is not uncommon in the field of children’s rights in Africa that even when 
the legislative machinery has done its part in enacting legislation, the administrative 
machinery still lags behind.277 There is often a need for administrative structures to be 
re-orientated and strengthened in several ways if the rights of children are to be fully 
                                                 
272  However, save its shortcomings in terms of accessibility and availability to all children in the 
country (which in part relates to the human and financial resources allocated to it) the Special 
Desk for Children’s Affairs within the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance of 
Tanzania is worthy of note.  
273  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Ghana, (2006), para. 15. Here the experience of 
Nigeria with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and its regional offices and in 
particular the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Child Rights within the NHRC could be a 
promising example.  See, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, (2005), paras. 19-
20. 
274  IBCR, (2007), 175 and 190. 
275  Maripe, (2004), 344. 
276  See, Sloth-Nielsen et al. (2009) 76-82 for a discussion of the experiences of some African 
countries in this regard. 
277  Maripe, (2004), 356. 
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recognised in African countries.278 That is why it seems that addressing factors that 
impede progress, including negative social attitudes, stigma, discrimination, taboos, and 
cultural and traditional practices and beliefs, has been identified as an important 
objective in need of concerted efforts. 
 
2.6.4    Justiciability of socio-economic rights (of children) in Africa 
 
All African constitutions recognise human rights in one way or another.279 Civil and 
political rights feature more prominently than socio-economic rights in these 
constitutions. The number of African constitutions that recognise socio-economic rights 
in their Bill of Rights is very limited, since many constitutions recognise this group of 
rights only as Directive Principles of State Policy.280 Subsidiary legislation that 
encompasses justiciable socio-economic rights is also not in abundance on the African 
continent. 
 
In the context of children’s socio-economic rights, an even more limited number of 
instances of constitutionalisation exist. It is important to give credit to South Africa’s 
Constitution that appears to be quite progressive regarding children’s socio-economic 
rights.281 Article 52 of the Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe which provides that the 
“youth...enjoy special protection in order to render effective their economic, social, and 
cultural rights” also deserves mention. However, as observed elsewhere,282 the general 
                                                 
278  See, for instance, Maripe, (2004), 356 in the context of Botswana. 
279  See Heyns and Kaguongo, (2006), 673-714. 
280  Heyns and Kaguongo, (2006), 677. 
281  See Sec. 28(1)(c) of the South African Constitution. 
282  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 343. 
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practice in African countries is to include this group of rights as “Directive Principles of 
State Policy” which are not directly justiciable283 but serve only as guiding principles.284  
 
As Chirwa notes, unlike the position at the regional level, the status of socio-economic 
rights at the constitutional level is markedly less promising.285 It has been proposed that, 
because economic upliftment and gradual recovery of financial health can rightly be 
identified as continental priorities, advocacy of, and research on, measures to enhance 
the fulfillment of children's socio-economic rights must be regarded as key objectives.286 
 
2.6.5    Preliminary observations on some of the implications of the legal contexts 
on intercountry adoption  
 
The legal contexts highlighted above have a number of direct implications for 
intercountry adoption. Outdated legislation might mean that intercountry adoption is 
prohibited, at least in law. A good example of this is Namibia, where it was reported that 
intercountry adoption was illegal in Namibia.287 Outdated laws might also mean, as is 
the case in Liberia, that there are no arrangements to regulate and monitor the 
practice.288 In the absence of a sound regulatory framework, the possibility of 
compromising children’s best interests while undertaking intercountry adoption is high. 
 
                                                 
283  It needs to be noted that this assertion must be qualified in so far as case law from abroad, 
notably India, has supported the use of such directives of state policy as a basis for elaborating 
the normative content of socio-economic rights. 
284  See Sloth-Nielsen, (2007), 91-96 (discussing children’s socio-economic rights in African 
constitutions). 
285  Chirwa, (2008), 105. 
286  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 344. 
287  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Namibia, (February1993), para. 108. 
288  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Liberia, (July 2004), para. 38. 
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As will be discussed below,289 in the absence of promulgated statutory provisions, the 
development of rules and standards governing intercountry adoption in a number of 
African countries has thus far been the preserve of the judiciary. This has been the 
case, for instance, in Malawi and Namibia.  
 
This does not, however, suggest that the judiciary is always prepared to deal with, or is 
aware of, the important issues that are pertinent to children’s best interests in 
intercountry adoption. In fact, as the Infant DB and Infant CJ cases in Malawi show, the 
possibility exists of two directly conflicting judgments not only creating confusion, but 
also compromising the best interests of children.290 Indeed, divergent judicial 
approaches to intercountry adoption are becoming characteristic of regional 
developments in this sphere. 
 
On a positive note, the fact that there remain a number of bills that continue as work in 
progress has a spin-off, too. It implies that there is an opportunity to positively influence 
legislation so that its text can reflect the CRC, the ACRWC, the Hague Convention and 
other international law instruments relevant in the context of adoption. 
 
Recently promulgated statutes also pose a challenge in respect of how these laws are 
operationalised, especially since there is often a shortage of good practices that can be 
identified in regard to implementation.291 This is partly because there is a marked 
                                                 
289  See for instance, Chapter 5, section 5.6.3 on the principle of subsidiarity in Malawi. 
290  It has been alleged that since the first Madonna case, a veritable flood of applications for 
intercountry adoptions of children in Malawi has served before the High Courts. This has led to 
the development of draft guidelines for judges dealing with intercountry adoption applications 
(personal communication, Edward Twea, Judge of the Malawi High Court, 13 March 2009).  
291  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 335. 
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tendency for children's legislation to be implemented only in a piecemeal fashion, or 
only in large towns or capital cities.292 
 
The drafting and enacting of child law without a properly thought out financial plan for its 
implementation characterises many of the child law reforms in Africa. To the writer’s 
knowledge, the only country on the African continent that has implemented a costing of 
child-related law reform is South Africa.293 This absence of costing legislation 
contributes towards making the implementation of new child laws on the African 
continent an incomplete and fragmented effort. Without budgets to implement laws, 
most will continue to remain only paper promises. 
 
The implementation of new child laws in Africa also elevates the need to develop 
training and capacity-building for all those involved in the implementation process - 
government officials, parliamentarians and members of the judiciary - and for all those 
working with and for children to a higher level.  In the context of adoption, social 
workers, probation officers and judges should undergo a process of initial training and 
re-training to increase their knowledge and understanding of the new law, and to 
encourage active respect for all its provisions.  
  
Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapter 6, section 6.3 below, intercountry adoption is 
one field of child law that requires a significant level of cooperation and coordination. 
This should be self-evident from the very fact that the practice often involves a minimum 
of two countries’ authorities, and a number of organs within the country of origin. 
                                                 
292  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 335; Sloth-Nielsen, (2008b), 69. 
293  See, generally, UNICEF Innocenti Case Study, (2007). 
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The lack of proper coordination of the implementation of children’s rights has negative 
implications for the collection of sufficient and reliable data on children, disaggregated to 
enable identification of discrimination and/or disparities in the realisation of rights. As a 
result, finding seemingly basic statistics on how many children are deprived of their 
family environment in a State Party becomes a difficult task.  
 
Lack of effective coordination at the practical level also means that a State Party to the 
CRC and the ACRWC may find it difficult to follow-up and implement the 
recommendations that stem from the CRC Committee and the African Committee. This 
hampers progress in enacting and implementing children’s rights related laws, as 
guidance from experts at the international level will not have the expected impact. 
 
The absence of justiciable socio-economic rights in almost all African countries has 
serious implications for children’s enjoyment of a family environment. For instance, 
where the right to health is not justiciable, HIV-positive parents do not have an 
enforceable claim to ARVs, which in turn contributes to children’s deprivation of a family 
environment. Or, there is a high possibility that the absence of a right (to access) to 
social security might contribute towards parents’ decision to abandon their children 
because of poverty. 
 
Even where socio-economic rights exist in legislation in one form or another, it is not 
expected that the justiciability of these rights will provide a simple or one-dimensional 
solution.294 As Viljoen cautions: 
                                                 
294  Viljoen, (2007), 569. 
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To have meaningful effect, justiciability has to go hand in hand with a respect for the rule 
of law; an independent, functioning and respected judiciary; and the availability of at least 
some resources.295 
Countries in Africa that have a high number of children deprived of their family 
environment generally tend to fall short, at least, of respect for the rule of law, and the 
presence of an independent judiciary.296   
 
African countries should take into account the legal contexts discussed above in order 
to have an intercountry adoption system that complies, at least, with the minimum 
standards prescribed by international law and practice.  They ignore these contexts at 
the risk of violating their children’s rights. 
 
Receiving countries, too, by recognising some of the limitations of the legal contexts, 
should exercise caution in undertaking intercountry adoption with some African 
countries. This might, depending on the attendant circumstances, require establishing 
more detailed safeguards than the norm. For instance, it may mean requesting DNA 
tests where systematic irregularities exist in the determination of adoptable children. 
 
The legal contexts have implications not only on receiving countries, but also on the 
developed world at large. This is the case, in particular, within the framework of 
international cooperation. The CRC Committee, in its concluding observations and 
general comments, often encourages States Parties to seek international cooperation in 
broad terms, either in relation to general or specific issues. States Parties to the CRC 
bear the obligation not only to implement the Convention within their respective 
                                                 
295  Viljoen, (2007), 569-570. 
296  Examples include Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. 
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territorial jurisdiction, but also to contribute, through international cooperation, to global 
implementation.297 There is also a need for continuous technical assistance from 
organisations, such as, UNICEF and the Permanent Bureau of Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, in drafting, enacting and implementing children’s rights (and 
adoption) related legislation in Africa. 
 
2.7  CONCLUSION 
 
An edited book entitled “Intercountry adoptions: Laws and perspectives of ‘sending’ 
countries” published in 1995 did not have any chapter on an African country.298 
However, a decade or so later, a true reflection of a list of sending countries in the world 
would include a number of African countries, as Africa is increasingly becoming the new 
frontier for intercountry adoption. 
 
Premised on the fact that context matters, this Chapter provided a broad overview of the 
important African contexts that are relevant for children’s access to a family 
environment, with a focus on intercountry adoption. It set the platform for an informed 
appraisal of intercountry adoption as viewed through an African lens. It was 
underscored that the African context that is relevant in respect of intercountry adoption 
involves not only legal issues but also a range of social, political, economic, cultural, 
religious, and other factors. 
 
                                                 
297  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (2007), para. 6. 
298  Jaffe, (1995). 
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The historical background of the continent (especially slavery and colonialism) and how 
it should inform any intervention (legal, social and policy) with regard to intercountry 
adoption was underscored. For instance, the delicate nature of intercountry adoption, 
especially when undertaken between former colonisers and their former colonies, and 
the need for caution was highlighted.  
 
The potency of culture in political, legal, and social discourse in Africa is enormous. As 
a result, cultural practices inform children’s rights in Africa to a great extent. The 
extended family (and kinship care) plays a huge role in child care in Africa. Statistics 
show that kinship support structures absorb a lion’s share of the children in need of 
alternative care. The practical and legal implication of according recognition to the role 
of the extended family in respect of intercountry adoption was highlighted. For instance, 
the point was made that laws that attempt to sever completely the ties that existed 
between children and their family, including the extended one, should be questioned. In 
addition, the meaningful recognition (or lack thereof) of the extended family in Africa has 
an implication for the meaning of adoptability, consent to adoption, the nature of 
adoption (open or closed), cultural heritage, and so forth; all of which are issues that are 
central to intercountry adoption. In connection with this, supporting the practice of 
customary adoption (through legislation and policy interventions) was suggested as a 
crucial strategy African countries should adopt to cater for the needs of children 
deprived of their family environment. 
 
Cultural practices and social realities that hamper children’s access to a family 
environment, particularly discrimination against illegitimate children, and the HIV/AIDS 
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pandemic, were discussed. It was submitted that whether to accept or reject 
intercountry adoption as one means of alternative care in Africa requires, at a minimum, 
an appreciation and understanding of the challenges that the AIDS pandemic poses to 
the continent.  
 
In addition many Africans’ attitude of unquestioning submission to authority and 
attitudes to sexual orientation in Africa were broached. In respect of the latter, the point 
was made that homosexual applicants might continue to try to evade the system by 
posing as heterosexual and/or single prospective adoptive parents, and receiving 
countries have a duty to duly inform sending countries of this situation, in order to 
minimise the potential of putting future adoptions from these sending countries at risk. 
 
In discussing a religious context in Africa, Sharia was singled out. The need for 
receiving countries to be sensitive towards the position of Sharia on adoption in African 
countries was argued. After discussing the economic context in Africa, it was concluded 
that the dim economic forecasts highlight the fact that the current situation which is 
characterised by lack or resources, absence of social security, inequality, and aid 
dependency is to continue for the foreseeable future. Many African countries will 
continue to struggle to put in place the necessary institutional support systems for 
children’s well-being. Since the capacity of donors not only to influence but, in some 
respects, to dictate policies that have a direct bearing upon the realisation of children’s 
rights is immense, a call for a participatory child-centred approach was made. 
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Finally, the legal context was highlighted. That there have been great strides in child law 
reform efforts in the last decade is not in doubt. It would not be an exaggeration to state 
that African countries are star performers in the ratification of human rights treaties. 
However, outdated legislation, ongoing law reform efforts, lack of provision of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in domestic law, and inadequate institutional structures for 
coordinating and monitoring child law implementation are characteristic of a number of 
African countries. The drafting and enacting of child law without a properly thought out 
financial plan for its implementation is another factor present in many of the child law 
reforms in Africa. It was recommended that African countries should take into account 
these legal contexts in order to have an intercountry adoption system that complies, at 
least, with the minimum standards prescribed by international law and practice.  They 
ignore these contexts at the risk of violating their children’s rights. In sum, this Chapter 
has argued that a sound and effective alternative care option, including intercountry 
adoption, must be grounded firmly in an African context, taking African realities into 
account. 
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                CHAPTER 3 
 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The three main international instruments that have a direct bearing on intercountry 
adoption are the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), and the Hague Intercountry Convention. 
This has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. This Chapter attempts to appraise in 
detail the legal framework under international law that pertains to intercountry adoption.  
 
In addition to the general principles of the CRC and the ACRWC,1 a number of 
provisions within the CRC and the ACRWC draw upon, reinforce, integrate and 
complement a variety of other provisions, and cannot be properly understood in 
isolation from them.2 The provisions pertaining to intercountry adoption are not an 
exception to this synergy.3 This emphasises the indispensable interconnected nature of 
the CRC’s and the ACRWC’s provisions.4   
 
Therefore, it is important to put the provisions on intercountry adoption in the context of 
the whole Convention and Charter. The instruments themselves host a bundle of 
concepts and rights that should guide the analysis of intercountry adoption. Such a 
                                            
1  Also referred to as the “four cardinal principles” or the “four pillars”. See section 3.3 below for 
detailed discussion of these principles. 
2  See, for instance, CRC Committee, General Comment No 1, (2001), para. 6 in the context of the 
right to education. 
3  Art. 21 of the CRC and Art. 24 of the ACRWC. 
4  See, for instance, General Comment No. 1, (2001), para. 6. 
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discussion serves as a backdrop and helps ground the arguments that follow in 
subsequent Chapters. 
 
Though the Hague Convention is the most directly applicable treaty in the intercountry 
adoption sphere,5 it is Articles 21 and 24 of the CRC and the ACRWC, respectively, that 
precede it and expressly address the practice. However, neither Article 21 of the CRC 
nor Article 24 of the ACRWC on domestic and intercountry adoption have an 
independent existence.6 Therefore, in the interest of completeness, an attempt is made 
to anchor some of the relevant rights, such as the right against non-discrimination, the 
right to a name, and the right to birth registration, in the legal framework regulating 
intercountry adoption. 
 
The fact that a wide array of provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC have a direct, or an 
indirect, bearing upon intercountry adoption can also be inferred from the General 
Guidelines of the CRC Committee that provide for the form and content of the periodic 
reports to be submitted by States Parties.7 According to these Guidelines the 
substantive provisions of the CRC are classified into eight themes.8 Of immediate 
interest for the purpose of this chapter is the theme “family environment and alternative 
care” under which intercountry adoption falls. Under this theme, the relevant Articles of 
the CRC that are listed are: parental guidance;9 parental responsibilities;10 separation 
                                            
5  While the discussions in this chapter mainly revolve around the CRC and the ACRWC, where 
appropriate, reference to the provisions of the Hague Convention is made. 
6  See, UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 5. 
7   CRC Committee, General Guidelines for periodic reports, (2005). 
8   As above. 
9   Art. 5 of the CRC. 
10  Art. 18(1) and (2) of the CRC. 
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from parents;11 family reunification;12 recovery of maintenance for the child;13 children 
deprived of a family environment;14 adoption;15 illicit transfer and non-return of children 
abroad;16 abuse and neglect,17 including physical and psychological recovery and social 
reintegration;18 and periodic review of placement.19  
 
Furthermore, although not included explicitly under the heading “family environment and 
alternative care”, the four cardinal principles of the CRC and the ACRWC that underpin 
the overall implementation of these two instruments, as well as the principle of “the 
evolving capacities of the child”, are of significant relevance. In addition, rights 
pertaining to name and nationality, identity, and birth registration have their own bearing 
on intercountry adoption. Similarly, at least to the extent that intercountry adoption is 
done in an illegal manner, or for illegal purposes, the provisions of the CRC and the 
ACRWC on child trafficking are of relevance.   
 
It should be mentioned at the outset, however, that the list of provisions under the CRC 
and the ACRWC that can be read to have a bearing on the issue of intercountry 
adoption is long. This is patent from the preceding paragraphs. Therefore, a detailed 
exposition of these provisions and their bearing on intercountry adoption is perhaps a 
topic for further research.  
 
                                            
11  Art. 9 of the CRC. 
12  Art. 10 of the CRC. 
13  Art. 27(4) of the CRC. 
14  Art. 20 of the CRC. 
15  Art. 21 of the CRC. 
16  Art. 11 of the CRC. 
17  Art. 19 of the CRC. 
18  Art. 39 of the CRC. 
19  Art. 25 of the CRC. 
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Throughout this Chapter, an attempt is made to look at the content of the right in 
question, its scope, as well as the nature of the corresponding State Party obligations. 
Such discussions attempt to anchor the right in question in intercountry adoption. While 
it is not the objective of this Chapter to reach conclusions regarding the “true” meaning 
of words and phrases in the substantive Articles of the CRC and the ACRWC, where 
necessary, a reasonable construction of provisions is offered. 
 
The analysis in this Chapter is assisted by resort to the travaux preparatoires of the 
CRC. Such an approach is supported by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).20 In addition, reliance on the concluding observations, general comments, and 
recommendations by the CRC Committee are essential in order to form a better 
understanding of the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. 
 
At the regional level, the assistance that could be garnered for this chapter from the 
African regional human rights system, mainly composed of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Committee, is very limited.21 Therefore, 
while acknowledging the regional limitations of the European Court on Human Rights 
(European Court) under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), reference is still made to the effective control machinery and wealth 
of case law offered by this regional body. After all, States Parties to the ECHR are also 
                                            
20  Art. 49 of VCLT.  
21  See Chapter 1, section 1.8.1 and the footnotes therein for a discussion of the African Committee 
and its work to date.  
 
 
 
 
 104
States Parties to the CRC, and the decisions of the European Court may suggest some 
guidelines for the interpretation of some of the provisions of the CRC.22 
 
After this introduction, the chapter sheds some light on the interdependence and 
interrelatedness of children’s rights. Subsequently, the definition of a child; the four 
cardinal principles; and the provisions on alternative care and adoption are explored.  
After this, section five interrogates, amongst others, children’s rights to identity, culture, 
and privacy. In particular, the rights explored include: the right to a name and birth 
registration; the right to freedom of religion; and, albeit briefly, the rights related to child 
trafficking. Some concluding observations are made at the end of the Chapter.                                      
 
3.2 INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERRELATEDNESS OF CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 
 
The fact that human rights are interrelated, interdependent and interconnected is an 
issue that seems to have gathered close to virtual consensus.23  The UN has reiterated 
in various forums its dedication to the interdependence and interrelated nature of 
human rights.24 In the words of Lee, human rights are “like a tapestry; just as the pulling 
of one string may unravel an entire tapestry, so may the denial of one basic human right 
lead to denying other rights”.25 Mutua refers to it as “the often-chanted mantra of the 
indivisibility, interrelatedness and interconnectedness of all human rights” (emphasis 
mine).26  
                                            
22  See Doek, (2006a), 25 (in the context of Art. 9 of the CRC). 
23  The UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, and the CRC all embrace the idea of universality and indivisibility 
of rights. See too Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, (1993), para. 5. 
24  See, for instance, Van Boven, (1982), 51; Sohn, (1982), 15. 
25  Lee, (1995), 330. 
26  Mutua, (1999), 210. 
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As Lopatka, who is sometimes unofficially referred to as the “godfather” of the CRC,27 
observes: “From the standpoint of the Convention, the rights constitute a unity; they are 
complementary and interdependent”.28 This view is shared by Freeman, who writes that: 
[r]ights are invisible and inter-dependent. Human rights - for that is what children’s rights 
are - include the whole range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. 
Denying certain rights undermines other rights.29  
The CRC Committee has often echoed this position.30   
 
One of the strong aspects of the CRC, which is imitated in the ACRWC, is that it implies 
a multi-disciplinary vision of the child. Both the CRC and the ACRWC comprehensively 
group civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural ones.31 They strongly 
re-affirm the indivisibility and interdependence of all rights, and suggest a holistic vision 
of the child. 
 
The nature of children’s rights as indivisible and interrelated connotes that all rights are 
important and essential to the harmonious development of the child. A reading of the 
CRC and the ACRWC as whole instruments lends important insights into how the 
different provisions of the documents might be construed to affect the practice of 
intercountry adoption.32 Such recognition is one of the main reasons why organisations 
working on children’s rights, including UNICEF, are encouraged to “prioritize [their] 
                                            
27  In 1978, as Deputy Chairman of the Commission, he introduced the Draft Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. He was Chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group made responsible by the 
Commission for developing the Draft Convention. 
28  Lopatka, (1999), 87. 
29  Freeman, (2007b), 7. 
30  See CRC Committee, General Comment No. 4, (2003), para. 5. 
31  However, this does not mean that both categories of rights are on the same footing. That this is 
not the case is expressly stated in Art 4 of the CRC where the phrase of “progressive realization” 
is used as the measure to be taken for socio-economic rights.  
32  Graff, (2000), 412. 
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work, recognizing that all rights embodied in the CRC are indivisible and 
interdependent” (insertion mine).33  
 
Two scenarios help to reinforce this point. First, the fact that the integration of children’s 
economic and cultural rights with civil and political rights under the CRC and the 
ACRWC reinforces and resonates with the so-called “indivisibility” of human rights - the 
ways in which the rights regime is an integrated structure at whose core is the dignity of 
every human person.34 Secondly, an analysis of the four cardinal principles of the CRC 
and the ACRWC35 drives the point home that the application of these provisions across 
the board is an example of the interconnectedness of the provisions.  
 
3.3 DEFINITION OF A CHILD, AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
CRC AND THE ACRWC IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION 
 
3.3.1    General introduction 
 
For the application of the CRC and the ACRWC, the starting point is the definition of a 
child.36 It would be incomplete to discuss children’s rights in connection with intercountry 
adoption, without first establishing who a child is. Similarly, as identified by the CRC 
Committee, the so-called ‘‘four pillars’’ of the CRC are considered general principles of 
fundamental importance for the implementation of the whole Convention.37 The four 
                                            
33  Rios-Kohn, (1996) 300. 
34  See Detrick, (1999), 22; Liefaard, (2007), 574. However, it is to be noted that the fact that the 
CRC and the ACRWC do not establish a hierarchy of rights and recognise that they are all 
equally important, interrelated and indivisible, does not mean that actions to ensure their 
realisation should not be prioritised. 
35  See sections 3.3.3-3.3.6 for a detailed discussion of the four cardinal principles.  
36  See Grahn-Farley, (2003), 886. 
37  See, CRC Committee, General Guidelines for periodic reports, (2005), para. 21. 
 
 
 
 
 107
cardinal principles (also known as “the four general principles”) not only capture the 
spirit of the treaty, but also declare its object and purpose.38 These principles have also 
been referred to as “the soul of the treaty”.39 In order for all children to enjoy all the 
rights contained in the CRC and the ACRWC, it is critical for the Articles containing 
these principles to be fully respected.40 
 
The four cardinal principles accord children the right against “non-discrimination”;41 the 
right to have their best interests be a primary consideration in all actions concerning 
them;42 the “inherent right to life, survival and development”; 43 and the right of a child 
“who is capable of forming his or her own views … to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child”.44 The following sections highlight the definition of a child 
and the four cardinal principles in the context of intercountry adoption.  
 
3.3.2    Definition of a child  
 
The definition of a child is a fundamental provision that basically determines the scope 
of application of the CRC and the ACRWC.45  Article 1 of the CRC states that “a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
                                            
38  Rios-Kohn, (1998),146. 
39  Rios-Kohn, (1998), 143. 
40  Rios-Kohn, (1998), 146. 
41  Art. 2 of the CRC. 
42  Art. 3 of the CRC. 
43  Art. 6 of the CRC. 
44  Art. 12 of the CRC. For different ways of grouping the rights established in the CRC, see 
generally LeBlanc, (1995); Detrick, (1992); Van Bueren, (1995). For a brief discussion of child 
participation in the context of the ACRWC, see Mezmur and Sloth-Nielsen, (2009). For a brief 
comparison of the CRC and ACRWC provisions on child participation, see Mezmur, (2008a), 9. 
45  Detrick, (1999), 51. 
 
 
 
 
 108
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.46 Age is a criterion that can help to 
escape the ambiguities and contradictions of other definitions of a child, as it gives 
predictability regarding which rule or provision will apply to whom.47 Therefore, arguably, 
the choice of age 18 in the CRC has contributed for the construction of a uniform 
identity of the child.48 
 
As a product of protracted negotiations, Article 1 of the CRC places limits on who will be 
afforded its protections depending on the age of majority in the law applicable to the 
child in the home country.49 This approach has been a subject of criticism by some 
commentators, one of such criticism being that it contains loopholes relating to 
exemptions for national law that undercut the guarantee of universal rights for all 
children without distinction.50 
 
Article 2 of the ACRWC, on the other hand, offers a clear and concise definition of the 
child as “every human being under 18 years” of age. In addition, unlike the CRC 
provision,51 there are no limitations or attached considerations, so that it may be applied 
to as wide-ranging a number of children as possible. It is promising to witness that some 
of the law reform efforts on the African continent reflect the impact of the ACRWC on 
                                            
46  Art. 1 of CRC. 
47  See Grahn-Farley, (2003), 887.  
48  Grahn-Farley, (2003), 887. There are a number of places in the world where children are 
governed by customary law which does not define childhood by reference to numerical age. 
49  See Detrick, (1999), 58-59; Van Bueren, (1995), 36-37. 
50  See Grover, (2004), 260. 
51  This provision is ambiguous and weak, lacking specific protection within the African context in 
order to take into account child betrothals, child participation in armed conflict and child labour. 
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standard-setting exercises at the national level. In this respect, the definition of a child is 
one example.52  
 
In the context of intercountry adoption, Article 1 of the CRC and Article 2 of the ACRWC 
have an implication for issues such as who can be adopted; who can adopt; and who 
benefits from the protection, provision and participation rights incorporated in these 
instruments.53  
 
Generally speaking, to be adopted, children would be persons below the age of 18. 
However, it is not uncommon to find national laws that limit the adoption of children to 
an age lower than 18. For instance, in The Netherlands, the maximum age at which a 
child can be adopted from abroad is six years old.54  
 
                                            
52  The constitutions of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, follow the 
ACRWC’s definition of a child without exception – that is, as persons under the age of 18 years. 
Although the Constitution of Malawi defined a child as a person under the age of 16, the 
proposed Child (Justice, Care and Protection) Bill seeks to remove the child/young person 
categorisation by adopting a comprehensive definition of the child as any person below the age of 
18 years. Furthermore, in Nigeria, where the 1943 Children and Young People’s Act classified 
only those people under 17 years as juvenile offenders, the Child’s Rights Act of 2003 rectifies 
this and puts the age at 18. A similar problem transpires under Chapter 44 of the Children and 
Young Persons Act of 1945 of Sierra Leone and will most likely be addressed when the Child 
Rights Bill becomes an Act. Egypt adopted a Children’s Code in 1996 which regulates the duties 
and functions of institutions providing juvenile justice services to children and applies to all 
persons under the age of 18. In addition, it is interesting to note that although Morocco is not a 
party to the ACRWC, under Law no 11 of 1999, which amends and supersedes Sec. 446 of the 
Penal Code, a child is defined as a person under the age of 18. In Sec. 2, the Kenyan Children’s 
Act specifically defines a ‘child’ as any person under the age of 18 years. The adoption of the 
definition of a child with no exception (in consonance with the ACRWC) is not without practical 
advantage in the lives of African children, as it helps to extend the protection of the rights under 
the Charter and the CRC to a larger group of persons and to the maximum extent possible. 
53  The rights in the CRC have also been described by some child rights commentators as the three 
Ps:" "protection," "provision," and "participation”. See Cantwell, (1992), 27. 
54  Curry-Sumner and Vonk, (2009), 348. Save exceptions, the U.S. puts this age limit at 16. To cite 
a traditionally sending country as an example, China sets the maximum age for intercountry 
adoption at 13. 
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These ages are fixed by taking into account various policy considerations, such as the 
age at which children tend to bond better; the need to have younger children adopted 
domestically; the assumption that older children should benefit from alternative care 
options other than intercountry adoption; and so forth. This, however, begs the question 
as to whether these measures would withstand the tests of Article 1 of the CRC and 
Article 2 of the ACRWC, as well as the right against non-discrimination.55 
 
States Parties to the CRC and the ACRWC can legitimately provide for minimum legal 
ages defined by national legislation for various purposes (such as, criminal 
responsibility; consent to medical treatment; and end of compulsory primary 
education).56 This, however, should be done by taking into account other provisions of 
the CRC and the ACRWC. In particular, the CRC Committee has emphasised 
consistently that, in setting minimum ages, States must have regard to the general 
principles of the CRC.57  
 
It could be argued that the jurisprudence of the CRC Committee has established that, in 
general, minimum ages that are protective should be set as high as possible.58  On the 
other hand, those ages that pertain to the child’s autonomy demand a more flexible 
                                            
55  See section 3.3.4 below on the non-discrimination principle. The relationship between and 
importance of the non-discrimination principle (Art. 2) in relation to the definition of the child is 
stressed in the CRC Committee Guidelines for periodic reports, (2005), para. 19. 
56  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 4. 
57  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 5. For instance, in cases where there is a difference in the 
legislation between minimum ages for domestic adoption, on the one hand, and intercountry 
adoption, on the other, the extent to which Art. 2 of the CRC and Art. 3 of the ACRWC on non-
discrimination have been given consideration is very crucial. 
58  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 5. These include ages for protecting children from criminalisation, 
involvement in armed conflict, child labour and similar other circumstances. 
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system, sensitive to the needs of the individual child.59 Sensitivity to the individual 
child’s needs bodes well for “the evolving capacities of the child” principle in the CRC.60 
 
In addition, it is observed by Newell and Hodgkin that the “Convention provides a 
framework of principles; it does not provide direction on the specific age, or ages, at 
which children should acquire such rights”.61 As a result, determining whether or not a 
minimum age for a particular purpose is congruent with the letter and spirit of the CRC 
and the ACRWC is not simple.62 
 
Therefore, any minimum ages set for allowing children to be adopted should be the 
result of a process that has taken into account fully the provisions of the CRC and the 
ACRWC. In particular, it should pass the test of the best interests of the child principle, 
and the right against discrimination. The other general principle – namely, the right to 
life, survival and development - is relevant, too. It is submitted that this principle, for 
instance, would require a State Party to take into account a number of factors including: 
the number of children who are permanently deprived of their family environments in the 
country; the viable and suitable alternative care options (other than intercountry 
adoption) available for these children in practice; and also have a proper grasp of the 
age group of these children, as well as the actual profile of those who can benefit from a 
family environment. 
                                            
59  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 5. At this juncture, it is important to note that some issues such as 
minimum age for filing a complaint in court, or of sexual consent, could be cross-cutting issues 
falling in both protective as well as autonomy-related minimum ages.  
60  Art. 5 of the CRC. 
61  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 5. 
62  Although, ages such as the minimum age for criminal responsibility has been established by the 
CRC Committee to be 12. See CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10, (2007), para. 33 in 
this regard. 
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The question of who is to be adopted also brings to the fore the application of the CRC 
and the ACRWC to unborn children. Both the CRC and the ACRWC are silent on the 
beginning of childhood.63 However, the issue of when childhood begins was debated 
during the drafting stage of the CRC.64 Ultimately the end product, as spelt out in Article 
1 of the CRC, is what the drafters arrived at as a compromise upon which all negotiating 
States could agree.65 As a result, the definition in Article 1 allows for several 
interpretations of when childhood might begin,66 and provides scope for each State to 
decide for itself when childhood begins. 
 
Nonetheless, Preambular paragraph 9 of the CRC seems to point towards protection of 
the unborn child by quoting the 1959 Declaration: "the child . . . needs ... appropriate 
legal protection before as well as after birth”. In addition, the inclusion in the CRC and 
the ACRWC of a child's right to life does not include an opinion about the right to an 
abortion.67 The drafters of the CRC did not discuss the abortion issue per se because 
the Convention focuses on the rights of children, born or unborn, not on the rights of 
mothers to decide whether or not to bear a child.68 In this light, some countries provide 
rights to the unborn child.69  
 
In the context of intercountry adoption, or adoption in general, there is legislation that 
does not allow the adoption of a child before the child is born, or has attained a 
                                            
63  See Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 1. 
64  McSweeney, (1993), 472. 
65  McSweeney, (1993), 472.. 
66  For a discussion of the beginning of childhood under the CRC, see generally Janoff, (2004), 163; 
Cohen, (1997), 34; Cohen, (1998), 201; Alston, (1990), 173; Lopatka, (1999), 90-94.  
67  Cohen, (1989), 1450. 
68  As above. 
69  For instance, laws that ban abortion are a good example.  
 
 
 
 
 113
specified age (usually weeks or months).70 These measures are often prescribed to 
protect both the rights of the child as well as that of the mother, and it is argued, they 
are congruent with the spirit and letter of the CRC and the ACRWC.  
 
3.3.3 Best interests of the child  
 
3.3.3.1 Best interests of the child: General 
Despite its controversial nature71 the best interests principle has been in use since at 
least as early as the 19th century.72 The principle has become a term of art used within 
the context of marriage, divorce and separation proceedings, child custody matters and 
other areas of law that affect children. Even in domestic law, references to the best 
interests of the child standard pervade.  
 
The first appearance of the concept in an international human rights instrument was in 
the 1959 Declaration. Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration provided in part that: 
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities… . 
In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration.73 
Subsequently the best interests standard has found its way into the CRC, the ACRWC, 
and the Hague Convention. All these instruments explicitly aspire to advance this 
principle. 
                                            
70  For instance, Kenyan law requires the child to be a minimum of 6 weeks old.  
71  See, for instance, Guggenheim, (2005), 38-43 (arguing that the best interests doctrine is 
"intensely value-laden," and a parental rights doctrine is preferable); Buss, (2000), 312. 
72  See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (1864) 205 ("In the case of a child of tender years, the 
good of the child is to be regarded as the predominant consideration."). 
73  Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration. This was followed by subsequent human rights instruments 
such as CEDAW, Hague Convention of 1980, CRC (and its two Protocols), the ACRWC, and the 
Hague Convention.  
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Arguably the best interests of the child concept has been the subject of more academic 
analysis than any other concept in the CRC.74 However, its appropriate meaning still 
continues to elude academics, lawyers, social workers, legislators, policy makers and 
judicial officers. Not only does the legal meaning of the best interests of the child mean 
different things to different people, but, sometimes, it might connote very polarised and 
contradictory notions. For instance, as Exon notes, “[s]ome may think that blood is 
thicker than water”, and hence “a biological relationship is superior in the adoption 
realm”.75 Yet others might place “precedential value on geography, nationality, religion 
and culture” or “money and prestige”.76 
 
Under the CRC, Alston identified two roles for the best interests principle. First, it has 
been credited as a tool that can “support, justify or clarify a particular approach to issues 
arising under the Convention”.77 Secondly, rather controversially, it is said to be a 
“mediating principle which can assist in resolving conflicts between different rights 
where these arise within the overall framework of the Convention”.78 A third role, it could 
be added, is to serve as a “gap-filling” provision when lacunae are identified.79 
 
Article 3 of the CRC, which is the umbrella provision on the best interests of the child, 
provides in part that: 
                                            
74  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 41. However, writing in the context of the U.S., Kohm observes that 
“[t]he dearth of scholarship, however, on the foundations of this best interests standard for 
children in American family law jurisprudence does not make the judge's job any easier”. Kohm, 
(2008), 337. 
75   Exon, (2004), 3-4. 
76   Exon, (2004), 4. 
77  Alston, (1994), 15-16. 
78  Alston, (1994), 16. 
79  Freeman (2007a), 32 citing Parker, (1994), 26. 
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1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.  
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary 
for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, 
legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, 
shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.80  
The counterpart provision in the ACRWC, Article 4(1), provides that: “In all actions 
concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the 
child shall be the primary consideration”.81  
 
Paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the CRC merits closer examination. As argued elsewhere,82 
both the CRC and the ACRWC emphasise the consideration of the best interests of the 
child principle “in all actions concerning children”. This quoted phrase is intended to be 
interpreted broadly, so as to encompass any action that directly or indirectly affects 
children.83 As Freeman correctly demonstrates, “[t]he decision to build a new major road 
concerns children”.84 The decision to go to war, decisions taken in relation to global 
warming, and the passing of laws about cloning, too, are material to children’s 
interests.85 South African Constitutional Court Justice Sachs expresses this idea thus: 
The word paramount [in relation to the best interests principle] is emphatic. Coupled with 
the far reaching phrase ‘in every matter concerning the child’, and taken literally, it would 
                                            
80  Art. 3(1) and (2) of the CRC. 
81  Art 4(1) of the ACRWC. However, the best interests principle is also referred to in six other places 
in the Charter. Article 9(2) on freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 19(1) on 
parental care and protection; Article 20(1)(a) on parental responsibilities; Article 24 on adoption; 
and Article 25(2)(a) and 25(3) on separation from parents all refer to the best interests of the child 
principle. It is to be noted that within the CRC too, the best interests principle appears in various 
provisions. 
82  See, for instance, Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008b), 23 -25. 
83  During the drafting of the CRC, an early draft of Art 3 read "[i]n all official actions concerning 
children," but the word "official" was dropped to broaden the scope of the provision. 
84  Freeman, (2007a), 46. 
85  As above. 
 
 
 
 
 116
cover virtually all laws and all forms of public action, since very few measures would not 
have a direct or indirect impact on children, and thereby concern them.86 
 
While Article 3(1) of the CRC and Article 4(1) of the ACRWC are essentially the same, 
the latter provides that the best interests of the child should be the primary 
consideration. Under the CRC there is a downgrading of the primacy of best interests of 
the child as it speaks of the principle being “a” primary consideration. It is apparent from 
the drafting history of the CRC that the Working Group considered, and rejected, 
making the best interests of the child "the" primary consideration.87 Therefore, in order 
to reach consensus, the Working Group replaced "the" with "a", the implication being 
that other considerations, in addition to the best interests of the child, can assume 
primacy.88 In Africa, few examples exist of countries that have domesticated “the 
primary consideration” phrasing of the principle.89  
 
CRC Article 3(1)'s and ACRWC Article 4(1)’s use of "shall" is unqualified, enjoining 
States Parties to take affirmative actions to provide for the enumerated rights. However, 
the use of the word “undertake” in Article 3(1) of the CRC might be labelled to indicate a 
lesser degree of obligation, since the promise to “undertake” an obligation, arguably, 
requires only a good faith effort for a State Party to be in compliance, and does not 
necessarily require success.90 Similarly, the obligation to “undertake to ensure” in Article 
                                            
86  See M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC) (hereafter M v S) 
 para. 25. 
87  Considerations, (1989), para. 125. 
88  Considerations, (1989), para. 125. 
89  See Art. 36(2) of the Ethiopian Constitution; Art. 3(2) of the Children’s Protection Bill of 2004 of 
Lesotho. 
90  See Cohen and Davidson, (1990), 36 -37. 
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3(2) of the CRC has been equated to a contractual, or semi-contractual obligation, with 
less force perhaps than an imposed one91 - such as the duty “to ensure”. 
 
The wording “any person or authority” in the ACRWC seems to indicate the wide scope 
of application envisaged for the best interests of the child principle. Not only are state-
initiated actions concerning the child bound by the best interests principle, private actors 
too should take all actions concerning the child in accordance with the best interests 
principle. 
 
This, however, would raise a number of questions. The main one is, if “any person” is to 
be read literally to cover all private actors, does it mean that the State has to ensure that 
every non-state decision maker in society – every parent, every business enterprise, 
and every other child or adolescent, for instance – makes sure that every decision in 
any matter affecting a child should be made in the best interests of the child?  
 
It is argued that the answer to this question is in the positive. This line of interpretation 
has textual support. Throughout the ACRWC, where the term “any person” is used, the 
reference is to individual non-state actors. For instance, in Article 29 (a) which 
entrenches that States Parties shall take appropriate measures to prevent “the 
abduction, the sale of, or traffick of children for any purpose or in any form, by any 
person including parents or legal guardians of the child”, “any person” refers to 
individual non-state actors. It is submitted that the same is true for Article 42(c) of the 
                                            
91  Freeman, (2007a), 67. 
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ACRWC.92 This wording can be contrasted, for example, with Article 7 of the ACRWC 
dealing with child participation, which does not mention “any person or authority”.93  
 
In addition, recourse to rules of legal interpretation as codified in the VCLT would 
validate this point. The primary rule of interpretation is the “ordinary-meaning” rule: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.94  
And, in ordinary parlance, “any person” is a catch-all phrase that means “anyone”. 
 
One common ground used to criticise the principle is its indeterminate nature.95 It is 
argued, for instance, that “what is best for a specific child or for children in general 
cannot be determined with any degree of certainty”.96 In support of this assertion, it is 
submitted that;  
For a determinate answer to the question of what would be in the child’s best interests, 
(a) all the options must be known, (b) all the possible outcomes of each option must be 
known, (c) the probabilities of each outcome occurring must be known and (d) the value 
attached to each outcome must be known.97 
In an attempt to demonstrate the diverse interpretations the principle attracts, Alston 
noted that; 
                                            
92  Which provides that the functions of the Committee shall be, amongst other things: 
(c) To interpret the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State 
Party, an Institution of the Organization of African Unity or any other person or 
Institution recognized by the Organization of African Unity, or any State Party. 
93  Commenting on Art. 12 of the CRC, which uses similar language to Art. 7 of the ACRWC, 
Abramson argues that if the drafters of the CRC had wanted the “child participation” provisions of 
Art. 12 of the CRC to apply to non-state actors too 
...they would have used suitable language to do it, such as, ‘shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that parents, legal guardians, and any other 
person will allow the child to freely express….  
Abramson, (2006), 5. 
94  Art. 32(1) of VCLT. 
95   See, for example, Peskind, (2005), 449. 
96  Elster (1987), 12. 
97  Elster (1987), 12. 
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... it might be argued that, in some highly industrialised countries, the child’s best 
interests are ‘obviously ‘ best served by policies that emphasize autonomy and .... In 
more traditional societies, the ... the principle that ‘the best interests of the child’ shall 
prevail will therefore be interpreted as requiring the sublimation of the individual child’s 
preferences to the interests of the family or even the extended family.98 
 
While the main challenge remains in understanding what is meant by “the best interests 
of the child”, compounded by the absence of an accepted definition,99 general 
observations about the principle can be proffered.  At the outset, it should be pointed 
that, even though it is one of the cardinal principles of both the CRC and the ACRWC, 
the best interests of the child principle should respect the other three cardinal principles. 
More often than not, if a certain measure goes against any of the other three pillars of 
the CRC and the ACRWC, for instance, the rule against discrimination,100 it is unlikely 
that it would pass the best interests of the child test.  
 
Resort to the CRC Committee’s jurisprudence in the form of General Comments could 
shed some further light on what is meant by the best interests of the child, albeit in the 
context of specific themes. For instance, premised on the scarce attention that has been 
paid to the principle as a primary consideration in the planning and implementation of 
policies and programmes for the prevention, care and treatment of HIV/AIDS, the best 
                                            
98  Alston, (1994), 5. 
99  According to Eekelaar, best interests can be defined as:  
Basic interests, for example to physical, emotional and intellectual care 
developmental interests, to enter adulthood as far as possible without 
disadvantage; autonomy interests, especially the freedom to choose a lifestyle of 
their own. 
This definition too needs further unpacking if it is to offer any concrete suggestions in countering 
some of the points raised by detractors of the principle mentioned above. Eekelaar, (1992), 230-
231.  
100  For instance, when the principle is incorporated in national law, it should not reflect either direct or 
indirect discrimination on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds under the CRC and the 
ACRWC. 
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interests of the child in the context of HIV/AIDS requires that “[t]he child should be 
placed at the centre of the response to the pandemic, and strategies should be adapted 
to children’s rights and needs”.101 In the light of the rights of children with disabilities, 
too, the best interests of the child principle dictates that institutions and other facilities 
that provide services for children with disabilities are expected to conform to standards 
and regulations that should have the safety, protection and care of children as their 
primary consideration.102 It is argued that this consideration should outweigh any other 
and under all circumstances, for example, when allocating budgets.103 Within the 
context of unaccompanied and separated children, the CRC Committee is of the view 
that: 
A determination of what is in the best interests of the child requires a clear and 
comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including her or his nationality, 
upbringing, ethnic, cultural and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and 
protection needs.  Consequently, allowing the child access to the territory is a 
prerequisite to this initial assessment process.104 
In addition, seemingly subsidiary matters “such as the appointment of a competent 
guardian as expeditiously as possible” are considered to serve “as a key procedural 
safeguard to ensure respect for the best interests of an unaccompanied or separated 
child”.105 In connection to this, it would be remiss not to mention that the UNHCR has 
developed Guidelines on the best interests of the child in the context of unaccompanied 
and separated children.106  
                                            
101  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), para. 10. 
102  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 9, (2006), para. 30. The principle should be the basis on 
which programmes and policies are set and the principle should be duly taken into account in 
every service provided for children with disabilities and any other action affecting them. General 
Comment No. 9, (2006), para. 29. 
103  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 9, (2006), para. 30. 
104  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 6, (2005), para. 20. 
105  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 6, (2005), para. 21. 
106  UNHCR, (2008).  
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These understandings of the CRC Committee of the best interests principle, however, 
may only serve as general guidance - hence the title “General Comment”. There still is a 
considerable need for interpretation in order to apply this guidance to real cases. For 
instance, how does one balance competing interests between the views of the child, the 
views of parents, the views of the court, and the position of any other professionals, 
when these views are in conflict?   
 
The English case,107 which is famously known as the “Zulu boy case”, is a good 
illustration of the complexity of disputes about children and the determination of their 
best interests.108 Central to the case was the question whether it is in a nine year old’s 
best interests to remain in Britain with his foster mother or to return to his biological 
parents in South Africa.109 The foster mother brought the child, who was 18 months old 
at the time, to Britain in 1992 when she took British citizenship. This was done with the 
parents’ consent as they viewed the arrangement to be good, amongst other reasons, 
for the child’s education. However, a problem arose when the biological parents started 
legal proceedings to have the child returned, after discovering in 1994 that the foster 
mother had launched an attempt to adopt him. By the time the case reached a 
substantive hearing, the child had been in the care of the foster mother for almost ten 
years, the last four of which had been spent in England. The child had maintained that 
                                            
107  Re M (Child’s upbringing) (1996) 2 FLR 441. 
108  In this case, amongst others, the conflicts involved were between the interests of prospective 
adoptive parents versus the interests of biological parents; the views of the child versus the views 
of biological parents and the views of the court; and culture and biology on the one hand, and 
nurture on the other. For a discussion of this case, see, Fortin, (2003), 435. 
109  Freeman, (2007a), 29. 
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he did not want to return to live in South Africa.110 Their Lordships described this 
decision as "difficult and anxious". Lord Justice Neill said that the child “… has the right 
to be reunited with his Zulu parents and with his extended family in South Africa”.111 It 
was also stated that the child’s development “must be, in the last resort and profoundly, 
Zulu development and not Afrikaans or English development”.112 
 
This Judgment has been a subject of criticism.113 Assessed against the provisions of the 
CRC and the ACRWC, especially the requirement to make the best interests principle a 
primary (if not the paramount) consideration, it leaves much to be desired. For instance, 
almost all the considerations taken into account by the Court seemed to have made the 
interests of the biological parents paramount - which has the unfortunate overtone of 
considering the child “as the property of its biological parents”. In addition, the role of 
the views of the child, as one important element in defining the best interests of the child 
was ignored. While to consider a child’s views and to attach less or no weight thereto, is 
one thing, to completely not consider them is quite another thing. While a prima facie 
right of the child to be brought up by its natural parents exists in both the CRC and the 
ACRWC, compelling factors – mainly the best interests of the child – can, and should be 
able to, override this prima facie right. Both the CRC and the ACRWC support a child’s 
cultural background,114 but there is no textual support in these instruments that propels 
the inference that cultural considerations trump all other rights. Measures that were less 
                                            
110  The follow-up to the case suggests that the child had not been settled in South Africa after the 
court decision and that six months on he had returned to England with his biological parents’ 
agreement. See Freeman, (1997), 382; Fortin, (2003), 427. 
111  Re M (Child’s upbringing) (1996) 2 FLR 441, 454. 
112  As above.  
113  For such media criticism, The Independent, (10 March 1996). 
114  See section 3.5.3 below on cultural identity and children’s rights in adoptions. 
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intrusive in order to ensure the “continuity in the child’s upbringing”,115 such as, making 
an order for contact with the biological family, and requiring the foster mother to obtain 
Zulu lessons for the child,116 would have fulfilled some of the concerns of the Court and 
the biological parents, and would have served some of the best interests of the child.117 
 
3.3.3.2 Best interests of the child: Intercountry adoptions 
It is the very principle - the best interests of the child - that has been credited with being 
the justification behind international law developments in adoptions.118 During the 
drafting of the CRC, it was Barbados’s initial proposal that the best interests of the child 
principle required that the CRC should establish provisions on the rules and procedures 
for adoptions.119 
 
Article 21 of the CRC stipulates that “States Parties that recognize and/or permit the 
system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration…”. This provision is duplicated almost word for word in Article 
24 of the ACRWC. There is a clear shift from the reference to the best interests of the 
child being “a primary consideration” in Article 3 of the CRC to being “the paramount 
consideration” in the context of adoptions. 
 
The drafting history of this provision tells of a conscious decision to make the best 
interests of the child “the paramount consideration”. A simple reference to the best 
                                            
115  A phrase used in Art 20(3) of the CRC. 
116  Presumably to promote continuity with his heritage. Freeman, (1997), 382. 
117  Freeman, (1997), 382.  
118  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 22. 
119  Travaux Preparatoires (1995), 5 as cited in Vite and Boechat, (2008), 22. 
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interests of the child, similar to that in Article 3(1) of the CRC, was considered to be 
insufficient,120 for instance, because it was considered inadequate to counter the 
possibility of the parents’ interests intervening in the determination of the best interests 
of the child.121 
 
It is argued that Article 21 of the CRC (and Article 24 of the ACRWC) establishes “… 
that no other interests, whether economic, political, state security or those of the 
adopters, should take precedence over, or be considered equal to, the child’s”.122 In 
addition, by declaring “that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration” with regard to adoption systems, Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of 
the ACRWC appear to lay down a clear base from which all adoption policy should 
flow.123 The use of the peremptory “shall” in these Articles is significant, too. 
 
The full (tongue twisting) title of the Hague Convention (The 1993 Hague Convention on 
the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption) belies 
its chief aim which is to uphold the best interests of the child in intercountry adoption law 
and practice. Explicit mentions of the principle predominate in the Hague Convention.124 
According to the Preamble, for instance, the best interests of the child recognises that 
the most ideal place for a child's growth is in a "family environment”.125  
 
                                            
120  Detrick, (1999), 347. 
121  As above. 
122  Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 296. 
123  Graff, (2000), 416. 
124  It features six times in the Convention - in the Preamble, and in Arts. 1, 4, 16, 21 and 24. 
125  Preamble CRC and ACRWC. 
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Under a section entitled “measures supporting the best interests principle”, the Guide to 
Good Practice prepared by the Permanent Bureau identifies three main areas that 
would help promote the best interests of the child in adoptions: efforts to combat 
abduction of, sale of and trafficking in children to ensure that a child is genuinely 
adoptable; efforts to collect and preserve as much information as possible about the 
child’s origins, background, and medical history; as well as ensuring a matching that 
meets the needs of the child with the qualities of the adoptive parents and family.126 It is 
submitted that, in a broader sense, however, almost everything that is contained in the 
Hague Convention (or, for that matter, the CRC and the ACRWC, too) is what the 
drafters thought would serve to promote the best interests of the child.127  
 
Procedurally, the best interests of the child require that the proposals of adoptable 
children by countries of origin should be given priority over the requests of receiving 
countries.128 In practice this would entail the dispatching of files of children in need of 
intercountry adoption by States of origin to the potential receiving States, rather than the 
other way round.129 
 
Post-adoption contact is yet another sphere where the best interests of the child could 
play a role.130 In some quarters, there is still some debate on who decides whether or 
                                            
126  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 31-32. 
127  This ranges from respect for the subsidiarity principle to the “no initial contact” rule; from the 
establishment of the necessary institutional structures to regulating the costs of intercountry 
adoptions; and from ways of cooperation between the authorities of ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ 
countries to rules on post-adoption matters. 
128  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 27. 
129  As above. 
130  For the discussion of some of the advantages of post-adoption contact, see Maldonado, (2008), 
321. But, for post-adoption contact to happen, open adoption should be promoted. 
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not post-adoption contact is in the best interests of the child.131 The option is sometimes 
left for courts to decide, while in other circumstances it is left as the preserve of the 
adoptive family.132 Whichever position of the debate one takes, it is important to 
recognise the role of the child’s views in such determination. 
 
At a general level this writer shares the view of Freeman that “[p]ost-adoption contact 
makes little ... sense when the adoptee is a baby”.133 However, the best interests of an 
older child (whom Freeman describes as “where the child concerned has a sense of 
his/her being, his/her relationships and his/her status”134) could certainly dictate that 
post-adoption contact be allowed. In fact, in the context of older children, the best 
interests of siblings who are also children (if not adopted together) might dictate that 
post-adoption contact is an imperative. 
 
In deciding intercountry adoption cases, it is advisable that courts invest their energies 
in matters that address the welfare of the child. Taking account of considerations that do 
not help promote the best interests of the child in adoptions could be labelled as an 
abuse of discretion.135 For instance, it has been found that the denial of an adoption 
order because the adoption would terminate a family name, meaning that the family line 
would cease to exist, can hardly be labelled as being in the best interests of a child.136 
Rather, it is a scenario that interjects the interests of others, or a general interest in a 
                                            
131  See Strasser, (1999), 1023. 
132  As above. 
133  Freeman, (1997), 379. 
134  As above. 
135  Hester, 248 S.E.2d at 539 cited in Smith, (2009), 278. 
136  As above. 
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"family name and the heritage which accompanies it",137 thereby compromising the best 
interests of the child. From this follows the discussion in the next paragraphs on 
conflicting interests in intercountry adoptions. 
 
In sum, it could be argued that with no clear definition or criteria of what constitutes the 
best interests of the child, the adoption process becomes less certain, less uniform, 
and, ultimately, more difficult to implement in practice. In the meantime, it is submitted 
that the indeterminacy of the best interests standard does not necessarily produce a 
result which is detrimental to children. In fact, the absence of a fixed and inflexible 
definition of what constitutes best interests allows for a case by case consideration, and 
facilitates a context-dependent application to the individual child.  
 
3.3.3.3 Best interests of the child versus “best interests” of biological 
parents and (prospective) adoptive parents  
 
Some argue that an intercountry adoption regime should have, if not at its centre of it, at 
least related thereto, the best interests of the adoptive parents. For instance, in a self-
explanatory article titled “Intercountry adoption: Towards a regime that recognizes the 
‘best interests’ of the adoptive parents” Steltzner emphatically argues that prospective 
adoptive parents’ “best interests” rests on their capacity to make fully informed adoption 
choices.138 In this regard, Steltzner expresses disquiet with some adoption agency 
practices whereby prospective adoptive parents are misinformed about the true physical 
and mental condition of the children to be matched with them. The article suggests that 
any policy that distorts the ability of parents to make this assessment should be 
                                            
137  Smith, (2009), 279. 
138  Steltzner, (2003). 
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reviewed with great scrutiny.139 This approach, it is submitted, could be accommodated 
within the best interests of the child principle.140 
 
A conflict could ensue between the interests of prospective adoptive parents, biological 
parents, and the best interests of the child. Especially in contested adoptions, those e 
situations in which biological parents and adoptive parents fight for custody of a child, all 
too often the child's interests are not considered when determining with whom she will 
ultimately reside. To demonstrate these conflicts, and the balancing acts necessary to 
promote the best interests of the child, the following discussion highlights the highly 
publicised American case of Baby Jessica141 and a lesser known case from South 
Africa.  
 
The facts of the Baby Jessica case involved an unwed mother (Cara Clausen) who 
gave birth to the child on 8 February 1991 and put the child up for adoption. 
Subsequently, not only did the mother sign papers relinquishing her parental rights, she 
also lied about the identity of the biological father and had another man sign the 
release-of-custody form terminating the father's parental rights. Within days, the child 
was placed with a couple (Roberta and Jan DeBoer) who named her Jessica. Soon 
thereafter the DeBoers filed a petition for adoption. The Court terminated Clausen's and 
the named father's parental rights.  
 
                                            
139  Steltzner, (2003), 152. 
140  In fact, it fits squarely within that principle, as the matching of special needs children with adoptive 
parents who are not fit and proper to cater for their special needs goes against the children’s best 
interests. 
141  DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
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However, a problem arose nine days later when Clausen filed a request to revoke the 
release-of-custody, together with an affidavit naming the true biological father as Daniel 
Schmidt. Schmidt filed a petition asserting his parental rights and expressing his 
opposition to the adoption within about one month after Jessica's birth. Clausen and 
Schmidt married in April 1992. Despite this, the DeBoers, believing their petition for 
adoption would be granted, kept Jessica with them. 
 
The trial and appellate courts ruled that the natural father's rights had not been 
terminated in accordance with the law, in that there was no indication that the natural 
parent was unfit.142 After their unsuccessful attempts to obtain legal custody of, and 
adopt, Jessica in Iowa, the DeBoers filed a petition in December 1992 in a Michigan 
court, asking for custody of Jessica in her "best interests”. Even though the parties went 
through various trial and appellate level courts, all the courts involved refused to 
consider the best interests of the child unless the requisite grounds were met to 
terminate the Schmidts' parental rights.143 
 
On 26 July 1993 the U.S. Supreme Court entered an order denying a stay of the 
Michigan Supreme Court's decision, reasoning that the DeBoers claim that Jessica's 
best interests will be served by allowing them to retain custody of her was based, in 
part, on the relationship that they had been able to develop with the child after it 
became clear that they were not entitled to adopt her. He stated that neither Iowa law, 
                                            
142  This was upheld even though there were allegations that he had abandoned two children 
previously born of other women prior to the birth of Jessica.  
143  Quilloin v Walcott, 434 US 246, 255 (1978), where it is stated that regardless of how a state 
structures its proceedings, the Supreme Court has stated that the state must show that the 
parents are unfit before a court can determine whether termination would serve the child's best 
interests. 
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Michigan law, nor Federal law, authorized unrelated persons to retain custody of a child 
whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, simply because they are better 
able to provide for her future and her education. On 3 August 1993 the DeBoers were 
forced to give Jessica to the Schmidts, almost two and a half years after they had taken 
custody of her.144 
 
In another illustrative case, in South Africa, In the matter of Bryony Disemelo (Child 
concerned), Lynn Noble (First applicant), Regina Ramodia (Second applicant),145 the 
Court was seized of two counter applications to adopt a child. The child’s mother and 
father had given signed consent in favour of the second applicant, who was also the 
aunt of the child. However, the first applicant who had been giving care to the child 
since she was four months old, had also applied for an adoption order. On 12 June 
2003, Ms. Noble applied for the adoption of the child while Mrs. Ramodia, applied to 
adopt the same child on 9 September 2003.  
 
It was the mother’s assertion that, when she left the child at the hospital, she had 
thought that the child would be safe; that her sister would visit the child; and, since she 
had left her address (at her sister’s home in Johannesburg where she was initially 
staying) with the hospital, that she had thought she would be contacted once the child 
was ready to be discharged.146 She further disputed the assertion that she had 
abandoned her child by stating that she was informed that her sister had attempted to 
see the child, but had not been allowed to do so by the hospital; and that upon her 
                                            
144  See Miller, (1994), 497. 
145  Case number 14/1/2-52/2003 in the Children’s Court for the District of Randburg. 
146  As above. 
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return to Johannesburg, she had gone to the hospital but had been referred by the 
hospital to the Social Worker who informed her of the status of the child with Ms. 
Noble.147 
 
The Court, in deciding the case, placed the best interests of the child at the centre of its 
inquiry. It summoned a number of professionals, from social workers to psychologists, in 
its quest to determine where the best interests of the child lay. In fact, in a 
commendable appreciation of the fact that the child’s best interests may not necessarily 
be represented either by the family of origin or the prospective adoptive parent, the 
Court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child. After a thorough examination, the 
Court decided that the child should remain with Ms. Noble. 
 
The common thread that runs through these two cases is that the “best interests” of 
prospective adoptive parents, adoptive parents, and biological parents can be 
accommodated within the best interests of the child principle if they are, as a minimum, 
either neutral or, preferably, in agreement with the child’s best interests. A tension exists 
when these “best interests” conflict with the best interests of the child. A legal 
framework that considers the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration 
would make children’s rights the overriding factors in making decisions about them. 
However, a legal system that considers the best interests as a primary consideration 
would do a balancing act, and weigh up all competing interests before arriving at a 
decision. 
 
                                            
147  As above.  
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At times, national interests might also come in conflict with the best interests of the child 
in intercountry adoptions. To illustrate: Marx’s article entitled “Whose best interests does 
it really serve? A critical examination of Romania’s recent self-serving international 
adoption policies”,148 criticises the moratorium placed on intercountry adoptions from 
Romania. She argues that Romania is hiding behind the best interests standard 
promulgated in international treaties and using it to justify its own narcissistic policies.149 
While the validity of the argument is not embraced by this writer,150 it nonetheless can 
demonstrate the perception that national interests might be viewed as compromising 
children’s best interests. 
 
3.3.3.4 Best interests of the child: Limitations  
Even though the best interests of the child principle should be the paramount 
consideration in adoptions, it appears that, in one sense, it could be circumscribed by 
the legal necessity of complying with legal requirements and securing the necessary 
consents.151 If such compliance is not present, it is insinuated that the adoption should 
not proceed even if it is viewed to be in the best interests of the child.152 Could it be 
argued that such an approach undermines the “paramountcy” of the best interests of the 
child principle? 
 
                                            
148  Marx, (2007), 373. 
149  As above. 
150  Mainly because the reason for the moratorium was to protect children’s best interests until a 
comprehensive regulatory framework is set in place. 
151  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 288. 
152  As above. However, it is interesting to note that some national courts accord the best interests 
principle overriding value even when it is apparent that the adoption was done in breach of 
international or national law. For instance, in Germany, in AG Hamm, 17 April 2006 – XVI 44/05, 
363, the court ruled that a foreign adoption can be recognised even if it is legally flawed as long 
as it serves the interests of the child and is consistent with the essential principles of German law.  
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Nonetheless, such line of argument is difficult to sustain irrespective of how relatively 
“best interests” are defined. For instance, it is submitted that, if the adoptability 
requirement is not complied with, it is difficult to maintain that it is in the best interests of 
a child to be adopted.153 In addition, where the consent of natural parents is not secured 
in contravention of legislation, it is safe to assume that the child’s and the parent’s right 
to family life would be violated.154 Such an adoption could hardly be labelled in the best 
interests of the child.   
 
The possibility exists that a child’s best interests could be limited by consideration of the 
best interests of another child or children. In the context of intercountry adoption, for 
instance, if the adoption of a child has the capacity to compromise the rights of other 
children in the new household (for instance, their right to health care or their right to 
education), the child’s best interests could be limited by the best interests of children in 
the household. This seems to be one of the reasons why courts usually want to 
establish the financial capacity of prospective adoptive parents, before allowing them to 
bring an additional child into their family. 
 
3.3.4 Non-discrimination 
 
3.3.4.1 Non-discrimination: General 
Because equality is a principle deep-rooted in human morality, the principle of non-
discrimination has quickly been recognized legally as one of the fundamental principles 
                                            
153  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 37. 
154  See Arts. 7 and 8 of the CRC. 
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of modern democracies.155 Thus, internationally, all but one156 of the seven core human 
rights treaties contain explicit provisions on equality and non-discrimination.157 Through 
their writings, scholars have recognised and signified the importance of non-
discrimination and equality; for instance, Ramcharan describes it as “one of the major 
themes of most UN core human rights treaties”,158 while Nowak refers to it as “the most 
important principle imbuing and inspiring the concept of human rights”.159 
 
Even though the term “discrimination” is derived from discriminare, meaning “to treat 
differently”, discrimination is to be distinguished from differentiation.160 The most 
commonly used definition of discrimination is provided by the Human Rights Committee 
in its General Comment No 18 on the principle of non-discrimination. It provides that 
discrimination is: 
…any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms.161 
 
This definition, it is argued, contains four important elements: (1) the differentiation of 
similar situations; (2) the absence of legitimate ends; (3) the lack of proportionality of 
                                            
155  Besson, (2005), 434. 
156  The Convention Against Torture does not have a provision on the principle of non-discrimination.  
157  In fact, two of the seven (namely, the ICERD and CEDAW) core human rights treaties are 
exclusively devoted to the issue of equality and non-discrimination. 
158  Ramcharan, (1981), 246. 
159  Nowak, (1993), 458. 
160  See section 3.4.3 for a discussion of differentiation in the context of adoptions and how it is 
justified within the law. 
161  HRC, General Comment No. 18, (1989), para. 6. 
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means to ends; and (4) the use of suspect classifications.162 A contrary reading of these 
four elements conveys the message that the differentiation of different situations; the 
presence of legitimate ends; the presence of proportionality of means to ends; and 
often, but not necessarily always, the use of non-suspect classifications, could possibly 
pass the test of the non-discrimination principle and be classified as justified distinction. 
 
Both the CRC and the ACRWC entrench the right of non-discrimination.163 The principle 
of non-discrimination has been identified by the CRC Committee as a general principle 
of fundamental importance for implementation of the whole Convention.164 The 
Committee has indicated that this principle is applicable irrespective of budgetary 
resources,165 and to “each child within (a State Party’s) jurisdiction”. 
 
The principle of non-discrimination is often identified with that of equality.166 As a result, 
it is correctly argued that equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative 
statements of the same principle.167 
 
The principle of non-discrimination incorporates a number of specifically proscribed 
grounds of discrimination, such as, race, colour, and sex. Initially it was the UDHR that, 
after an introductory general Article asserting that "all human beings are born free and 
                                            
162  Bayefsky, 1990, 11–24; Besson, (2005), 435. 
163  Art. 2 of the CRC and Art. 3 of the ACRWC. 
164  Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 19. See also CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), 
para. 5; General Comment No. 1, (2001), para. 6; and General Comment No. 5, (2003), paras. 4 
and 12. For a criticism of the recognition of the principle of non-discrimination as one of the four 
cardinal principles, see Abramson, (2008), 64. 
165  It is to be noted that other treaty bodies such as CERD, the CESCR, and the CEDAW 
Committees have indicated that the principle of non-discrimination is not subject to progressive 
realization. 
166  Bayefsky, (1990), 1.  
167  For an analysis of the principle of non-discrimination from the perspective of gender, see Cohen 
(1997), 29; Backstrom, (1996-97), 541. 
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equal,"168 that listed these grounds.169 Subsequently international and regional 
instruments have mainly reiterated the UDHR’s formulation of the principle of non-
discrimination. 
 
Article 2 of the CRC provides that: 
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to 
each child without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s 
or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.  
The counterpart provision of the ACRWC also uses similar phraseology and states in 
Article 3 that: 
Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child's or his/her parents' or legal guardians' 
race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status. 
It is interesting to note that the CRC, one of the most recent UN human rights treaties, 
has an unusually comprehensive version of the principle of non-discrimination. This 
conclusion is premised on the fact that  
[n]ot only does it apply the Universal Declaration's prohibited grounds of discrimination 
against the child, it extends this prohibition to discrimination aimed at the child's parents 
or legal guardians.170   
                                            
168  See Art. 1 of the UDHR. 
169  See Art. 2 of the UDHR. But it is to be noted that the 1959 Declaration stated in Principle 1 that: 
[t]he child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this Declaration. Every child without 
any exception whatsoever shall be entitled to these rights , without distinction or 
discrimination on account of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, whether 
himself or his family. 
    See Todres (1998) 162-163 (briefly discussing this provision). Similar provisions appear in the 
other major conventions. Examples include, Art. 2(1) of the ICCPR; Art. 2(2) of the ICESCR. In 
addition, Art. 10 of the ICESCR states that “special measures of protection and assistance should 
be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of 
parentage or other conditions”. 
170  Cohen, (1997), 34. 
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Further, both the CRC and the ACRWC address not only legalised discrimination, but 
also de facto discrimination.171 
 
In the context of the ACRWC, Chirwa convincingly argues that, “unlike article 2 of the 
CRC, the Charter does not make any reference to the ‘state’”172 in describing the nature 
of the obligation, and this is taken to imply that “… the obligation not to discriminate is 
binding not only on the State but other actors as well”.173 In spite of the fact that the 
CRC, in Article 2(1), confines States Parties to only ensure that children “within their 
jurisdiction” receive the rights in the CRC without discrimination, the ACRWC does not 
include any such limitations. That Articles 26(2) and 26(3) of the ACRWC oblige States 
Parties individually and collectively to accord the highest priority to the special needs of 
children living under discriminatory regimes, as well as the obligation to offer, “whenever 
possible, ... material assistance to such children and direct efforts to the elimination of 
all forms of discrimination”, is indeed laudable. Lloyd agrees that: 
These explicit provisions are a positive contribution by the ACRWC, as they do not dilute 
the importance of non-discriminatory practices and directly confront some of the most 
relevant issues affecting children in Africa.174 
In its consideration of States Parties reports, the CRC Committee has identified some 
legislative and policy interventions that violate the right against discrimination.175 
                                            
171  The non-discrimination obligation in the CRC is also said to require States to review legislation, 
planning and education, and to raise awareness and disseminate information to address and 
redress disparities brought about by discrimination. 
172  Chirwa, (2002), 159. 
173  As above. 
174  Lloyd, (2008), 38. 
175  For instance, it has encouraged States to take all necessary measures to ensure that customary 
law does not impede the implementation of this general principle, notably through raising 
awareness among community leaders. See, for instance, Concluding Observations: Comoros, 
(October 2000), para. 23; Zambia, (July 2003), para. 25. 
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3.3.4.2 Non-discrimination: Intercountry adoption 
The rule against non-discrimination has a direct bearing on intercountry adoption. This 
relationship often manifests itself in three areas: first, the principle of non-discrimination 
is intended to address some of the main causes that lead children to be deprived of a 
family environment (for instance, discrimination against children born outside of 
wedlock), which, in turn, leads to these children’s need for alternative care, such as 
adoption; secondly, the rule against discrimination is also intended to cater for the 
needs of vulnerable and minority children so that they can also benefit from the 
possibility of growing up in a family environment such as through adoptions;176 and 
thirdly, the non-discrimination principle is also intended to guarantee equivalent rights 
and protections for all adopted (both through domestic and intercountry adoption) 
children. 
 
For instance, adoption procedures that have an apparent bias in favour of either boys or 
girls give rise to a form of discrimination.177 Although legislation that allows same-
gender couples to adopt children as co-parents is not common,178 where it does occur, 
children might often be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their parent’s sexual 
orientation. An age of consent for adoptions which is not equally applicable to both boys 
and girls would be in violation of the rule against discrimination.179 In connection with 
accessing intercountry adoption procedures, particular attention must also be paid to de 
                                            
176  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 31, in this regard. 
177  Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 296. 
178  For instance, in 2000, it was reported that even though the Netherlands Constitution Art. 1 
prohibits discrimination on any ground whatsoever, and the Netherlands allows same-gender 
partnership registration, Dutch law prohibited homosexual co-parents from adopting children that 
they have raised from birth. See Maxwell et al., (2000), 337-338. This, however, is not the case 
anymore. 
179  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chile, (January 2007), para. 47. 
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facto discrimination and disparities which may be the result of a lack of a consistent 
policy, and involve vulnerable groups of children, such as children infected or affected 
by HIV/AIDS,180 street children, children belonging to racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities, indigenous children, girl children, children with disabilities, and so forth. 
 
Furthermore, the rule that has direct implications for intercountry adoptions is the one 
that requires that the State should not discriminate against or punish the right holder on 
account of a parent’s (or relative’s) actions, beliefs, or status; which does not have any 
counterpart in other UN international human rights instrument. As mentioned above, 
discrimination against children as children born outside of wedlock is one good example 
of discrimination on the basis of the status of the parents. This kind of discrimination 
often causes children to be deprived of their family environment through abandonment.   
 
A State Party to the CRC and the ACRWC is forbidden to unreasonably treat the right 
holder differently on the basis of the parent’s or guardian’s or family member’s actions, 
beliefs, or status. The word “unreasonably” is indicative of the fact that the right is 
context dependent, and that this provision does not envisage an absolute right.181 
 
While the rule against discrimination has relevance for many of the provisions of the 
Hague Convention, Article 26(2) of the Hague Convention entrenches a specific non-
discrimination clause. The thrust of Article 26(2) is that when the effect of an adoption is 
                                            
180  See Chapter 5 below for further details on the adoptability of HIV/AIDS positive children. 
181  In explaining the non-absolute nature of this right in the area of inheritance and adoption, 
Abramson writes that “[f]or instance, adoption depends upon the actions of two sets of adults, the 
birth parents and the adoptive parents, and the adoption will alter the legal relations of the child to 
both sets. Once the child’s legal status changes, the State will treat the youngster differently; the 
child will not be allowed to inherit from the birth parents, whereas the non-adopted birth-siblings 
can, for example”. Abramson, (2008), 130. 
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to terminate a pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, the child’s rights resulting from 
the adoption should be equivalent to those resulting from a similar adoption made under 
national law in the receiving State.182  
 
The practice of running genetic tests on adoptees to determine whether an individual 
child has a genetically based disease, or disease susceptibility, has been labelled as 
discriminatory.183 By performing a genetic test, it is argued, “prospective adoptive 
parents discriminate against the child by placing him or her in a class of either ‘good’ or 
‘bad,’ based on the probability of a genetic disorder”.184 While the running of tests on 
adoptees for the purpose of finding children the right match in adoptive parents can 
withstand the test of the non-discrimination rule, these genetic tests are intended to 
solely serve the interests of other third parties, such as, adoption agencies or adoptive 
parents.185  
 
The controversy surrounding inter-racial placement (also known as race matching)186 of 
children through adoption is another area that has a discriminatory angle to it. This 
controversy has been more pervasive in the U.S., where it has also received 
                                            
182  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 31. 
183  Schlee, (2001), 182. Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states: 
"any discrimination based on ... genetic features ... shall be prohibited. According to the 
explanatory text, this non-discrimination provision draws on Article 11 of the EU Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (adopted November 1996) which prohibits any form of 
discrimination on the basis of genetic heritage. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union Art. 21; See too European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 
available at <http:// conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/164.htm>,11. 
184  Schlee, (2001), 182. For some more details on this, see Lorandos, (1996), 277. 
185  As a result, they fail to serve the best interests of the child, but rather perpetuate potential 
discrimination against children by testing them for untreatable, adult onset diseases, thereby 
negatively affecting their chances of benefiting from a family environment through adoption. 
186  Although race matching takes many forms, its consistent premise is that same-race placements 
are preferable to cross-race placements; the optimal placement for a black child, for example, is 
with a black family. 
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considerable scholarly attention, than anywhere else in the world.187 It is now clearly 
impermissible in the U.S. to "delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into 
foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster 
parent, or the child, involved”.188 
 
In Interracial intimacies: Sex, marriage, identity, and adoption,189 Kennedy observes that 
there are two distinct forms of racial discrimination that pervade the adoption process in 
the U.S.. The first one involves social workers who match children to parents on the 
basis of race.190 The second coalesces around adoptive parents who typically choose a 
child on the basis of race.191 Kennedy views the use of race by social workers as 
illegitimate discrimination attributable to the State, and by adoptive parents as a morally 
justifiable assertion of individual autonomy. While Kennedy’s distinction has been 
challenged by authors, such as Banks,192 it brings to the fore the question whether the 
provisions of Article 2 of the CRC and Article 3 of the ACRWC apply to non-State 
actors.  
 
Applying different safeguards to children adopted from States Parties to the Hague 
Convention, on the one hand, and those from countries that are not Contracting States 
to the Hague Convention, on the other, might also violate the non-discrimination rule in 
                                            
187  Since the early 1990s, race matching has received considerable scholarly attention. See, for 
instance., Bartholet, (1999b); Bartholet, (1991), 1163; Forde-Mazrui, (1994), 925. 
188  42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(18)(B) (West Supp. 1998) as cited in Davidson, (1998), 191. 
189  Kennedy, (2002). 
190  Banks, (2003), 455. 
191  As above. 
192  As above. 
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relation to intercountry adoption.193 Viewed strictly from the perspective of interpretation 
of treaty law, this line of argument may sound baseless: after all, more often than not 
treaties impose obligations only between contracting parties.194 What is being 
suggested here, however, is that the best interests of the child principle independently 
demands respect for the rule against discrimination.195 This in turn would call on 
Contracting States to the Hague Convention to try and apply, “as far as practicable…the 
standards and safeguards of the Convention to the arrangements for inter-country 
adoption which they make in respect of non-Contracting States”.196 The careful choice 
of words, “as far as practicable…”, is indicative of the non-imperative nature of this 
proposal.  
 
3.3.4.3 Non-discrimination: Affirmative action 
The non-discrimination principle does not bar affirmative action, which, by definition, is 
legitimate differentiation in treatment of individual children. In other words, it is the 
preferential treatment of certain disadvantaged or underrepresented groups, and 
requires “positive action” per se. Differentiation does not automatically lead to 
discrimination. In fact, at the heart of the rule against discrimination is the tenet that 
non-discrimination law is particularly concerned with redressing structural 
disadvantages and counterbalancing the underlying power inequalities in society. 
                                            
193  In the latter case basic guarantees may not be applied, that could lead to compromising the best 
interests of the child. Such a distinction could not pass the best interests test, and, as a result, the 
possibility of justifying it as a fair discrimination is low. See Vite and Boechat, (2008), 50, giving 
the example of Art. 29 of the Hague Convention espousing the “no initial contact” rule. For further 
details on this rule, see Chapter 6, section 6.2.7. 
194  Save for the limited exception of treaties that constitute customary international law. 
195  See also section 3.3.3 above, indicating that the best interests of the child should be compliant 
with the other three cardinal principles of the CRC and the ACRWC. 
196  Permanent Bureau, Recommendations of the Special Commission, (2001), 31. 
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Therefore, at times, it is the failure to differentiate that could constitute discrimination.197 
As already alluded to above, differentiation only constitutes discrimination in the 
absence of an objective and reasonable justification.198 In the CRC, preferential 
treatment enjoys both textual and institutional (through the CRC Committee) support. 
 
In its Preamble the CRC recognises that “in all countries in the world, there are children 
living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special 
consideration…” (emphasis mine).  In addition, the provisions of both the CRC and the 
ACRWC draw distinctions between different groups of children. A good example is the 
provision on the right to free and compulsory primary education – which make a 
distinction between primary and secondary school children.199 
 
This is also a position that garners support from the jurisprudence of the CRC 
Committee. In this respect, it is worth having regard to the relevant part of General 
Comment No. 5 on “General measures of implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child”. The CRC Committee notes that: 
This non-discrimination obligation requires States actively to identify individual children 
and groups of children the recognition and realization of whose rights may demand special 
measures.200 
 
In the context of intercountry adoption, this implies a number of things. As far as special 
needs children are concerned, it is argued that a sound intercountry adoption system 
that respects the rule against discrimination would at least have three central 
                                            
197   See HRC, General Comment No. 18, (1989), para. 10. 
198   See Hendriks, (2001), 46. 
199   Art. 28 of the CRC and Art. 11 of the ACRWC. 
200   CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, (2003), para. 12 
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characteristics. First, a State would respect the non-discrimination rule and abstain from 
taking measures that would discriminate against this group of children. Secondly, 
pursuant to its duty to ensure that all children within its jurisdiction enjoy all the rights 
enshrined in the Convention without discrimination of any kind, the State should 
proscribe discrimination; provide for effective remedies in case of violations; and 
conduct awareness raising and educational campaigns targeting the public at large and 
specific groups of professionals with a view to preventing and eliminating de facto 
discrimination against this group of children.201 
 
Thirdly, and more importantly to this section at hand, a State should take some positive 
measures aimed at providing enhanced treatment to special needs children so that they 
could benefit from adoptions.202 These measures, could include facilitating the adoption 
applications of prospective adoptive parents who are willing to adopt special needs 
children; relaxing the requirements, such as age gaps, between children and 
prospective adoptive parents. In sum, the right against discrimination has a many 
implications for intercountry adoption, and its violation would compromise children’s 
rights in a number of ways. 
 
3.3.5    The right to life, survival and development 
 
Article 6 of the CRC enjoins States Parties to “…recognize that every child has the 
inherent right to life”,203 and to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and 
                                            
201  See General Comment No. 9, (2006), para. 9 (a)(b)(c). 
202  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 52. 
203  Art. 6(1) of the CRC. 
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development of the child”.204 The corresponding provision, Article 5 of the ACRWC, 
provides under a heading “Survival and Development” that: 
1. Every child has an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the 
survival, protection and development of the child. 
3. Death sentence shall not be pronounced for crimes committed by children.205 
 
It is submitted that the nature of States Parties obligations espoused by Article 6 of the 
CRC and Article 5 of the ACRWC are of a high standard. In the context of children’s 
right to survival and development, the obligation is to “ensure”.206 The use of the term 
“shall” in Article 5(1) of the ACRWC on the protection of the right to life by law is forceful 
too. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that the choice of the word 
“recognize” in Article 6 of the CRC creates the inference that States are obliged only to 
refrain from obstructing the exercise of the "inherent right to life”.  
 
Notably, Article 4 of the CRC prescribes that the measures taken by States Parties to 
guarantee the survival and development of the child and the right to an adequate 
standard of living are to be undertaken "to the maximum extent of their (the States 
Parties’) available resources” (insertion mine).207 A similar limitation is in-built in Article 
5(2) of the ACRWC.208  
 
                                            
204  Art. 6(2) of the CRC. The right to life is not a preventive measure alone, but ensures that State 
parties take steps to prolong the life of the child; thus it encompasses both the survival and the 
development of children.  
205  Art. 5 of the ACRWC. 
206  Art. 6 of CRC and Art. 5(2) of the ACRWC 
207  LeBlanc, (1995), 78. 
208  Art 5(2) of the ACRWC. Therefore, there is merit in noting the presence of a qualifying statement 
that these mandates are to be accomplished within a State’s ability to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 146
Initially the Working Group drafting the CRC had intended Article 6 of the CRC to have 
priority over all the other rights in the Convention.209 While a negative approach to the 
right to life is apparent from previous human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, the 
drafters of the CRC had intended Article 6 of the CRC to reflect a positive approach to 
the right to life.210 The dual nature obligation that this right embeds – composed of both 
positive and negative elements - is a position that is reinforced both by the terminology 
of the text and by the drafting history of the provisions.211 This right has to do with 
raising life expectancy, reducing child mortality, immunisation, addressing malnutrition 
and preventable diseases, and other related issues,212 which cannot be labelled only as 
negative obligations. Buttressing this point, the CRC Committee, for instance, noted in 
2003 that “[c]hildren have the right not to have their lives arbitrarily taken”,213 but also “to 
benefit from economic and social policies that will allow them to survive into adulthood 
and develop in the broadest sense of the word”.214 
 
The right to life, survival and development in Article 6 of the CRC and Article 5 of the 
ACRWC is also an implicit part of a number of other Articles in these instruments. This 
position is reiterated by the CRC Committee.215 To illustrate: closely related to this right 
are Article 27 of the CRC which deals with maintaining an adequate standard of living; 
                                            
209  See Considerations, (1988), para. 21. 
210  Considerations, (1989), para. 89 
211  As a result, simply refraining from action that would deprive children of the opportunity to benefit 
from basic material needs, including food, clothing, and shelter, would not suffice as compliance 
with the obligations States Parties have under these instruments. Stewart, (1998), 168. 
212  See Mower, (1997) 32-33. See too Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008b), 5. 
213  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), para. 11. 
214  As above. 
215  The CRC Committee “reminds States parties (and others concerned) that the right to survival and 
development can only be implemented in a holistic manner, through the enforcement of all the 
other provisions of the Convention, … as well as through respect for the responsibilities of 
parents and the provision of assistance and quality services (Arts. 5 and 18)”. CRC Committee, 
General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 10. 
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Articles 24 and 25 of the CRC and Article 14 of the ACRWC that deal with health 
care;216 and Article 37 of the CRC prohibiting capital punishment for crimes committed 
by children under 18 years of age. Articles 26 and 27 of the CRC, and, in a limited 
sense, Article 14 of the ACRWC217 obligate governments specifically to provide, "in 
case of need”, material assistance and support to children, particularly with regard to 
nutrition, clothing and housing.218  
 
The term “survival rights” covers a child’s rights to life and the needs that are most basic 
to the child’s existence, which include, an adequate living standard, shelter, nutrition 
and access to medical services.219 Ensuring survival and physical health are priorities, 
but States Parties are reminded that Article 6 of the CRC encompasses all aspects of 
development, and that a child’s health and psychosocial wellbeing are in many respects 
interdependent.220 Thus, implicit in this requirement are the issues of safety, health, and 
welfare of the child.221 
 
There is also an expectation that the term “development” be interpreted in its broadest 
sense as a holistic concept.222 This should encompass the child’s physical, mental, 
                                            
216  There is a tendency to misconstrue the right to life and the right to health care. Both the CRC and 
the ACRWC do not entitle children a right to good health as such. Rather, children are entitled to 
services and programs that are conducive to providing a child with proper medical health care. 
See Mower, (1997), 32. 
217  It is to be noted that the ACRWC does not have a corresponding provision to Art. 26 of the CRC 
on provision of social security for the child. See, too, Mezmur, (2008a), 14. 
218  Stewart, (1998), 168. 
219  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008b), 5. It is also indicated that the term "survival" encompasses 
the obligation on signatory states to take positive steps toward providing "growth monitoring, oral 
rehydration and disease control, breastfeeding, immunization, child spacing, [and] food”. See 
Considerations, (1989), para. 88. 
220  See CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 10. 
221  See Goetz, (1996), 155. 
222  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, (2003), para. 12. 
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spiritual, moral, psychological and social development.223 After all, the child's standard 
of living is not only related to basic physical provisions fundamental to the child's 
survival, but also to a child's moral and social development.224  
 
The inherent right to life, survival and development is a right that warrants particular 
attention where children permanently deprived of their family environment are 
concerned.225 On the subject of the right to life, it is not uncommon to regard 
intercountry adoption as a “life saving” act.226 However, can not allowing intercountry 
adoption in a specific case lead to the inference that the right to life is violated?  
 
This was part of the strategy attempted by Madonna’s lawyers in their appeal to the 
SCA227 in Malawi to have a decision of a lower court228 denying the applicant an 
adoption order reversed. Counsel argued that “a child in dire circumstances has still a 
right to life”229 and that “to deny the child the opportunity of adoption on a ground whose 
relevance or significance in the modern world is doubtful amounts to arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life”.230 Article 16, the right to life provision of the Malawi 
                                            
223  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, (2003), para. 12. 
224  See Seitles, (1997-1998), 178. Thus, the positive action required of states includes the duty to 
guarantee each child an opportunity to develop his or her personality, which is a far greater 
objective than mere survival. See Goetz, (1996), 175-176. 
225  In addition, while assuring an adequate standard of living for all children is relevant, it is even 
more apposite for children who are deprived of their family environment. Article 27 of the CRC 
addresses this issue and obliges States Parties to ensure that children are provided with food, 
clothing, and housing according to the financial resources available and the norms of the 
particular culture. 
226  In “Live or let die: Could intercountry adoption make the difference?”, as the title itself intones, 
Olsen ends the article by posing the question: “Should the orphaned children of the world live, or 
should we let them die? Intercountry adoption could be the vehicle through which many children 
have the chance to live”. Olsen, (2004), 525. 
227  SCA Infant CJ case. 
228  High Court Infant CJ case. 
229  SCA Infant CJ case, 5. 
230  As above. 
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Constitution, was invoked.231 In dismissing this line of argument, the SCA reasoned 
that:  
We do not also subscribe to the idea that by declining to grant an adoption order on the 
ground of residence the decision of the Judge in the court below is in violation of section 16 
of the Constitution which recognizes the right to life with regard to the infant.  There is no 
evidence on record or from the Guardian Ad litem that suggests that the infant will die due 
to lack of adequate care and nutrition.232 
 
This approach, it is submitted, is valid. In the absence of compelling evidence that the 
denial of an intercountry adoption order would fully compromise the right to life of a 
child, an argument invoking the right to life seems untenable. The Court left open, 
however, the minimal possibility that a State’s refusal to grant intercountry adoption of a 
child who could “die due to lack of adequate care and nutrition” could constitute a 
violation of the right to life. Arguably, for instance, this could include cases where a 
country does not offer HIV/AIDS treatment, and the adoption of a child who is HIV 
positive to a country where he or she could have had access to HIV/AIDS treatment is 
denied.  
 
The obligation to ensure life, survival, and development is cemented by Article 4 that 
obliges States Parties to address economic, social and cultural rights to the maximum 
extent of their available resources.233 This obligation should be complemented, where 
needed, with international cooperation.234 Premised on this, an argument could be 
advanced, rather ineptly, that States Parties who do not have the capacity to uphold the 
                                            
231  As above. 
232  SCA Infant CJ case, 5-6. 
233  See, CRC Committee, General Comment No. 11, para 34. For a detailed discussion of Art. 4 of 
the CRC, see generally, Rishmawi, (2006). 
234  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 11, para. 34. For a detailed discussion of international 
cooperation in the context of the CRC, see generally, Rishmawi, (2006), 35-43. 
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rights to survival and development of children permanently deprived of their family 
environment, should use intercountry adoption. An attempt could be made to bolster this 
argument by viewing intercountry adoption as an element of international cooperation. 
However, it is argued that intercountry adoption does not constitute either financial or 
technical cooperation as envisaged in the CRC. There is no State practice that lends 
support to it, too. 
 
3.3.6 Child participation 
 
Article 12 of the CRC provides:  
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
 
The right of a child “who is capable of forming his or her own views … to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child” (Article 12 of the CRC and Article 7 of the 
ACRWC) is one of the four cardinal principles of both the CRC and the ACRWC. In their 
basic form, these provisions indicate that children have the right to participate in 
decision making that is relevant to their lives, and to influence decisions taken within the 
family, the school or the community to which they belong. 
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It is argued that children’s participation rights are a “cluster of rights” of which the core 
seems to consist of respect for the views of the child,235 the right to freedom of 
expression,236 the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,237 the right to 
freedom of association and peaceful assembly (Article 15), and the evolving capacities 
as a legitimate limitation on parental guidance.238 
 
Nowhere in the international normative framework mentioned above does one find an 
indication that child participation should necessarily be directly by the child. In fact, 
Article 12(2) of the CRC speaks of the child being offered an opportunity to be heard 
“either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body”. In this light, the 
appointment of a curator ad litem for a child in proceedings assists by providing for an 
independent assessment of a situation and facilitates the airing of an opinion that is 
presumably in the best interests of the child.239  
 
Although not traditionally conceptualised as one of four cardinal principles, the “evolving 
capacities of the child” is also a very important principle. This principle entrenches that 
there is a reduced need for direction and a greater capacity to take responsibility for 
decisions affecting children’s lives as they acquire enhanced competencies. 
                                            
235  Art. 12 of the CRC and Art. 7 of the ACRWC. 
236  Art. 13 of the CRC and Art. 7 of the ACRWC. 
237  Art. 14 of the CRC and Art. 9 of the ACRWC 
238  Art. 5 of the CRC and Art. 9(1) of the ACRWC. See too Ang, (2006), 9. It is interesting to note that 
the rights enshrined in Arts 13–16 (right to freedom of expression, religion, thought, and 
association) of the CRC can also be found in the ICCPR in articles that use terms such as 
“everyone” or “no one”. 
239  For the role of a curator ad litem in the context of South Africa, see Centre for Child Law and 
Another, Ellis, v Minister of Home Affairs and others (2005) 6 SA 50 (T) as well as Du Toit and 
Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (2003 2)SA 198 (CC)). See, too, 
Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008b), 19-20. 
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Here, it is apposite to consider the opinion of the CRC Committee on the participation of 
young children in the adoption process. The CRC Committee notes that “[r]espect for 
the young child’s agency – as a participant in family, community and society – is 
frequently overlooked, or rejected as inappropriate on the grounds of age and 
immaturity’.240 By recognising that young children “make choices and communicate their 
feelings, ideas and wishes in numerous ways, long before they are able to communicate 
through the conventions of spoken or written language”,241 the Committee reminds 
States parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the concept of the child as rights 
holder with freedom to express views and the right to be consulted in matters that affect him or 
her is implemented from the earliest stage in ways appropriate to the child’s capacities, best 
interests, and rights to protection from harmful experiences.242 
 
After all, if children’s best interests are understood to be a guiding principle in the work 
that child advocates hold dear, how well can and do they assist and develop children’s 
meaningful participation in defining this principle? This is a crucial question that needs 
to be addressed. 
 
A recent General Comment by the CRC Committee on children’s right to be heard 
eloquently captures the role of this right in adoptions. The General Comment leaves no 
doubt about the vital role of having a child heard when “a child is to be placed for 
adoption”243, as well as when a child “finally will be adopted”.244  The application and 
relevance of this right is wide-ranging, in that it should be upheld even when “step-
                                            
240  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 14. 
241  As above. 
242  As above. 
243  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12, (2009), para. 55. 
244  As above. 
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parents or foster families adopt a child, although the child and the adopting parents may 
have already been living together for some time”.245  
 
Whenever possible, States Parties are urged to inform the child about the effects of 
adoption.246 This includes providing the child, depending on his or her evolving 
capacities, with information about: severance of legal ties with significant others; 
assumption of a new name, residence, domicile, and citizenship, as the case may be; 
and acquisition of such rights as may be attached as conditions to the adoption order. 
The duty to entrench children’s right to be heard by legislation is one of the unequivocal 
obligations States Parties bear.247  
 
A case from the European Court captures this synergy between best interests  of the 
child and the views of the child well. In Pini and Others v. Romania248 the applicants had 
sought to adopt two Romanian children who had been abandoned. A court granted their 
applications and made an order for the children’s birth certificates to be amended. An 
appeal lodged by the Romanian Adoption Board against those orders was dismissed 
and they became final. When the applicants sought to enforce the adoption orders, 
PSBCV, the institution where the children had been placed in care, refused to hand over 
the children or their birth certificates. The PSBCV as well as the children applied to have 
the adoption orders quashed. They refused to leave Romania and said that they wished 
to remain in the care of the PSBCV. Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for family life) 
                                            
245  As above. 
246  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12, (2009), para. 56. 
247  As above. Reiterating the interconnectedness of children’s rights, particularly the four cardinal 
principles of the CRC and the ACRWC, it is observed that “the ‘best interests’ of the child cannot 
be defined without consideration of the child’s views”. CRC Committee, General Comment No. 
12, (2009), para. 56. 
248  Applications Nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, (2001). 
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of the ECHR, the applicants complained that the Romanian authorities’ failure to comply 
with final judicial decisions has deprived them of contact with their adopted children.  
 
The Court found that there had been no violation of Article 8.249 Taking into account the 
interests of the children and in particular the opposition which they had expressed to 
their adoption, the Court considered that there had been no absolute obligation on the 
authorities to ensure that the children left the country against their will and to ignore the 
pending legal proceedings in which the lawfulness and merits of the initial adoption 
orders had been challenged. The Court found that the interests of the two girls should 
prevail over the interests of the prospective adoptive parents to create a new family with 
the children.250 
 
Two important points can be distilled from this case. First, the Court’s understanding 
and reference to the fact “that the child's interests may, depending on their nature and 
seriousness, override those of the parent”251 is promising. This is so despite the fact that 
the Court does not recognise children’s best interests in adoption to be the paramount 
consideration. Secondly, the importance attached to the views of the child in defining his 
or her best interests is laudable.252 
 
                                            
249  Pini and Others v. Romania, (2001), para. 153. 
250  As above. 
251  Pini and Others v. Romania, (2001), para. 155 
252  Pini and Others v. Romania, (2001), para. 157. The Court stated that “[i]t must be pointed out that 
in the instant case the children rejected the idea of joining their adoptive parents in Italy once they 
had reached an age at which it could reasonably be considered that their personality was 
sufficiently formed and they had attained the necessary maturity to express their opinion as to the 
surroundings in which they wished to be brought up”. Pini and Others v. Romania, (2001), para. 
157. 
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Finally, providing minimum ages for participation, including for adoption purposes, is a 
common practice within States Parties to the CRC and the ACRWC. Assessed against 
the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC, such minimum ages may risk being non-
compliant with the rule relating to “the evolving capacities of the child”.253 This is 
because the notion of “evolving capacities” cannot be ascribed to a fixed age limit. In 
addition, in an implicit acknowledgment that children’s levels of understanding are not 
uniformly linked to their biological age, the CRC and the ACRWC require that due 
weight be given in accordance with age and maturity.254 In other words, “[a]rticle 12 
makes it clear that age alone cannot determine the significance of a child’s views”.255  
 
3.4.  CHILDREN DEPRIVED OF THEIR FAMILY ENVIRONMENT, 
ALTERNATIVE CARE, AND ADOPTION (ARTICLES 20, 21, AND 25 OF 
THE CRC; ARTICLES 24 AND 25 of the ACRWC) 
 
3.4.1    The family under international law: A brief overview 
 
The point of departure for this section is a brief discussion of the notion of “family”. The 
family is "the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State”.256 The family is an important structure that governs marriage 
practices, lineage, child bearing, death, succession, and inheritance, amongst other 
things.257 In light of this, the right to family life, which has been recognised as a 
                                            
253  See Art. 5 of the CRC and Art. 9(1) of the ACRWC. 
254  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12, (2009), para. 29. 
255  As above. 
256  Art. 16(3) of UDHR. Arts. 12, 16, and 25 of the UDHR provide for the first time a recognition of 
the right to a family life as a basic human right. .  
257  See Agrawal, (2004), 19. 
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fundamental right in international law, is enunciated in all major international 
instruments and conventions.258  
 
Thus, while the ideal of the notion of family has obvious appeal, its content and form are 
not so clearly apparent, because of lack of consensus.259 Therefore, at this juncture, it is 
fitting to ask “what is a family?”. 
 
It is known that in some countries family relations are based on a nuclear family concept 
while other traditions in Asia and Africa recognise diverse alternative family forms, such 
as polygamous, extended, and joint families.260 However, at the global level, the two 
Covenants interpret the term “family” to include "all those comprising the family as 
understood in the society of the State Party concerned”.261 This is an all encompassing 
approach, which leaves the definition to the discretion of States Parties. 
 
In the last decade the new concept of "family in its various forms" has been introduced 
by the UN.262 According to Aguirre and Wolfgram, it is argued that the UN understands 
the concept "various forms of family" as composed of three groups: Nuclear, extended, 
and reorganised families.263 These groups are in turn divided into subgroups. 
Accordingly, the “nuclear family” subgroups include biological, social, one-parent, 
                                            
258  See Art. 23(1) ICCPR; Art. 10(1) ICESCR. Similar provisions may be found in various regional 
conventions, such as: American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Art. VI: and Art. 
18(1) of the ACHPR. 
259  See Cantwell, (2006), 390. In General Comment No. 19 of the HRC: “The Committee notes that 
the concept of the family may differ in some respects from State to State, and even from region to 
region within a State, and that it is therefore not possible to give the concept a standard 
definition…”. HRC, General Comment No. 19, (1990), para. 2. 
260  Goonesekere, (2000), 83. 
261  See, for instance, HRC, General Comment No. 19, (1990), para. 2. 
262  See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, (2000), 60. 
263  Aguirre and Wolfgram, (2002), 36-41. 
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adoptive, and in vitro, whereas the extended family subgroups include three-generation, 
kinship, tribal, and polygamous families.264 The last group, namely “reorganised 
families”, is said to be composed of remarried, community living, and same-gender 
families.265 So, this redefined concept of the “family” allows for "other unions", which do 
not necessarily reflect the natural family pattern based on blood and kinship. 
 
At the regional level, in Europe, Article 8 of the ECHR establishes a fundamental right to 
respect for private life and family life. While the possibility to interfere with these rights 
exists, for it to be legal, it should not be applied arbitrarily, have a legitimate aim, and 
should also be necessary in a democratic society.266 The notion of family is said to 
include spouses and their children, and can also exist between a non-married mother 
and her child, and with the child’s father.267  
 
The preference expressed towards “function” over “form” in constructing the notion of 
family is appealing to those who advocate, for example, the case for sexual minorities. 
In arguing the case for the rights of gays and lesbians to be eligible to adopt, Tobin and 
Mcnair are in full agreement that the family can still remain the fundamental unit of 
society and the optimal place within which all children should be raised and provided 
                                            
264   As above. 
265  As above. 
266  See, generally, Danelius, (2004) for a discussion of the principles of the European Court and 
human rights regarding family life. 
267  Johnston et al v. Ireland, A112, para 55. See too, Marckx v Belgium, A 31, para 31. It is not clear 
if it extends, for instance, to child headed households, which, in any case, is a concept fairly alien 
to most parts of the European continent. 
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with care.268 However, they contend that the effective functioning of this unit is not to be 
assessed by reference to its legal structure or the sexual orientation of its members.269 
 
3.4.2 Children deprived of a family environment and alternative care under the 
CRC and the ACRWC 
 
3.4.2.1  What is a “family environment”? 
The recognition under international law that children without a family and deprived of 
parental care need special protection dates back at least to 1924. Among the five 
principles of the 1924 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, “[t]he orphan and 
the waif must be sheltered and succoured” is one example.270 The 1959 Declaration 
also stipulated a comparable provision in Article 6.271 
 
A similar position is echoed by the CRC and the ACRWC. Both of these treaties clearly 
acknowledge the primary role of the family and parents in the care and protection of 
children, and the obligation of the State to help them in carrying out these duties. 
Among the principles that underlie the CRC, in the context of family environment, 
paragraphs 5 and 6 of its Preamble come to the fore. Paragraphs 5 and 6 read in part 
as follows: 
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society ... should be afforded the 
necessary protection and assistance ..., 
 
                                            
268  Tobin and Mcnair, (2009), 113. 
269  As above. To substantiate their point further, they quote Nevins in the Canadian case of Re K 5 
who observed that it is the capacity of its members to ensure the “healthy development of a child 
through the provision a stable, consistent, warm and responsive relationship between a child and 
his or her care giver” that is of central concern. 5 (1995) 15 RFL (4th) 129 (Canada) para. 143. 
270  The 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (192 Declaration). 
271  Principle 6 of the 1959 Declaration. 
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Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding,272 
These paragraphs add weight to the rule that the preferred environment for the growth 
and wellbeing of the child is the family environment.  
 
However, these paragraphs are not alone in evincing support of the family. Apart from 
the Preamble, there are 19 other Articles in the CRC273 that expressly acknowledge the 
role and importance of parents and the family in the promotion and protection of 
children’s rights. Nonetheless, Article 20 of the CRC and Article 25 of the ACRWC 
entrench an exception - namely, children deprived of their family environment 
temporarily or permanently - and what steps shall be taken to provide these children 
with alternative care.274 
 
The specific phrase “family environment” appears in Article 20(1) of the CRC, and 
subsequently in the ACRWC;275 the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency;276 and the Plan of Action for Implementing the World Declaration on the 
Survival, Protection and Development of Children.277 
 
It transpires from the CRC travaux preparatoires that during the drafting of Article 20 of 
the CRC terms, such as, “biological family”, “natural family environment”, and “normal 
                                            
272  Para. 5 and 6 of its Preamble. 
273  Arts. 2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11,14,16,18,20,21,22,23,24,27,37, and 40. 
274  Art. 20(1) of the CRC. Generally, the rights of the child, in international human rights law, are to 
be viewed independently from his or her membership of a family environment. Nevertheless, the 
above treaties indicate that the rights (and interests) of the child are often best protected by 
maintaining the child within his or her family. Breen, (2003), 756. 
275  Preamble, Arts. 23, 3, 25, and 2(a). 
276  (1990), para. 14. 
277  (1990), para. 18. 
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family environment”, were proposed.278 Ultimately, according to Cantwell and 
Holzscheiter, the final decision to accept the least prescriptive term, “his or her family 
environment”, suggests an attempt to look beyond conventional parental care.279  
 
Detrick argues that other provisions of the CRC, notably Article 5, could be of some 
assistance.280 Article 5 of the CRC provides for "the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as 
provided for by local custom" (emphasis mine)], and is interpreted to hint at the 
definition of a “family” under the CRC. Citing the Technical Review of the Text of the 
Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child as further support, Detrick concludes that 
the inclusion in Article 5 of the CRC of “the members of the extended family or 
community as provided by local custom” reflects the context of the use of the notion of 
“family environment” under Article 20 of the CRC.281  
 
This position is congruent with the much more flexible definition of “family” that seems to 
be endorsed by the CRC Committee. Reference to the Committee’s observation during 
its General Day of Discussion on the “Role of the Family in the Promotion of the Rights 
of the Child” can testify to this. The Committee observed that:  
… When considering the family environment the Convention reflects different family 
structures arising from the various cultural patterns and emerging familial relationships. In 
this regard the Convention refers to the extended family and the community and applies to 
                                            
278  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 30. 
279  Cantwell and Holzscheiter (2008), 32 also citing the Travaux Preparatiores 56-59, (1982), 
reproduced in Detrick, (ed.), (1992), 298. 
280  Detrick, (1996), 98. 
281         As above. The reference to “local custom” in Art. 5 of the CRC has been understood to be 
intended to cover the wide range of family relationships that exist in a multi-cultural world. See 
Goonesekere, (1998), 102. Art. 5 has been read as an attempt by the CRC to generally extend 
the definition of the family. See Rios-Kohn, (1998), 146. 
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situations of nuclear family, separated parents, single parent family, common law family 
and adoptive family.282  
 
From this, the inference has been made that Article 5 of the CRC is intended to serve 
as an “umbrella” provision.283 In fact, commentators like Todres explicitly refer to Article 
5 as “one of the umbrella provisions of the CRC” similar to the four cardinal 
principles.284 However, this inference is not acceptable to some observers. Prime 
amongst these is Cantwell.285 Some of the considerations that are said to challenge the 
validity of this inference include: that there is no reference in the travaux preparatoires 
which supports this inference; that Article 5 is not one of the four cardinal principles of 
the CRC; Articles, such as, 3,7,9 and 18 of the CRC, show that rights and duties are to 
be limited to persons with legal responsibility towards the child; and that the role of the 
range of persons mentioned in Article 5 of the CRC applies only to providing 
“appropriate direction and guidance” for children and is not necessarily applicable as far 
as their general care is concerned.286 It is also pointed out that while the role and 
significance of parents and the family enjoy reference in 19 Articles of the CRC, the 
treaty explicitly mentions the wider family as such only four times.287 In a rather vague 
manner, “members of the (applicant’s) family”288 and “relatives”289 occur in the CRC.  
                                            
282  CRC Committee, General Day of Discussion, (1994), para. 2.1 
283   See Todres, (2006), 21. 
284   Todres, (2006), 21. Elevating Article 5 of the CRC to an “umbrella” provision connotes that its 
application is of an overarching nature, similar to the four cardinal principles, which should be 
read together with every right contained in the Convention. See Abramson, (2008) 66, on what is 
meant by “umbrella” provision. 
285   See Cantwell, (2006), 389-400; See too Cantwell and Holzscheiter (2008), 34-35. 
286   Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 34-35 
287   “Family members” (Art 2(2)); “members of the extended family” (Art 5); “another member of the 
family” (Art 9(4); and “other members of the family” (Art 22) 
288   Art. 10(1) of the CRC. 
289   Art. 21 of the CRC. 
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It is submitted that, strictly speaking, Article 5 of the CRC is not an umbrella provision.  
The CRC Committee has not given it such a position. There is also nothing to aid one to 
establish that the drafters of the CRC intended it to be such. Nonetheless, Article 5 of 
the CRC generally sheds light on the approach to be adopted in interpreting other 
related provisions - as it embodies a spirit of cultural sensitivity and inclusiveness.290 It 
is submitted that, upon closer analysis, the validity of some of the arguments that are 
advanced to challenge the applicability of a flexible and wide definition of “family” in the 
context of “family environment” is highly questionable. 
 
The CRC Committee has reiterated a flexible construction of the notion of “family” in 
2006, similar to the one proposed in 1994, in its recommendations on the Day of 
General Discussion under the theme “Children Without Parental Care”.291 The only 
difference between the two is the explicit addition of “re-constructed family” and “joint 
family” as two of the various forms of family to which the Convention refers.292 
 
Further support for this approach can be found in General Comment No 7 of the CRC 
Committee which provides that the Committee: 
… recognizes that ‘family’ … refers to a variety of arrangements that can provide for 
young children’s care, nurturance and development, including the nuclear family, the 
extended family, and other traditional and modern community-based arrangements, 
provided these are consistent with children’s rights and best interests.293 
The fact that the CRC reiterated a broader construction of the notion of a family in 
relation to different themes lends support to the argument that the range of persons 
                                            
290  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 35. 
291  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (2005), paras. 636-689. 
292  As above. 
293  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7, (2003), para. 15. 
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mentioned in Article 5 of the CRC could apply beyond the context of providing 
“appropriate direction and guidance” for children.294 
 
In the context of the ACRWC, a provision corresponding to Article 5 of the CRC is not 
present.295 However, recognition of the role of the extended family and of communities 
in the care of children is discernible. For instance, Article 20 of the ACRWC indicates 
“[p]arents or other persons responsible for the child” as having “the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child” (emphasis mine).296 This 
obligation on parents as well as “other persons responsible for the child” goes beyond 
the obligation under Article 5 of the CRC. 
 
An interpretation of the ACRWC provisions in the spirit of “the virtues of their (African) 
cultural heritage, historical background and the values of …African civilisation”297 does 
indeed recognise the fact that the extended family and other persons often have a role 
to care for a child. In such circumstances, this kind of care could qualify as being a 
“family environment”.  
                                            
294  The role of grandparents in caring for children has drawn the attention of the CRC Committee. In 
this regard, in its recommendation on the Day of General Discussion on Children without parental 
care”, the Committee expressed its view that: 
As regards different family structures, the Committee wishes to pay attention to 
the concept of the extended family and, particularly, to the possible role of the 
grandparents in the child-rearing responsibilities which is very rarely 
acknowledged in domestic laws and practices. The Committee encourages the 
States parties to take a more active approach to this issue by adopting 
appropriate measures to support the role of the grandparents in child-rearing. 
CRC Committee, Children without parental care, (2005), para. 648. 
295  Though it is to be noted that Art. 9 of the ACRWC resembles Art. 5 of the CRC. Art 9(2) provides 
in full that “[p]arents, and where applicable, legal guardians shall have a duty to provide guidance 
and direction in the exercise of these rights having regard to the evolving capacities, and best 
interests of the child”. 
296  Although Art. 20 of the ACRWC is titled “Parental Responsibilities”, its provisions apply beyond 
parents. 
297  Para. 5 of the Preamble to the ACRWC. 
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3.4.2.2  Advantages of the reference to a “family environment” 
 
The reference to a “family environment” has a number of advantages for the protection 
of children’s rights. Zilliox draws attention to the fact that what is offered by Article 20 of 
the CRC, and what it protects, “does not necessarily fall into the category of civil or 
political rights or in the category of economic, social, and cultural rights”.298 In addition, 
the innovative feature of this Article is apparent in its reference to family, and not 
parents. This has been observed to be an important distinction.299 
 
Notably, the use of the language of “family environment” has managed to bypass 
dispute about the nature of a family.300 There is also no doubt that the choice of words 
emphasises function rather than form, thereby opening the way for its application in 
various cultures.301  
 
From the viewpoint of State obligations, the emphasis on family environment in contrast 
to a family helps to create a legally enforceable right. While it is impossible to expect 
government to create families for every child, providing a family environment that is 
protective of the functional relationships most important to the child seems pragmatic.  
 
3.4.2.3 Child-headed households as a “family environment” 
Though it is not an entirely new phenomenon, the situation of child-headed households 
had not been singled out for special attention during the drafting of the CRC.302 With the 
                                            
298  Zilliox, (2006), 376.  
299  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 278. 
300   Kaufman, (1994), 4. It is a way of providing a wider protection too, as relationships in a family 
environment are protected irrespective of whether they embody a particular family structure. 
301   As above. 
302   Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 41. 
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advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, however, the presence of child-headed households 
has surfaced increasingly in the last decade.303 The recognition of child-headed 
households as constituting a family environment is still considered controversial in some 
quarters. Admittedly, such a recognition is not without its risks. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that remaining in child-headed households often corresponds best 
to the wishes of the children concerned is gaining ground.304 As a result, in some 
countries, efforts are being made to seek ways of securing the conditions for their 
adequate protection in the community.305 These efforts can be juxtaposed with attempts 
to bring these children into conventional and structured care environments. A country 
that stands out in this regard is South Africa.306 
 
It could be argued that the CRC Committee does not bar the possibility of recognising 
child-headed households as constituting a family environment. In fact, some of the 
comments that are made by the CRC Committee seem to support such recognition. For 
instance, General Comment No 3 recommends that “[o]rphans are best protected and 
cared for when efforts are made to enable siblings to remain together…”.307 The State is 
under an obligation to make efforts that would strengthen family ties.308 The recognition 
of child-headed households as a family environment is also implied in the CRC 
Committee’s Concluding Observations to the Republic of the Congo. In this particular 
                                            
303   There is disagreement on the definition of a “child-headed household”.  
304   Cantwell, (2006), 8. See Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 278, briefly discussing Art. 4 of the 1986 
Declaration and giving the impression that placement in (and by implication, recognition of) child-
headed households falls within the category “care by relatives of the child’s parents”. 
305   Cantwell, (2006), 8. 
306  For a discussion of some of the issues pertaining to child-headed households, see generally 
Bessler,  (2008), 33; Bonthuys, (2008), 333; Nicholson, (2008), 407; Sloth-Nielsen, (2005). 
307  CRC Committee, Genera Comment No. 3, (2003), para. 34, 
308  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone, (2008), para. 49. 
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case, the CRC Committee recommended the State Party to provide “economic and 
psychosocial support to children who head families and act as parents so that they may 
continue their education, when necessary”.309 
 
At times a child-headed household set-up could be the only way of keeping siblings 
together. Even when child-headed households are recognised as a family (and which, 
therefore, does not necessarily imply deprivation of a family environment), it is important 
that “States parties are encouraged to provide support, financial and otherwise, when 
necessary”. 310  
 
3.4.2.4 Other elements of Article 20 of the CRC and Article 25 of the 
ACRWC 
 
Apart from State actions, such as deportation and imprisonment, the use of the word 
“deprived” in Article 20(1) of the CRC and Article 25(1) of the ACRWC encompasses 
other scenarios, such as, poverty and illness311, which could deprive a child of a 
meaningful family environment.312 Abandonment and displacement are also other 
common reasons that could deprive children of their family environment.313 
                                            
309  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: The Republic of the Congo, (2006), para. 47(b). 
310  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), para. 34. 
311  In this regard, there is merit in pointing out that Art 23(4) of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, adopted in December 2006 entrenches that “States Parties shall ensure 
that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when 
competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and 
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. In no case shall a 
child be separated from parents on the basis of a disability of either the child or one or both of the 
parents”. 
312  During the drafting of this provision, it was pointed out by a member of the Working Group that: " 
…acknowledgement must be made of the fact that imprisonment or other similar judicial or 
administrative sanction are not the only reasons that would prevent children from receiving 
appropriate care from their parents....”. It was further underscored that to provide only “…judicial 
or administrative sanctions as reasons for children being deprived of parental care would thus 
create a false emphasis”. See Considerations, (1982), para. 62. 
313  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 277. 
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It is to be noted that States Parties’ obligation to provide alternative care is a strong one. 
The combination of the words "shall" and "ensure" in Article 20(2) of the CRC and 
Article 25(2)(a) of the ACRWC creates a high degree of obligation on States Parties to 
provide alternative care to children deprived of their families.314  
 
The mention in Article 20(2) of the CRC that alternative care is to be provided “in 
accordance with their national laws” may be read to limit the nature of the States 
Parties’ obligation. However, this is not the case. A closer look at the provision indicates 
that the phrase “in accordance with their national laws” does not refer to the higher 
standard of State Party obligation imposed on States but to the type of alternative care 
to be provided.315 A similar debate, however, does not arise in the context of the 
ACRWC as the phrase “in accordance with their national laws” does not appear in 
Article 25 of the ACRWC. 
 
It is also worth observing that the words “alternative care” are not employed by the 
ACRWC. Rather, the ACRWC speaks of “alternative family care” (emphasis mine).316 It 
would be wrong to suggest that “alternative care” and “alternative family care” are 
synonymous. The implications of “alternative family care” are discussed in Chapter 4. In 
addition, other elements of Article 20 of the CRC and Article 25 of the ACRWC are 
                                            
314  See Cohen and Davidson, (1990), 38 (discussing how the combination of the words “shall” and 
“ensure” imposes a higher level of obligation). 
315  Detrick, (1999), 336. It is to be noted that the discussion during the drafting of this provision 
seems to support this position. See, generally, Considerations, (1989), 339 - 348. 
316  Art. 25 of the ACRWC. 
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highlighted at a later stage, in particular in the Chapter dealing with the principle of 
subsidiarity.317  
 
Finally, the recognition in Article 25 of the CRC of the need for periodic review of 
placement is also relevant, since many children potentially eligible for adoption live in 
orphanages or other institutions, where they very often languish or are “forgotten” until 
adulthood. A periodic review of the child’s placement will ensure that, at the earliest 
possible time, decisions are taken by parents, guardians or the competent authorities 
relative to the child’s reunification with his or her birth family or extended family, or 
permanent care by an adoptive family.318 
 
3.4.3    Intercountry adoption 
 
3.4.3.1 Intercountry adoption: General introduction 
During the drafting of the CRC one of the most controversial areas of negotiation was 
adoption.319 While it started with an obligation on States Parties to “facilitate” 
adoption,320 the end product does not mandate that the States parties take measures 
to facilitate the adoption of children.321 Rather, Article 21 entails an obligation on States 
Parties to make the best interests of the child “the paramount consideration”322, and to 
regulate adoption if it is recognised as an alternative means of care. 
 
                                            
317  Chapter 5 below. 
318  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 5. 
319  See Cohen, (1989), 1450.  The controversy mainly centered on the objection of Islamic 
delegations based upon non-recognition of adoption in Islamic religion. 
320  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 5. 
321  Le Blanc, (1995), 120. 
322  See section 3.3.3 above on a discussion of the best interests of the child principle in the context 
of intercountry adoption. 
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Article 21 of the CRC provides that: 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the 
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:  
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all 
pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child's 
status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons 
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such 
counselling as may be necessary;  
(b) Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of 
child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any 
suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin;  
(c) Ensure that the child concerned by inter-country adoption enjoys safeguards and 
standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption;  
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-country adoption, the placement 
does not result in improper financial gain for those involved in it;  
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present article by concluding 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this 
framework, to ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by 
competent authorities or organs.323  
 
Although Article 24 of the ACRWC is very similar to Article 21 of the CRC, there is merit 
in quoting it in full as it is a provision that is central to this thesis. Article 24 of the 
ACRWC provides that: 
States Parties which recognize the system of adoption shall ensure that the best 
interest of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
 
(a) establish competent authorities to determine matters of adoption and ensure that the 
adoption is carried out in conformity with applicable laws and procedures and on the 
basis of all relevant and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of 
the child's status concerning parents, relatives and guardians and that, if necessary, the 
appropriate persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the 
basis of appropriate counselling; 
                                            
323  Art. 21 of CRC. 
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(b) recognize that inter-country adoption in those States who have ratified or adhered to 
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child or this Charter, may, as the last 
resort, be considered as an alternative means of a child's care, if the child cannot be 
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in 
the child's country of origin; 
(c) ensure that the child affected by inter-country adoption enjoys safeguards and 
standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption; 
(d) take all appropriate measures to ensure that in inter-country adoption, the placement 
does not result in trafficking or improper financial gain for those who 
try to adopt a child; 
(e) promote, where appropriate, the objectives of this Article by concluding bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this 
framework to ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by 
competent authorities or organs; 
(f) establish a machinery to monitor the well-being of the adopted child.324 
 
The following sections shed some light on the elements of Article 21 of the CRC and 
Article 24 of the ACRWC. However, since the majority of the discussions in this study 
coalesce around these provisions and subsequent chapters deconstruct in detail the 
elements of these provisions,325 a relatively rudimentary approach is taken in the 
following sections. In this regard, since the principle of subsidiarity and adoptability are 
issues with dedicated chapters below, their discussion is totally deferred for now.  
 
3.4.3.2        Preliminary considerations 
In the interest of clarity, it is apposite to investigate at the outset three interrelated 
questions pertaining to intercountry adoption. The first issue for investigation is whether 
there is an international law obligation to provide for intercountry adoption as an 
                                            
324  Art 24 of the ACRWC. 
325  See, for instance, Chapter 4 on adoptability, Chapter 5 on the principle of subsidiarity, and 
Chapter 6 on improper financial gains, trafficking and other illicit activities pertaining to adoption. 
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alternative means of care. The second and third, which are closely related, look at 
whether there is a right to be adopted and whether there is a right to adopt, respectively. 
 
3.4.3.2.1 Is there an obligation under international law to provide 
for intercountry adoption as an alternative means of 
care?   
 
It appears that the answer to this question is no.  
 
The majority of the principles and rights provided in the CRC and the ACRWC are not a 
matter of discretion for States Parties.326 However, the wording of Article 21 of the CRC 
and Article 24 of the ACRWC contains no mandate requiring States to permit adoption, 
either nationally or internationally.327 Indeed, Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of the 
ACRWC reflect the exception, in giving states the option to have adoption and 
intercountry adoption as alternative means of care. 
 
Contrary to popular belief, no country, by virtue of it being State Party to the CRC and 
the ACRWC, is under an automatic international obligation to allow intercountry 
adoption as a means of alternative care.328 A close reading of the carefully crafted 
wording of Article 21 of the CRC (as well as that of Article 24 of the ACRWC) reveals 
the opposite. The caveat to Article 21 provides for “States Parties that recognize and/or 
permit the system of adoption …” (emphasis mine), while Article 24 of the ACRWC 
speaks of “State Parties which recognise the system of adoption …” (emphasis mine). 
The travaux preparatoires to the CRC indicate that this caveat was added during the 
                                            
326  Most provisions require states to “ensure”, “undertake”, “recognize”, “respect”… 
327        LeBlanc, (1995), 143-44. 
328  See, for instance, Dillon (2003), 207. 
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negotiations, in response to interventions by a number of Muslim countries (particularly 
Bangladesh), since Islamic law does not recognise the concept of an adoption which 
disguises the true parentage and blood relationships of a child.329 The “recognize and/or 
permit” phrase used is also not redundant. Countries that might not generally recognise, 
but do permit adoption, are those States, for instance, that allow the practice for non-
Muslims within their jurisdiction. A case in point is Lebanon, which, while not 
recognising adoption for Muslims, allows non-Muslims to adopt other non-Muslims 
within its jurisdiction.330 
 
Furthermore, Article 21 (b) of the CRC has the same caveat where it speaks of the fact 
that “intercountry adoption may be considered as an alternative means of child’s care 
…”.  The wording deliberately falls short of saying that countries must consider 
intercountry adoption as one of the options for the care for children without families.331 
If one has regard to State practice on the issue, the reality emerges that there are a 
number of countries in the world that are States Parties to the CRC but still do not allow 
intercountry adoption. Of course, the classic examples are Islamic countries that adhere 
to Sharia law. However, non-Islamic countries, such as Korea and Myanmar, are also 
                                            
329  Travaux Preparatoires, 16. The Quranic edict that has been interpreted to prohibit adoption 
reads: ‘ … Nor hath He made those whom ye claim to be your sons. This is a saying of your 
mouth … Proclaim their real parentage. That will be more equitable in the sight of God. And if ye 
know not their fathers, then (proclaim them) your brethren in faith and your clients. (33:4/5)’. In 
Algeria, for instance, the Family Law 84/1984 (promulgated 09 June 1984) dealing with 
inheritance, guardianship, maintenance, marriage, wills, gifts, and other related issues expressly 
provides that ‘Adoption shall be forbidden, under the Sharia and the law’ (Art 46). In a similar 
fashion, Article 83 of Decree No 1/57/379 which forms part of The Code of Personal Status and 
Succession of 1957 entrenches that “[a]doption as understood customarily is void and shall 
produce no legal effect. Adoption for the purpose of rewarding or bequeathing, known as 
according a person the status of one’s child, shall not establish a parentage, and shall be subject 
to the provision of the will”. 
330  Hodgkin and Newell , (2002), 296. 
331  As above. 
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examples. In Africa, it can be mentioned that while Nigeria allows adoption, its 2003 
Children’s Rights Act proscribes intercountry adoption.332 
 
Finally, Article 20 of the CRC, in listing the various alternative forms of care for children 
deprived of their family environment, highlights that “[s]uch care could include, inter alia, 
foster placement, kafalah333 of Islamic law, adoption …”.334 The use of the phrase “could 
include” is yet more proof that intercountry adoption is not imposed by international law.  
 
This leads to one conclusion that the provision made for intercountry adoption in Article 
21 of the CRC is optional, in that its application is limited to those countries that 
“recognize and/or permit the system of adoption”. Any support that international human 
rights law may lend to the argument that intercountry adoption should necessarily form 
part of alternative care options available to states, is at best tenuous.335  
 
3.4.3.2.2   Is there a right to be adopted under international law? 
Some have articulated a child’s right to be adopted under domestic law. In “Waiting for 
loving: The child’s fundamental right to adoption”,336 Woodhouse argues that adoption 
constitutes a fundamental family relationship and is not simply a privilege created by 
                                            
332  See Initial and First Periodic Report of Nigeria to the African Committee available at <www.africa-
union.org>. 
333  Kafalah under Islamic Law entails the acceptance of children without families in what is 
tantamount to a permanent form of foster care, but without the children concerned taking on the 
family name or enjoying the right to inherit from the family with which they are placed. See 
Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 295–296; Assim, (2009). 
334  Art 20(3) of CRC. 
335  This position does not necessarily bar potentially convincing arguments in favour of intercountry 
adoption. For instance, can a country validly decline intercountry adoption when the country 
maintains large numbers of children in institutions? Nonetheless, as the law stands, as opposed 
to what the law ought to be, there is no obligation under international law to allow intercountry 
adoption as an alternative means of care. 
336  Woodhouse, (2005), 297. 
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state law.337 By comparing adoption to marriage, she contends that adoption is as 
crucial to children seeking parents as marriage is to adults seeking partners.338 She 
employs three major premises for her conclusions: first, that adoption is a basic family 
relationship and not a state-created privilege;339 secondly, that adoption is no less 
fundamental because it is based on choice rather than blood ties;340 and thirdly, that 
children, like adults, have a fundamental right to form a family.341 Without going into the 
validity of her arguments, suffice it to mention that her position is based on domestic 
statutes and case law, and does not necessarily purport to reflect a child’s right to be 
adopted under international law.342  
 
There is no doubt, generally speaking, that both the CRC and the ACRWC seek to 
place a children definitively deprived of their family environment with a family, in 
preference to in an institution.343 This, however, can only happen when possible and in 
the best interests of the child. As already discussed above in relation to “family 
environment”, there is no right to a family or a family environment under international 
law.344 Van Bueren maintains that “[a]doption, quite rightly, is not regarded as the 
entitlement of a child to a family life”.345 In other words, the provisions of the CRC and 
the ACRWC do not articulate a child’s right to be adopted since children’s right to be 
adopted is directly related to children’s “right to a family”.  
                                            
337  Woodhouse, (2005), 307,328 
338  As above. 
339  Woodhouse, (2005), 308-316 
340  Woodhouse, (2005), 316-319 
341  Woodhouse, (2005), 319-322 
342  However, for responses to her position, see for instance, Duncan, (2005), 345. 
343  Van Bueren, (1995), 94. 
344  Van Bueren is of the opinion that this perhaps explains the absence of any specific reference to 
adoption or fostering in either of the two Declarations on the Rights of the Child which preceded 
the CRC. Van Bueren, (1995), 94. 
345  Van Bueren, (1995), 125. 
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The submission that there is a right to a family, however, should be considered 
carefully. Where an adoption system is set in place by a State Party, children who are 
deprived of their family environment and for whom adoption is in their best interests, 
should have a right of access to the system without discrimination.346 In the meantime, 
though a child does not have a right to a family life, hence to be adopted, a child has the 
right to respect for his or her existing family life,347 for instance, once the child is 
adopted. 
 
In sum, there is no right to be adopted under international law. This is partly so because 
there is no right to a family in the CRC and the ACRWC. Moreover, it is directly related 
to the fact that there is no obligation under international law to provide for intercountry 
adoption as an alternative means of care.  
 
3.4.3.2.3 Is there a right to adopt under international law?  
The question “is there a right to adopt?” is a loaded one.348 The question could imply a 
claim on the basis of equality before the law that if a certain group of persons are 
allowed to adopt, other groups should also be treated equally and be allowed to adopt. 
It could also imply an obligation on the part of the State to provide interested parties 
with an adoptive child or a right that one be authorised to adopt, should an adoptive 
child become available. Meanwhile, does it also mean a right to adopt a specific child 
with whom one already has de facto parent-child bonds?349 
 
                                            
346  See discussion above in section 3.3.4 on non-discrimination. 
347  Van Bueren, (1995), 94. See, too, Art. 16 of the CRC on non-interference in family life. 
348  Letsas, (2008), 1. 
349  Letsas, (2008), 1. 
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If one uses the language of rights in the context of “a right to adopt”, it means 
acknowledging a human right to adopt as a question of entitlement, and a 
commensurate responsibility to ensure its effective enjoyment. Such an approach could 
indeed come into conflict with children’s best interests, since the purpose of adoption is 
to provide the best possible parents for children, not to provide children for adults who 
desire to parent them. As a result, adoption policy and practice guided by the best 
interests of the child does not recognise a “right to adopt”.350 This position is further 
demonstrated by the experience from Europe. 
 
In Europe, for instance, while a legal family created through adoption is protected under 
paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the ECHR, a duty does not flow from this Article for States 
Parties to grant a person the status of adoptive parent or adoptive child.351 In X v 
Belgium and the Netherlands it was acknowledged that while the right to found a family 
is absolute and  that the State cannot interfere with the exercise of this right, equally, it 
has no legal obligation to provide the services that may be necessary for the right to be 
exercised.352 In other words, it is argued that the right to respect for family life 
presupposes the existence of a family and does not safeguard the mere desire to found 
a family.353 As a result, it was maintained that unmarried persons cannot claim a right to 
adopt.354 
 
                                            
350  Adult assertions of a right to adopt reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the most basic 
principle of adoption: the whole purpose of adoption is to serve the best interests of children. 
351  Di Lazzaro v. Italy, no. 31924/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997, DR 90, 134 (139). 
352  X v Belgium and the Netherlands, no. 6482/74, Commission decision of 10 July 1975, DR 7, 77. 
353  Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31, para. 31. 
354  As above. 
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The “right to adopt” is often the language invoked by gays and lesbians in order to 
tackle discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in relation to adoption. This 
would mean that, insofar as a straight couple has the “right” to adopt a child, a 
homosexual couple should have that same right. In other words, they argue that States 
which have systems for adoption should neither implicitly nor directly prohibit 
homosexuals from adopting simply because of their sexual orientation. Even in this 
context, however, the proper terminology is not “the right to adopt” but rather “the right 
to be assessed as a prospective adoptive parent”.  
 
In the final analysis, irrespective of the various implications that the right to adopt 
conveys, in international law, there is no right to adopt. This conclusion is further 
bolstered by the foregoing sections that there is neither an obligation under international 
law to provide for intercountry adoption as an alternative means of care, nor a right to 
be adopted. 
 
3.4.3.3  Substantive provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC on 
intercountry adoption 
 
As quoted above, Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of the ACRWC deal with a 
number of substantive issues that pertain to intercountry adoption.  These provisions 
deal with adoptability, the principle of subsidiarity, and illicit activities in intercountry 
adoption, such as, trafficking and improper financial gains. All these issues are 
discussed in subsequent Chapters and will not form part of the discussion here.  
 
Other issues that Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of the ACRWC address are the 
provision of equivalent standards for domestic and intercountry adoption; post-adoption 
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follow-up; and the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements to regulate 
intercountry adoption. The following discussion focuses on these three issues. 
 
3.4.3.3.1 Equivalent standards for domestic and intercountry 
adoption 
 
One of the notable provisions of Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of the ACRWC is 
the obligation imposed on States Parties that adoption laws should grant a child who is 
the subject of intercountry adoption the same level of safeguards as are available for 
domestic adoptions.355 This provision draws its inspiration from the 1986 UN 
Declaration.356  
 
There seems to be no consensus on the purpose of this provision. Padilla, for instance, 
maintains that “[b]ecause incountry adoption laws in many western countries often 
serve to prohibit adoption for eligible parents, this provision could serve to equally limit 
intercountry adoption” under the guise of providing equivalent standards for domestic 
and intercountry adoption.357 Padilla cites the comment of one person to substantiate 
her interpretation of the provision.358 
 
However, a reasonable construction of this provision proffers that, just as in domestic 
adoption, intercountry adoption should benefit from similar safeguards and be 
authorised when in the best interests of the child.359 The involvement of competent 
                                            
355  Detrick, (1999), 351. 
356         As above. 
357  Padilla, (1993), 842. 
358  Padilla, (1993), 842 footnote 215 citing that Moore, (1992), 8 where “[o]ne British commentator 
noted that if intercountry adoption were subject to the same standards as adoption within Britain, 
the process would become "interminable and therefore impracticable”. 
359  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 299. 
 
 
 
 
 179
authorities in the determination of the best interests of the child is crucial, and this 
should be done on the basis of proper investigation and information and with proper 
consents having been obtained.360 
 
It is questionable whether the safeguards available for domestic adoption would achieve 
a similar level of guarantee in promoting the best interests of children in intercountry 
adoption.361 For instance, safeguards often necessary in intercountry adoption, but not 
recognised in the case of domestic adoption, include, respecting the subsidiarity 
principle and upholding the “no initial contact” rule. It is submitted that, if the phrase 
“…standards equivalent to…” is read to mean “comparable to”, and not “the same as”, 
then the possibility of providing for better safeguards for intercountry adoption seems to 
be accommodated within the text of the provision. 
 
3.4.3.3.2 Post- adoption follow-up 
Some detractors of adoption deplore the fact that once a child leaves his or her state of 
origin, the possibility of a follow-up is lost. They use this as an argument for a total ban 
on intercountry adoption. A contrary reading of their position seems to suggest that if 
post-adoption procedures are put in place, the possibility of upholding the best interests 
of adopted children could be facilitated. Post-adoption services consist of providing for a 
period of time for follow-up reports on the situation of adopted children. 
 
Article 24(f) of the ACRWC requires a follow-up once adoption takes place, by stating 
that “State Parties shall ‘establish a machinery to monitor the well-being of the adopted 
                                            
360  As above. 
361  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 49. 
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child”, a requirement that is not apparent in the CRC. This provision reflects recognition 
of the fact that adoption is not a once-off event but a process. Article 24(f) of the 
ACRWC is relevant in the context of both domestic and intercountry adoption. This can 
be deciphered from the use of the word “adopted child”.362 Article 24(f) of the ACRWC 
should be interpreted to include the conclusion of international cooperation agreements 
or treaties relating to monitoring and enforcing the Charter’s provisions.363 Understood 
in this manner, it could go a long way to ensuring that States exercise a continuing duty 
regarding the welfare of the adopted child. 
 
3.4.3.3.3 Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements  
In order to regulate intercountry adoption, one option available to countries is to enter 
into co-operation agreements. Both the CRC and the ACRWC suggest this option for 
States.364 According to LeBlanc, the need for bilateral or multilateral agreements flows 
from the fact that Article 21 of the CRC addresses intercountry adoption in a 
rudimentary manner.365 As a result, the drafters agreed to leave most of the important 
work in this field to future negotiations.366  
 
A few African countries have entered into bilateral agreements of this nature. Ethiopia’s 
bilateral agreement with Australia367 sought to establish a system of cooperation 
between the two countries that shall ensure the prevention, or the total elimination, of 
                                            
362  Art 24(f) of the ACRWC. 
363  See Gose , (2002), 111-112 
364  See Art. 21(e) of the CRC.  
365  LeBlanc, (1995), 143. 
366  As above. 
367  Parliament of Australia, (2005). 
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the abduction, trafficking, or sale, of children and adolescents. In 2006, a bilateral 
agreement between Morocco and Spain was expected.368 
 
3.5 CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO IDENTITY, PRIVACY, AND RIGHTS 
AGAINST EXPLOITATION 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines rights not discussed above that have an indirect bearing upon 
intercountry adoption. These include the right to a name and birth registration, the right 
to freedom of religion and the right against child trafficking. Issues pertaining to cultural 
identity, freedom of religion and the right to privacy are also explored. 
 
 
3.5.2 Children’s right to identity and adoptions: Birth registration, right to a 
name and nationality, and the right to know and be cared for by one’s 
parents 
 
As Van Bueren put it: “An individual’s identity is at root an acknowledgement of a 
person’s existence; it is that which makes a person visible in society”.369 This section 
focuses mainly on Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC, and Article 6 of the ACRWC. It is logical 
that Article 7 is read in conjunction with Article 8 (preservation of identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations), as they display some level of overlap. These 
provisions read as follows: 
 
 
                                            
368  Vericat, (2006). Attempt by this writer to establish whether or not this agreement materialized 
have been unsuccessful. 
369  Van Bueren, (1995), 117. 
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Article 7  
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to 
a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents.  
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their 
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, 
in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.  
 
Article 8  
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference.  
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, 
States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.  
 
Article 6, the corresponding provision in the ACRWC, provides that: 
Article 6: Name and Nationality 
1. Every child shall have the right from his birth to a name. 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth. 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 
4. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to ensure that their 
Constitutional legislation recognize the principles according to which a child 
shall acquire the nationality of the State in the territory of which he has been 
born if, at the time of the child's birth, he is not granted nationality by any other 
State in accordance with its laws. 
 
All these provisions are interrelated. Even though Article 8 of the CRC and Article 6 of 
the ACRWC do not define the concept of “identity”, they give three examples of what it 
includes: nationality, name, and family relations. It is to be noted, however, that unlike 
the CRC, children’s right to know and be cared for by their parents is not recognised 
explicitly in the ACRWC. A provision similar to Article 8 of the CRC is also not present 
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in the ACRWC.370 The following sub-sections proffer a detailed discussion of these 
rights in the context of adoption. 
 
3.5.2.1 The child’s right to birth registration 
In ancient times, children were not registered at birth.371 In addition, in the past, birth 
registration was often regarded as a concept of public administration372 and alien to the 
language of “rights”. However, with the coming into force of the ICCPR and the CRC, 
birth registration has come to be viewed as a basic human right for all children.373 
The importance of birth registration for the promotion and protection of children’s rights 
is an elevated one. As Newell and Hodgkin correctly put it: 
Registration is the State’s first official acknowledgement of the child’s existence; it 
represents recognition of each child’s individual importance to the State and of the child’s 
status under the law. Where children are not registered, they are likely to be less visible, 
and sometimes less valued.374 
It is also important for the protection of children born out of wedlock; asylum-seeking 
and refugee children; for prevention of malpractices in intercountry adoption; and for 
                                            
370  There is not, as such, a right to identity under the ACRWC. In fact, the word identity does not 
appear anywhere in the text of the document. This seems to have emanated from the 
understanding that identity is composite of a number of rights (such as the right to a name, 
nationality, and so forth) and a separate provision on the concept might have been deemed 
unnecessary. 
371  A classical example which asserts this fact is the period of the Roman Empire where women and 
children were not allowed to be registered by the civil registration system. See, in this regard, 
Wei, (2000), 48. 
372  See, for instance, Huawen, (2004) arguing that birth registration is still considered as a public 
administration issues as opposed being the right of a child. See also, Changbin, (1991), 469 as 
cited in Huawen, (2004), 3. 
373  Before the CRC, it was Art. 24(4) of the ICCPR that provided that “[e]very child shall be registered 
immediately after birth and shall have a name”. For a detailed discussion on this, see Van 
Bueren, (1995), 118. 
374  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 98. For a similar position, see Nowak (1993), 432. According to 
Nowak, the right to identity flows from the right to privacy and the right to recognition before the 
law. 
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preventing the abduction, and trafficking of children. In some instances the absence of a 
birth certificate can result in the sentencing of a child to the death penalty.375  
 
A UNICEF study states that “a fully registered birth and the accompanying birth 
certificate help a child secure the right to his or her origins, to a nationality and also help 
to safeguard other human rights”.376 Since birth certificates contain the date of birth of a 
child, they are very crucial for the enforcement of minimum age legislation.377 Without a 
proper birth registration system, effective national planning for children becomes 
difficult, too.378 This is so because without birth registration children are not recognised 
by law, and they are apt to be invisible in government statistics.  
 
The term “immediately” in Article 7(1) of the CRC and Article 6(2) of the ACRWC 
signifies the need to undertake registration in an urgent manner after birth.379 It can be 
interpreted to refer to “a defined period of days rather than months”.380 In addition, the 
CRC Committee recommends that birth registration should be free381 and universally 
accessible.382 States are further urged to facilitate and provide late registration free of 
charge.383 Special measures, such as, mobile units and periodic birth registration 
campaigns to target particularly vulnerable children, are often encouraged.384 
                                            
375  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Yemen, (May 1999), para. 20. 
376  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (2002), 4. 
377  Van Bueren, (1995), 118. 
378  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 98. 
379  Van Bueren, (1995), 118. 
380  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 100. 
381  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10, (2007), para. 39; CRC Committee, Concluding 
Observations: DRC, (February 2009), para. 36. 
382  See CRC Committee, General Comment No. 11, (2009), para. 41. 
383  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Malawi, (January 2009), para. 37; 
Chad, (January 2009), para. 40; General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 25. 
384  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mauritania, para. 39; General 
Comment No. 9, paras. 35-36; General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 25. 
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In consequence of birth registration, there is also an obligation not to discriminate on the 
basis of the information contained in the birth certificate or obtained through the 
registration procedure.385 According to the CRC Committee, even when a child is born 
outside of wedlock, it is important to identify the father in the birth certificate.386 Since 
the registration of the birth of a child is the minimum guarantee for the enjoyment of his 
or her rights, it should also not be affected by the uncertainties that may relate to the 
issue of citizenship or other related status.387 There is an obligation to preserve and 
protect the elements of the identity of the child.388 
 
In the context of this study, for instance, the absence of birth registration and a 
supporting birth certificate may facilitate the production of false papers for illegal 
domestic and intercountry adoption. It is common practice that, once an adoption order 
is made, a copy of the amended birth registration with the adoptee’s name and other 
relevant information is prepared. As a result, original birth certificates can also become 
crucial at a later stage when an adoptee attempts to establish his or her identity in 
relation to his or her family of origin.389 
 
3.5.2.2 The child’s right to a name  
Since names are used to identify and categorise, they are also very significant elements 
of one’s identity. A name (in particular a surname) can reflect one's cultural, ethnic, 
                                            
385  Ziemele, (2007), 21. 
386  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Ireland, (February 1998), para. 36. 
387  Ziemele, (2007), 23. 
388  As above. 
389  See discussion below on the right to know one’s origin in this regard. 
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religious, or familial heritage. In fact, it carries with it practical as well as symbolical 
importance. The power to name390 is also a very important issue, and as a result, it is 
not uncommon to have court cases where people (in particular divorced or unmarried 
couples) fight over the choice of name and surname for their children.391 
 
The previous chapter has alluded to the importance of names within African societies.392 
For instance, the importance of names in Muslim societies is well captured in a recent 
article by Ishaque.393 Ishaque contends that when considering issues of identity, such 
as names, one has to be mindful of core values which are universal and thus can 
provide an opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the ultimate aim of protecting the 
child.394 
 
The right to a name was first mentioned in Principle 3 of the 1959 Declaration. However, 
it was in Article 24(2) of the ICCPR that, for the first time, one finds a binding recognition 
of the essential nature of the right to a name to the formation and preservation of a 
child’s identity. During the drafting of the CRC, the incorporation of this right did not face 
any resistance. The only divergent view expressed at the drafting stage suggested the 
inclusion of children’s right to a “sensible” name which was found to be unnecessary;395 
the feeling was that national law should regulate what is sensible or not, and a name 
                                            
390  Herring, (1998), 235. 
391  See, for instance, Herring, (1998),  235, 
392  Ishaque, (2008), 393-420. 
393  As above. 
394  Ishaque, (2008), 393-420. The Koran states, “[Allah] . .. does not regard your adopted sons as 
your own sons. . . . Name your adopted sons after their fathers; that is more just in the sight of 
Allah.” Koran, xxxiii, 4-6. Accordingly, very few Muslim countries practice formal adoption. 
395  Van Bueren, (1995), 117. 
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that violates any of the four cardinal principles of the CRC and the ACRWC would be in 
violation of the CRC and the ACRWC.396 
 
One consequence of adoption is usually that the surname of the adopted child is 
changed to that of the adoptive parents. Often the given name of the child is also 
changed to a new name often determined by the adoptive parents. It is not uncommon 
to include the preferred name change for the child in the petition to a court for an 
adoption order. In Liberia, for instance, when a petition for adoption is filed with the 
Probate Court, the petition must contain, amongst others, the petitioners' desire to adopt 
the child and the child's change of name.397 
 
In the interest of children’s identity right (particularly older children) maintaining original 
names and surnames are very important. Therefore, and by having regard to the best 
interests of the child principle and child participation, it is advisable that legal systems 
retain the option that adopted children are able to retain or regain their original names 
and surnames, if they so request. In addition, on a practical level, consideration must 
also be given to a situation where the surname of an adopted child can be changed into 
a double (for instance, hyphenated) name at his or her request, consisting of the original 
surname in combination with the surname gained as a result of adoption.398 To 
illustrate: in Niger, Government has reported that “[w]ith a view to preserving the child’s 
identity, the law provides that, in cases of simple adoption, the adoptee keeps his or her 
                                            
396  Newell and Hodgkin note that “[d]omestic laws should have appropriate mechanisms to prevent 
registration of a name that might make a child an object of ridicule, bad luck or discrimination, 
Newell and Hodgkin, (2007) 103.  
397  U.S. Department of State “Intercountry adoption: Liberia” (December 2008). 
398  See Committee on Lesbian Parenthood and Intercountry Adoption, (2008), 12. 
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original name, to which the name of the adopter may be added, if the child so 
desires”.399 
 
3.5.2.3 The child’s right to acquire a nationality 
Before the CRC, the essential nature of the right to acquire a nationality for the 
constitution and preservation of a child’s identity was also recognised in Article 24(3) of 
the ICCPR.400 Article 7(1) of the CRC and Article 6(3) of the ACRWC seem to follow the 
language of Article 24(3) of the ICCPR which provides that “[e]very child has the right to 
acquire a nationality”. All these treaties share the view that the purpose of the child's 
right to acquire a nationality is mainly "to prevent a child from being afforded less 
protection by society and the State because he is stateless”.401 
 
An inclination of States Parties desire to maintain immigration issues as the preserve of 
national law can be gleaned from these provisions. In fact, the legislative history of the 
drafting of the CRC indicates that most of the discussion and debate surrounding Article 
7 of the CRC involved the conditions under which a child would acquire a nationality, 
and particularly the tension between the immigration laws of the various potential States 
parties and the need to ensure that each child acquired some nationality.402  
 
Notably, the child's right to acquire a nationality would be satisfied by obtaining any 
nationality. The phrase “would otherwise be stateless” suggests that national measures 
                                            
399  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Niger, (November 2008), para. 154,  
400  The right to nationality is also recognised in a number of other international instruments. These 
include, Principle 3 of the 1959 Declaration, Art. 15(1) of the UDHR, and Art. 20(1) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
401  HRC, General Comment No. 24, (1989), para. 8. 
402  See Blair, (2001), 646. 
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for implementing Article 7 of the CRC and Article 6 of the ACRWC should make it their 
underlying goal to eliminate the problem of statelessness. In this regard it is crucial to 
address the issues of the absence of equality between the sexes,403 and discrimination 
against children who are born outside of wedlock, which are two of the main reasons 
that lead to children’s statelessness.404  
 
This provision of the CRC has been read to embody the international rule of jus soli, in 
accordance with which children would acquire nationality by birth, if they would 
otherwise be stateless.405 In this regard, Article 6(4) of the ACRWC is a more 
comprehensive provision as it explicitly and clearly provides for nationality to be granted 
from the territory or residence in which one is born.406 In respect of children, arguably, it 
is noted that the principle of jus soli is part of international customary law.407 
 
Some commentators have pointed out that the Hague Convention, by emphasising 
family environment if not in the State of origin, then internationally, has taken the notion 
of identity rights beyond the confining limits of nationality.408 However, the effects of a 
Convention adoption on a child’s nationality are not governed expressly by the Hague 
Convention.409 As a result, questions, such as, in what circumstances does an adoption 
                                            
403  Undoubtedly, the growing recognition of the child's right to acquire a nationality does not, by itself, 
amount to the recognition of the equal right of both parents to pass their nationalities to the child. 
However, as Goonesekere argues, at least as far as the CRC is concerned, its general articles on 
gender equality (Art. 2), family and parental rights and responsibilities (Arts. 5, 8-10, and 18), and 
its norm of the best interests of the child (Art. 3) require that if the child's nationality is traced 
through the parents (jus sanguinis), then it must be traced equally through both parents. 
Goonesekere, (1996), 89-90. 
404  Ziemele, (2007), 24. 
405  Ziemele, (2007), 25, 28-29. 
406  See, Mezmur, (2008a), 9. 
407  Ziemele, (2007), 29. 
408  Maravel, (1996), 318. 
409  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 108. 
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lead to acquisition of a new nationality for the child or the loss of an existing nationality 
do not necessarily get an answer from the provisions of the Hague Convention.410 
However, Article 26(2) of the Hague Convention which requires that the child should 
enjoy in the receiving State rights equivalent to those which result from similar 
adoptions within that State is of some guidance.411 In other words, Contracting States 
should make sure that an adopted child is not made stateless. 
 
It is important that the loss of nationality through adoption should be conditional upon 
the acquisition by the adopted person of the nationality of the adopter. Article 17 of the 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws412 
espouses the same principle. In Korea the fact that adoption procedures were extremely 
cumbersome where a father was not a national has led the CRC Committee to point out 
its incompatibility with the provisions of the CRC.413 Such practices would also not be 
congruent with the rule against discrimination.414 
 
3.5.2.4 The child’s right to know, and be cared for, by his or her 
parents 
 
Being able to know one’s origin is a way of ascertaining one’s complete identity 
information.415 The absence of a capacity to do so might contribute to an unhealthy 
sense of self-esteem.416 
                                            
410  As above. 
411  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 109. 
412  Adopted 12 April 1930. 
413  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, (February1996), para. 22. 
414  See section 3.3.4 for a discussion on the principle against discrimination. 
415  Cahn and Singer, (1999), 173. 
416  As above. 
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The strict understanding of, and adherence to, the notion of adoption as a “rebirth”, as 
well as “the legacy of secrecy”, act as a challenge to the realisation of children’s right to 
know their origins.417 In the past secrecy was the rule where court records and birth 
records were closed to all.418 In recent times, however, progress made in areas such as 
genetic research, and the increase of both domestic and intercountry adoptions have 
put the spotlight on the right to know one’s genetic origins. As a result, it is noted that 
recent reform of the domestic laws of many nations reflect increased awareness, to 
varying degrees, of the importance of a post-adoption connection to biological origins.419 
The main complicating feature of this right emanates from the fact that it could conflict 
with other person’s rights – namely, for instance, the competing rights to autonomy and 
privacy of the mother, the father, the adoptive parents or the gamete donor as the case 
may be.420 While disclosure of identifying information by mutual consent is widely 
accepted, what is controversial is when the interests of the adoptee and the family of 
origin, in particular the biological parents, conflict with one another. In such scenarios 
there is a need, if possible, to devise a way of addressing the rights of both the adoptee 
and the birth family, and, if possible, of striking a balance between the conflicting rights. 
 
                                            
417  See, for instance, Blair, (2001), 591 who recounts the historical evolution of confidentiality in 
adoption and some of the justifications for it. For a discussion of the history of adult adoptee 
access to birth records, see Samuels, (2001), 434 (arguing that “adoption law did not proceed in 
a simple, single step from a period in which court and birth records were closed to the public to a 
period in which the records were permanently closed to all of the parties. Instead, a more 
complete and accurate history of the law reveals interim periods, lengthy ones in many states, in 
which court records were closed to all, while birth records, as recommended by social service and 
legal authorities, were closed to everyone except the adult adoptees whose births they 
registered”). 
418  See, for instance, Samuels, (2001), 434. 
419  Van Bueren, (1995), 121; Blair, (2001), 587. 
420  Besson, (2007), 138. 
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In particular, two major arguments against access to adoption records by adoptees 
seem to have permeated the legal discourse. One is, that open records will lead to more 
abortions.421 The second argument contends that if birth parents were promised, 
conditional upon their consent to adoption, a right to privacy and confidentiality, it should 
not be violated.422 
 
In the same vein, the main rights of the child involved are the rights to privacy, family 
life, identity and freedom of expression.423 A child’s access to adoption records also has 
the right to equality implications for adopted children as a class.424 
 
All three relevant instruments for discussion (the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague 
Convention) address, in varying degrees, and explicitly or implicitly, the right of the child 
to know his or her origins.425 Nonetheless, the novelty of the CRC (and impliedly the 
ACRWC) lies in the fact that the child’s right to know his or her parents qua child, and 
not only later as an adult,426 found explicit expression in the instrument for the first time. 
 
The drafting history of the right to know, and be cared for by, one’s parents in the CRC 
indicates the significant role played by Muslim countries in proposing the inclusion of 
this right.427 The underlying view advocated by these countries was that the right to 
                                            
421  Cabellero (2006), 306; Behne, (1997) 80; Racine, (2002), 1453-1454; Hughes, (2007), 445. 
422  Cabellero, (2006), 306. 
423  Van Bueren, (1995), 122. 
424  Van Bueren, (1995), 121. 
425  Arts. 7 and 8 of the CRC and Arts. 6 and 10 of the ACRWC. 
426  Much of the discourse that exists about the right to know one’s origin is argued in the context of 
adult adoptees. See, for instance, Racine, (2002), 1435; Hughes (2007) 429; Samuels (2001), 
367; As argued above, the application of the provisions of both the CRC and the ACRWC are 
limited to persons below the age of 18.  
427  Blauwhoff, (2009), 50 
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know one’s parents is very fundamental for the child’s psychological wellbeing.428 This 
underlying view was accepted by the drafters of the CRC. 
 
The nature of States Parties’ obligation with regard to the right to know and be cared for 
by one’s parents has both a positive and negative slant to it. As a positive duty, States 
should register, preserve, and open access to birth data, while, as a negative duty, they 
should also protect the child’s interests against active violations.429 It is also important to 
recognise that, the “right to know” does not imply the right to know and be with 
parents.430 The right places more emphasis on biological ties, rather than on social 
ties.431 
 
The right to know, and to be cared for by one’s parents is qualified by the phrase “as far 
as possible”. This phrase is intended to reconcile some divergent views surrounding the 
scope of the right.432 Although various meanings have been attached to the limitation 
imposed by the phrase “as far as possible,”433 a reasonable construction of this phrase 
is that it is intended to accommodate national laws that do not, in general, allow 
adoptees to know identifying information about their biological parents.434 This limitation, 
read with the obligation in Article 7(2) of the CRC to implement the right in accordance 
with national laws as well as relevant international instruments, suggests that the CRC 
does not create an unlimited right to access to identifying records.  
                                            
428  As above. 
429  Besson, (2007),145. 
430  Besson, (2007), 145-146. 
431  Besson, (2007), 146. 
432  Blauwhoff, (2009), 51. 
433  Some have asserted that this means that, the right should be implemented as far as it is possible 
as a matter of fact. Besson, (2007), 150. 
434  Report of Working Group, (1989). 
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Even Article 8 of the CRC does not impose such an absolute obligation on States 
Parties. Inspired by the abduction of children in Argentina between 1975 and 1983, 
Article 8 of the CRC attempts to establish a duty on States to preserve or safeguard, 
and when necessary, to re-establish, the identity of the child.435 As a lawful “deprivation 
of identity”, adoption appears to be excluded from the scope of Article 8 of the CRC 
because Article 8 generally refers to “unlawful” deprivation of identity.436 
 
While Article 30 of the Hague Convention requires contracting States to ensure the 
preservation of information concerning the child's origin, including the identity of the 
child's parents and medical history, there is no indication that the adoptee has an 
absolute right to disclosure of information about the family of origin.437 This is apparent 
from a reading of the second leg of this provision, that States are bound to ensure that 
the child or her representative “has access to such information, under appropriate 
guidance, in so far as is permitted by the law of that State”.438 
 
However, the CRC Committee has objected to States laws which do not allow adopted 
children to know identifying information about their biological parents.439 It has not, 
however, gone as far as asserting that the right to know, and to be cared for by one’s 
parents is an unlimited right. The Committee’s preference for children’s right to know 
                                            
435  Van Bueren, (1995), 118-119; Blauwhoff, (2009), 52 highlighting that this provisions is known as 
the “Argentine article”;  
436  Welbourne, (2002), 282; For a debate whether this provision is applicable to adoptions, see Van 
Bueren, (1995), 120; Moreover, the context in which Art 8 was proffered, in reaction to atrocities 
in Argentina, further supports its inapplicability to adoptions that do not involve the wrongful taking 
of children. 
437  See Rains, (2004) 595-597. 
438  Art. 30 of the Hague Convention. 
439  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan, (July 2003), paras. 45-46; Czech 
Republic, (March 2003), paras. 8-9. 
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can be contrasted with the previous position of the European Court which favoured the 
rights of biological parents.440 
 
A solution that takes all of the fundamental rights and public policy concerns into 
consideration is needed, though it is not an easy one to formulate. Nonetheless, there is 
a strong case to be made for open adoptions especially in cases where the child who is 
a subject of adoption is an older child. In addition, even when parents or significant 
others cannot offer the child a home, they may an important part of a child’s life, and the 
child may be important to them. In the final analysis the role of the best interests of the 
child principle in the interpretation of these provisions is patent. As stated by Ziemele, 
generally, “it is clear that non-registration, statelessness, lack of knowledge of one’s 
roots as part of one’s identity and lack of family environment are not in the best interests 
of the child”.441 
 
3.5.3    The child’s right to cultural identity and intercountry adoption 
 
One area of child law where the “turf” between “cultural imperialism” and “cultural 
protectionism” looms large is in the field of intercountry adoption. One of the many 
issues that seems to elude consensus in the area of intercountry adoption, is the right to 
cultural identity. Certain critics denounce the practice of intercountry adoption as 
“modern-day imperialism, allowing dominant, developed cultures to strip away a 
                                            
440  See Odievre v. France, 15, (2003), paras. 44, 47. 
441  Ziemele, (2007), 31. 
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developing country's most precious resources, its children”.442 Referring to Buti, Martin 
further observes that: 
[t]he intercountry adoption debate is suffused with the concept of culture, on both an 
individual and a societal level. Individually, critics of intercountry adoption believe that the 
loss of a child’s cultural heritage (which inevitably occurs during intercountry adoption) 
leads to the loss of the child’s identity. Some even go to so far as to brand the practice as a 
“cultural genocide”. Countries that prohibit intercountry adoption based on arguments of 
culture and cultural identity continue to exist (notes omitted).443 
 
As Woodhouse notes, “… culture of origin, no matter how hard to define with satisfying 
logic, do[es] matter to children and therefore should matter in adoption law”.444 After all, 
Article 20(3) of the CRC reads that, when considering alternative care solutions, “due 
regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the 
child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background”.445 
 
It is sometimes the same concept of cultural identity that is used by opponents of 
intercountry adoption to deny children a family environment, even when it is clear that 
intercountry adoption would be in the children’s best interests.446 Unfortunately, it is a 
fact that some groups (sometimes a whole nation) consider the claiming of a right of 
                                            
442  Martin, (2007), 174. 
443  Martin, (2007), 174-175 also citing Buti, (2006), 6. For arguments that intercountry adoption is a 
“cultural genocide” see, for instance, Crichlow, (2002), 104-127; Hubinette, (undated); Krieken, 
(1999), 297-312. 
444  Woodhouse, (1995), 114. 
445  Art. 25(3) of the ACRWC entrenches a similar position. 
446  See, for instance, Candea, (2001). The attitude that intercountry adoption allows dominant, 
developed cultures “to strip away a developing country's most precious resources, its children” 
prevails in these quarters. Kleem, (2000), 325-326.  Because a child's right to a name and 
nationality are crucial for his or her identity, “opponents of intercountry adoption argue that rather 
than promoting a child's identity, the practice strips it away and replaces it with a name and 
identity chosen by the adoptive parents”. Olsen, (2004), 510. 
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custody or control over their children as an issue447 that has priority over promoting the 
rights of these children’s best interests.  
 
Making the claim that States have a right of custody or control over children, with no 
consideration of the best interests of the children, has a “children as objects” ring to it. 
As Woodhouse advocates, “a child-centered perspective would suggest that the right to 
preservation of a group identity of origin is best analyzed as a right of the child, and a 
responsibility or trust of the group”.448 
 
In some instances it is the concepts of “continuity” and “background” under Article 20(3) 
of the CRC and Article 25(3) of the ACRWC that are used to argue the case for the 
primacy of cultural identity, and serve as a ground for prohibiting or undermining 
intercountry adoptions as an alternative means of care. But as Cantwell and 
Holzscheiter remind us: 
… while connected, the questions of “continuity” and “background” should not be seen as 
one and the same issue. The text of article 20 does not explicitly demand “continuity … in 
the child’s … background” but requires that due regard be paid both to continuity in 
upbringing and to the child’s background.449 
This argument adds clarity to the position that culture cannot, and should not, be used 
as a smokescreen to deny children their right to grow up in a family environment, when 
that family can only be found abroad.  
 
At the regional level, the ACRWC purports to take into consideration 
                                            
447  Woodhouse, (1995), 112. 
448  As above. 
449  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 61. However, while due regard is to be paid both to continuity 
in upbringing and to the child’s background, in contrast, it is worth noting that “State Parties shall 
in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care” (emphasis mine). See Art 20(2) of 
CRC and Art 25(2)(a) of the ACRWC. 
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...the virtues of their [African member States’] cultural heritage, historical background and 
the values of the African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection 
on the concept of the rights and welfare of the child.450  
However, although it copies Article 20(3) of the CRC virtually word for word, Article 
25(3) of the ACRWC omits the word “cultural” when listing the background aspects of 
the child to which due regard shall be paid when considering alternative family care.451 
In this light, if the best interests of the child means anything at all, let alone being “the 
paramount consideration”,452 preserving cultural identity should be seen as a means, 
and not necessarily as an end in itself, in considering alternative care for children 
deprived of their family environment. 
 
Under Article 31 of the CRC and Article 12 of the ACRWC, children have the right “to 
participate freely in cultural life” and it is the duty of States to respect and promote the 
right of the child to fully participate in cultural life. These provisions too do not insinuate 
that cultural identity overrides children’s rights and needs to a family environment, to 
love, and to care. 
 
3.5.4  The child’s right to freedom of religion 
 
The synergy that exists between freedom of religion, on the one hand, and adoptions, 
on the other, is relatively limited. Without examining which range of beliefs qualify for 
protection under Article 14 of the CRC and Article 9 of the ACRWC,453 in brief, the thrust 
                                            
450  Para. 7 of the Preamble to the ACRWC. 
451  Art. 25(3) of the ACRWC provides in full that: 
 When considering alternative family care of the child and the best interests of the 
child, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child's 
upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious or linguistic background. 
452  As Art. 21 of the CRC and Art. 4 of the ACRWC provide. 
453  Art. 18 of the ICCPR has a similar provision on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  
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of these provisions is that the right of the child to religious freedom is the right of every 
child to be unhindered in his or her growth as an autonomous independent actor within 
the matrix of parents, religious community and society.454 
 
What is clear from Article 14(2) of the CRC is that the evolving capacities of the child 
should be the overarching principle guiding the interpretation and implementation of this 
provision. The travaux preparatoires of the CRC clearly show that Article 14(2) was 
consciously drafted in such a way so as to serve as a limitation on parental rights.455 
Article 9(2) of the ACRWC explicitly adds the best interests principle as a guiding 
principle in providing guidance and direction in the exercise of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. 
 
From the provision that “[e]very child shall have the right to freedom of thought 
conscience and religion” emanates a child’s freedom to choose and change one’s 
religion. However, this is not an absolute right accorded to every child with no 
distinction.456 Otherwise an “open-ended” freedom of choice of religion for every child 
which does not take into account their evolving capacities, and in relation thereto, the 
need for guidance from parents or legal guardians, might lead to the unnecessary 
consideration of children as fully autonomous “little adults”.  
 
In some countries minimum ages are provided above which children’s religious 
denominations cannot be changed unless the opinion of the child has been sought. In 
                                            
454  Langlaude, (2007), 100. 
455  As above. 
456  As mentioned above, the evolving capacities of the child and the best interests principle should 
have play a role in children’s exercise of their right to freedom of thought, and religion. 
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Iceland, for instance, the state had reported to the CRC Committee indicating that such 
age is fixed at 12.457 Without saying whether it thought 12 is or is not an appropriate age 
or whether the country should take the evolving capacities of the child into account, the 
CRC Committee questioned the basis on which the age of 12 had been chosen.458 
 
Of the three different facets of religion established by Gunn, one is “religion as 
identity”.459 It is argued that “identity religion is experienced as something akin to family, 
ethnicity, race, or nationality”.460 In its basic form identity religion “understands co-
religionists to be a part of the same group (perhaps even regardless of their personal 
beliefs)”,461 and it emphasises shared histories, cultures, ethnicity, and traditions.462 As 
a result changing a child’s religion as a result of intercountry adoption could have 
implications for a child’s identity, since religion could be tied inextricably to ethnicity, 
family, culture, traditions, and history. In addition, it needs to be noted that if a child is a 
Muslim and refuses to be adopted for this reason, a balancing act needs to be effected 
between the child’s right to participate and the child’s religion, on the one hand, and the 
child’s best interests and need for a family environment, on the other. 
 
From the viewpoint of prospective adoptive parents, it could be mentioned that, at times, 
there are some eligibility requirements pertaining to religion to which prospective 
adoptive parents have to adhere in order to qualify as adoptive parents. For instance, in 
China, it is provided that: 
                                            
457  CRC Committee, Summary Record, (January 1996), para. 12. 
458   As above. 
459  The other two are religion as belief, and religion as way of life. See Gunn, (2003), 200. 
460  Gunn, (2003), 201. 
461  As above. 
462  As above. 
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Families with religious beliefs that prohibit any kind of medical treatment, including blood 
transfusions, for the child, will not be eligible to adopt. According to the CCAA this 
includes religions that use alternatives to blood transfusions, as this is not available in 
every country.463 
In addition, it is not uncommon to experience that when an adoption agency is 
religiously affiliated, preference may be given to prospective adoptive parents who 
profess the same or a similar religion. 
 
3.5.5 Right to privacy 
 
Children, like adults, have a right to privacy. This is evidenced by Articles 16 and 10 of 
the CRC and the ACRWC, respectively. Children’s right to privacy “symbolises pre-
eminently the right to dignity and respect”.464 Article 16(1) of the CRC states: “No child 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation”. In an 
effort to concretise this right, Article 16(2) entrenches the child’s right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks. The only addition to Article 10 of the CRC 
that Article 16 of the ACRWC brings is that, in the exercise of this right, “parents or legal 
guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of 
their children”. This addition is indeed implicit in the CRC provision.465 
 
Children’s right to privacy in the context of intercountry adoption may feature in various 
ways. For instance, in the context of “photo-listing”, where lists of children available for 
                                            
463  Children’s Hope International available at <http://www.chinaadoptionagency.com/>. 
464  Graff, (1998), 7. For a discussion of this right from the view point of sociology and psychology see 
Markinioti, (1998), 18 and Jaffe, (1998). 
465  For a discussion of the right to privacy in various contexts see CRC Committee, General 
Comment No. 3, (2003), paras. 20, 24, 29, and 40(c); General Comment No. 6, (2005), paras. 29 
and 98; General Comment No. 10, (2008), paras. 50, 64-67, and 99. 
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adoption (usually through public agencies) containing photos and descriptions are 
published,466 an international consensus seems to be gaining ground that children’s 
privacy should be protected. The assurance of privacy as to the identity of the natural 
parents and extended family members, enables them, too, to place the child for 
adoption with an agency, in the knowledge that their actions and the reasons for their 
actions will not become public knowledge. Thus, adoption laws should protect the 
privacy of all of the parties: the child, the natural family, and the adopting family. 
 
Unfortunately, this practice of maintaining the privacy of children in adoption 
proceedings is sorely lacking467 in a number of jurisdictions on the African continent. 
Publishing the names of children or families involved in intercountry adoption in the 
media could raise legal and ethical questions for reporting. It is contrary to the CRC 
Committee’s recommendation that “[t]he integrity of the child should be protected in 
reporting about, for instance, involvement in criminal activities, sexual abuse and family 
problems”.468 
 
It would be ideal if courts issue an “anonymisation order” to curb the further publication 
of the identity of the applicants, respondents, and in particular the infant, in order to 
protect their privacy. The Constitutional Court case of AD v DW is exemplary in this 
regard.469 Such an order could demand that, in citing the case, abbreviations or initials 
                                            
466  They may be printed in a book or newspaper, shown on TV or posted at a web site. The Internet 
is just the latest medium for communicating photo-listings to the public. 
467  See for instance, in Uganda, cases such as Family Cause No.81 / 05 in the matter of Adoption of 
Maria Hodkins an infant by Mark and Kate Skidmore and Family Cause No 13/06 in the matter of 
Jacob Mukisa Meyer-an infant where the cases identify the children with their full names. 
468  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (1996), 1. 
469  In this case, the Constitutional Court made an anonymisation order to protect the privacy of the 
child (as well as that of the foster parents). 
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be used, and that any papers filed in the matter should refer to the parties involved by 
means of these abbreviations. In addition, an order indicating that no person shall 
publish in any manner whatsoever any information which reveals, or may reveal, the 
identity of the parties involved, should more often than not be made. 
 
3.5.6    Child exploitation, trafficking and other similar practices, and intercountry 
adoption 
 
Contrasted with the positive face of adoption are some scandals and irregularities 
concerning the practice – and at its worst, adoption is portrayed as child trafficking or 
baby selling.470 Therefore, issues pertaining to child labour,471 sexual exploitation,472 
and sale, trafficking and abduction of children473 have relevance for the discussion of 
intercountry adoption. In this regard, apart from the CRC and the ACRWC, the OPSC, 
and the Palermo Potocol are of direct application. A detailed discussion of these issues 
is deferred, as it forms the focus of a substantive discussion in Chapter 6 below. 
 
3.6  CONCLUSION 
 
The CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention are the three main international 
instruments that have a direct bearing on intercountry adoption. The discussion in this 
Chapter has reaffirmed the interdependence and interrelatedness of children’s rights in 
the context of intercountry adoption.  
 
                                            
470  Smolin, (2004), 281; Smolin, (2005), 404; Van Bueren, (1995), 96. 
471  Art. 32 of the CRC, and Art 15 of ACRWC. 
472  Art. 32 of the CRC, and Art 27 ACRWC. 
473  Arts 34, 35, and 36 of the CRC and Art 29 of the ACRWC. 
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Article 1 of the CRC and Article 2 of the ACRWC have been highlighted as having 
implications for several issues related to intercountry adoption. Despite the fact that the 
meaning of the best interests of the child still continues to elude many, an effort was 
made to make some important observations about the principle. Article 3(1) of the CRC 
and Article 4(1) of the ACRWC are very similar. However, the latter provides that the 
best interests of the child should be the primary consideration. This means that African 
countries that are States Parties to the ACRWC have an even greater obligation to 
promote the best interests of children than non-States Parties elsewhere.  
 
Resort to the CRC Committee’s jurisprudence in the form of General Comments was 
identified as being able to shed further light on what is meant by the best interests of the 
child, albeit in the context of specific themes. Instances of discrimination which are 
obvious in the context of intercountry adoption, as well as subtle forms of discrimination 
in the context of intercountry adoption, have been highlighted. In regard to the right to 
life, survival, and development, it was proposed that the term “development” should be 
interpreted by African countries in its broadest sense as a holistic concept 
encompassing the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social 
development. It was also observed that “the ‘best interests’ of the child cannot be 
defined without consideration of the child’s views.  
 
Arguments in favour of the “best interests” of prospective adoptive parents are made by 
some writers. Some also contend for the “best interests” of the family of origin. It was 
argued that the “best interests” of prospective adoptive parents (adoptive parents) and 
biological parents can be accommodated within the best interests of the child principle if 
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they are, as a minimum, either neutral or, preferably, in agreement with the child’s best 
interests. It was submitted that a legal framework that considers the best interests of the 
child as the paramount consideration, and is in compliance with the ACRWC, would and 
should make children’s rights the overriding factor in making decisions about them. 
 
Instances of discrimination which are obvious in the context of intercountry adoption, as 
well as subtle forms of discrimination in the context of intercountry adoption, have been 
highlighted. While the rule against discrimination has relevance for many of the 
provisions of the Hague Convention, Article 26(2) of the Hague Convention entrenches 
a specific non-discrimination clause. The thrust of Article 26(2) is that, when the effect of 
an adoption is to terminate a pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, the child’s 
rights resulting from the adoption should be equivalent to those resulting from a similar 
adoption made under national law in the receiving State.474 Applying different 
safeguards to children adopted from Contracting States to the Hague Convention, on 
the one hand, to those from countries that are non-Contracting States to the Hague 
Convention, on the other, might also violate the non-discrimination rule in relation to 
intercountry adoption. Failure by a State to take positive measures aimed at providing 
enhanced treatment to special needs children so that they too could benefit from 
adoptions475 may also be discriminatory. In addition, it was submitted that the practice of 
running genetic tests on adoptees to determine whether an individual child has a 
genetically-based disease or disease susceptibility, when these tests are intended to 
                                            
474  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 31. 
475  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 52. 
 
 
 
 
 206
solely serve the interests of other third parties, was found to be potentially 
discriminatory. 
 
In the context of the right to life, survival, and development, it was submitted that the 
term “survival rights” covers a child’s rights to life and the needs that are most basic to 
the child’s existence, which include an adequate living standard, shelter, nutrition and 
access to medical services. It was suggested that the term “development” should be 
interpreted by African countries in its broadest sense as a holistic concept 
encompassing the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social 
development. 
 
Understanding what constitutes a “family environment”, in order to determine which 
children or group of children are deprived of their family environment and in need of 
alternative care, was accorded great attention. Article 5 has been read as an attempt by 
the CRC generally to extend the definition of the family. In relation to intercountry 
adoption, this insight revealed that children who are in the care of their extended family 
or benefitting from kinship care and not children deprived of a family environment, and, 
hence, are not in need of alternative care. Further provisions of the ACRWC have been 
understood as reinforcing a wider notion of a “family”. In this respect, it has been argued 
that the care provided to African children by those who fall within the definition of 
“family” in terms of the ACRWC could qualify as constituting care within a “family 
environment”.  
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The fact that there is no obligation under the CRC and the ACRWC to provide 
intercountry adoption as an alternative means of care was confirmed. In addition, the 
absence of a right to adopt as well as a right to be adopted under international law was 
underscored. 
 
Since names (especially family names) reflect one's cultural, ethnic, religious, or familial 
heritage and occupy a special place in African societies, it was submitted that legal 
systems should retain the option that adopted children are able to retain or regain their 
original names and surnames, when this is requested. The fact that children’s right to 
privacy in the context of intercountry adoption may feature in various ways, and the 
need to provide safeguards against violations of the right, have been elaborated. 
 
This Chapter has generally emphasised that human rights standards are not static, but 
rather evolve and adapt to new circumstances. It is submitted that the CRC and the 
ACRWC have benefited from this evolution. Nonetheless, further research and the 
development of more jurisprudence is required to better understand the meaning and 
scope of the various rights that have a bearing upon intercountry adoption.  
 
Premised on the international legal framework discussed in this Chapter, the 
subsequent Chapters highlight thematic issues that have been identified as crucial for 
intercountry adoption in an African context. First from amongst these thematic issues, 
the next Chapter undertakes an examination of adoptability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNDERSTANDING ADOPTABILITY IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE AFRICAN    
CHILD 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is noted that “the pursuit of the best interests of the child is the foundation of adoption, 
from which ensue two equally essential principles: subsidiarity and adoptability”.1 This 
Chapter will address the former – namely, “adoptability”, whilst Chapter 5 will focus on 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
A preliminary question when examining discourses surrounding intercountry adoption is 
“who is adoptable?”. This question generates different answers, such as, “orphans”, 
“orphans and vulnerable children”, “abandoned children”, and “children deprived of their 
family environment”. 
 
A common misconception prevails that the mere deprivation of a child of his or her 
family environment, temporarily or permanently, would automatically make such child 
adoptable. This misconception was reflected in the aftermath of the tsunami that struck 
Southeast Asia and the eastern coast of Africa on 26 December 2004. Subsequent to 
the tsunami, a number of people and organizations around the world responded with an 
enormous outpouring of concern and assistance. In particular, as news of the tragedy 
reached the rest of the world, many people were touched by the vast numbers of 
children left orphaned and indicated interest in providing homes for the orphaned 
                                                 
1   ISS/IRC, (2006b), 1.  
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children.2 Many wished to adopt children who were deprived of their family 
environments,3 though such deprivation might ultimately have been a temporary one. 
 
As a result, many of the countries affected by the disaster shut their borders to adoption 
altogether.4 This was done primarily because in such situations of natural disaster 
families get separated, documents get damaged or lost, and determining the 
adoptability or otherwise of a child becomes non-viable. 
 
In this Chapter, an attempt is made to arrive at a clarification of the concept of 
adoptability that serves the best interests of the African child. After a brief overview of 
the concept of adoptability, the main reasons why a proper determination of adoptability 
is very important are investigated. This is followed by an examination of the relevant 
international legal frameworks pertaining to adoptability.  
 
Subsequently, different themes are highlighted for discussion. These themes include 
termination of parental rights including through a decision of a competent authority, 
abandonment, and relinquishment. Orphanhood and poverty as grounds for 
adoptability, as well as the adoptability of refugee children, special needs/hard-to-place 
children, and children who have a Muslim background form some of the issues for 
examination. A concluding section sums up the findings of the chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2   See National Post, (14 January 2005), 3. 
3  See, for instance, The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, (2005), 1; Washington Post, (13 
January 2005), C05. 
4  For instance, in regard to India, see Jakarta Post, (5 January 2005), 2. 
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4.2  WHAT IS ADOPTABILITY?: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The use of the term “adoptable” does not necessarily enjoy general acceptance. In fact, 
it is criticised by some as suggesting "availability" as though the child is a commodity.5 
Nonetheless, the use of the term continues for lack of a better word that can describe 
children who are eligible or free for adoption.  
 
According to the Hague Convention, a child must qualify for adoption under the laws of 
his or her country of origin in order to be adopted.6  Thus, put in simple language, 
adoptability indicates that a child is free for adoption. To borrow the words of Cantwell, 
the term “adoptable” refers to the status of a child who is “officially recognised as having 
a legal status enabling adoption to be considered, and deemed to require and to be 
potentially able to benefit from such a measure".7  
 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has identified two elements of 
adoptability that should be present for a child to be available for adoption. First, the 
child’s psycho-social adoptability should determine that it is impossible for the birth 
family to care for the child, and that the child will benefit from a family environment.8 
                                                 
5  See Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 117. 
6  Art. 4(a) of the Hague Convention. 
7  Cantwell, (2003), 1. This is indicative of one important lesson to be gleaned from the immense 
debate surrounding intercountry adoption - that not every child that is deprived of his or her family 
environment is adoptable. 
8  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 82. It is argued that “[d]ue to earlier 
experiences, some children may lose the ability/desire to develop a new bond of emotional 
dependency, or they may show clear limitations in adjusting to a family environment”. ISS/IRC, 
(1999a), 9.   
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Second, the child’s legal adoptability should be ascertained. Relying on the law of the 
country of origin, the legal adoptability of the child forms the basis for severance of the 
filiation links with the birth family, in particular parents.9 
 
Countries might have different requirements for children to be eligible for adoption. As a 
result, the question of who is adoptable could vary amongst cultures, legal systems and 
jurisdictions. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to determine some 
common elements and standards that epitomise the concept. Actually, since 
adoptability is not a self-defining construct, it is important to grapple with the complex 
and inconsistent legal and cultural issues that need to be addressed to determine 
whether a child is, in fact, adoptable.10 
 
The adoptability of a child who is deprived of his or her family environment is often 
decided on the basis of pre-determined legal rules. Such rules include, whether the 
child has been abandoned, neglected, or orphaned.11 However, to look at adoptability 
as being a strictly legal question is very limiting.12 Therefore, while the adoptability of a 
child is mainly decided through the application of pre-determined legal rules, it is also 
determined on the basis of, amongst others, social, psychological, and medical 
conditions.13  
 
                                                 
9  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 82. 
10  Oreskovic and Maskew, (2008), 78. 
11  See, ISS/IRC, (2006a), 1-2; ISS/IRC, (2006b). 
12  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 117; UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 14. 
13  As above. 
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In addition, whether a child is adoptable domestically or through intercountry adoption is 
an issue determined partly by applying the subsidiarity principle.14 In other words, first 
preserving or re-uniting the child with the birth family should be given priority before a 
child is declared adoptable. In this regard, adoption should be subsidiary to family 
reunification in terms of the subsidiarity principle.15 Secondly, in compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle again, generally, domestic adoption should enjoy preference over 
intercountry adoption.16 
 
In addition, it is important to note that the adoptability of a child to a specific receiving 
State could also depend on the definition of adoptability in the receiving state. For 
instance, to adopt a child overseas and bring that child back to the U.S., the child must 
be found eligible to be adopted under U.S. law. Therefore, even if an Ethiopian child 
who is 17 years old might meet the adoptability requirements in his or her country of 
origin,17 as U.S. law requires a child to be under the age of sixteen to qualify for a U.S. 
immigrant visa, the adoptability of such child into the US, as far as the law is concerned, 
is impossible.18  
 
                                                 
14  For a detailed discussion of the subsidiarity principle, see Chapter 5 of this study. See too, for a 
discussion of subsidiarity from the view point of traditionally receiving but also sending countries, 
ISS/IRC, (March-April 2009).   
15  As above. 
16  See, Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.2 for a detailed discussion of the issues that pertain to the 
subsidiarity principle and domestic adoption. See too Art. 21(b) of the CRC and Art. 24(b) of the 
ACRWC. 
17  Notably, Ethiopian law does not set an age limit on who is adoptable, as long as the person is a 
child (by definition, a person below the age of 18). 
18  After a matching of a child with a prospective adoptive parent is made, an application to the U.S 
Government, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) for provisional approval to adopt that particular child needs to be made to determine 
whether the child is eligible under U.S. law to be adopted and enter the United States. U.S. 
Department of State, Intercountry adoption:   Who can be adopted?” (undated). However, a child 
can be 16 or 17 if adopted with younger siblings and will be eligible for an immigrant visa. See, for 
instance, U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Sierra Leone”, (December 2007).  
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This, however, is not an issue of adoptability as such. Rather it is an issue of matching, 
which is the practice of matching the needs of the child with the qualities of the adoptive 
parents and family.19 Reverting to the example above, the authorities in Ethiopia should 
abstain from matching a child who is 17 years old with prospective adoptive parents in 
the U.S.. Nonetheless, the child would still continue to qualify as adoptable under 
Ethiopian law for domestic adoption. And in case domestic adoption is not a viable 
option or does not succeed, the child is adoptable and could be matched with 
prospective adoptive parents from countries that allow the adoption of older children up 
to the age of 18. 
 
All the above issues are discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. However, 
before embarking on a detailed analysis of the concept of adoptability, the procedures 
for determining such a status, and the guidance that can be sought from the 
international legal framework, it is crucial to understand why a proper determination of 
adoptability is very important in order to promote and protect the best interests of the 
child. The next section embarks on this task. 
 
4.3 WHY IS A PROPER DETERMINATION OF ADOPTABILITY IMPORTANT? 
 
Dillon highlights the importance of the concept of adoptability in intercountry adoption 
when she notes that “[t]he real debate on intercountry adoption may circle around the 
                                                 
19  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 31-32. 
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concept of adoptability”.20 Thus, the importance of determining who is adoptable (and in 
turn, who is not adoptable) cannot be overemphasised.  
 
A clear definition and understanding of who is adoptable is important for the following 
three reasons:- 
 
A)  A clear definition and understanding of who is adoptable is vital so that the 
concept of “adoptable children” is not confused with that of “children currently in out-of-
home care”.21 Children in institutions are not necessarily adoptable.22 For example, 
children who reside in orphanages as a short term measure because they are deprived 
of their family environment as a result of the imprisonment of the sole primary care giver 
are not necessarily adoptable.23 It would be far from the reality in the developing world 
to equate placement in an orphanage with an intent to relinquish the child 
permanently.24  
 
                                                 
20  Dillon, (2008), at footnote 80. 
21  Cantwell, (2003), 71. 
22  In recognition of this fact, in Argentina, for instance, it is provided that a release of a child for 
adoption by the biological parents will not be necessary in those instances when the child has 
been housed in a government institution continuously for more than one year without any 
indication of interest from the birth parent(s). Thus, the mere fact that a child is in an institution 
does not qualify the child to be labelled as adoptable. See U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry 
adoption: Argentina”, (November 2008).  
23  See generally, Robertson, (2007).    
24  See UNICEF Innocenti Insight, (2006), 36 (discussing how, “[i]nstitutional placement as an 
economic and social coping strategy can be attractive to some families, because they anticipate 
that their children will have better access to services or receive material goods that the families 
feel they cannot provide” despite the fact that the biological parents are around). In research 
conducted in Zimbabwe, it has been established that, despite the presence of care givers, the 
ready availability of institutions to provide long term care for orphaned children has resulted in 
encouraging some relatives to forego their responsibility to care for orphaned children. Foster, et 
al., (1995). 
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B) A clear definition and understanding of who is adoptable has the capacity to 
disprove the wrong perception (especially within some parts of the Western world) that 
there are lots of orphans, especially in the developing world - and hence a lot of 
adoptable children. There is a dire need to disprove such a misperception which in turn 
has the capacity to minimise the misinterpretation of adoptability that has the potential 
to result in flagrant abuses against, and exploitation of, a child who is adoptable.25  
 
In this regard, Graff contends that Westerners have been sold the myth of a world 
orphan crisis.26 She challenges the assumption that there exist millions of children who 
are waiting for their “forever families” to rescue them from lives of abandonment and 
abuse.27 Clearly, there is a cause for concern when sweeping statements are made, 
without statistics, that “millions on millions” of children are available for intercountry 
adoption.28 It is even more disconcerting when such statements are made by seasoned 
researchers on the subject of intercountry adoption.  For instance, a similar assertion by 
Bartholet has been a subject of severe criticism.29 Amongst other factors, given the high 
number of unregistered births in the developing world every year,30 Oreskovic and 
Maskew argue that this assumption can neither be proved nor disproved with any 
certainty.31 
 
                                                 
25  Thompson, (2004), 463. 
26          Graff, (2008), 1.  
27  As above. 
28  See, for instance, Bartholet, (2007), 158 who employs such a line of argument. See, too, Dillon, 
(2003), 179, who contends that more empirical evidence on the number of adoptable children is 
needed.  
29  See, generally, Oreskovic and Maskew, (2008), 71 and in particular “Part I: Millions on Millions?” 
77-81. 
30  See, generally, UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (2002).   
31  Oreskovic and Maskew, (2008), 77-78. 
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According to Graff, the infants and toddlers being adopted by Western parents today 
are not orphans at all,32 indicating a failure of intercountry adoption schemes intended to 
benefit those children who are deprived of their family environment.  And unfortunately, 
there is some evidence to partly reinforce Graff’s position. Amongst such evidence, that 
provided by Oreskovic and Maskew is persuasive: 
Despite the fact that we do not know how many "orphans" - however the term is 
defined - are actually adoptable, the evidence does show clearly that at least in one 
demographic dimension, the characteristics of the world's orphans differ significantly 
from those of children who are adopted internationally. UNICEF and USAID estimate 
that approximately 88% of the world's orphans are over the age of 5. But a review of 
the children adopted by U.S. citizens over the last 11 years shows that on average, 
85-89% of the children adopted were under the age of 5. This disparity suggests that 
prospective adoptive parents in the U.S. view only a small fraction of the world's 
orphanage population as "adoptable". It also suggests that it is unlikely that children 
languish in orphanages primarily because of anti-adoption sentiment or restrictive 
state policies but rather because they do not satisfy the well-documented preference 
of adoptive parents for infant and toddler girls.33 (notes omitted) 
Oreskovic’s and Maskew’s assertion hints at the fact that many children who are 
benefitting from the system of intercountry adoption are not necessarily those who are 
in need of a family environment, but those who are “produced” into the system.34 
Minimising the misperception of who is “adoptable” has the potential to result in 
reducing illicit activities, and exploitation of, a child not yet adoptable.35  
                                                 
32  Graff, (2008), 1.  For a discussion on orphanhood and adoptability, see section 4.5.2 below.  
33  See, generally, Oreskovic and Maskew, (2008), 80-81. See, too, Smolin, (2006),  113, where he 
argues that  “… while the untrained Western eye may perceive millions of adoptable orphans in 
such societies, child stealing/kidnapping rings may still develop, as agencies find it most 
convenient or effective to buy or steal the kinds of infants and children which seem most likely to 
meet Western specifications”. Smolin, (2006), 128. 
34  Although conclusive evidence is not present, Oreskovic’s and Maskew’s assertion could be taken 
to imply in part that there is non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This is because, a 
concrete implementation of the principle of subsidiarity naturally encourages domestic adoption 
and when it is implemented, “it often results in an increase of the average age of internationally 
adoptable children, as the younger ones are more easily adopted by local couples”. See ISS/IRC, 
(2006a), 1-2. 
35  Thompson, (2004), 463. 
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In this regard, Dillon discusses what she terms the “adoptability conundrum”, which is 
described as the difficulty of distinguishing children who would be in the system of 
orphanage care (in any event) from those brought into the system by the lure of the 
profitability of international adoption, and who would not otherwise be in care.36 If 
children are drawn into the intercountry adoption scheme in order to fulfil the 
requirements of prospective adoptive parents (for instance, for girls below the age of 1 
year), in other words being “produced” for this end, those children who could, and 
should, be adopted run the risk of being excluded from the system.  
 
This kind of experience would make adoption appear to be a “business” where the 
economic elements of "supply and demand" actively intervene.37 For some, arguably, a 
situation whereby the supply of adoptable babies rises to meet foreign demand and 
dwindles when Western cash is no longer available (for instance when a moratorium is 
imposed), is indicative of a trend that many legally adoptable children enjoy less benefit 
from intercountry adoption schemes.38 
 
Nonetheless, while the general assertion that there are “millions on millions” of children 
awaiting adoptive families is not valid, some of Graff’s arguments are not necessarily 
fully accurate. For instance, Graff seems to make the assumption that the definition of 
orphan is not relative.39 However, the definition of orphan for the purpose of intercountry 
                                                 
36  The absence of a clear definition makes it impossible to tell whether the children most in need of 
families were being adopted or whether the facilitators are actually generating children who would 
be more desirable from the adopter’s point of view. 
37  Meier and Zhang, (2008-2009), 91-92 (identifying the root of the problem of trafficking as the 
supply and demand forces that drive the market for intercountry adoption); See too Smolin, 
(2006), 117. 
38  Graff, (2008), 3. 
39  As above. 
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adoption (or adoption in general) might vary from country to country.40 Some of Graff’s 
statements also seem to equate orphanhood with “adoptability” which clearly should not 
be the case. To mention but one example, Graff states that the infants and toddlers 
being adopted by Western parents today “are not orphans at all”.41 This seems to imply 
that, if these children were orphans, their adoptability would have been justified or 
obvious. As is often the case in Africa, many orphans get absorbed by the extended 
family which therefore makes them unavailable for adoption.42 
 
C) The availability of a clear understanding of adoptability would also facilitate 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The subsidiarity principle in general terms 
requires that intercountry adoption be considered once other suitable domestic 
measures are exhausted, or ruled not to be in the best interests of the child. Thus, for 
instance, if a child is not adoptable for one reason or another,43 priority could be given to 
foster placement without wasting a lot of time. Or, if it is clear that a child is adoptable, 
there might not be any need to subject the child to institutionalisation. However, in 
situations where there is confusion about the clear standards for adoptability (or 
otherwise) of a child, the risk of compromising the best interests of the child by waiting 
for an unnecessary period of time or by other means is evident. 
 
In sum, even with the recent relative widespread acceptance of the Hague Convention, 
one cannot devise appropriate and just national or international legal regimes for 
                                                 
40  See section 4.5.2 below for a detailed discussion of the term “orphan”.  
41  Graff, (2008), 1. 
42  See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2 above for a discussion of the role of the extended family. 
43  For instance, because he or she is an older child (and by definition hard-to-place). 
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international adoption unless a better and more transparent understanding of which 
children should be considered truly adoptable is formulated.44 There is an urgent but 
unmet need for sound international adoption policy to require a far greater degree of 
information on orphans and adoptable children than is currently available. This 
proposition is further cemented by the following discussion of adoptability under the 
international legal framework. 
 
4.4 ADOPTABILITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The question of adoptability is often an issue that is either avoided or scantly 
investigated by writers when they discuss both domestic and intercountry adoption. 
Even the two leading works on the travaux preparatoires of the CRC45 do not offer any 
detailed insight into the question of who is adoptable. One of the major works on the 
ACRWC46 also fails to pay any detailed attention to the subject. As far as the Hague 
Convention is concerned, as will be shown in the respective section below, a detailed 
engagement of what factors help in establishing the adoptability of a child is often 
lacking- as the issue is relegated for the laws of states of origins to regulate. 
 
A number of reasons could explain this lack of detailed engagement with the concept by 
writers. However, suffice it to mention that the different grounds that various legal 
                                                 
44  Important work is being done by Trish Maskew and her organisation, Ethica, to publicize the need 
to purge the international adoption system of questionable ethical practices. See, for instance, 
Maskew, (2003). For a detailed discussion of illicit activities in intercountry adoption, see Chapter 
6 of this study. 
45  Detrick, (1999); Van Bueren, (1995); Newell and Hodgkin, (2007).  
46  Gose, (2002). 
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systems consider to be criteria for adoptability make a comprehensive discussion of the 
concept difficult.  
 
While it may be difficult and even unnecessary to provide prescriptive criteria for the 
determination of adoptability, it is possible to analyse the provisions of the CRC, the 
ACRWC, and the Hague Convention and extract some of the common and important 
principles for the determination of adoptability. It is this task that this section embarks 
upon. 
 
4.4.1    The CRC and the ACRWC 
 
While States are not under an obligation to establish a system of adoption per se,47 
where the system exists it should be accompanied by a clear policy and appropriate 
legislation.48 Although not provided for under Article 21 of the CRC (and Article 24 of the 
ACRWC) in so many words, it is the obligation of States Parties to the CRC to establish 
“clear conditions under which a child is adoptable”.49 In addition, it is the view of the 
Committee that it is an obligation under the CRC to “[e]ffectively identify those children 
potentially adoptable” (emphasis mine).50  
 
                                                 
47  See, for further details, discussion of this position Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.1.  
48  For instance, see, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nepal, (September 2005), para. 
53 which stipulates that: 
Given the significant number of Nepalese children who are adopted by foreigners 
and in the context of the current armed conflict in the State party, the Committee 
is concerned at the lack of a clear policy and appropriate legislation on 
intercountry adoption, which results in various practices, such as trafficking and 
smuggling of babies.   
49  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia, (June 2008), para. 43(a). 
50  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia, (June 2008), para. 43(b); 
Republic of Georgia, (June 2008), para. 39(c). 
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Therefore, although the word “adoptable” does not appear anywhere in the CRC 
and the ACRWC, a closer look at the provisions of these instruments, albeit very 
limited, sheds some light on adoptability. Reference to Article 21(a) of the CRC 
shows that the permissibility of adoption must be determined:  
…on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is 
permissible in view of the child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal 
guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given their informed 
consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary.51 
Article 24 of the ACRWC stipulates the same requirement. However, it is to be 
noted that it only refers to “guardians” as opposed to “legal guardians”. This is a 
welcome move since it is reflective of the reality in Africa where persons might be 
de facto and not necessarily de jure guardians. 
 
These provisions are reflective of Articles 7 and 9 of the CRC52 and Articles 19 and 
20 of the ACRWC.53 They reaffirm the assumption that children’s best interests are 
promoted optimally within their original family environment as much as possible. In 
addition, the provisions also offer parents the opportunity to exercise their primary 
responsibility as far as the care of their children is concerned.54 
 
                                                 
51  This provision is similar to Art. 3(2) of the CRC which provides that “States Parties undertake to 
ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into 
account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally 
responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures”. 
52  The right to birth registration, name and nationality and the right to know and be cared for by 
parents as well as the right not to be separated from his or her parents respectively.  
53  For a discussion of these provisions in the context of intercountry adoption, see Chapter 3 above. 
54  See Art. 3(2) of the CRC too. 
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However, an adoption can occur if parents are unwilling or are deemed by judicial or 
administrative process to be unable to discharge this responsibility.55 This takes into 
account the possibility of children being orphaned, abandoned, and relinquished, 
amongst others. In addition, children could be separated from their parents in order to 
protect their best interests. For instance, where child abuse is prevalent within the family 
environment, the best interests principle might dictate that the child be separated from 
his or her parents permanently.  
   
The authorisation of adoption “on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information” 
under the CRC56 and “on the basis of all relevant and reliable information” under the 
ACRWC57 should be read to imply that, amongst others, it is not only legal requirements 
that need to be fulfilled before a child is declared adoptable. Therefore, though 
adoptability establishes the fact that the child is legally adoptable, determination of 
adoptability should go beyond the legal determination.58 It should also establish that the 
child is both emotionally and medically capable of benefiting from adoption.59 It is wrong 
to assume that all children who are deprived of their family environment permanently 
are ready to reap the benefits of a permanent family environment. Writing on 
                                                 
55  Newell and Hodgkin argue that “any legislation that permits adoptions under less stringent 
conditions would probably amount to a breach of both children’s and parents’ rights under the 
Convention”. Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 296. 
56  Art. 21(b) of the CRC. 
57  Art 24(a) of the ACRWC. 
58  See ISS/IRC, (2006b), 1-2; ISS/IRC, (2007), 1.   
59  There is evidence that proves that some children, as a result of various previous experiences, 
have a difficulty forging an attachment with an adoptive family. At times, they may also have 
limitations to adapt to a new family environment. It is these types of cases in particular that the 
determination of emotional and medical capabilities of children to benefit from adoption becomes 
crucial. See ISS/IRC, (2006b), 1. Sometimes, the adoptability of a child could be conditional on 
the availability of specific types of eligible adoptive parents. A good example here is the 
adoptability of children with physical or mental disability, illness, and the like. This group of 
children will need an adoptive family environment that offers special features that make their 
physical, emotional or psychological recovery possible. See ISS/IRC, (2006b), 1.  
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intercountry adoption from an African perspective, Davel60 correctly concurs that apart 
from the legal criteria, other factors such as medical, psychological and social aspects 
of adoptability need to be addressed in implementing the relevant legislation. 
 
The CRC Committee also seems to support the view that the determination of 
adoptability should have a social dimension. This is apparent from its consideration of 
State party reports under the CRC. In its Concluding Observations on Mauritius’s State 
Party report, for instance, it has expressed its concern about the “lack of a specific 
requirement to have a social report to assist judges in their decisions that adoption is in 
the best interests of the child”.61 It subsequently recommended that the State Party 
should take legislative measures to fill this gap.62 Furthermore, establishing clear 
conditions for adoptability also needs to be accompanied by the obligation to ensure 
that “the biological parents and the child have sufficient information prior to consenting 
to a decision” on the adoption.63 
 
In the determination of adoptability, one of the central elements that the CRC and the 
ACRWC recognise is the importance of the views of the child. This is entrenched by 
Article 12 of the CRC and Articles 4(2) and 7 of the ACRWC.64 The CRC Committee 
has aired its concern where, “although the assessment of the needs of the child in the 
placement of an adoptive home has been established, the views of the child are not 
                                                 
60  Davel, (2008), 263. 
61  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mauritius, (March 2006), para. 45. 
62  As above. 
63  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia, (June 2008), para. 43(a). 
64  See Chapter 3, section 3.3.6 for a detailed discussion on these provisions in the context of 
adoption. 
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included in the selection process”.65 In such situations, states are reminded to “[t]ake 
into consideration the views of the child within the processes and procedures of 
institutions that administer the adoption processes”.66 
 
Adoptability for the purpose of intercountry adoption could be subject to an additional or 
extra determination process. In other words, even if a child is declared adoptable, in 
some jurisdictions (notably India)67 it is a requirement that failing domestic placement, 
the child be declared adoptable again for the purpose of international placement. 
However, it is submitted that adoptability for the purpose of intercountry adoption should 
be addressed through the application of the principle of subsidiarity (which is discussed 
in Chapter 5), and a two pronged process does not seem necessary. In other words, 
once a child is declared adoptable (generally for both domestic and intercountry 
adoption), applying the principle of subsidiarity is expected to do away with the need to 
declare a child adoptable twice - once for domestic adoption, and then, failing that, for 
intercountry adoption. 
 
The kind of institutions that could be given the task of determining adoptability is also 
not an issue explicitly catered for under the CRC and the ACRWC.68 In the absence of 
this, State practice indicates that the task of determining adoptability could be given to 
                                                 
65  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Saint Lucia, (September 2005), para. 47. 
66  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Saint Lucia, (September 2005), para. 47(b). 
67  In case the Adoption Coordinating Agency (ACA) cannot find suitable Indian parent/parents within 
30 days, the ACA will have to issue a Clearance Certificate which paves the way for the 
adoptability of the child internationally. The ACA is an agency in a state/region set up for the 
promotion of In-country Adoption through co-ordination of its member agencies, and recognized 
by Central Adoption Resource Authority and to issue clearance certificate for a child to be placed 
in inter-country adoption. See Central Adoption Resource Authority, (undated). 
68  See the discussion under Chapter 6 below on competent authorities on the intercountry adoption 
process. 
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courts, administrative structures or government authorities. Related to the determination 
of adoptability is also the obligation of the competent authority “deciding on the 
adoptability the child” to ensure that “all efforts have been made for the child to maintain 
links with his/her [extended] family and community, and that adoption is used in last 
resort”.69 
 
The age at which children can be considered adoptable is generally up to 18 years of 
age. This is compliant with the definition of a child in Article 1 of the CRC and Article 2 
of the ACRWC.70 However, some States have provided a lower age limit than 18 above 
which children cannot be considered adoptable.71 As argued above in Chapter 3, while 
States can provide for minimum ages for various purposes (for instance, for giving 
consent for medical treatment), these ages should be able to withstand scrutiny against 
the best interests of the child, the rule against discrimination, and the evolving 
capacities of the child in the context of child participation.72 
                                                 
69  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico, (June 2006), para. 42(d). 
70  See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 for a discussion of the definition of a child in relation to adoptions. 
71  For instance, the U.S. provides for the age 16. The U.S. Department of State indicates in its “who 
can be adopted?” section that, amongst other requirements “... the child must be under the age of 
16 at the time an I-600 petition is filed on his or her behalf with USCIS or a consular officer (a 
child adopted at age 16 or 17 will also qualify, provided he or she is a birth sibling of a child 
adopted, or who will be adopted, under the age of 16 by the same adopting parents)”. See U.S. 
Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Who can be adopted?”, (undated). The Netherlands 
allows intercountry adoption only of children up to the age of 6. See Committee on Lesbian 
Parenthood and Intercountry Adoption, (2008), 57. In Costa Rica, while two parallel systems of 
adoption are recognised (those arranged through the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI), 
the Costa Rican child welfare authority, and private adoptions) Costa Rican law prohibits adoption 
of children less than four years of age, except in cases in which the child is part of a family group, 
or is difficult to place. See U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Costa Rica”, 
(September 2009). In a clear display of exception from the common practice, Salvadoran law 
allows the adoption of children over 18 provided that they are in the care of parents or relatives, 
and a court finds that adoption would be in the best interests of the child. Assessed against 
international law, this should be able to withstand scrutiny since States Parties have the right, by 
keeping children’s best interests at heart, to provide for minimum ages for various themes. In the 
case of Kenya children must at least be six weeks old to be adoptable. See Sec. 156(1) of the 
Children Act; U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Kenya”, (November 2008). 
72  See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion of this. 
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Finally, even though the best interests of the child is of paramount importance in 
adoptions, it seems that, in one sense, it could be circumscribed by the legal necessities 
of complying with legal requirements and securing the necessary consents.73 If such 
compliance is not present, it is insinuated that the adoption should not proceed even if it 
is viewed to be in the best interests of the child.74 Such a decision, it could be argued, 
undermines the “paramountcy” of the best interests of the child. 
 
Nonetheless, such a line of argument is difficult to sustain, irrespective of how relatively 
“best interests” is defined. For instance, it is submitted, that if the adoptability 
requirement is not complied with, it is difficult to maintain that it is in the best interests of 
a child to be adopted. In addition, where, in contravention of legislation, the consent of 
natural parents is not secured, it is safe to assume that the child’s and the parent’s right 
to family life would be violated.75 Such an adoption could scarcely be labelled to be in 
the best interests of the child.   
 
Determining adoptability should also be compliant with other relevant provisions of the 
CRC and the ACRWC. For instance, when considering factors, such as age and health, 
that have a bearing on adoptability, caution should be exercised that one of the cardinal 
principles of the CRC and the ACRWC – namely, non-discrimination – is not violated.76 
In this regard, Hodgkin and Newell are of the view that any legislation that permits 
                                                 
73  Newell and Hodgkin, (2002), 288. 
74  Newell and Hodgkin, (2002), 288. However, it is interesting to note that some national courts 
accord the best interests principle overriding value even when it is apparent that the adoption was 
done in breach of international or national law. For instance, in Germany, in AG Hamm, 17 April 
2006 – XVI 44/05, 363, the court ruled that a foreign adoption can be recognised even if it is 
legally flawed as long as it serves the interests of the child and is consistent with the essential 
principles of German law.  
75  See Arts. 7 and 8 of the CRC. 
76  See Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion of this. 
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adoptions under less stringent conditions than what is provided for under the CRC 
would probably amount to a breach of both children’s and parents’ rights under the 
Convention.77 
 
4.4.2 The Hague Convention  
It is in Chapter II that Articles 4 and 5 of the Hague Convention set down the main 
requirements for intercountry adoption. Of interest to this chapter is Article 4(a) which 
entrenches that an adoption is only allowed once the competent authorities of the state 
of origin have determined: “(1) that the child is in fact adoptable”.78 
 
4.4.2.1 The term “adoptable” during the drafting of the Hague 
Convention 
 
As its Explanatory Report indicates, the term “adoptable” in the Hague Convention was 
a subject of an in-depth discussion during the drafting stages of the Convention.79 As 
already mentioned above, the expression “adoptable” was criticised as suggesting the 
“availability” of children, as though children are merchandise to be acquired by the 
prospective adoptive parents.80 In other words, the connotation that the term 
“adoptable” could imply - that the child concerned may be perceived as the object rather 
than the subject of an adoption – was of concern.  
 
                                                 
77  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 296. 
78  Art. 4(a)(1) of Hague Convention. 
79  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 117-119. 
80  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 117. 
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It was also contended that the term might be understood as only referring to the legal 
conditions necessary for the adoption, with the exclusion of psycho-social conditions.81 
The expression “free for adoption” was considered inappropriate because it fails to take 
into account, amongst other things, the psycho-social conditions of the child.82 As a 
result, in the absence of a better word, the term adoptable was retained.83   
 
4.4.2.2 The term “adoptable” in the Hague Convention 
Throughout the Hague Convention the word “adoptable” appears only twice84 and 
“adoptability” appears once.85 These terms are not defined anywhere in the treaty. This 
leaves the interpretation of the term up to the individual sending countries. It is on the 
basis of this and other “deficiencies” that Thompson referred to the Convention as “a 
vague Hague”.86 
 
However, the fact that the Hague Convention does not provide for a definition of the 
term “adoptable” is not by default but by design – hence, it is an intentional vagueness. 
This vagueness, it is believed, is expected to allow some level of flexibility, thereby 
catering for varying cultural, economical, and social differences amongst contracting 
states. The lack of definition of “adoptable” in the Hague Convention could also be 
                                                 
81  As above. 
82  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 117. 
83  As above. In addition, it was said that the expression "in need of adoption" was declared less 
appropriate, because a child may need to be adopted but not fulfil the necessary legal 
requirements. 
84  In Arts. 4 and 16(1)(c) of the Hague Convention. 
85  In Art. 16(1)(a) of the Hague Convention. 
86  Thompson, (2004), 459-461. Thompson writes that “the deficiencies identified here constitute the 
Hague Convention's overall weakness: the lack of clear and concise definitions of key adoption 
terms and procedures”. Thompson, (2004), 460-461. 
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explained by the procedural, as opposed to substantive, nature of the treaty.87 
Adoptability is a substantive issue. 
 
In addition, it is important to recall that it is not one of the objectives of the Hague 
Convention to introduce a comprehensive, uniform international code on adoption.88  
Rather, the Hague Convention sets out the basic requirements necessary to ensure that 
intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child. As a result, the 
provision of a definition of, or grounds for, adoptability would not necessarily have been 
appropriate. 
 
4.4.2.3 Adoptability in the Hague Convention 
Despite the lack of definition of the term “adoptable” under the Convention, it is possible 
to tease out some characteristic features of adoptability. It is provided that Article 4(b)(1) 
of the Hague Convention builds on Article 21(b) of the CRC which is discussed in the 
previous section. Therefore, it is important to note that most of the arguments 
mentioned above in the context of the CRC (and the ACRWC) in respect of adoptability 
apply to the Hague Convention, as appropriate.89  
 
The lack of definition of the term “adoptable” in the Hague Convention has also raised 
the question whether Article 4(b) connotes that “the child is merely capable of being 
                                                 
87  Maravel, (1996), 316 (writing that “[o]ne may say that it is a procedural rather than substantive 
document in that it regulates the process of intercountry adoption rather than substantive norms 
of adoptability or other matters”.) 
88  See Art. 1 on the objectives of the Hague Convention. 
89  For instance, the arguments pertaining to consent, grounds for adoptability and so forth. In 
addition, similar arguments that the “child’s psycho-social adoptability is determined by the 
conclusion that it is impossible for the birth family to care for the child, and by the assessment 
that the child will benefit from a family environment”. See, Permanent Bureau, (2008), Guide to 
Good Practice, 82.  
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adopted” or that “the child ought to be adopted”.90 A definition of “adoptable” offered by 
Cantwell indicating that the term refers to the status of a child who is “officially 
recognised as having a legal status enabling adoption to be considered, and deemed to 
require and to be potentially able to benefit from such a measure",91 seems to favour 
the former interpretation. In addition, it is submitted that the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity, which seems to generally favour local solutions over international ones, 
seems to accord with the interpretation of adoptability which implies that “the child is 
merely capable of being adopted”.92 
 
For adoption to be in the best interests of the child, there should exist evidence that, 
even though the birth family (including the extended family) cannot care for the child, 
the child is still capable of benefiting from a family environment. Ensuring that the child 
is adoptable should include establishing that all necessary consents have been 
obtained.93 Article 4(a)(1) of the Hague Convention is to be read in conjunction with 
Article 16 (b) which demands that information about the adoptability of the child should 
be included in the report to be prepared by the Central Authority of the State of origin 
when it is satisfied that the child is adoptable.94  
 
                                                 
90  See Murphy, (2005) 189. 
91  Cantwell, (2003), 1. 
92  The assumption that adoptability connotes that the “child ought to be adopted” could be labelled 
to be too inflexible to the extent that it might fail to accommodate the best interests of the child 
principle. For instance, a child who is found abandoned may be declared adoptable, and before 
adoption takes place, the extended family of the child might surface and offer to take custody of 
the child. In such circumstances, reading “adoptability” as to mean “ought to be adopted” could go 
contrary to the best interests of the child. 
93  See Arts. 16(1)(c) and 16(2) of the Hague Convention. 
94  Art. 16(1)(a) of the Hague Convention provides that “[i]f the Central Authority of the State of origin 
is satisfied that the child is adoptable, it shall – a) prepare a report including information about his 
or her identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family history, medical history 
including that of the child's family, and any special needs of the child”. 
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As far as grounds of adoptability are concerned, there is not even a general criterion 
provided for by the Hague Convention.95 However, once again, it is safe to deduce that 
the same general requirement under the CRC and the ACRWC, that adoptability should 
be determined “on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is 
permissible in view of the child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal 
guardians” would apply.96 This is confirmed by the Guide to Good Practice of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law which indicates that orphanhood, 
abandonment, and relinquishment are some of the acceptable grounds for 
adoptability.97 
 
Under the Hague Convention, it is the obligation of Central Authorities of sending States 
to produce reports on all adoptable children that may be better protected by intercountry 
adoption.98 It is important that these reports are prepared irrespective of whether 
adoptive parents have filed their reports (indicating their willingness and capacity to 
adopt) with the sending State's Central Authority. Therefore, before the sending State's 
Central Authority is allowed to try to find prospective adoptive parents who match the 
needs of a child, a report should be generated on an adoptable child describing, "at a 
minimum, the child's identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family and 
medical history and special needs".99  
                                                 
95  Of course this is once again related to the criteria that adoptability is to be determined on the 
basis of the laws and procedures of the state of origin. 
96  It is to be noted that, amongst others, the Preamble to the Hague Convention refers to the CRC. 
97  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 81-82. 
98  Katz, (1995), 308. 
99  As above. One of the objectives of this advance preparation of reports is to do away with the 
practice of locating children to “fill the orders” or meet the needs of adoptive parents. It helps to 
keep intercountry adoption as a child centred service and subverts the practice of a parent-driven 
adoption market. 
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Reverting to the lack of definition on who is adoptable, though some level of flexibility in 
definitions is envisaged by the Hague Convention, it may be contended that it still 
leaves too much discretion in the hands of the Central Authorities of sending countries 
to unilaterally determine the meaning of such key terms. It could be argued that such 
discretion compromises one of the objectives of the Convention, viz to prevent the 
abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children,100 and contributes to perpetuate “the lack of 
uniformity the Hague Convention attempted to streamline in the first place”.101 
 
It is submitted that such claims would not be totally acceptable. It is argued that, though 
sending countries have the ultimate mandate to determine who is adoptable, under the 
Hague Convention, to some extent, receiving states have an influence in shaping the 
adoptability requirements that are set in place by the relevant authorities (including 
legislators)  of the country of origin.102 This is possible in terms of Article 17(c) of the 
Convention, which provides that “[a]ny decision in the State of origin that a child should 
be entrusted to prospective adoptive parents may only be made if – c) the Central 
Authorities of both States have agreed that the adoption may proceed”. This provision 
allows the relevant authorities (mainly Central Authorities) of the receiving state to insist 
                                                 
100  Art. 1(b) of the Hague Convention. 
101  Thompson, (2004), 465. 
102  Although it does not have, in strict sense, implications for the rules of adoptability, an example of 
“other measures” that receiving states could take that have the capacity to influence the 
adoptability of children (specifically to minimise the possibility of abusing adoptability 
requirements) includes making DNA testing compulsory. For instance, on 1 October 1998 the 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service introduced compulsory DNA testing for all 
intercountry adoptions from Guatemala. See Human Rights Internet, (2008). Talks are underway 
to implement, albeit in a limited scope, a similar measure in Ethiopia. See Ethica, (23 June 2009). 
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on the application of certain additional requirements of adoptability under the law of the 
sending state103 in order for a child to be matched with a family in that receiving State.  
 
Similarly, if receiving States are of the view that the determination of adoptability in the 
country of origin does not comply with international law, and falls short of promoting and 
protecting the best interests of the child, they have the option of placing a moratorium 
on adoptions from the country of origin. This, as experience has shown (in the case of 
Guatemala and Romania, for instance) has the potential to influence the process of 
determining adoptability in the State of origin. 
 
The assertion that the discretion vested in sending States would contribute to 
perpetuate “the lack of uniformity the Hague Convention attempted to streamline in the 
first place”, as already mentioned above, is also flawed. As pointed out above, the 
Hague Convention is more procedural than substantive in nature.104   
 
4.4.2.4 Competent authorities in the determination of adoptability 
While the issue of institutional framework in intercountry adoptions is addressed in detail 
in chapter 6, it is worth mentioning that it is also a crucial tenet of adoptability that it is 
determined by competent authorities.105 The question of who determines adoptability is 
                                                 
103  Since one of the objectives of the Convention is co-operation, the additional requirements of the 
receiving State should be made known to the State of origin through exchange of information. 
104  Maravel, (1996), 316 (writing that “[o]ne may say that it is a procedural rather than substantive 
document in that it regulates the process of intercountry adoption rather than substantive norms 
of adoptability or other matters”.) 
105  Under the Hague Convention, a competent authority could be “any authority appointed by a 
Contracting State to perform a function attributed in the Convention to this type of authority”. 
Some functions require a competent authority that is a public authority such as a court or an 
administrative body. Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 15 (Glossary). 
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an issue partially addressed by the Explanatory Report of the Hague Convention as well 
as its provisions. Accordingly, the adoptability of a child is to be determined by the 
“competent authorities of the state of origin”.106 Such determination is to be made 
according to the criteria of the applicable law as well as by considering psycho-social 
and cultural factors.107 Therefore, contracting states have the obligation either to appoint 
or designate competent authorities to fulfill their functions.  
 
It is possible to decipher from the terms “competent authorities” the drafter’s indifference 
to the branch of government (or authority) which would be vested with the power and 
responsibility to determine adoptability. “Competency” connotes the power or jurisdiction 
to make the decision in question. It is submitted that, as long as competency is 
displayed by the authority that determines adoptability of a child, the requirement of the 
Convention would be complied with. Therefore, the state of origin is at liberty to 
determine its competent authority, whether it be an administrative, judicial, or any other 
type of competent authority.  
 
The Hague Convention does not rule out the possibility of various competent authorities 
for various Convention functions. Therefore, for instance, the competent authority that 
determines adoptability could be different from the one that makes the Article 23 
certification of adoption under the Hague Convention.108 
 
 
                                                 
106  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 119. 
107  As above. 
108  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 39. 
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4.5 A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROUNDS FOR ADOPTABILITY 
 
4.5.1 Termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result of court 
orders, recognition of abandonment, and voluntary relinquishment 
 
Although a myriad of issues are related to the topic of termination of parental rights, this 
section will address only three: 1) termination of parental rights and responsibilities 
through court orders; 2) termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result of 
recognition of abandonment; and 3) termination of parental rights and responsibilities as 
a result of voluntary relinquishment.109 While most states have formal mechanisms 
included in their laws that specify the ways in which a child may enter into the care of, or 
protection by, the state,110 these three are the most common methods (along with 
orphanhood) by which parents permanently lose rights to their children. Usually, for a 
child to be declared adoptable and an adoption to take place, parental rights should be 
terminated in one of these ways.111 
 
The phrase “termination of parental rights and responsibilities through court orders” is 
understood to refer to situations where parents or guardians are found to be “unfit” 
and/or “improper” for the care of a child and their rights and responsibilities are 
terminated as a result of an administrative or court order. This may happen, for 
                                                 
109  While there is a lot of overlap between the terms abandonment and relinquishment, they are not 
used interchangeably in this study. It is possible to relinquish ones legal rights to a child without 
actually disappearing from the child's life, which is what abandonment implies. It is not clear, for 
instance, whether it is only abandonment or relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities 
too that could be accommodated as grounds to declare children as adoptable. State practice is 
divided on the issue. While some States allow both, others limit abandonment as the only ground 
for a child to be declared adoptable. 
110  See Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 69-72 for a discussion of a child’s entry into care in the 
context of intercountry adoption.  
111  Termination of parental rights is not necessary, however, in the context of step-parent or so called 
second-parent adoptions. A second-parent adoption takes place when one parent, either an 
adoptive or birth parent, seeks to add another parent for his or her child. 
 
 
 
 
 236
instance, if the parent/s or guardian/s is abusing or neglecting the child, and 
permanency planning has been found to be in the best interests of the child.112  
 
Similarly, while there is a lot of overlap between the terms “abandonment” and 
“relinquishment”, they are not used interchangeably in this chapter. Therefore, 
“abandonment”, as understood in this chapter, refers to ”the act of leaving a child with 
the intention of forsaking one’s parental rights, with no intention of return”.113 The notion 
of “relinquishment”, on the other hand, refers to a parents or guardians decision to 
surrender rights and responsibilities in respect of a child.114 It is possible to relinquish 
ones legal rights in respect of a child without physically disappearing from the child's 
life, which is what abandonment implies. 
 
4.5.1.1 Termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result 
of a court order 
 
It is one of the important elements of Article 9 of the CRC and Article 19 of the ACRWC 
that the child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will.115 In 
exceptional circumstances, competent authorities subject to judicial review can 
determine separation, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, for the best 
                                                 
112  For a discussion of what permanency planning is, and its application in various contexts see 
generally, Testa, (2005), 499; Young and Lee, (2003), 46; Herring, (1995), 183. 
113  Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 70, citing “Morocco (Law 15-01 relating to the care of abandoned 
children (kafala), Official Bulletin, 15 September 2002, Art. 1). Abandonment must be approved 
by a court, among others, in Bolivia (1999 Children and Adolescents. Code, Arts 35, 289 and 
293), the Dominican Republic (2003 Child and Adolescence Protection System and Fundamental 
Rights Code, Art. 132) and France (Civil Code, Art. 350)”. 
114  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 71. 
115  Art. 19(1) of the ACRWC stipulates that “[n]o child shall be separated from his parents against his 
will, except when a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law that such 
separation is in the best interest of the child”. The phrase “against their will” has been interpreted 
to refer equally to the will of both the parents and the child. Doek, (2006a), 21-22. 
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interest of the child.116 If a parent's act or failure to act deprives a child, and the 
deprivation is currently causing or will in the future cause serious physical, mental or 
moral harm, then it is common practice that a designated person or authority may 
petition the court to terminate the parental rights of such parent.117 Nonetheless, it is 
important to appreciate that involuntary termination of a living birth parent's rights is an 
extreme measure reserved for cases of egregious abuse, abandonment, desertion, 
neglect, or inability to support. 
 
As far as the determination of the termination of parental responsibility is concerned, the 
procedure should always keep at its centre the best interests of the child or children 
involved. One of the vital ways to do this is to establish “a due judicial process, including 
technical assessment of the capacity of the parents or guardians, in cases involving 
termination of the parental responsibility”.118 It is crucial that states “[e]nsure that 
exhaustion of all means to prevent termination of parental responsibility and/or 
separation of the child is set as a clear criteria [sic] in all cases involving adoption”.119 
As far as the States Parties’ obligation to respect non-separation is concerned, there is 
a need to use positive measures to address the causes for the removal of children from 
their parents,120 including providing parents or guardians with appropriate assistance.121  
                                                 
116  Art. 9 of CRC.  
117  The type of behaviour that may cause the court to consider terminating parental rights includes 
prolonged alcohol or other substance abuse, or a failure to discontinue abusing alcohol or other 
substances after receiving treatment. 
118  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nepal, (September 2005), para. 
53. 
119  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nepal, (September 2005), para. 54(d). 
120  See, for instance, Braveman and Ramsey, (1997), 447 (arguing that “[w]e need to focus our 
energy, attention, and resources on the elimination of child poverty so that children will not be 
removed from caring parents because the parents are financially unable to provide for their basic 
needs”); Guggenheim, (2000), 1716. 
121  As above.  
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There is a protracted debate in some quarters whether termination of parental rights 
should only take place after the adoptability of a child has been asserted (or, in some 
instances, even only after an adoptive parent is found).122 In this regard, it is submitted, 
that, even if adoptability might factor into parental rights termination decisions, it need 
not be a fundamental consideration. Rather, it should once again be the best interests 
of the child that should be the overall consideration. If the prospect of adoptability is to 
unduly influence whether or not to terminate parental rights, the possibility that certain 
groups of children such as older children, special needs children, or children from 
minority groups could suffer from neglect or abuse at the hands of their parents would 
increase. It would also mean that these groups of children would remain in institutional 
or foster care for a longer period of time until termination of parental rights occurs.123 
 
Within the jurisdictions of all the countries in the study, the termination of parental rights 
and responsibilities (leading to the adoptability of a child) is possible. What needs to be 
mentioned at the outset, however, is that this measure cannot be labelled as a common 
child protection measure in any of the countries under the study. The fact that it is a 
highly exceptional measure, and, when it happens, does not often lead to the 
adoptability of children, is partly apparent from the unsuccessful attempt by this author 
to find cases of termination of parental rights that subsequently led to the 
adoptability/adoption of a child. 
                                                 
122  See Williams v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., CA 05-947, (3 May 2006) (not designated for 
publication); See Williams v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs, CA 05-947 Appeal (6 December 
2006) (not designated for publication). See, too, Noonan and Burke, (2005), 241-256. 
123  In the context of the U.S., this has been found to mean “we expect African American children, 
children of Hispanic decent, older children, and disabled children to have a lower probability of 
parental rights termination because they have less chance of being adopted”. Noonan and Burke, 
(2005), 245. 
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4.5.1.1.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, it is noteworthy that, under the Child Care Act of 1983, when there is no 
prospect for a child to reunify with his or her original family soon enough for his or her 
developmental needs to be met, the possibility for a child to be adopted exists.124 
Nonetheless, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) had found that, in 
practice, courts have often been reluctant to terminate parental rights and 
responsibilities.125  
 
In addition, certain children might be caught up in statutory care with no prospect of 
reunification with original family. These children’s situation is exacerbated if they do not 
benefit from adoption because “disruptive or violent behaviour by seriously disturbed 
parents makes it impossible to even begin introducing them [these children] to 
prospective adoptive families” (insertion mine).126 Since the Child Care Act requires that 
a child develop a relationship with a prospective adoptive parent before an application 
before a court is brought, and no other provision existed for termination of parental 
rights, children’s rights to a family environment have been compromised. 
 
Fortunately, clarity on these issues is introduced through the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
The Children’s Amendment Act 41 of 2007 inserts section 135 in the Children’s Act that 
allows for the termination of parental rights and responsibilities of the parents of children 
                                                 
124  Sec. 19 of the Child Care Act 
125  See, generally, SALRC Project 110, (2001). 
126  Mosikatsana and Loffell, (2007), 15-5. 
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in statutory care.127 This is to be done only when it is in line with the best interests of the 
child with a view, amongst others, to the adoption of such child.128  
 
According to the Children’s Act, the termination of parental responsibilities and rights 
can be initiated by various parties. Pursuant to Section 135 of the Children’s Act, these 
includes through the application of the Director-General or a provincial head of social 
development or a designated child protection organisation. At times, the application for 
the termination of parental responsibilities and rights can be made without the consent 
of a parent or care-giver.129  
 
As entrenched in Section 136 of the Children’s Act, in considering such an application, 
the relevant court must take certain factors into account, such as the need for the child 
to be permanently settled, preferably in a family environment (taking into consideration 
the age and stage of development of the child); the success or otherwise of any 
attempts that have been made to reunite the child with the person whose parental 
responsibilities and rights are challenged; and the probability of arranging for the child to 
be adopted or placed in another form of alternative care. The consideration of these 
                                                 
127  Sec. 135 of the Children’s Act. 
128  Mosikatsana and Loffell, (2007), 15-5. A joint reading of Secs. 155, 156, and s157 of the 
Children’s Act is of further guidance in the determination of which children are adoptable. The 
thrust of a combined reading of these sections gives the view that a children’s court is enjoined to 
consider various options, including adoptions, for the purpose of achieving stability in the life of a 
child who is need of care and protection. See Mosikatsana and Loffell, (2007), 15-5. After all, the 
South African Constitution (Sec. 28(1)(d)) allocates to every child the right to be protected from 
maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation, which includes more than the current emphasis on 
remedial interventions.  
129  These scenarios are to occur if the child at the time of the application, is older than seven years, 
and has been in alternative care for more than two years; is older than three years but not older 
than seven years, and has been in alternative care for more than one year; or is three years or 
younger, and has been in alternative care for more than six months. 
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circumstances is crucial in order not to use the procedure to the detriment of the 
child.130  
 
While “the probability of arranging for the child to be adopted”131 is one of the relevant 
factors a court should take into account when considering an application for the 
termination of parental rights and responsibilities, it is not a precondition for the 
termination of such rights. This is laudable, and is clearly contrary to the negative 
position held by some that termination of parental rights and responsibilities should take 
place only when the adoptability of a child has been asserted (or, in some instances, 
when an adoptive parent is found).132 
 
In order to minimise compromising the best interests of the child through a premature or 
unwarranted termination of parental rights and responsibilities leading to adoptability, 
the Children’s Act builds sufficient safeguards. For instance, the appreciation of the 
legislator that termination of parental rights and responsibilities does not necessarily 
lead to the automatic adoptability of a child is apparent from Section 230 of the Act.133  
 
Section 230(3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which entrenches the definition of 
adoptable children, provides in relevant part that: 
   A child is adoptable if— 
(a) the child is an orphan and has no guardian or caregiver who is willing to adopt 
the child; 
(b) the whereabouts of the child’s parent or guardian cannot be established; 
                                                 
130  For instance, as per the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care, such consideration complies with the 
requirement that family separation should be a measure of last resort. 
131  Sec.136 of the Children’s Act. 
132  See section 4.5.1.1 above for such a discussion. 
133  Sec. 230 of the Children’s Act. 
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(c) the child has been abandoned; 
(d) the child’s parent or guardian has abused or deliberately neglected the child, or 
has allowed the child to be abused or deliberately neglected; or 
(e) the child is in need of a permanent alternative placement. 
Under this Section, there is no indication that a child is adoptable simply because the 
parent’s rights and responsibilities were terminated.134  
 
Arguably, however, Section 230(3)(e) could be read to enunciate that if the termination 
of parental rights and responsibilities was made in order to secure stability in the child’s 
life, a child could become adoptable automatically.135 This Section provides that a child 
is adoptable if “the child is in need of a permanent alternative placement”.  
 
It is submitted that such an argument is untenable in the face of the fact that alternative 
care under Sections 46(1)(a)(i) and 167(1)(a) includes foster placement. For instance, 
an older child who requires a permanent alternative placement might not be adoptable 
because he or she lacks the capacity to form attachments and benefit from a family 
environment. In such exceptional circumstances, children will not be adoptable even if 
they display a need for a permanent alternative placement.  
 
This approach is also compliant with the position that the determination of adoptability is 
not an issue to be determined only by using legal principles, but also requires social as 
well as psychological assessments. In addition, it also counters the assumption that in 
all cases where termination of parental rights and responsibilities takes place, the best 
option is always adoption, which is a position devoid of the generally acceptable 
                                                 
134  As above. 
135  See CLE and CCL, (2009), 26. 
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standard that the best interests of a child should be considered on a case by case 
basis. 
4.5.1.1.2 Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, during marriage, the mother and the father are joint guardians and tutors of 
their children,136 and the default of one of the parents (which includes through death, 
disability, unworthiness or removal) shall make the other parent exercise such functions 
alone. The termination of parental rights and responsibilities is catered for under Article 
247 of the RFC.137 In this regard, it is interesting and noteworthy that, the removal of 
ascendants shall be declared by a court “only with extreme caution”.138 The word 
“removal” under the RFC connotes termination of parental rights and responsibilities.139 
The termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result of a court order that 
leads to the adoptability of a child is used sparingly. 
 
4.5.1.1.3 Kenya 
The Kenyan experience also indicates a similar situation. While Section 6(1) of the 
Children Act gives the child a right to live with and be cared for by the parents, the 
“court or the Director determines in accordance with the law that it is in the best 
interests of the child to separate him from his parent”. This may happen, for instance, 
                                                 
136  Art. 220 of the RFC. 
137  Art. 247 of the RFC 
138  Art. 247(1) of the RFC. In addition, Art. 249 of the RFC under the title “Duties of the Court” 
provides that: 
1) Where the court is to appoint or to remove a person as guardian or 
tutor of a minor, it shall, before making its decision, consult, in so far 
as possible, the ascendants and the brothers and sisters of the child 
who have attained majority 
2) Where it thinks fit, it may hear the minor himself 
3) The court shall decide having regard solely to the interest of the 
minor and without being bound by the information which it has 
obtained. 
139  See Art. 219 of the RFC. 
 
 
 
 
 244
where a parent is abusing a child.140 In such circumstances, “the best alternative care 
available shall be provided for the child”.141 Section 6(3) provides in full that: 
Where a child is separated from his family without the leave of the court, the Government 
shall provide assistance for reunification of the child with his family. 
This suggests, rather obliquely, that in court-ordered separations, family reunification 
might not be an option, and termination of parental rights and responsibilities could 
follow from this. It is notable that the involvement of the court is congruent with Article 9 
of the CRC and Article 19 of the ACRWC. 
 
4.5.1.2 Termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result 
of abandonment  
 
Apart from termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a court order, parents 
might abandon or relinquish their children, and terminate their parental rights and 
responsibilities voluntarily. The common dictionary definition of “abandonment” is: 
To relinquish or give up with the intent of never again resuming or claiming one's rights or 
interests in; to give up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly; to relinquish all 
connection with or concern in; to desert, as a person to whom one is bound by a special 
relation of allegiance fidelity; to quit; to forsake.142 
Abandonment of a child is desertion by the parent with the intent to completely sever 
the parent-child relationship, including its rights and obligations. Abandonment can be 
viewed as a drastic form of relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities.143 It 
includes the intention to abandon as well as the physical act of surrendering all parental 
                                                 
140  See, for instance, Sec. 24(7) of the Children Act on the exercise of parental responsibility. 
141  Sec. 6(2) of the Children Act 
142  Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 
143  Monica, (2000), 267. 
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duties.144 Therefore, abandonment must be wilful, and it must be established that there 
is a settled intention to renounce permanently the rights and duties of parenthood.145 
This definition is indicative of the need to draw a distinction between those children who 
are “conditionally abandoned”,146 i.e. where parents express the intention to retrieve the 
child later; to contribute to the care of the child later; or express ongoing parental 
interest in the child, on the one hand, and those children that are indeed permanently 
abandoned. In this thesis, it is the permanently abandoned group of children that are 
referred to as abandoned.  
 
In most countries, particularly African countries, abandonment is a crime.147 Child 
abandonment could also be interpreted to constitute a breach of Articles 18(1) and 
19(1) of the CRC, and Article 20(1) of the ACRWC. Despite this, one route followed by 
some countries (mainly Western) to minimise the problem of abandoned infants deaths, 
is to provide legislation that offers confidentiality and immunity to parents who leave 
their unharmed infants at a hospital or other designated places.148 Often these laws also 
set out procedures for child welfare agencies to follow immediately after the 
                                                 
144  Black’s Law Dictionary, (1990), 2. Abandonment is sometimes classified into conditional and 
unconditional. Such a distinction is necessitated to differentiate between those children who are 
handed over to orphanages temporarily and those that are abandoned irreversibly. According to 
the 7th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, abandonment in general is defined as “[t]he relinquishing 
of a right or interest with the intention of never again claiming it” while within family law it is 
defined as “[t]he act of leaving a spouse or child willfully and without an intent to return”. Garner, 
(1999), 1-2. 
145  Van Bueren observes that there are two types of abandonment- namely acts of commission 
(wilful abandonment) and acts of omission (neglect). Van Buren, (1998), 284. The former is the 
focus here as neglect is a form of abandonment which leads to termination pf parental 
responsibilities through a judicial or administrative process. 
146  This is sometimes referred to as temporary relinquishment. 
147  For instance, in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt.  
148  See, for instance, Gee, (2001), 151; Partida, (2002), 61. These child abandonment laws are 
commonly referred to as "safe haven laws", "baby Moses laws" or in Europe, "hatchery laws". 
Germany for example, "has adopted the use of 'baby slots' in which unwanted newborns may be 
deposited anonymously." while South Africa has a program called "the revolving crib," and 
Hungary has established "anonymous drop-off locations”.  
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abandonment takes place, including an expedited process to terminate parental 
rights.149 
 
It is submitted that abandonment is not a concept the elements of which are necessarily 
agreed upon amongst all cultures and backgrounds. Possibilities exist, for instance, 
where street children are not necessarily without a family, and hence, not abandoned.150 
In some parts of the world, it is not uncommon for “parents to entrust the child they 
cannot care for, without, however, wishing to abandon him”.151 This is a clear indication 
that the definition, and declaration, of abandonment should be able to take these 
realities into account, and consequently be a matter of the law relating to the adoptee 
rather than to the adopter.152 
 
Despite the various standards pertaining to abandonment, a few points could be 
highlighted as constituting good practice. Therefore, a sound abandonment 
determination legal regime would provide for a clear standard for abandonment, as well 
as for the authority that formally verifies and declares that abandonment has 
occurred.153 This should be accompanied by measures to be taken to locate the family 
of origin, and to guide the way forward in order to place those children who could benefit 
from a family environment.154 
 
                                                 
149  See, for instance, Gee, (2001), 151.    
150  This calls for an appreciation of the distinction between children who work on the streets and 
those who live on the streets.  
151  ISS/IRC, (2006a), 2. 
152  As above. 
153  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 71. 
154  As above. 
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In addition, while some States require a specified amount of time to lapse between 
abandonment and the declaration of adoptability, others do not have such a 
requirement. In the case of India, for example, a maximum of three months is allowed 
for tracing the parents in cases of abandonment.155 It is only after the three months 
period has lapsed that the child may be declared adoptable.156 
 
Abandonment is a ground for the adoptability of a child cutting across all the countries 
under the study. All the respective legislation (both primary and subsidiary) of the 
countries under the study expressly identifies abandonment as a ground for adoptability. 
 
4.5.1.2.1 South Africa 
Section 230(3) of the Children’s Act expressly recognised abandonment as one of the 
potential grounds that could lead to adoptability. The term “abandoned” is defined in the 
Act as a child who “has obviously been deserted by the parent, guardian or care-giver” 
or “has, for no apparent reason, had no contact with the parent, guardian, or care-giver 
for a period of at least three months” (emphasis mine).157 The presence of this definition 
facilitates the understanding of Section 230(3)(c) of the Children’s Act.  
 
Further clarifications ushered in through the Draft Regulations to the Children’s Act are 
of immense importance in promoting the best interests of the child in the determination 
of adoptability as a result of abandonment. In this regard, of particular importance is 
Regulation 56 of the Draft Regulations. Titled “Abandoned or orphaned children”, 
                                                 
155  CARA, (1995), Chapter IV; See, too, Dohle, (2008-2009), 138. 
156  CARA, (1995), Chapter IV. 
157  Art. 1(a) and (b) of the Children’s Act. 
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Regulation 56(1) enjoins designated social workers to “cause an advertisement to be 
published in at least one local newspaper circulating in the area where the child has 
been found calling upon any person to claim responsibility for the child”. Furthermore, 
before being satisfied that a child is abandoned, a presiding officer should take into 
account the definition of abandonment in the Act;158 be satisfied that a period of at least 
three months have lapsed since the publication of the advertisement and that no person 
has claimed responsibility for the child;159 and also have regard to 
an affidavit,… setting out the steps taken to trace the child’s parent, guardian or care-giver, 
by the social worker concerned to the effect that the child’s parent, guardian or care-giver 
cannot be traced and an affidavit by any other person who can testify to the fact that the 
child has had no contact with his or her parent, guardian or care-giver for a period of at 
least three months.160 
This is congruent with what the South African Government communicated to the 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference in 2005. The Government indicated that:  
A child is only adoptable after the Children’s Court has made a finding in terms of the Child 
Care Act. That can only happen if: The court is sure that the biological parents gave proper 
consent and were given enough time to reconsider (60 days), or proof of death of parents, or 
sufficient proof that parents cannot be traced (police reports, affidavits, adverticements 
[sic].161 
In the past, in South Africa, it was reported that162 the lack of a clear definition and 
guidelines associated with abandonment was a major drawback in establishing 
adoptability. Allegedly, Commissioners had set their own procedures for the 
management of such cases and these were at times incompatible with the 
developmental needs of the children. To reinforce this point, the SALRC highlights the 
                                                 
158  Regs. 56(2)(a) of the Draft Regulations. 
159  Regs. 56(2)(b)(3) of the Draft Regulations. 
160  Regs. 56(2)(d) of the Draft Regulations. 
161  Available at <http://www.hcch.net/upload/adop2005_za.pdf>.  
162  According to the SALRC Project 110, (2001), para. 10. 4. 5. 
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example that some Commissioners refused to free abandoned infants for (domestic) 
adoption until a lengthy police search (sometimes spanning a period of two years) had 
been carried out before a child was declared abandoned and made available for 
adoption.163 By the time this was over, the child’s development had been compromised 
and the chance of adoption reduced. This, in conjunction with a lack of permanency 
orientation among social workers, may result in infants being institutionalised and 
“drifting in care” for years.164 Fortunately, the foregoing provisions under the Children’s 
Act and the Draft Regulations have attempted to tackle some of these concerns head 
on. 
These provisions under the Children’s Act and the Draft Regulations are informed by 
real life experiences. For instance, the complication that may arise in relation to the 
determination of adoptability, especially on the ground of abandonment, is epitomized in 
the Infant BD case discussed in Chapter 3.165 It transpired from the case that the child 
was born on 20 December 2002 in the Johannesburg Hospital, and, since she was born 
prematurely, the mother was discharged from the hospital before the child.166 Within a 
month, on 21 January 2003, the child was removed from the Johannesburg hospital to 
the place of safety on 21 January 2003 by way of a Form 4 under the Child Care Act 
which indicated that the child was abandoned.167 However, despite only seeing the child 
only after five months, the mother contended that she did not intend to abandon the 
child and testified that she took the telephone numbers of the hospital and phoned to 
                                                 
163  SALRC Project 110, (2001), para. 10. 4. 5.. 
164  Currently, Sec. 157(3) stipulates that “[a] very young child who has been orphaned or abandoned 
by its parents must be made available for adoption in the prescribed manner and within the 
prescribed period except when this is not in the best interests of the child”. 
165  Section 3.3.3.3. Case number 14/1/2-52/2003 in the Children’s Court for the District of Randburg. 
166  As above. 
167  As above. 
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inquire about the child’s condition.168 When she phoned the third time, according to the 
mother, the child was no longer there.169 It was the mother’s assertion that when she left 
the child at the hospital, she had thought that the child would be safe; that her sister 
would visit the child; and since she had left her address (of her sister’s place in 
Johannesburg where she was initially staying) with the hospital, she had thought she 
would be contacted once the child was ready to be discharged.170  She further disputed 
the assertion that she had abandoned her child by stating that she was informed that 
her sister attempted to see the child, but was not allowed by the hospital; that upon her 
return to Johannesburg, she allegedly went to the place where she left the baby and 
was referred by the hospital to the Social Worker who informed her of the status of the 
child with Ms. Noble.171 
 
While the issue of abandonment did not occupy centre stage in this case, it could clearly 
be discerned that the complication arose as a result of the determination of 
abandonment leading to adoptability. For arguments sake, assuming that all the 
mother’s contentions are true, the direct application of the relevant provisions of the 
Children’s Act and the Draft Regulations on the definition of abandonment, the 
requirement of advertisement, the time lapse required before abandonment is declared, 
and other similar conditions embrace great potential to minimise similar occurrences 
from taking place.  
 
                                                 
168 As above. 
169 As above. 
170 As above. 
171 As above. 
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4.5.1.2.2 Kenya 
Section 157 of this Act, with a side title of “Children who may be adopted” provides in 
relevant part that: 
1) Any child who is resident within Kenya may be adopted whether or not the child is a 
Kenyan citizen, or was or was not born in Kenya: 
Provided that no application for an adoption order, shall be made in respect of a child 
unless the child concerned has been in the continuous care and control of the applicant 
with in the Republic for a period of three consecutive months preceding the filing of the 
application and both the child and the applicant or applicants as the case may be 
evaluated and assessed by a registered adoption society in Kenya. 
 
The Children’s Act indicates that abandonment is one of the main grounds that could 
lead towards the determination of a child as adoptable. In this respect, the court has the 
mandate to dispense with a parent’s or guardian’s consent if he or she has “abandoned, 
neglected, persistently failed to maintain or persistently failed to maintain the child”.172 In 
elaborating this provision further, the Act stipulates that “abandonment may be 
presumed if the child appears to have been abandoned at birth or if the person or 
institution having care and possession of the child has neither seen nor heard from a 
parent or guardian of the child for a period of at least six months”.173 
 
Case law in Kenya seems to uphold such a position. In Re S W (a child) (2006) eKLR 
(adoption cause 190 of 2004), for instance, before justifying and confirming the decision 
to make the child free for adoption, the Kenyan High Court highlighted that “[t]he child 
was abandoned and has not been claimed for over 6 months”.174  This seems to give 
                                                 
172  Sec. 159(1)(a) of the Children Act. 
173  Sec. 159(1)(a)(i) of the Children Act. 
174  Re S W (a child) (2006) eKLR, 3. 
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the implication that the time that lapses between abandonment and the initiation of an 
adoption procedure is one of the important elements before declaring children 
adoptable.  
 
What is missing, however, is a requirement on police or other authorities to undertake 
family tracing efforts. Neither the Children Act nor the Children (Adoption) Regulations 
of 2005 attempt to regulate this in any meaningful detail. Current efforts to amend the 
Children Act have taken note of this shortcoming, and attempts are underway to remedy 
it. 
4.5.1.2.3 Ethiopia 
It is reported that, in the context of Ethiopia, in general: 
…orphans identified for intercountry adoption have been abandoned by their parents or 
have lost their parents to disease or other misfortune … . When a child is abandoned, 
by law it comes into the custody of the government. When a child is found to have two 
HIV/AIDS-infected parents, or one living HIV/AIDS-infected parent, the government 
routinely declares that the child is an orphan and assumes legal guardianship of the 
child.175  
 
The previous Guidelines for Adoption issued by MOLSA, the Ministry in charge of 
adoptions before 2007, had sections that further clarified adoptability. These sections 
are not present in the current Internal Guidelines of MOWA. Despite this, it is observed 
that the practice of defining who is adoptable has continued along the same lines of the 
previous Guidelines of MOLSA. As a result, it would not be unwarranted to anchor the 
discussion of who is adoptable in Ethiopia partly within the provisions of the former 
Guidelines.  
                                                 
175  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia”, (December 2008). 
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Accordingly, a child is adoptable if he/she is disadvantaged and/or unaccompanied. 
Under paragraph 2(3) of the former Guidelines by MOLSA, a child is “unaccompanied or 
disadvantaged” if a child is fully orphaned (both parents); an abandoned child (both 
parents untraceable); a child with parents who are certified as terminally and/or mentally 
incapacitated by an appropriate and accredited body; or a child who cannot be allowed 
to remain in his or her family environment for his/her own best interests. 
 
This requirement on adoptability is relatively detailed compared with what can be found 
in a number of African countries, with the exception of a few countries, such as, South 
Africa. It is further consolidated by paragraph 6(3) of the Guidelines which lists the 
documents and information that needs to be compiled about an adoptable child. These 
documents need to be produced before a child is given to prospective adoptive parents 
through an adoption contract. The main report that needs to be produced should have 
information on “the child’s life history”. This should include, but is not limited to, the 
identity of the child, the child’s family situation, the child’s close relatives name list, and 
if the child is in an institution, information relating to how and when the child entered 
institutional care.176 In addition, MOWA should receive a dossier, accompanied with a 
letter, from the competent authority tasked with monitoring the well-being of children at 
the province/zone/ kebele177 level detailing the situation of the child. 
 
While abandonment, as quoted above, is expressly recognised as a ground for 
adoptability, some of the necessary pre-conditions for the determination of 
abandonment are lacking. One of the main safeguards that is set in place to counter a 
                                                 
176   Para. 6.3 of MOWA Guidelines. 
177   This is the lowest administrative level. 
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premature determination of the adoptability of abandoned children is found in paragraph 
(6)(5)(2) of the Guidelines by MOWA. According to this section, it is a compulsory 
requirement that, before an abandoned child is made available for adoption, the child 
must stay in an orphanage for a minimum of two months. This, it is believed, is to allow 
for a period of grace in case any person would come to claim the child. However, efforts 
by police or other competent bodies to trace families, and how and for how long tracing 
efforts are to be conducted before abandonment is declared remain elusive. 
 
4.5.1.3 Termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result 
of relinquishment  
Apart from abandonment, as already mentioned above, another way of terminating 
parental rights and responsibilities is through relinquishment. By definition, “to 
relinquish” is “letting something go or giving something up”.178 "Relinquishment" of a 
child is a voluntary consent to the termination of one's parental rights to a child. It is also 
called "voluntary termination of parental rights" and "consent to adoption".179 As 
mentioned above, relinquishment is often effected by giving up one’s rights in writing in 
the presence of a judge or a representative of an agency taking custody of the child. 
During relinquishment, it is not uncommon to solicit information regarding the parents’ 
age, heritage, education, physical appearance, health history, and religious background, 
as well as the reasons for the relinquishment or the placing of the child for adoption.180 
                                                 
178  Available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Relinquishment>. 
179  Temporary relinquishment does not terminate parental rights and responsibilities, and does not 
make a child adoptable. In Russia, for instance, temporary relinquishment, which entails the 
possibility of taking the child back from the state’s care after a certain period of time (from one 
month to three years) is encountered extremely rarely at the present time, because a woman who 
chooses that option, as a rule, has to have a permanent address (residence permit) in the same 
town where she gave birth to and relinquished the child. See Isupova, (2004), 50-51. 
180  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 71-72. See, too, Art. 16 of the Hague 
Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 255
Since the process of the determination of adoptability should not take an unreasonable 
amount of time, the existence of relinquishment as a ground for adoptability might be 
very crucial in achieving this end. In fact, experience shows that the older children are, 
the less their prospects of adoption.181 The CRC Committee has expressed its concern 
where there has been a lengthy process of declaring a child available for adoption, 
resulting in a prolonged stay in an institution.182 In this particular instance the State party 
was recommended to “identify the factors in the adoption process which result in 
children’s prolonged stay in institutions” and to address them.183 
 
A relinquishment may be made in favour of particular adoptive parents,184 or to an 
agency or institution to place the child for adoption.185 Some countries disallow the 
former type of relinquishment where a child is handed over to prospective adoptive 
parents.186 In fact, valid concerns might drive a government to disallow the 
relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities altogether.187 One such concern 
could be to fight corruption, baby selling and buying, and child trafficking. Therefore, 
while there is nothing in the CRC and the ACRWC as well as in the jurisprudence of the 
                                                 
181  See section 4.5.4 on special needs and hard to place children. 
182  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Philippines, (September 2005), para. 48. 
183  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Philippines, (September 2005), para. 49. 
184  It is of interest to note that the act of surrendering a child directly to the adoptive parents, or for 
adoption by specific adoptive parents, does not constitute abandonment, as the designation of a 
specific person is considered a “condition” of abandonment. 
185  Once the relinquishment is made and accepted, the agency stands in loco parentis to the child 
and has to the power to place the child for adoption and grant consent to the adoption. 
186  In Argentina, for instance, biological parents may relinquish their children for adoption only 
through the courts. It is also indicated that the law provides for a 60-day window period after the 
birth of the child to allow the birth mother time to think about her decision. U.S. Department of 
State, “Intercountry adoption: Argentina”, (November 2008). 
187  The practice of proscribing voluntary relinquishment is not a practice that sits well with everyone. 
Some contend that denying a birth mother the right to voluntarily relinquish her child often means 
that a baby who would have been quickly placed with an adoptive family ends up spending a 
significant amount of time in State care, awaiting a legal declaration of abandonment. See 
McKinney, (2007), 361. 
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CRC Committee that disallows the practice of relinquishment of rights and 
responsibilities in respect of children, some countries use the prohibition of 
relinquishment in order to counter the ill effects of direct adoptions in which birth parents 
give their child to specific prospective adoptive parents or their intermediaries. These 
countries include a number of South American countries, such as Peru and Bolivia.188 
 
However, if relinquishment is to be allowed under national law as a ground for 
determining the adoptability of a child, certain stringent conditions need to be put in 
place and complied with. And despite the fact that relinquishment law is very diverse 
from one country to the other, a few basic generalised observations are possible.  
 
In principle, since a child is not adoptable unless the parental rights of its birth parents 
have been properly terminated, laws impose stringent safeguards against a hasty,189 
coerced, or otherwise improperly influenced, parental relinquishment of rights and 
responsibilities in respect of a child for adoption. Since it is not uncommon for birth 
parents to challenge adoptions on the grounds that they were not properly informed that 
the consequence of signing a consent was the termination of their parental rights, the 
requirement that relinquishment should be made in writing and witnessed is mainly 
aimed at serving as a safeguard against such scenarios. 
 
                                                 
188  McKinney, (2007), 395-396. 
189  See, for instance, Freundlich, (1999), 97 (arguing that while expedited termination of parental 
rights may indeed solve the short-term problem of too many children remaining too long in foster 
care without a definitive permanency plan, it may also negatively affect children’s chances of 
permanency with their birth family). 
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Furthermore, the general rule that parental rights and responsibilities cannot be 
relinquished in favour of anyone before the child is born should be enforced. In most 
countries, laws specify whether or not there is a reasonable period of time after the 
signing of adoption consent papers during which the relinquishing parent(s) can revoke 
consent.190 To illustrate, the CRC Committee criticised Hungary for the short period of 
time (2 months) during which a biological mother may withdraw her consent to 
adoption.191 The rights of biological fathers must be respected too, and failure to advise 
a known father and allow his participation in an adoption plan, or allow him to explore 
his wish to parent, may lead to the adoption being contested, and/or possible disruption 
or dissolution thereof. 192 
 
There is also a merit in mentioning that the distinction made between abandonment and 
(voluntarily) relinquishment of children is not only of theoretical importance. It has 
practical implications too. For instance, it was reported in 1999 that under Chinese law 
relinquished children may only be adopted by couples who are over thirty-five and 
childless, and only one such child may be adopted per couple.193 However, it is 
important to note that parents seeking to adopt orphans, abandoned and "special 
                                                 
190  For instance, the 1997 Adoption Law of Paraguay imposes a mandatory 45-day waiting period on 
parents who wish to relinquish their child for adoption, during which the judge must take all 
necessary measures to maintain the child within his or her birth family. Ley de Adopciones 
(Paraguay), No. 1.136/97, Art. 21. 
191  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Hungary, (March 2006), para. 34. 
192  In light of adoption, relinquishment has some positive spin-offs over abandonment in promoting 
and protecting the rights of the prospective adoptive or adopted child. For instance, it offers the 
opportunity to know more details about the biological parents of the child. This in turn might be 
helpful in the future in case tracing the background of the child becomes important. 
193  See Leeuwen, (1999), 208.  
 
 
 
 
 258
needs" children do not fall under such restrictions.194 While Liberian legislation seems to 
recognize both abandonment and relinquishment as grounds for adoptability, there is no 
need to secure parental consent when termination of parental rights and responsibilities 
takes place by a decision of the competent authorities or through abandonment.195 
However, if the case is one that involves relinquishment, evidence should be produced 
showing that consent of the appropriate persons is secured, or justification adduced 
why such consent is not necessary. The same is true for Angola and a few other African 
countries.196 
4.5.1.3.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, a cursory look at Section 230(3) of the Children’s Act on adoptable 
children seems to discount the adoptability of children as a result of the relinquishment 
of parental rights and responsibilities. This is because a child whose parents choose to 
relinquish parental rights and responsibilities do not fit into the category of orphaned; 
abandoned; a child the whereabouts of whose parents or guardians cannot be 
established; or a child whose parents or guardians abused or deliberately neglected, or 
a child whose parents or guardians allowed the child to be abused or deliberately 
neglected., all of which are the specific categories referred to in this section. 
                                                 
194  Art. 8. The adopter may adopt one child only, male or female. Orphans, disabled children or 
abandoned infants and children, who are raised in the social welfare institutes, and whose 
biological parents cannot be ascertained or found, may be adopted irrespective of the restrictions 
that the adopter shall be childless and adopt one child only. See Adoption Law of the Peoples’ 
Republic of China (October 2005).   
195  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Liberia”, (December 2008).  
196  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Angola”, (July 2008). The situation is the same, 
for instance, in Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.  See U.S. Department of State, 
“Intercountry adoption: Burkina Faso”, (August 2008); Sierra Leone, (December 2007); Tanzania, 
(March 2009). 
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The only provision under the Children’s Act (perhaps along with the notion of “freeing 
orders”) that could be read to offer the possibility of the adoptability of a child through 
relinquishing parental rights and responsibilities is Section 230(3)(e). This section 
provides that a child is adoptable if the child is in need of permanent alternative care.197  
 
Detailed provisions on parental consent coupled with the prevailing practice of adoption 
testify to the fact that relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities could 
nevertheless make a child adoptable. For instance, Section 233(3) of the Children’s Act 
stipulates that “[i]f the parent of a child wishes the child to be adopted by a particular 
person the parent must state the name of that person in the consent”. Direct 
relinquishment to prospective adoptive parents without involving the state machinery 
such as the courts, social workers, the Department of Social Development, and other 
relevant competent authorities does not find any support under South African law. Even 
when a parent wants a certain person to adopt his or her child, Section 233(5) of the Act 
requires rightly that the eligibility of the person as an adoptive parent must be 
determined by a children’s court in terms of Section 231(2) of the Act. 
 
4.5.1.3.2 Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, the possibility of relinquishing a child for adoption can be deciphered, rather 
obliquely, from the MOWA Guidelines. The point of departure for this argument is 
paragraph 5(1) of the Guidelines that lists the group of persons or authorities who can 
                                                 
197  And since section 150(1) of the Children’s Act envisages a long list of group of children who are 
labelled as “in need of care”, including those “without any visible means of support” or live “in 
circumstances which may seriously harm that child’s physical, mental or social well-being”, 
parents might relinquish their rights and responsibilities leading to the adoptability of their child.  
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apply for an adoption order. Included amongst this group of persons are parents,198 
giving the implication that they could relinquish a child for adoption. 
 
Since an adoptable child, by definition, includes “a child with parents who are certified 
as terminally and/or mentally incapacitated by an appropriate and accredited body; or a 
child who cannot be allowed to remain in his or her family environment for his/her own 
best interests”,199 the possibility of relinquishing parental rights and responsibilities 
which could make the child adoptable is legally justifiable.  
 
According to paragraph 6(2)(b) of the MOWA Guidelines, a child is free for adoption 
when the adoption contract between the prospective adoptive parents and the parents 
or guardians of the child is concluded in accordance with the law. Notwithstanding 
paragraph 6(2)(b), if the child is an orphan and does not have any parents, his or her 
ascendants should produce proof of their filiations in order to be allowed to sign an 
adoption contract. 
 
The rule is slightly different for collateral relatives of the child who want to make the 
child available for adoption. In such cases, it is required that collateral relatives should 
have secured legal guardianship before making the child available for adoption. In 
practice, this would require them to apply for (have already secured) a guardianship 
order pursuant to Article 228 of the RFC. The motive of this provision can be safely 
                                                 
198  Para. 5(1)(f) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
199  Para. 2.3 of the former Guidelines by MOLSA. 
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assumed - that it wants to protect the best interests of the child by prohibiting collateral 
relatives without a guardianship order from entering into an adoption contract.200  
 
While it does not enjoy a clear and strong legal basis, the practice pertaining to the 
relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities leading to adoptability in Ethiopia 
has attempted to keep pace with the current challenges. For instance, a move in this 
direction came in November 2008, and it was reported that: 
The Ethiopian Ministry of Women’s Affairs now requires additional documentation for 
adoption cases in which a living birth parent or parents has/have abandoned their child 
to an orphanage.  The regional social affairs bureau must now authenticate the letter 
issued by the local Kebele court that acknowledges the abandonment.201 
This measure is intended to minimise cases of abuse where orphanages routinely claim 
that a certain child was relinquished into their custody by a parent(s). However, there is 
still some room for improvement for addressing potential illicit practices related to 
relinquishment.202  
 
Unfortunately, the RFC allows the possibility of any person below the age of 18 years 
and under guardianship to be adopted. It is submitted that the language “any person 
who is less than eighteen years of age” could be read to include a child merely 
conceived and not yet born. In fact, as a follow-up to this provision, Article 187(1) of the 
RFC expressly allows that “[a] child merely conceived may be adopted”.203 This stands 
                                                 
200  If a disagreement arises between the collateral relatives of the child about any aspect of the 
upbringing of the child, the collateral relative(s) with guardianship would have the overriding 
power. 
201  Available at <http://www.jcics.org/Ethiopia.htm>. 
202  See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of illicit activities in relation to intercountry adoption. 
203  However, the legislator in Ethiopia has attempted to provide some level of safeguard for the 
adoption of a child merely conceived. Article 187(2) of the RFC requires that the adoption 
agreement for a child merely conceived may be revoked unilaterally at the will of the mother 
within six months following the birth of the child. 
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in a stark contrast with the positions under the Kenyan Children Act and the South 
African Children’s Act and goes against the position of the CRC Committee on the 
subject matter of adoption of unborn children. 
 
4.5.1.3.3 Kenya 
As far as the possibility of relinquishing a child directly to a prospective adoptive parent 
is concerned, there are some provisions in the Kenyan Children Act that could be 
interpreted to outlaw such a practice. One provision that is of great relevance in this 
regard is Article 156(2). It states that: 
It shall not be lawful for any person whether being a parent or guardian of a child or 
otherwise […] to place a child into the care and possession or control of a person who 
proposes to adopt him, if an adoption order in respect of the child cannot be lawfully made in 
favour of that child.   
The evident group of persons in favour of whom a lawful adoption order cannot be 
made are listed under Section 158(3) of the Children Act which includes persons of 
unsound mind and homosexuals. Except in special circumstances, persons such as a 
sole male applicant in respect of a female child204 and a sole female applicant in respect 
of a male child are persons in favour of whom a lawful adoption order can also not be 
made. 
 
It is submitted that, a broad reading of this provision, in conjunction with other provisions 
of the Children Act, further elaborates the stance that directly relinquishing a child by a 
parent or a guardian into the care of a prospective adoptive parent (especially one who 
is not a relative of the child) falls foul of Section 156(2). For instance, the determination 
of the suitability of a prospective adoptive parent is the preserve of a registered 
                                                 
204  Sec. 158(2)(a) of the Children Act. 
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adoption society.205 Without such an assessment, which is a task that a parent or 
guardian neither has the capacity nor the authority to undertake, the placing of a child 
directly into the care and possession or control of a person who proposes to adopt him 
is in contravention of this suitability assessment that needs to be undertaken by an 
adoption society. 
 
In addition, while there are scattered provisions in the Kenyan Children’s Act that give 
parents or guardians some leverage in deciding aspects of their child’s adoption (such 
as demanding that their child be brought up in accordance with a certain religion),206 
there is no explicit provision that allows for relinquishing a child directly into the care of a 
prospective adoptive parent. In fact, according to Article 24(8)(a) of the Children Act, a 
person who has parental responsibility for a child may not surrender or transfer any part 
of that responsibility to another, though it is possible to arrange for some or all of the 
parental authority to be met by one or more persons acting on his or her behalf.207 
 
Regulations 19(a) and (b) of the Children (Adoption) Regulations of 2005 also further 
corroborate this assertion in that no child shall be delivered into the care and 
possession of an adopter by or on behalf of an adoption society until “the case 
committee has considered the reports required under regulation 18” (psycho-social and 
medical reports) and “the adopter has been approved by the case committee”. While the 
language “on behalf of an adoption society” might be read to refer to parents or 
                                                 
205  See Sec. 177(7)(b). 
206  See, for instance, Fifth Schedule of the Regs. 
207  Art. 24(8)(a). Sub-art (c) of the same provision, however, cautions that “[t]he making of any such 
arrangement shall not affect any liability of the person making it which may arise from any failure 
to meet any part of such person’s parental responsibility for the child concerned”.  
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guardians of the child, in practice it refers to orphanages. In addition, since the only 
channel to a case committee to approve adoptions in Kenya is through an adoption 
society, the possibility of parents or guardians relinquishing parental rights and 
responsibilities directly to prospective adoptive parents is close to zero.  
 
Despite the foregoing, a contradiction seems to be created by Regulation 30 on the 
position of Kenyan law on relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities directly 
to prospective adoptive parents. Regulation 30 entrenches that “[e]very prospective 
adopter shall, forthwith upon a child being placed with him by any party other than an 
adoption society, notify the Director of such placement and of the date thereof”. Far 
from clearly prohibiting “any party” other than an adoption society from placing a child 
with a prospective adoptive parent, Regulation 30 attempts to somehow to regulate it.208 
Though it is not quite clear who “any party” refers to, it could be argued that it could 
include birth families. However, the orientation of the law seems to disallow this. As a 
result, once again, a joint reading of the Children Act along with the Regulations should 
hold sway in favour of a legal regime that prohibits the relinquishing of parental rights 
and responsibilities directly into prospective adoptive parents.209 
 
This said, relinquishing parental rights and responsibilities in favour of a registered 
adoption society with a view to the child being adopted is accommodated within the law 
in Kenya. In particular, it is envisaged under Regulations 17-19 of the Children 
(Adoption) Regulations of 2005. The Regulations enjoin the adoption society to furnish 
                                                 
208  For instance, it provides that, in such circumstances, the visits are to be conducted by the 
Director or his authorised representative (Regulation 30(1))208 and such visits are to be reported 
to the guardian ad litem (Regs. 30(2)). 
209  However, it should be recognized that scope for alternative readings remains. 
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the parent or guardian an explanatory memorandum detailing, amongst other things, the 
effects of an adoption order, the requirements for consent, the possibility of giving 
consent on condition that the child is brought up in a particular religious persuasion, 
conditions for the withdrawal of consent, and the rules on any financial payments and 
receipts in connection with the adoption.210 
 
In passing, it is noteworthy to mention that some of the practices in the declaration of 
adoptability in Kenya seem to give the indication that children are declared adoptable 
only when there is a prospective adoptive parent interested in the specific child.  In 
principle, a child should be declared adoptable if the child would benefit from a family 
environment, irrespective of whether or not there is a prospective adoptive parent 
interested in the child.211  
 
There is at least one case that seems to lend support to the existence of this ill-advised 
procedure. In Re RMM (A Child) (2006), the case involved a petition to adopt a 15 year 
old girl by an American couple who were 31 and 29 years old respectively. The Judge 
refused the adoption because granting it would have been in contravention of Section 
158(1) of the Children’s Act which requires that the prospective adoptive parents must 
have attained the age of 25 years and be at least 21 years older that the child but not 
have attained the age of sixty-five years. More often than not the statutory age 
requirements need to be fulfilled before an adoption order is granted. The judge further 
commented that “Little Angels Network, a registered adoption society in Kenya, has not 
declared the child free for adoption, principally because of non-compliance of this case 
                                                 
210   See Fifth Schedule of the Regs., which is composed of 12 paras. 
211   See discussion above under section 4.5.1.1. 
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with the statutory age requirements” (emphasis mine).212 This seems to give the 
impression that children are declared adoptable once a prospective adoptive parent is 
found for them. 
 
Finally, it seems that the possibility of relinquishing parental rights and responsibilities 
and giving lawful consent to adoption before the child is born is non-existent under 
Kenyan law. In an indirect attempt to outlaw such situations, Section 159(8)(a) of the 
Children Act charges that a document signifying the consent of the mother of the child 
shall not be admissible unless the child is at least six weeks old on the date of the 
execution of the document. This provision seems to draw its source from Section 156(1) 
of the Children Act that provides for the pre-requisites for adoption - which includes the 
requirement that no arrangement shall be commenced for the adoption of a child unless 
the child is at least six weeks old. 
 
4.5.2 “Orphan” status  
It is commonplace to read about the orphan crisis that is sweeping the African 
continent.213 While the information about the crisis is hardly false,214 it is flawed to 
equate orphans with adoptable children. The media often use the words “orphaned” and 
“adoptable” children interchangeably. Apart from media reports, there is a vast amount 
of literature that seems to assume this synonymous relationship between the two 
                                                 
212  In Re RMM (A Child) (2006), 4. 
213  Davis County Clipper, (18 April 2009). 
214  While the African continent is home to a large number of orphan children (however defined), the 
majority of these children are not available for adoption. As already discussed above under 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.2, a large number of orphaned children are absorbed by their extended 
families in Africa. 
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terms.215 In other words, it is unfortunately confusing that international adoptees are 
often referred to as “orphans”216 as much as “orphans” are considered as being 
automatically adoptable. 
 
In ordinary parlance, an orphan is defined as a “child whose parents are dead”217 or a 
“child who has been deprived of parental care ...”.218 However, the use of the term has 
evolved and could encompass a larger group of children. Since differences in orphan 
definition have program and policy implications,219 various disciplines and organizations 
have adopted different tailor-made definitions of the term.  
 
One such organisation is UNICEF. Although UNICEF reports 132 million orphans 
worldwide,220 this definition includes "single orphans" who have lost just one parent, and 
"double orphans" being cared for by extended families- hence not necessarily children 
in need of alternative care (adoptable).221 Contrary to traditional usage, UNAIDS also 
                                                 
215  For instance, just recently, Myers, after noting the orphan population in Asia that was estimated at 
87.6 million in 2004 argued that “[n]o matter what the cause, the fact remains that millions of 
children throughout the world lack parents…”.215 See Myers, (2009), 780. 
216  Bhabha, (2004), 185. 
217  The Free Dictionary available at <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/orphan>. 
218  As above. 
219  Not only does the definition of “orphan” vary if one approaches it from an epidemiological or a 
legal point of view, but the ordinary language usage varies among people of different cultures and 
ethnic groups. The difference in the use of this terminology is prone to misinterpretation, which 
could lead to misguided child welfare interventions. For instance, one might understand 
UNICEF’s “orphan” statistics to mean that globally there are 132 million children in need of a new 
family. This is bound to lead to program and policy responses that focus on providing care for 
individual children rather than supporting the families and communities that care for orphans (and 
are in need of support). UNICEF, “Press Centre: Orphans”, (2007).  
220  See, for instance, UNICEF, “Press Centre: Orphans”, (2007). 
221  It is understandable that UNICEF’s definition is partly intended to show the magnitude of the 
problem of children who have lost one or both parents, and raise funds to improve child welfare 
systems in affected communities. It is indicated that “UNICEF and numerous international 
organizations adopted the broader definition of orphan in the mid-1990s as the AIDS pandemic 
began leading to the death of millions of parents worldwide, leaving an ever increasing number of 
children growing up without one or more parents”. UNICEF, “Press Centre: Orphans”, (2007). 
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uses the term “orphan” to describe a child who has lost either one or both parents.222 
The same is true with the use of the terms “Aids orphan” used by UNAIDS, WHO and 
UNICEF to refer to a child who loses his/her mother to AIDS before reaching the age of 
15 years;223 therefore, not necessarily indicating a child’s deprivation of his or her family 
environment.  Furthermore, the orphan statistics used by UNAIDS and UNICEF do not 
include children who have lost only their fathers (and still have mothers to care for 
them). This is despite the fact that research in Uganda has found that, in some 
instances, paternal orphans are affected more severely than maternal ones.224 
 
These organisations’ use of the term “orphan” does not necessarily indicate that the 
children are necessarily deprived of their family environment. Indeed, the possibility that 
some of these children could still have one surviving parent who is caring for them, 
according to the definitions provided above, is illuminative of the fact that not all so-
called “orphans” are adoptable. These children may also well be cared for by their 
extended families. In sum, data from these and other similar organizations should not 
be presented as conclusive evidence indicating that there are “millions of orphans” who 
are “waiting for adoptive parents”. 
 
In addition, even if a child is a double orphan- by definition one who has lost both 
parents through death - the child might first become the legal responsibility of a 
guardian appointed by the birth parents’ will, by a state court, or by operation of law. 
                                                 
222  UNAIDS “UNAIDS’ Terminology Guidelines”, (2008). 
223  Some of these children have also lost, or will later lose, their father to AIDS. As a matter of 
interest, it is important to note that “[i]n the context of AIDS, it is preferable to say “children 
orphaned by AIDS” or “orphans and other children made vulnerable by AIDS”. Referring to these 
children as “AIDS orphans” not only stigmatizes them, but also labels them as HIV-positive, which 
they may not necessarily be”. 
224  See Monk, (2000), 7-12.  
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Such scenarios indeed make the child non-adoptable, as the child is not deprived of a 
family environment.  
 
At the country level too, different definitions of the term “orphan” prevail. One study 
vividly displays the various definitions that are (and were) found in a number of African 
countries.225 According to this study, in Namibia, an orphan is a “child under the age of 
18 who has lost a mother, a father, or both – or a primary caregiver – due to death, or a 
child who is in need of care”.226 In Uganda and Rwanda, an orphan is a child below the 
age of 18 who has lost one or both parents.227 In Botswana, in order for a child to be 
classified as an orphan, he or she must have lost one (single parents) or two (married 
couples) biological or adoptive parents.228 In a clear departure from these definitions of 
the term orphan, in Ethiopia, an orphan is a child less than 18 years of age who has lost 
both parents.229 These differences in definition clearly show that the relevant figures of a 
certain country’s statistics on orphans do not necessarily testify to the number of 
children who are deprived of their family environment (and are adoptable). 
 
Despite this recognition, the use of the term “orphans” to imply “adoptable” children 
continues. One reason for this could be that it serves the purpose of adoption advocates 
to generally speak of, and write about, “orphans”, thereby creating the implication that 
all orphans are adoptable. This is mainly because, in Dillon’s words, the word “orphan” 
is highly “emotive, conveys the intense loneliness of a child without loving and devoted 
                                                 
225  Smart, (2003), 3. 
226  As above. 
227  As above. 
228  As above. 
229  As above. 
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care”.230 It is also a way of depicting that it is an unnatural state for a child to live in the 
absence of a family environment.231 The indiscriminate use of the word “orphan” has 
also contributed to making prospective adoptive parents oblivious of the fact that not all 
orphans are adoptable. There is a tendency to believe that almost all children in 
orphanages are orphans and hence adoptable.232   
 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is warranted to conclude that one of the problems 
and confusions in relation to adoptable children is caused by the continued unqualified 
use of the term “orphan” to describe children who are deprived of their parent(s), but not 
necessarily deprived of their family environment and in need of care. It is argued that if 
the word “orphan” is to be used to connote adoptability at all, it needs to be 
accompanied with the qualification that the child is without any care by extended family 
members or members of the community – and, therefore, deprived of a family 
environment.233 
 
More controversial (and complicated) is the question of the adoptability of so called 
“social orphans”. The term “social orphan” refers to a child who may have living parents, 
                                                 
230  Dillon, (2008), 39. 
231  As above. 
232  See, for instance, European Commission Daphne Programme, (2007), 66. It is “estimated that 
only 4% of young children in residential social care across the European Region are biological 
orphans because their parents are deceased"). 
233  However, the argument that the use of the term “orphan” needs to be accompanied with the 
qualification that the child is without any care by extended family members or members of the 
community, is not without its shortcomings, too. It can be challenged on the ground that it seems 
to make an underlying assumption that adoptability is a strictly legal question. For instance, a 
child might be an orphan and not benefiting from a family environment. However, the child might 
not be adoptable currently because adoption is not in his or her best interests, as the child is not 
in a psychological state where he or she could benefit from any new family attachments. Thus, 
where orphan status is to be used in determining the adoptability of children, not only should the 
legal adoptability of the child be ascertained, but the child’s social, psychological and 
developmental status too. 
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but who is not currently living under the care of those parents.234 The term can be 
differentiated from so called “true orphans”, that is, children who have lost their parents 
due to their death. 
 
As already highlighted above,235 some countries allow social orphans (through 
relinquishment especially) to be adoptable while others do not. For instance, Chinese 
law explicitly allows the adoption of social orphans. According to Article 4(3) of the 
Adoption Law of the People’s Republic of China, “[m]inors under the age of 14” whose 
“parents are unable to rear them due to unusual difficulties” can be adopted.236 
 
Allowing only those children who have either lost one or both parents to be adoptable 
could be challenged on the basis that it discriminates against the social orphans that are 
found all over the world, but in greater numbers in the developing world. This would 
exclude those who have living parent(s) but are nonetheless effectively deprived of a 
family environment. It is also not necessarily in line with the spirit of the relevant 
provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. After all, the consistent thread running through 
                                                 
234  Dillon, (2008), 39. 
235  See section 4.5.1.3. 
236   Adoption Law of the People’s Republic of China available at <http://www.china-
caa.org/site/infocontent/ZCFG_2005100901425793_en.htm>. As far as receiving States are 
concerned, for instance, the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act has been reported to have 
a highly specific definition of the term “orphan” which permits children with one or two living 
parents to be deemed to be orphans for the purposes of orphan visa petitions. The former 
U.S. definition of “orphan” required an even more narrow definition: 
For an adoptee to qualify, both parents must have died or have 
abandoned the child, or there must be a demonstration that the 'sole 
or surviving' parent is unable to care for the child. Excluded are 
children who in some technical sense have two parents ... even if 
those parents are demonstrably unable or unwilling to care for the 
child, and even if those parents want to surrender the child for 
adoption. 
See Bartholet, (1993), 147. See, too, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(b)(1)(F), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2000). The current definition of “orphan”, however, accommodates the 
concept of the so called “social orphans” to a certain extent.  
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these international instruments, especially incorporated under Article 20 of the CRC and 
Article 25 of the ACRWC, is intended to address the effective deprivation of children’s 
family environment, irrespective of the cause of the deprivation.237 The recognition that 
it could sometimes be in the best interests of a social orphan to benefit from adoption, 
also reflects the reality that it is parental destitution, and social and political pressures, 
rather than death or disappearance, that appear to be the prime factors motivating 
relinquishment of children.238 This in part draws to centre stage the contribution of 
poverty in depriving children of their family environment, which forms the substantive 
discussion of the next section. 
 
The orphan status of a child is an express ground for adoptability under all the 
jurisdictions of the countries under the study. Where the South African law and practice 
parts company from the other countries in the study, however, is in its comprehensive 
nature and detailed guidance.  
 
In South Africa, a child is adoptable if “the child is an orphan and has no guardian or 
caregiver who is willing to adopt the child”.239 The term ‘‘orphan’’ means a child who has 
no surviving parent caring for him or her.240 In connection to this, there is some merit in 
mentioning that the Children’s Act wisely caters for any occurrence of social parentage 
                                                 
237  See, for instance, Art. 25(1) of the ACRWC which reads “for any reasons”. Allowing only those 
children who have either lost one or both parents is also an indication of failure to recognize that it 
is diverse circumstances that prevent children from growing up with families and in a family 
environment and, instead, force them to live on the streets or in state-run institutions. Apart from 
death, mental and physical illnesses, financial hardships accompanied by lack of social services 
also prevent children from having the benefit of a family environment. 
238  Bhabha, (2004), 185. 
239  Sec. 230(a) of the Children’s Act. 
240  Sec. 1 of the Children’s Act. 
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by defining a “caregiver” as any person other than a parent or guardian, who factually 
cares for the child and includes “any person who cares for a child with the implied or 
express consent of a parent or guardian of the child” as well as a “child at the head of a 
child-headed household”.241  
 
It is notable that, under South African law, orphanhood per se is not a sufficient ground 
to lead to lead to adoptability. The cumulative conditions of orphanhood on the one 
hand, and, the absence of a guardian or care giver willing to adopt the child on the 
other, should be present simultaneously for the child to be declared adoptable. This 
approach clearly recognises that orphans could get absorbed in their extended family or 
community and might not qualify for adoptability. 
 
In South Africa, in accordance with Draft Regulations 56, the procedure put in place to 
establish whether a child is an orphan or not is laudable too. Just like the establishment 
of abandonment, the process involves an advertisement to be published in at least one 
local newspaper circulating in the area where the child has been found calling upon any 
person to claim responsibility for the child.242 In addition, in determining whether a child 
has been orphaned, a presiding officer must “be satisfied that the child has been 
orphaned as defined in section 1 of the Act”243; and also have regard “to the death 
certificate or certificates of the child’s parent or parents, guardian or care-giver, obtained 
by the social worker concerned, or, if such certificate cannot be obtained, to an affidavit 
                                                 
241  Sec. 1 of the Children’s Act. 
242  Regs. 56(1) of the Draft Regulations. 
243  Regs. 56 (2) (a) Draft Regulations. 
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by a person or persons who can testify to the death of the child’s parent, guardian or 
care-giver”.244 
 
Both in Ethiopia and Kenya, a basic definition of “orphan” is lacking in the respective 
pieces of legislations let alone detailed guidelines on which orphans could be declared 
adoptable. The practice of the Ethiopian authorities that declares a child found to have 
two HIV/AIDS infected parents, or one living HIV/AIDS-infected parent, as an orphan 
(leading to the assumption of legal guardianship of the child by the state)245 is not without 
its shortcomings too. Not only is this practice contrary to the definition of orphan cited 
above,246 but it also has the potential to deprive the children the opportunity of being 
taken care of by their extended family members or communities.  
 
The Births and Deaths Registration Act (Cap 149) Laws of Kenya (in the L.N 184/1971) 
provides that registration of births and deaths of all inhabitants within the Republic is 
compulsory, the practice proves otherwise. In Ethiopia, the absence of an Officer of Civil 
Status maintaining a register of deaths as initially envisaged by the Civil Code of 1960 
compounds the problem. In both countries, the practice is that it is difficult to prove 
orphan status on the basis of death certificates. 
 
In sum, even though orphanhood is a common ground for adoptability, it should be 
approached with caution. Indeed, not every orphan is adoptable. As a result, for a child 
to be declared adoptable, the child should at least be deprived of his family 
                                                 
244  Regs. 56(2)(c) Draft Regulations. 
245  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia”, (April 2008). 
246  Citing Smart, (2003), 3. 
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environment. Appropriate procedures to prove orphan status should be set in place to 
prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry adoption. 
 
4.5.3    Poverty  
Poverty, however defined, is one of the main factors that severely limits the capacity of 
African families to take care of their children. Therefore, drawing the line between 
termination of parental rights and responsibilities, abandonment and voluntary 
relinquishment, on the one hand, and poverty on the other, as potential grounds for 
adoptability is very difficult. Poverty is often one of the reasons why parents abandon or 
voluntarily relinquish their children.247 In addition, many children taken away from their 
original families come from homes where parental neglect is sometimes barely 
distinguishable from the effects of dire poverty.248 This reality is arguably more acute in 
Africa than in any other region in the world. 
 
While some see intercountry adoption as a means of addressing the poverty of children 
and parents/communities,249 there are also those who contend that the practice is a 
mechanism to exploit the vulnerabilities of poor families and communities.250 It is 
sufficient to mention that the debate on poverty as a ground for adoptability of a child is 
bound to generate polarised responses from different quarters.   
                                                 
247  See, for instance, AP, (05 February 2001). 
248  See, for the experience of Brazil in this regard, Fonseca, (2003), 111 and the citations therein. 
249  See the brief discussions on the arguments for and against intercountry adoption in Chapter 1, 
section 1.1. 
250  As above. 
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Nonetheless, to borrow Smolin’s words, “there is a palpable cruelty to taking away the 
children of the poor”251 simply because of the poverty of the parents. Domestic 
legislation in some countries expressly provides that poverty cannot be a sufficient 
ground for declaring a child adoptable. Attempts to find African laws as examples has 
been unsuccessful. However, Article 6 of Guatemala’s law (also known as Oretega’s 
law)252 provides: "The situation of poverty or extreme poverty of the parents does not 
constitute sufficient motive for placing a boy, girl or adolescent for adoption”.253   
 
Poverty alone as a ground for adoptability is not considered to be in accordance with 
the provisions of the CRC, too. A number of examples can be mentioned to support this. 
For instance, in 2005, Nepal was requested by the CRC Committee to “abolish the 
provisions in the Conditions and Procedures made to provide Nepalese Children to 
Foreign Nationals for Adoption (2000) that states that poverty of the parents of a child 
can be a legal ground for adoption”.254 The CRC Committee has raised deep concern 
about the fact that children living in poverty are over-represented among the children 
                                                 
251  Smolin, (2007), 437. 
252  For a discussion of this law, see, generally, Sohr, (2006), 559.  
253  As cited in Sohr, (2006), 571-572. The same was true of the 1990 Children's Code of Brazil 
(though already repealed) which stated that poverty alone should not be a ground for the removal 
of parental authority. In Art., this Code provided that ‘‘the lack of material resources does not 
constitute a sufficient motive for the loss or suspension of parental rights,’’ and, if this is the only 
motive, ‘‘the child or adolescent will remain in the family of origin, which must be referred to 
official aid programs”. 
254  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nepal, (September 2005), para. 54(c). If poverty 
is to find its way into the legal books as a ground for the determination of the adoptability of a 
child at all, some precautionary measures need to be taken. This is partly because, the existence 
of the possibility of declaring the adoptability of a child solely on the basis of poverty is prone to 
high level of abuse. For instance, agencies arranging adoption placements could easily secure 
consent of parents by using financial inducement and invoke poverty as a ground for the 
adoptability of a child. This way, the use of poverty as a ground for adoptability also makes a 
loophole that compromises the requirement that consents be fully informed and be given free 
from either duress or financial inducement. 
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separated from their parents, both in the developed and developing countries.255 The 
UN Guidelines for the Appropriate Use and Conditions of Alternative Care for Children 
evinces a similar position.256 
 
Thus, when poverty is the main reason why parental responsibility is terminated or 
abandonment or relinquishment is chosen, the rule requiring family preservation257 
dictates that families should be offered support in keeping their children. This may take 
the form of the creation of domestic social services to aid poverty-stricken birth families 
in supporting their children. 
 
Understandably, such support cannot be forthcoming in every country. In fact, many 
third world countries, especially the so called “least developed countries” (composed of 
a majority - 34 - of African countries) who also happen to be predominantly traditionally 
sending countries, can barely afford any such costs. However, every effort should be 
made by all stakeholders to support family preservation. In this regard, it is important to 
reiterate the obligations of States in Article 27 of the CRC and urge them “to ensure that 
poverty as such should not lead to the separation decision and to the out-of-home 
placement”.258 
 
                                                 
255  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (2005), para. 658. 
256  See, para. 14 which provides that “[f]inancial and material poverty alone, or conditions directly 
and uniquely imputable to such poverty, should never be a justification for the removal of a child 
from parental care, for receiving a child into alternative care, or for preventing his/her 
reintegration, but should be seen as a signal for the need to provide appropriate support to the 
family”. 
257  See Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.1 on this. 
258  See, CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, Children without parental care, (2005), para. 
659. Support for families living in poverty could include material assistance, implementing poverty 
reduction strategies and community development, including the participation of children.  
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A central question that emerges is: if poverty is to be considered as a valid ground for 
establishing the adoptability of a child, on what/whose standards is such poverty to be 
assessed? The term “poverty” is often used as an all-encompassing term to describe 
situations where people lack many of the opportunities that are available to the average 
citizen. Despite the relative nature of the term “poverty”, there is some broad guidance 
from traditionally receiving countries on how poverty should be defined and used to 
qualify a child for entry into the receiving country through intercountry adoption. There 
are some cases that address which children satisfy the orphan definition for entry into 
the U.S. through intercountry adoption. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Board of Immigration Appeals has ruled that an inability to care for the child would be 
demonstrated when the parent is destitute by local standards, and cannot provide the 
child with the nourishment and shelter necessary for subsistence consistent with the 
local standards of the child's place of residence.259 For instance, in a recent petition to 
classify a Nigerian child as orphan (as an immediate relative for intercountry adoption 
purposes), the poverty of the biological mother of the child was argued. It was 
contended that the biological mother was dependent on her parents and unemployed 
and unable to care for the child. Her status as a student and a young girl who had had 
the child at the age of sixteen was also invoked. In rejecting the poverty argument and 
in effect dismissing the appeal, the Administrative Appeals Office of the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services reasoned that: 
The U.S. consular investigation evidence reflects that the beneficiary (child to be adopted) 
lives in the same household as her biological mother… and the record contains no detailed 
                                                 
259  See, for instance, in the context of Guatemala, U.S. Department of State, “International adoption: 
Guatemala Sheet” (undated), part IV(B)(1)(a). 
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or current evidence to clarify or corroborate the claim that [she] is unable to work or to 
provide proper care to the beneficiary in accordance with the local standards in 
Nigeria.[emphasis mine] Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that all of the 
requirements contained in the sole parent definition have been met, as set forth in 8 C.F.R. $ 
204.3(b). The beneficiary therefore does not meet the definition of an orphan, as set forth in 
section 101 (b)(l)(F) of the Act.260 
This might indeed be a good approach in dealing with poverty as a ground for the 
adoptability of a child. It is important that, when poverty is a central ground in 
determining the adoptability of a child reports (preferably official ones) regarding local 
standards of living in the country should be taken into account. It would also be helpful if 
the documents on the child to be sent to the receiving country include such reports. 
Poverty should lead to the adoptability of a child only when the poverty the child lives 
under is found to be below local standards, and that such poverty has made it 
impossible to care for the child in any meaningful manner.  
In passing, it can also be mentioned that, as much as poverty alone cannot be a sole 
ground for declaring the adoptability of a child, adoptions by rich families cannot be 
prioritised. In this regard, the CRC Committee has expressed concern in reviewing the 
                                                 
260  Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate Relative Pursuant to Section IOl(b)(l)(F) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. I lOl(b)(l)(F), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
07 January 2009) .Volume 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (8 C.F.R.) section 204.3 
provides in pertinent part: 
Sole parent means the mother when it is established that the child is 
illegitimate and has not acquired a parent within the meaning of section 
101(b)(2) of the Act. An illegitimate child shall be considered to have a sole 
parent if his or her father has severed all parental ties, rights, duties, and 
obligations to the child, or if his or her father has, in writing, irrevocably 
released the child for emigration and adoption. This definition is not 
applicable to children born in countries which make no distinction between a 
child born in or out of wedlock, since all such children are considered to be 
legitimate. In all cases, a sole parent must be incapable of providing proper 
care as that term is defined in this section. 
 
Incapable of providing proper care means that a sole or surviving parent is 
unable to provide for the child's basic needs, consistent with the local 
standards of the foreign sending country. 
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State Party report of Mexico over “the fact that adoptions by rich families are reportedly 
prioritized, without giving due consideration to the best interests of the child and her or 
his cultural origins”.261 This would help to avoid the practice of making children 
adoptable to the highest bidder, and in turn make the practice child centred.  
Unfortunately, none of the countries under this study have an explicit provision that can 
parallel, for instance, that of Guatemala’s – that expressly proscribes that poverty alone 
cannot be a ground for adoptability.  However, it is worth noting two positive 
observations.  
 
Firstly, despite the lack of explicit provisions that outlaw poverty as a sufficient ground 
for adoptability, so too, there are also no provisions that explicitly identify poverty as a 
sole ground for adoptability. In particular, in South Africa, the presence of a range of 
social grants (including the child support grant), play a significant role to minimise the 
role of poverty in making children available for adoption or other forms of alternative 
care. 
 
Secondly, few provisions within the Kenyan Children Act seem to entrench measures 
that have the possibility of minimising the use of poverty as a sole ground for the 
declaration of adoptability. This is apparent from, for instance, the fact that “persistent 
failure to maintain”, which could be a reason to satisfy a court to dispense with consent 
of the parents or guardians of the child, can only presumed where: 
                                                 
261  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico, (June 2006), para. 42(c). 
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…despite demands made, no parent or guardian has contributed to the maintenance of 
the infant for a period of at least six consecutive months and such failure is not due to 
indulgence (emphasis mine).262 
 
On a different but related note, Section 231(4) and (5) of the Children’s Act clearly state 
that an adoptive parent may not be disqualified by virtue of his or her financial status 
and that an adoptive parent can be in receipt of a state grant. This means that a 
prospective adopter “could adopt a child on a very meagre income and then go and 
apply for the child support grant”.263  
 
To sum up, using poverty as a sole ground for adoptability could be labelled as taking 
“advantage of the vulnerability of the poor to obtain their children”.264 It can safely be 
speculated that a number of children are declared adoptable in Africa as a result of 
poverty. Legislation that limits the use of poverty as a ground for adoptability is 
important. Family preservation measures should be provided to families in poverty in 
order to preserve their children.  
 
4.5.4 Adoptability of hard to place/special needs children (with a focus on HIV-
positive children) 
 
The phrases “hard to place” and “special needs” children are used interchangeably in 
this chapter. These phrases are generally used to describe those children for whom, 
                                                 
262  Art. 159(1)(a)(ii) of Children Act. 
263  CLE and CCL, (2009), 17. 
264  Smolin, (2007), 453. 
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because of the presence of certain characteristics and conditions, it is particularly 
difficult to find permanent homes through adoption.265 
 
The adoptability of so-called “hard to place” children has drawn the interest of the CRC 
Committee on a number of occasions.266 The Committee has repeatedly requested 
State parties to: 
Promote awareness of adoption in general and in particular promote adoption of children 
belonging to groups that have particular difficulties to be adopted including siblings, 
disabled children and minority children.267 
Older children268 (and, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, sometimes siblings269) 
also fall within this category of children who should get special attention regarding their 
adoptability.270 
 
Different countries have put in place various creative policies and laws in order to 
facilitate the adoption of special needs children. Examples abound in this regard. For 
instance, though Australian state of Victoria has a quota of two files per year for 
adopting children from Lithuania who are aged less than six years, there is no quota for 
                                                 
265  See McKenzie, (1993), 62-76 (which discusses the history of special needs adoption, the current 
status of special needs adoption services, and possible future challenges and directions for 
reform). 
266  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia (June 2008); Georgia, (June 2008), para 
39(b). 
267  As above. 
268  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Georgia, (June 2008), para 39(b). 
269  In Ethiopia, for instance, “adoption agencies report a strong need to place sibling groups”. 
Adoption under one roof “Adoption from Ethiopia” available at 
<http://ouradopt.com/content/adopting-ethiopia>  
270  It is important to note that the definition of special needs, although displays some degree of 
commonality, could vary from one jurisdiction to the other. In Victoria, “Special needs” includes: 
older children, sibling groups of more than three and children with health problems. See 
<http://www.cyf.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/251215/icas-info-kit-march-2009.pdf>. 
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children older than six years.271 In lifting the moratorium on single applicants to adopt 
children, the Intercountry Adoption Board of the Philippines put the condition that it 
would only consider single applicants who will be accepting children from six years old 
and above of either gender with minor correctable medical conditions.272 
 
China’s policy that attempts to facilitate the adoption of special needs children is also 
exemplary. For instance, prospective adoptive parents who adopt special needs 
children are exempted from the requirement that a family must have fewer than five 
children under the age of 18, with the youngest being at least one year old.273 In 
addition, while the general age limit for prospective adoptive parents to be eligible to 
adopt is between the ages of 30 and 50, parents who apply to adopt a special needs 
child could be between the ages of 30 and 55.274 However, China only allows children 
up to the age of 13 to be adoptable through intercountry adoption, which may be 
contradictory to its overall preference to have hard to place children (in this case older 
children) adopted.275  
 
The declaration of adoptability is not an end in itself - but a means to an end. Therefore, 
a clear distinction needs to be made between the adoptability of hard to place children 
                                                 
271  State Government of Victoria: Department of Human Services “Intercountry adoption information 
kit”, (March 2009), 21.  
272         Reported at the Adoption Authority of Ireland, (undated), available at   
<http://www.adoptionboard.ie/intercountry/philipines.php>. 
273   U.S. Department of State “Intercountry adoption: China”, (April 2008). 
274  As above. 
275  As above. While placing siblings together is often seen as the preferred option, it is not always 
appropriate or possible, and can result in a longer wait for an adoptive family. As a result relaxing 
the rules, as the American law does, in order to promote the best interests of siblings is a 
commendable move. If siblings are not placed together, the issue of ongoing contact must be 
taken into account. It is important to note that finding similar measures for special needs children 
(like China) under law and policy are difficult to come by in many parts of the world - including 
Africa. 
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in theory, and their adoption in reality. As a result, in order to promote the best interests 
of hard to place children, not only should legal rules avoid directly and unfairly 
disallowing their adoptability, they should also not hamper, de jure or de facto, the 
actual adoption of this group of children.  
 
For instance, it is not uncommon for traditionally sending countries to include in their 
legislation a requirement that, before prospective adoptive parents adopt a second 
child/sibling, they should finalise the first adoption.276 If these same adoptive parents are 
to apply again at a later stage for the adoption of another child or children, the non-
flexible implementation of the rule that requires adherence to minimum age gaps 
between these prospective adoptive parents and other adoptable siblings could be a 
barrier to the adoption of older siblings.277 In addition, as far as siblings/twins are 
concerned, the experience from Nepal is indicative that a rule that disallows prospective 
adoptive parents to adopt children of the same sex could result in sibling separation.278 
A well thought out policy and law that does not hamper (both in theory and practice) the 
adoptability and adoption of special needs children is clearly required. 
 
However, one of the most controversial aspects of adoptability that is worthy of detailed 
reflection, as far as special needs children are concerned, pertains to the question of 
whether HIV-positive children should be declared adoptable or not. Some States 
prohibit (sometimes de jure but oftentimes de facto) the adoption of HIV-positive 
                                                 
276  For instance, under Sec. 7(4) of Nepal’s Conditions and Procedures to provide Nepali Children to 
the Foreign Citizens under Adoption as Sons and Daughters, 2008, it appears that adoptive 
parents have to finalize the adoption of the first child before they can adopt a sibling. 
277  Terre des Hommes Foundation and UNICEF, (2008), 43. 
278  As above. These scenarios draw to attention the importance of rules that require the undertaking 
of maximum effort by relevant persons/authorities for twins to be adopted by the same family 
could go a long way in averting separation. 
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children. This is so despite the absence of any international regulation that prohibits the 
intercountry adoption of children suffering from severe disabilities, including children 
who have been diagnosed as HIV-positive.279 It is argued that such an approach does 
not enjoy the support of the Hague Convention. However, there is nothing expressly 
stated in the Hague Convention, as the Guide to Good Practice notes, to prevent a 
receiving state from applying to intercountry adoption any health controls which apply 
generally to immigration into that country.280 The implications of a prohibition of the 
adoptability of HIV positive children, assessed against the provisions of the CRC and 
the ACRWC, have not been well interrogated. 
 
The most detailed and authoritative document on the rights of children in the era of 
HIV/AIDS is General Comment No. 3 titled “HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child”.281 
This document does not expressly address the issue of the adoptability (or otherwise) of 
HIV positive children. However, the General Comment re-iterates that the CRC 
Committee interprets “other status” under Article 2 of the Convention to include 
HIV/AIDS status of the child or his/her parent(s).282 This automatically implies that the 
discriminating against children on the basis of their HIV status is a violation of the CRC, 
unless a justification(s) exists that would make such discrimination a fair one.  
 
Guideline 5, paragraph 22(f) of the United Nations Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human 
Rights expressly entrenches that “the HIV status of a… child should not be treated any 
                                                 
279  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), para. 508. 
280  As above. 
281  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003).  
282  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), para 9; General Comment No. 4, (2003), para. 
6. See, too, Vandenhole, (2005), 174-176. 
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differently from any other analogous medical condition in making decisions regarding 
custody, fostering or adoption”.283 In other words, according to the Guidelines, singling 
out HIV as a condition that bars the adoptability of a child does not sit well with the 
demands of international human rights law.284  
 
In specific cases, where the adoption of a HIV positive child into a household which has 
as its members other children is concerned, the best interests of this latter group of 
children might be brought into play, too. In such circumstances, provision should be 
made, on a case by case basis, not to allow HIV positive children to be adopted in a 
household where they might pose a risk to the rights of other children. In fact, there is 
case law to support the position that where the placement of a HIV positive child in a 
family posed a threat to other children in the family, policy and law should reasonably 
protect children from the significant risk of harm that could result from being placed in a 
home with someone with a serious contagious disease.285  
 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such a prohibition does not constitute a blanket ban 
on the adoptability of a child who is HIV positive. Rather, it is a prohibition of the 
adoption of a HIV positive child into a specific household, in order to protect and 
                                                 
283  OHCHR and UNAIDS, (2006), 35 Guideline 5, para. 22(a) encourages that disability laws should 
also be enacted or revised to include HIV and AIDS in their definition of disability. This as 
premise, the provision under Art. 23 of the CRPWD repeats the provisions at the beginning of Art. 
9(1) of the CRC, adding: “In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a 
disability of either the child or one or both of the parents”. And to prevent “concealment, 
abandonment, neglect and segregation of children with disabilities” States must “undertake to 
provide early and comprehensive information, services and support to children with disabilities 
and their families. See Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 123. 
284  See, for instance, UNHCHR, (1995), 1; UNHCHR, (1999), (reiterating that a prohibition of 
discrimination based on "other status" in non-discrimination provisions prohibits discrimination 
based on HIV/AIDS). 
285  See, generally, Zounes, (2008), 529. 
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promote the best interests of children who are not HIV positive.286 It is more a question 
of matching than adoptability. This should also stand scrutiny against the non-
discrimination rule. It does not also indicate an over-inclusiveness of the excluded 
category (namely HIV positive children being adopted into a household where they 
might pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others). 
 
Though very slow, progress is being made in rendering HIV positive children adoptable. 
For instance, in the past Ethiopia did not allow the adoption of HIV-positive children.287 
Although there was neither policy nor law which substantiated this position, a de facto 
prohibition on the adoption of HIV positive children had prevailed. However, this has 
changed lately. In 2005, the first HIV positive children to the U.S. were adopted.288 
Currently, there are newspaper reports that indicate that the adoption of HIV positive 
children from Ethiopia is on the rise.289 The number of organisations that specifically 
promote the adoption of HIV positive children is also on the increase.290  
                                                 
286  For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 which was designed to promote a clear 
federal mandate that discrimination on the basis of one's disability was intolerable has exceptions 
where disability discrimination will be tolerated. One such exception arises where an "individual 
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others”. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1995) as 
cited in Zounes, (2008), 529. 
287  There are a number of news reports to corroborate this position. For instance, in 2006, the 
Boston Globe wrote that the “…Ethiopian government does not allow children who are HIV-
positive to be adopted overseas”. See Boston Globe, (7 December 2006).  
288  Personal communication with Rita Radostitz, Volunteer at the AAI in Ethiopia ( 22 November 
2006); Vitabeat, (01 September 2005).   
289         Vitabeat, (01 September 2005).  In 2005, it was reported that “[c]hildren will not be sent overseas 
if they are found to be HIV-positive themselves”. BBC, (04 March 2005).  
290  For instance, Cotlands is a long-serving South African “non-profit” agency that continues to meet 
the ever-changing needs of children impacted by HIV/AIDS in this country. It raises awareness 
and promotes the adoption of HIV positive children. Responding to the often posed question “how 
can you think of adopting of dying child?” Cotlands executive director, Jackie Schoeman, has said 
that:  
Yes, this is an obvious question, but at Cotlands we look at the issue of 
adopting HIV positive children from a different angle,” she says. “The HIV 
positive child is still living ⎯ a child who deserves a warm and loving home.  
See Cotlands, Press Release, (March 2004). 
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The foregoing discussions apply to the countries under the study. In particular, various 
provisions that cater for the rights of special needs children exist in Kenya and 
Ethiopia.291 In Ethiopia, the Guidelines by MOWA contain some progressive provisions 
to address the rights of special needs children. In relation to prospective adoptive 
parents who are interested in adopting children with disability or children with health 
problems, the Internal Directives are explicit in according them priority in adoptions. This 
is entrenched in paragraph 5(5) of the Guidelines.  
 
What is not clear, however, is whether or not prospective adoptive parents who are 
interested in the adoption of older children would benefit from a similar kind of special 
treatment. A straight forward reading of paragraph 5(5) of the Internal Directives seems 
to suggest otherwise. By definition, older children are neither children with disability nor 
children with medical problems.  What could perhaps be read into this stance by the 
Guidelines is that the adoption of older children (or the lack thereof) is either really not a 
problem or Government does not actively seek to facilitate the adoption of older children 
for a number of reasons. One reason could be the fact that older children usually have 
developed their own identity (more so than infants and toddlers). Since their adoption 
has more of an uprooting effect than the adoption of younger children, on a purely 
speculative basis, a policy decision might have been taken not to place older children 
through intercountry adoption. 
 
In South Africa, an assessment of a number of social worker reports on the adoptability 
of children expresses that the children were “tested for HIV, Hepatitis B and Syphilis” 
                                                 
291  In South Africa, at least the practice indicates that there are measures that cater for special 
needs/hard to place children. 
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and when they tested negative, they were declared “medically fit for adoption” by the 
respective paediatrician. This poses the question, if the children had tested positive for 
HIV, does it mean that they would have been declared unadoptable? There is anecdotal 
evidence that seems to suggest that the tests are done for matching the right child with 
prospective adoptive children and that the adoptability of HIV positive children does 
indeed happen in practice.  
 
Finally, it is submitted that the position of the Internal Directives in Ethiopia on the 
adoption of siblings is rather extreme. Using firm language, it is stipulated that it is not 
permissible to separate siblings who have lost both of their parents.292 The possibility 
remains open for the adoption of one sibling when the siblings have not lost both 
parents. What is a cause for concern is that this complete ban on separation of siblings 
does not seem to be subject to any qualifying criteria including the best interests of the 
child.  
 
4.5.5 Refugee children 
 
There are startling statistics on the number of refugee children in Africa, including  those 
from Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.293 
Some of these children are unaccompanied or separated, thus not necessarily 
benefiting from a family environment. While a number of African refugee children have 
                                                 
292  Para. 6(1)(4) of the MOWA Guidelines. The loss of parents could be for any reason including, 
death and abandonment.  
293  See, generally, UNHCR, (2008), 84-93; Kaime, (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 290
been internationally adopted in the past, the case of the “lost boys” of Sudan stands 
out.294 
 
The adoptability of refugee children is an issue that requires a high level of caution. This 
is partly because, in situations where children are refugees for one reason or another, 
families get separated, documents get damaged or lost, and determining the 
adoptability or otherwise of a child becomes to an extent guesswork. Therefore, 
generally speaking, to leave open the possibility of family reunification, refugee children 
are not available for adoption. 
 
There should be no doubt that in refugee situations, separation should not be 
considered equivalent to abandonment. This should be the case even when the parent 
has deliberately sent a child away to safety. In its Guidelines on Protection and Care of 
Refugee Children, the UNHCR acknowledges that unaccompanied children are not 
necessarily orphans, too.295 In other words, being a refugee cannot, and should not, be 
equated with adoptability. 
 
The refugee status of children ushers in other additional measures that need to be 
followed before children are declared adoptable.  For instance, tracing the relatives of 
refugee children who have been separated from their families may require additional 
efforts. 
 
                                                 
294  See, for instance, Stark, (2003); Sharfman, (2007-2008), 149-150; Ward-Lambert, (2009), 674-
675. 
295  UNHCR, (1994), 374. 
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During the drafting of the Hague Convention, it was not clear whether the Convention 
should apply to refugee children or not.296 The opinion that finally prevailed on the 
matter was to request the Secretary General of the Hague Conference to examine the 
issue and make specific proposals to a Special Commission of the Hague Conference 
to ensure appropriate protection of this category of children.297 This culminated in the 
Recommendation Concerning the Application to Refugee Children and Other 
Internationally Displaced Children of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.298 
 
Apart from declaring that, in relation to the Hague Convention, the child's country of 
origin is the country where the child is residing subsequent to his or her 
displacement,299 the Recommendation highlights further that, before an intercountry 
adoption is initiated, all reasonable measures should be taken in order to trace, and 
reunite the child with his or her parents or family members.300 In the context of the 2004 
tsunami disaster, the Permanent Bureau had issued a statement echoing these 
principles.301 
 
All States, whether or not they are parties to the Hague Convention, are urged to 
observe particular caution in order to prevent irregularities in respect of any cross 
border adoptions of refugee children. The obvious shortcoming of the Recommendation 
                                                 
296  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 609. 
297  As above.  
298  Permanent Bureau, Recommendations, (1994).   
299  See Permanent Bureau, Recommendations, (1994), para. 1. This is a clear indication that, when 
it comes to refugee children, there is a change in the use of the terminology “state of origin”. 
Thus, with respect to these children, the State of origin referred to in Art. 2, para. 1 of the Hague 
Convention, is the State where the child is residing after being displaced. 
300  See, Permanent Bureau, Recommendation, (1994), para. 2(a). 
301  See Permanent Bureau, Press Release, (January 2005).  
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is the fact that it is limited in application to children who cross borders, and does not 
address the issue of internally displaced children. The term “internationally displaced” in 
the title of the Recommendation is indicative of this. This in fact does not accord with 
Article 23 of the ACRWC which recognises rights for internally displaced children similar 
to those refugees, who by definition are those that have crossed an international border.  
 
The CRC Committee, in General Comment No. 6 on separated and unaccompanied 
refugee children, makes the general point that: 
States must have full respect for the preconditions provided under Article 21 of the 
Convention as well as other relevant international instruments, including in particular the 
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-
Country Adoption and its 1994 Recommendation concerning the application to Refugee 
and other Internationally Displaced Children when considering the adoption of 
unaccompanied … children.302 
In addition, it is underscored that refugee children must not be adopted in haste at the 
height of an emergency.303 The Committee has re-iterated that the adoption of 
unaccompanied or separated children should only be considered once it has been 
established that the child is in a position to be adopted.304 Once it has been determined 
that a child is “adoptable”, in the case of refugee children, consideration should be given 
to placement of the child within the refugee community or with families in the country 
from which the child has fled.305 
                                                 
302  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 6, (2005), para. 91. 
303  As above. 
304  In practice, this means, inter alia, that efforts with regard to tracing and family reunification have 
failed, or that the parents have consented to the adoption.  The consent of parents and the 
consent of other persons, institutions and authorities that are necessary for adoption must be free 
and informed.  This supposes notably that such consent has not been induced by payment or 
compensation of any kind and has not been withdrawn. CRC Committee, General Comment No. 
6, (2005), para. 91. 
305  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 9. 
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A recent example on the African continent that shed light on the adoptability of refugee 
children is the Zoe’s Ark case in Chad which was discussed in Chapter 2.306 It was the 
contention of the Zoe’s Ark group that the children that it was attempting to transport to 
France for adoption purposes were refugees from the Darfur conflict in Sudan.307 In 
analysing the events surrounding the Zoe’s Ark case, irrespective of whether the 103 
children were from Chad or Sudan’s Darfur region, it is argued that the extended conflict 
in both countries should have warranted a moratorium on intercountry adoption from the 
affected areas.308 In addition, the refugee status of the children, if they were refugees at 
all, should have caused the granting of a reasonable time during which all feasible steps 
to trace the parents or other surviving family members had been carried out.  Though a 
general reasonable time for tracing is proposed (usually two years),309 this period of 
time may vary with circumstances, in particular, those relating to the ability to conduct 
proper tracing. 
 
In general, therefore, refugee children are not adoptable. And, while some refugee 
children could benefit from intercountry adoption, their adoptability should be 
determined in a very cautious manner. While unaccompanied or separated children 
must not be adopted in haste at the height of an emergency, to equate the refugee 
status of children (unaccompanied or otherwise) with adoptability does not serve the 
best interests of the child. 
 
                                                 
306  Section 2.2.2. See Reuters, (31 March 2008).  
307  As above. 
308  As above; Mezmur, (2009), 163-164. 
309  See, for instance, CRC Committee, General Comment No. 6, (2005), para. 91. 
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The development of the law in relation to the adoptability of refugee children under the 
countries under the study is lacking. The use of the word  
“unaccompanied”310 under Ethiopian law in describing adoptable children implies that 
refugee children could be adoptable. The phrase in Article 157(1) of the Kenyan 
Children Act, which provides that “any child who is resident within Kenya may be 
adopted whether or not the child is a Kenyan citizen, or was or was not born in Kenya” 
leaves open the possibility of refugee children being adopted in and from Kenya. 
Although the Refugees Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998) of South Africa requires a 
refugee child to be brought before the Children’s Court as a child in need of care, the 
express suggestion the Act stipulates is that the “Children’s Court may order that a child 
… be assisted in applying for asylum in terms of this Act”.311 Neither the Children’s Act 
nor the Refugees Act expressly address or regulate the adoptability of refugee children.  
 
4.5.6 Children of Islamic background 
 
Under the CRC and the ACRWC, it is also possible to argue that the adoptability of a 
child is dependent on the religion of the parents or guardians and/or the child. Under the 
CRC, as already explained in Chapter two,312 adoption is not a practice that enjoys the 
support of Islam. It is this same reason why it is regarded as an alternative means of 
care only for those States that recognise and/or permit it.313 Therefore, children who are 
Muslims could be declared non-adoptable.  
 
                                                 
310  Para. 2(3) of the former MOLSA Guidelines. 
311  See Sec. 32(1) and (2) of the Refugees Act. 
312  See Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
313  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.1 on this. 
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This approach would not necessarily violate the non-discrimination rule under Article 2 
of the CRC and Article 3 of the ACRWC.314 On one occasion, the CRC Committee has 
recommended to a state party that it ensures “that adoption is possible for children of all 
religions”.315 However, this recommendation was qualified with the caveat that the 
practice should be undertaken “in accordance with the strict regulations reflected in 
article 21 of the Convention”,316 which in fact could be read to mean that it is possible to 
exclude its application to Muslim children. 
 
There are provisions in national law that envisage the application of adoption legislation 
only to non-Muslims. In Malaysia, for instance, Adoption Act 1952 (Act 257) shall not 
apply to any person who professes the religion of Islam and to a child who according to 
law is a Muslim.317  
 
In some instances, traditionally receiving countries have displayed recognition of the 
non-adoptability of Muslim children. A good example in this regard is France. In 
recognition of this state of affairs, France has often resisted the adoption of children 
from Algeria or Morocco.318 In 2001, a statutory intervention by way of amendment was 
made to give such a position a legal basis. As a result, the French Civil Code Article 
370-373 in relevant part provides that: 
Adoption of a foreign minor may not be ordered where his personal law prohibits that 
institution, unless the minor was born and resides usually in France.319 
 
                                                 
314  See discussion of fair discrimination under Chapter 3, section xo for further details on this. 
315  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: India, (February 2004), para. 49(c). 
316  As above. 
317  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations, Malaysia, (December 2006), para. 97.   
318         Cuniberti, (06 February 2009).  
319  See French Civil Code, Art. 370-373. 
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These, unfortunately, are isolated cases. None of the countries under the study 
expressly provide for a religiously sensitive treatment of adoptability.320 This is the case 
despite the fact that some of the countries in the study, in particular Ethiopia and Kenya, 
are home to a considerable number of Muslims. Under Kenyan law, what comes close 
to a religiously sensitive approach to the adoption of a child is the possibility of giving 
consent by a parent or guardian on condition that the child is brought up in a particular 
religious persuasion.321 In South Africa, the form to be filled by a social worker to 
determine the adoptability of a child has a section on the religion of the child.322 It is not 
quite clear if the religion of a child would have any implications on the adoptability or 
otherwise of a child. 
 
In sum, while adoption may generally stand a relatively good chance of providing a 
family environment for children of all religions, both the CRC and the ACRWC display 
some level of religious sensitivity and tolerance, and the non-adoptability of Muslim 
children would not be in violation of international law.323 Where Muslim children are 
deprived of their family environments, they could benefit from the practice of kafalah, 
which is the practice under Islamic law that comes close to adoption. 
 
 
 
                                                 
320  In Kenya, however, Sec. 6(1) of the Fourth Schedule of the Act; Foster Care Placement Rules, 
states that whenever possible, a child shall be placed with a foster parent who has the same 
cultural background as the child’s parents and who originates from the same areas in Kenya as 
the parents of the child. Arguably, cultural background may well be read to include religion. 
321  See, for instance, Schedule 5 of the Children (Adoption) Regulations. 
322  Copy on file with writer. 
323  This also ties well with the fact that adoption is not a compulsory form of alternative care under 
international law. See a more detailed discussion of this in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.1. See, too, 
Chapter 3, section 3.5.4 for a discussion of freedom of religion and adoption. 
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4.6  CONCLUSION 
The question of “who is adoptable?” is an a priori question when examining discourses 
surrounding intercountry adoption. It has been argued that, contrary to the common 
misconception, the mere deprivation of a child of his or her family environment, 
temporarily or permanently, would not automatically make such child adoptable. 
 
The three main reasons why a clear definition and understanding of who is adoptable is 
important were highlighted. The procedures for determining the adoptability of a child, 
and the guidance that can be sought from the international legal framework was 
explored.  
 
A child’s psycho-social adoptability and legal adoptability have been found to be the two 
cardinal elements of adoptability. The point has also been made that while actual 
adoptability of a child to a specific receiving State could also depend on the definition of 
adoptability in the receiving State; this, however, is not an issue of adoptability but 
rather, an issue of matching. 
 
The termination of parental rights and responsibilities through court orders; the 
termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result of the recognition of 
abandonment; and the termination of parental rights and responsibilities as a result of 
voluntary relinquishment as grounds for adoptability were highlighted. Amongst other 
points, it was underscored that since the process of the determination of adoptability 
should not take an unreasonable amount of time, the existence of a legal mechanism 
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for relinquishment as a ground which can lead to a determination of adoptability might 
be very crucial in minimising unwanted delay. 
 
Subsequently, different themes were discussed including: termination of parental rights 
including through; a decision of a competent authority; abandonment; relinquishment; 
Orphanhood and poverty as grounds for adoptability; the adoptability of refugee 
children, special needs/hard-to-place children, and children who have a Muslim 
background, as well as the reason for singling these specific groups out.  
 
It was contended that the use of the phrase “orphan” as though it is synonymous with 
“adoptability” has serious shortcomings, and is also misleading for programme 
interventions on children’s access to a family environment. It was concluded that one of 
the problems causing confusion in relation to adoptable children is caused by the 
continued unqualified use of the term “orphan” to describe children who are deprived of 
their parent(s), but who are not necessarily deprived of their family environment and in 
need of care.  
 
Poverty as a ground for adoptability alone has been identified as highly controversial. 
Thus, when poverty is the main reason why parental responsibility is terminated or 
abandonment or relinquishment is chosen, the rule requiring family preservation 
dictates that families should be offered support in keeping their children. The point was 
made that poverty should lead to the adoptability of a child only when the poverty the 
child lives under is found to be below local standards, and that such poverty has made it 
impossible to care for the child in any meaningful manner. It was also commented that, 
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as much as poverty alone should not be a sole ground for declaring a child adoptable, 
prioritising adoptions by rich families too would be in violation of the provisions of the 
CRC and the ACRWC. 
 
Various measures that would facilitate the adoptability of hard-to-place children were 
proposed. The adoptability of HIV positive children was singled out for detailed 
discussion. Although very slow, progress made in rendering HIV positive children 
adoptable in some of the countries in the study was examined. The point was also 
made that any declaration of adoptability is not an end in itself - but a means to an end; 
therefore, a clear distinction needs to be made between the adoptability of hard-to-place 
children in theory, and their adoption in reality. As a result, in order to promote the best 
interests of hard-to-place children, not only should legal rules avoid directly and unfairly 
disallowing their adoptability, they should also not hamper, de jure or de facto, the 
actual adoption of this group of children.  
 
The adoptability of refugee children was identified as an issue that requires a high level 
of caution. The general non-adoptability of Muslim children was also underscored, and it 
was argued that such a position would not be in violation of international law. Finally, 
the analysis of adoptability in the countries in the study has highlighted some gaps and 
opportunities. The general observation was that the legislation of the majority of the 
countries in the study did not have clear guidance on adoptability. As a result, the risk 
that those children who are genuinely in need of adoption (for instance, disabled 
children) might be falling between the cracks while those that fit the expressed 
preference of prospective adoptive parents’ requirements (for instance, girls below the 
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age of one) are adopted is real. Finally, whether or not a child is adoptable through 
intercountry adoption is an issue that is determined by the application of the equally 
essential principle of subsidiarity, which forms the focus of the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
PROTECTING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN AFRICA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a number of principles that underpin the practice of intercountry adoption.1 
Central amongst these is the principle of subsidiarity, to which this Chapter is devoted.  
 
The key formulation of the principle is found, directly or indirectly, in all the three 
instruments under consideration - namely the CRC,2 the ACRWC,3 and the Hague 
Convention. While the word “subsidiarity” does not appear anywhere in the CRC and 
the ACRWC, the Hague Convention explicitly refers to it.4  
 
The principle of subsidiarity is so important that it has been described as “a central 
issue in the protection of children deprived of their family, and its respect should guide 
the preparation of every life plan”.5 Sharing this view is Bainham, who says that the 
principle is, “in many ways, the crux of the matter”.6 According to Masson, the principle 
is key to ensuring that intercountry adoption is a service for children rather than for 
prospective adopters.7 
                                                 
1  Some of these include the best interests of the child, adoptability, suitability of prospective 
adoptive parents, recognition, and intercountry cooperation. All these principles and concepts 
have been covered in this thesis in varying degrees. For instance, on adoptability, see Chapter 4. 
2  Art. 21(b) of the CRC. 
3  Art. 24(a) of the ACRWC. 
4  Art 4(b) of the Hague Convention makes the determination of “the respect for the principle of 
subsidiarity” as one of the duties assigned to the state of origin. 
5  ISS/IRC, (April 2007), 1.  
6  Bainham, (1998), 235.  
7  Masson, (October 2001). 
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However, it is important to first understand what the principle means before 
appreciating its crucial role and value within the intercountry adoption scheme. The 
principle of subsidiarity means, in the words of the CRC Committee, “that intercountry 
adoption should be considered, in the light of Article 21, namely as a measure of last 
resort”.8 This is understood to have placed the option of intercountry adoption after all 
possible domestic care arrangements for children.9 In other words, the possibility of 
intercountry adoption as an alternative means of care is put behind just about every 
conceivable child care situation available within the child's country of origin.10 
 
However, this interpretation is a very simplistic understanding of the principle (and not 
really an authoritative one).11 Firstly, it only relates to the interpretation of the principle 
as incorporated in the CRC. Second, what is provided by the CRC Committee is a very 
narrow view as it does not indicate how the other alternative care options (apart from 
intercountry adoption) should fare amongst each other. Third, as will be shown below, 
the interpretation of the notion of “last resort” is unclear and subjective. The theory and 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity triggers a number of more complex 
questions than that which this interpretation of the principle by the CRC Committee 
seems to connote.  
 
                                                 
8  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Brazil, (November 2004), para. 47. 
It is to be noted that Art. 24 of the ACRWC explicitly mentions that intercountry adoption is a 
measure of last resort. 
9  Graff, (2000), 417; Katz, (1995), 304. 
10  Graff, (2000), 417. 
11  This is partly because, as will be demonstrated further below, the CRC Committee has given 
contradictory views as to the general place of intercountry adoption in the hierarchy of alternative 
care options. See section 5.4.2.5 below. 
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For the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
“subsidiarity” means that: 
… States Party to the Convention recognise that a child should be raised by his or her birth 
family or extended family whenever possible. If that is not possible or practicable, other 
forms of permanent family care in the country of origin should be considered. Only after due 
consideration has been given to national solutions should intercountry adoption be 
considered, and then only if it is in the child’s best interests.12 
From this passage, it is possible to decipher that there is some degree of disparity in 
the way the principle of subsidiarity is envisaged in the CRC and the ACRWC, on the 
one hand, and the Hague Convention, on the other. This disparity seems to suggest 
that while the former instruments give primacy to national based solutions, the Hague 
Convention is more favourable to family based ones, even if such family is found 
outside of the child’s country of origin. 
 
As a central principle in intercountry adoption, some of the implications of subsidiarity 
call for a detailed investigation. In this regard, several issues present themselves for 
comment in this chapter: for instance, based on the second chapter which outlined the 
African context that is relevant for intercountry adoption, how should the principle of 
subsidiarity be understood and implemented on the African continent?; Is a different 
form of understanding of the principle called for on the African continent?; If so, how?; In 
addition, given the seemingly different hierarchies to be followed in the implementation 
of the principle under the CRC and the ACRWC, on the one hand, and the Hague 
Convention, on the other, how can a position that is legal, and ultimately capable of 
promoting the best interests of the African child be formed?; How must countries that 
have ratified both the CRC and ACRWC on the one hand, and the Hague Convention, 
                                                 
12  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 29. 
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on the other, resolve the disparity of priority in the subsidiarity principle between the 
instruments?; What priority may be assigned to intercountry adoption as compared to 
foster care and institutional care?; What is the synergy that exists between the best 
interests of the child principle and the principle of subsidiarity?; What is the role of the 
views of the child in defining the principle of subsidiarity?; What is the role of the views 
of the biological family?; It is also a logical line of enquiry to investigate if the principle of 
subsidiarity, however interpreted, is open to any exceptions. In no particular order, 
these issues are interrogated in the sections that follow. 
 
As a disclaimer, one point should be mentioned at the outset. As the focus of this study 
is intercountry adoption, there is no intention to investigate in detail the general 
hierarchy of alternative care options amongst domestic adoption, foster care, kafalah, 
and institutionalisation.  
 
This Chapter proceeds in seven sections. After this introduction, section two highlights 
briefly the importance of understanding the principle of subsidiarity. Section three 
addresses the historical background of the principle of subsidiarity. An attempt is made 
to trace the initial endeavours made to introduce the principle of subsidiarity in 
international law.13 The incorporation of the principle under the CRC and the ACRWC, 
on the one hand, and the Hague Convention, on the other, forms the focus of a 
subsequent section.  
 
                                                 
13  “International law” is understood in this context as both soft and hard law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
305
Section five explores three complex matters related to the implementation of the 
principle of subsidiarity. These issues are complex partly because they do not have a 
concrete precedent to which anyone could turn for guidance. For instance, how States 
that are parties to all these three instruments can comply with these seemingly different, 
if not contradicting, hierarchies of alternative care options to be followed before 
embarking upon the process of intercountry adoption will be discussed.  
 
Section six addresses an important aspect of this study - the African context. This 
section deals with the domestication of the principle of subsidiarity under the municipal 
legislation of the countries under this study. In this regard, bills, Acts, as well as court 
cases are analysed. A concluding section sums up the chapter. 
 
5.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY 
 
The importance of the principle of subsidiarity in alternative care schemes is multifold. 
In the interest of brevity, this section highlights some of the general advantages of 
adhering to the principle of subsidiarity, while the detailed implications and advantages 
are deferred to a latter discussion in section four below. 
 
The first advantage of the principle of subsidiarity is that it allows children to remain 
with their family of origin. It helps to re-confirm the assertion that “children’s best 
interests are served by being with their parents wherever possible”.14 
 
                                                 
14  Hodgkin and Newell, (2002), 295. 
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The principle of subsidiarity also facilitates the promotion of the cultural identity of the 
child. Cultural identity is a cross cutting theme that tends to place preference for the 
biological family (both parents and extended family members) and domestic adoption 
above intercountry adoption: The former options generally cater for the continuity of the 
child’s cultural identity as the child would grow up in the culture, language and 
background of his or her country of origin. 
 
In this regard, not only would the child be allowed to enjoy the benefits of his or her 
cultural identity, he or she would also be allowed to maintain a relatively close 
relationship with “significant others”. These include parents, members of the extended 
family, and friends.  
 
The application of the principle also offers an opportunity to the authorities of the child’s 
country to respond to the needs of their children first. As the authorities with the 
responsibility to provide child welfare services, they are better placed to analyse and 
respond to the needs of children within their jurisdiction. 
 
5.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY  
 
In international law, neither the 1929 nor the 1954 Declarations on the Rights of the 
Child clearly provide for the principle of subsidiarity.15 If anything comes close to the 
principle of subsidiarity in the 1959 Declaration, it is Principle 6 which in pertinent part 
states that the child shall, “…wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the 
                                                 
15        Neither of these instruments deal with adoption. See Vite and Boechat, (2008), 7. 
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responsibility of his parents and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral 
and material security”.16 
 
Including the UDHR,17 a number of other (subsequent) general as well as specific 
human rights instruments do not explicitly address the principle of subsidiarity in the 
context of children deprived of their family environment. These include, the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CEDAW, and at the regional level, the ACHPR.18  
 
What stands out, however, is the 1986 Declaration.19 The 1986 Declaration appears to 
be the first instrument that laid down internationally the type and form of alternative 
care, as well as the different ways this may be effected, in situations where care by the 
child’s own parents is unavailable or inappropriate.20 
 
In this regard, it is pertinent to quote Article 4 of the 1986 Declaration which provides 
that: 
When care by the child's own parents is unavailable or inappropriate, care by relatives of 
the child's parents, by another substitute--foster or adoptive-- family or, if necessary, by an 
appropriate institution should be considered.  
                                                 
16  Principle 6 of the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child provides in part that “[s]ociety and 
the public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and 
to those without adequate means of support. Payment of State and other assistance towards the 
maintenance of children of large families is desirable”. 
17  Art. 25(2) of the UDHR specifically addresses the welfare of children: "[m]otherhood and 
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection”. Art. 25(2) of the UDHR is the only provision that 
specifically addresses the rights of children. 
18  The only “child rights specific” provision under the ACHPR is Article 18(3) which states that “[t]he 
State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the 
protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions”. 
19   See Vite and Boechat, (2008), 7-8. 
20   Preamble para. 6 of the 1986 Declaration. 
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This provision reaffirms the fact that the family is a fundamental unit of society, and 
recognises that, as incorporated in the CRC, that “the child, for full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment”.21 Doek 
describes this principle as a “leading principle for the implementation of the CRC”.22 
 
Institutionalisation as a means of alternative care seems to be accorded a very limited 
role in Article 4 of the 1986 Declaration.23 To borrow the words of Cantwell and 
Holzscheiter, Article 4 of the 1986 Declaration seems to give “an inferred subsidiarity” to 
institutional care over family type alternative care such as foster care and adoption.24 
This argument is substantiated by a reference to the use of the words “if necessary” 
which precedes the terms “appropriate institution” used in Article 4 of the 1986 
Declaration while proposing institutionalisation as one of the options available as 
alternative care.25  
 
                                                 
21  Preamble to the CRC. It is to be noted that Art. 3 of the 1986 Declaration explicitly provides that 
“[t]he first priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her own parents”. The stance that parents 
are the first-line providers of the rights and best interests of the child is vividly evident in the CRC. 
For instance, the CRC requires state parties to "respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents," (Art. 5) and to "ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child" (Art. 18) because "[p]arents ... 
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child." (Art. 18). 
22  Doek, (2006b), 205. 
23  Some of the reasons why children might need to be placed in temporary care (in particular foster 
care or an institution) include: 
- During a family crisis, when the parents are unable to care for the child; 
- to protect the child from a violent or abusive family situation; 
- while the family receives counseling pending reunification; 
- if the child is abandoned, and attempts are made to locate the family; 
- as an interim measure while permanency planning is undertaken; 
- as an interim measure before a declaration of adoptability is made; 
- if the parents are deceased, or have been found unfit to care for the child. 
See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 74. 
24  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 16.  
25  As above. 
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In addition, it is submitted that by taking into account the structure of the Article which 
first recognises biological parents, and ends with institutions, the provision lists the 
proposed alternative care options in the order of their generally preferred hierarchy.26 
The explicit preference towards the biological parents’ care of a child flows from the 
Preamble to the Declaration,27 and followed through by Article 3, which expressly 
provides that “[t]he first priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her own parents”. 
 
As far as adoption is concerned, Section C of the 1986 Declaration specifically 
addresses the practice.28 In particular, in the context of subsidiarity, Article 17 proclaims 
a preference for finding the child an adoptive family in the child's home country and only 
"[i]f a child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable 
manner be cared for in the country of origin, intercountry adoption may be considered 
as an alternative means of providing the child with a family”.29 
 
A general criticism of the 1986 Declaration maintains that “[a] closer look at the 
language of the Declaration ...shows pervasive use of the auxiliary verb ‘should’".30 
While this language is to be credited for “properly giving states the flexibility to establish 
their own laws and procedures regarding orphans, [it] also gives states a little too much 
flexibility in deciding whether to follow or disregard the guidelines” (insertion mine).31  
                                                 
26  Accordingly, if this argument is to be accepted, it means that the hierarchy of alternative care to 
be followed is care by extended family, foster care or adoption, and finally, institutionalisation. 
27  Para. 3 of the Preamble states that “[r]eaffirming principle 6 of that Declaration, which states that 
the child shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents 
and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security”. 
28  Comprised of 12 Arts (Arts 13-24), it forms half of what the 1986 Declaration provides in full. 
29  In addition, of interest is Art 13 which states that "[t]he primary aim of adoption is to provide the 
child who cannot be cared for by his or her own parents with a permanent family”. 
30  Olsen, (2004), 495 citing Saulle and Kojanec, (1995), 249-254. 
31  As above. 
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Interestingly, and arguably, this criticism does not necessarily hold water at least as far 
as Article 4 of the Declaration is concerned. Although the provision uses the word 
“should”,32 there does not seem to be “too much flexibility in deciding whether to follow 
or disregard the guidelines” that the Declaration attempts to set in place. As is evident 
from the preceding discussion, for instance, the use of the words “if necessary” under 
Article 4 seem to have established the hierarchy between institutionalisation on the one 
hand, and other family type alternatives, on the other. In addition, the preference 
towards the extended family over foster or adoptive family is expressly entrenched.  
 
In other words, States enjoy a limited margin of appreciation when deciding the 
hierarchy of alternative care options between care by extended family, foster or 
adoptive family, and finally, placement in institutions. It seems, the only flexibility, which 
is in fact called for in the promotion of the best interests of the child is in deciding the 
hierarchy to be followed between adoption (including intercountry adoption) and foster 
care. In other words, it is submitted that, in so far as context-specific application is 
accommodated, the general preference seems to be in favour of family based options 
over non-family based ones. 
 
It is pertinent to note that the 1986 Declaration obviously precedes, but also coincides, 
with the drafting of the CRC.33 As a result, it is possible to glean some of the influence 
of the former on the wording of the latter. In particular, Articles 20 and 21 of the CRC 
                                                 
32  Art. 4 provides in its entirety that “[w]hen care by the child's own parents is unavailable or 
inappropriate, care by relatives of the child's parents, by another substitute--foster or adoptive-- 
family or, if necessary, by an appropriate institution should be considered” (emphasis mine).  
33  The drafting of the CRC took place between 1979 and 1989. See Cohen, (1993), 12. At the time 
of the adoption of CRC in 1989, its drafters were already aware that the Hague Conference had 
decided to take the matter up in the Final Act of its Sixteenth Session in 1988. See Van Loon, 
(1995), 464. 
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display a substantial overlap concerning the wording and standards of the 1986 
Declaration.34 There is also merit in noting that the Preamble to the CRC explicitly 
mentions the 1986 Declaration.35 There is recognition that the 1986 Declaration was 
partly the origin of Article 21 of the CRC.36 As a result, a comprehensive understanding 
on the principle of subsidiarity in the CRC (and ACRWC) requires an appreciation of 
this historical background outlined above. 
 
5.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY IN THE CRC, THE ACRWC, AND 
THE HAGUE CONVENTION: AN APPRAISAL 
 
5.4.1    A brief overview of the issues 
 
Subsequent to the 1986 Declaration, the principle of subsidiarity has found its way into 
the CRC, the ACRWC and the Hague Convention. In this regard, Article 21(b) of the 
CRC provides in full that: 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the 
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:  
… 
(b) Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of 
child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any 
suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin;  
This provision of the CRC appears to take a very limited and unclear view of when 
intercountry adoption is appropriate.37 The choice of hierarchy between the various 
                                                 
34  Nonetheless, despite these overlaps, it is argued that “some of the standards of the Declaration 
are stronger than those relating to children without parental care in the CRC”. See Cantwell and 
Holzscheiter, (2008), 17. To reinforce this argument, see Art. 5 of the 1986 Declaration. While the 
applicable best interests clause under the CRC refers to the best interests of the child as “a 
primary consideration”, the 1986 Declaration speaks of the best interests principle as being “the 
paramount consideration”. See Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 17. 
35  Para. 11 of Preamble to the CRC. 
36  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 7. 
37  Smolin, (2005), 407-419 (reviewing relevant international law materials concerning relative 
prioritisation of the various alternative care options); Smolin, (2007), 423-424. 
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forms of alternative care implicit in this vague formulation could prove to be 
contentious.38 
 
In fact, some scholars have criticised the fact that the CRC failed to successfully clarify 
the proper hierarchy of solutions to be provided for children deprived of their family 
environment.39 In the Preamble to a Draft Protocol to the UNCRC on Social Orphans, 
Dillon echoes the concern that “…Articles 20 and 21 of the UNCRC are not sufficiently 
clear about the relationship between the developing child and the urgent and time-
bound need for permanency in a family setting”.40 
 
The corresponding ACRWC provision on subsidiarity is very similar to the CRC, and 
perpetuates the lack of clarity on the principle of subsidiarity. However, as already 
discussed in Chapter 3,41 one can discern a few differences. Article 24(b) of the 
ACRWC entrenches that:  
States Parties which recognize the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interest of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
… 
(b) recognize that inter-country adoption in those States who have ratified or adhered to the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child or this Charter, may, as the last resort, 
be considered as an alternative means of a child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a 
foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's 
country of origin; 
                                                 
38  Smolin, (2005), 407-419. 
39  See, for instance, Dillon, (2008), 40; Smolin, (2005), 423-424. 
40  Dillon, (2008), 85. 
41  See section 3.4.3.3 highlighting this difference. 
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Conspicuously, this provision adds the requirement that intercountry adoption should be 
used as a measure of last resort.42 This is not expressly provided for under the CRC.  
 
As alluded to above, the most directly applicable treaty in the intercountry adoption 
sphere, the Hague Convention, also entrenches the subsidiarity principle. The 
Preamble to the Hague Convention recognises that for children who cannot remain with 
their family of origin, “intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin” 
(emphasis mine).43 However, of more direct relevance is Article 4(b) which provides 
that: 
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of 
the State of origin 
… 
b) have determined, after possibilities for placement of the child within the State of 
origin have been given due consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the 
child's best interests; 
 
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning the compatibility of the CRC’s and the ACRWC’s 
preference for in-country over intercountry adoption with the Hague Convention.44 This 
means in particular that, domestic adoption, being a national permanent family based 
solution, enjoys the textual support of all the three instruments over intercountry 
                                                 
42  It is worth nothing that this provision prescribes the use of the last resort requirement not only to 
States Parties to the ACRWC but also States Parties to the CRC. However, its implications are 
unclear, and under the principles of international law, the ACRWC can only place obligations on 
its own States Parties, unless it achieves a customary law status. For a discussion of the 
implication of the use of the concept “last resort” see section 5.4.2.5.4 below which discusses it in 
the context of juvenile justice and transposes it to intercountry adoption. 
43  Para. 3 of the Preamble to the Hague Convention. See Parra-Aranguren, (1994), paras. 45-46 
(describing the drafting history of this paragraph, and part of the thinking that went into its 
formulation.) 
44  Smolin, (2005), 405. 
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adoption. Arguably, foster care might also be said to be compatible with the CRC and 
ACRWC, on the one hand, and the Hague Convention, on the other, provided that it is 
undertaken as a permanent measure.45 As discussed further below, however, the 
general preference that appears in the CRC and the ACRWC for in-country foster care 
and institutionalisation over intercountry adoption is more controversial and appears to 
contradict the Hague Convention.    
 
Clearly, paragraph 3 and Article 4(b) of the Hague Convention espouse a preference 
for permanent family care. According to the Explanatory Report of the Hague 
Convention drawn up by Parra-Aranguren, however: 
[t]he third paragraph of the Preamble, in referring to permanent or suitable family care, 
does not deny or ignore other child care alternatives, but highlights the importance of 
permanent family care as the preferred alternative to care by the child's family of origin.46  
Thus, even within the Hague Convention, it seems that there is some room for 
alternative care options that fall short of being family placements.  
 
Recourse to an internationally recommended policy concerning different child care 
measures could shed some light47 on our understanding of the hierarchy of alternative 
care options to be prioritised generally. According to UNICEF’s study on intercountry 
adoption, next to the best interests of the child, it is widely agreed that three principles 
which form an internationally recommended policy should guide decisions regarding 
                                                 
45  So that it meets the “permanent family” notion entrenched in the Preamble to the Hague 
Convention. 
46  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 43. Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 29. 
47  But it does not necessarily give complete answers. 
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long-term substitute care for children.48 This internationally recommended policy is as 
follows: 
- family-based solutions are generally preferable to institutional    placements;  
- permanent solutions are generally preferable to inherently temporary ones, and 
- national (domestic) solutions are generally preferable to those involving another 
country.49 
 
Judging by this policy, intercountry adoption fulfils the first two principles but not the 
third, while foster placement fulfils the latter two. This seems to put foster placement 
and intercountry adoption on a similar footing. However, the same cannot be said of 
institutionalisation, since it only satisfies one requirement - namely being a domestic 
solution.50 Therefore, intercountry adoption and foster placement are invariably to be 
considered subsidiary to any envisaged solution that corresponds to all three principles 
- for instance, domestic adoption. However, it is submitted that intercountry adoption 
and foster placement must be weighed carefully against any other solutions that also 
meet two of these three basic principles,51 and should not automatically be considered 
to be excluded in favour of institutionalisation. This approach garners support from the 
fact that determining the best interests of the child cannot be “circumscribed by 
mechanical legal formulae” or through “rigid hierarchical rankings” of care options.52  
                                                 
48  UNICEF Innocenti Digest, (1998), 5. 
49   As above. 
50  Though this is partly arguable, in exceptional circumstances, institutionalisation could be 
considered to be permanent for children who are often referred to as “hard to place”. In that case, 
institutionalisation might also appear to fulfil two of the three principles outlined, namely being a 
domestic and permanent solution. 
51  Naturally, the solution chosen and the manner in which it is effected must always fully respect 
the best interests of the child. 
52  As was stated in S v M (2008) (3) SA 232 (CC) para. 24. 
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5.4.2   Deconstructing subsidiarity under the CRC, ACRWC, and the Hague 
Convention: Specific alternative care options 
 
With the foregoing discussions as a backdrop, the following sections undertake a 
detailed appraisal of the principle of subsidiarity. The implications of the principle, and 
the generally preferred hierarchy of alternative care options for children deprived of 
their family environment under the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention will 
be investigated. The principle of subsidiarity, at first glance, poses the question 
“subsidiary to what”? Therefore, the starting point for the discussion should be the birth 
or extended family, to which all alternative care options are generally subsidiary.  
          
5.4.2.1 Birth and extended family as the first resort of care 
It is part of conventional wisdom that children do best if they are brought up by their own 
family. At the centre of this belief is the internationally accepted rule of child welfare 
policy and law that children should preferably grow up in a family environment.53 There 
is no intention here to recount the discussion on the importance and place of the family 
                                                 
53  At the regional level, a similar policy and practice can be detected in Europe and South America. 
Within Europe, the Explanatory Report to the Follow-up to Recommendation N° R(2005)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member States on the rights of children living in residential institutions 
has as one of its basic principles that the “… biological family is the best place for the 
development and well-being of the child”. In addition, according to Art. 1 of the Ethical Rules of 
Euradopt, “Parents who relinquish their child for adoption must be given all the necessary 
information concerning the implications of their decision and also reasonable time to reflect upon 
their decision....” available at <http://www.euradopt.org/Ethical-rules.htm>. Moreover, a range of 
instruments have been adopted in Europe, which directly or indirectly highlight the importance of 
the family and underscore the child's right to contact. These include the 1950 ECHR; the 1996 
European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights (ECECR); the 2003 European 
Convention on Contact Concerning Children (ECCC); the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 
Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial 
Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility (Brussels II bis). Under European human 
rights legislation, parents unable to cope also have the right to be supported and treated to help 
them develop a “good enough capacity” to care for their child(ren) before losing their parental 
rights. See Chou and Browne, (2008), 41 (this study was generally a preliminary attempt to 
explore the link between international adoption and institutional care for young children. The 
evidence does not support the notion that international adoption reduces institutional care. On the 
contrary, survey data suggest that it may contribute to the continuation of institutional care with 
resulting harm to children). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
317
in international law. A detailed account of this, particularly in the context of the CRC and 
the ACRWC, has been provided in Chapter three above.54 
 
The Hague Convention too echoes the importance of the family environment in the care 
of children. In fact, the Hague Convention's position on the primacy of family care is 
consonant with other provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. Paragraph 6 of its 
Preamble, stating that a child should grow up in a family environment, and the 
numerous Articles addressing aspects of the parent-child relationship that evidence an 
overwhelmingly pro-family stance lend support to this assertion.55 In addition, as 
commented above, paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Hague Convention entrenches 
that “intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for 
whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin”.56 This paragraph 
has been read to mirror Article 3 of the 1986 Declaration that “[t]he first priority for a 
child is to be cared for by his or her own parents”.57 Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the 
Preamble to the Hague Convention contains an aspect of the principle of subsidiarity in 
so far as “[e]ach state should take, as a matter of priority, appropriate measures to 
enable the child to remain in the care of his or her family of origin”.58  
 
                                                 
54  In particular sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. See, too, Rios-Kohn, (1998), 146-147 (highlighting the role 
of the family in the CRC). 
55  These Arts. include 1(2), 4(c)(1), and 16(1)(a). 
56  Despite the fact that it is the Preamble of the Hague Convention that lends recognition to this, this 
does not “rise to the status of explicit obligation”. Maravel, (1997), 566. However, the Preamble 
assists to read other positive obligation provisions in context, (such as Art 4, which deals with the 
best interests of the child, adoptability, consent and other safeguards) and leads to the conclusion 
that biological parents are accorded heightened protection in a child’s life. 
57  See Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 44. 
58  See Parra-Aranguren, (1994), paras. 44, 38-39. 
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As part of this general preference towards the family environment,59 the preference for 
the birth or extended family as the environment that children should grow up in is 
evident under all the three instruments under consideration.60 But while the importance 
and preference towards parents is obvious, the preference towards the extended family 
might appear less evident. However, it is submitted that there is room for interpretation 
in the CRC and the ACRWC that the extended family forms part of the definition of 
“family”. Within the Hague Convention too, it is submitted that the notion of “family of 
origin” includes the extended family of the child.61 As a result, those children who are 
being cared for by the extended family are generally not in need of alternative care.  
 
The implication of this preference towards the birth and extended family is that, 
according to the CRC Committee, it is only when all other options to keep the child 
remaining with his or her family have been exhausted and proved inefficient or 
impossible that adoption (or for that matter, any other alternative care option) should be 
envisaged.62 In other words, this is part of what is referred to as “prevention of 
alternative care”.63 In this respect, the subsidiarity principle requires that States provide 
                                                 
59  See discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.2 for the implications and potential meaning of “family 
environment”.  
60  For a discussion of how the Hague Convention views the importance of a family environment and 
“attempts to straddle the fence by discussing the necessity of maintaining an adoptee in a family 
of origin but not in staying in the country of origin” see Martin, (2007), 199-200; See too 
Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 29, 30, 72. 
61  See, Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), paras. 47 and 51. 
62  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 25. For instance, in the context of indigenous families and 
communities, the CRC Committee has maintained that “States parties should ensure effective 
measures are implemented to safeguard the integrity of indigenous families and communities by 
assisting them in their child-rearing responsibilities in accordance with articles 3, 5, 18, 25 and 27 
(3) of the Convention”. CRC Committee, General Comment No. 11, (2009), para. 46. This also 
reflects an understanding of the role of communities, as well as the extended family, in the care of 
children and its general preference for the care of children over all alternative care options. 
63  States Parties to the CRC are requested to ensure the upbringing of children in their families and 
communities of origin or, as a last resort, in alternative care centres. See, for instance, CRC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Djibouti, (October 2008), para. 41. 
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services, according to the United Nations Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children 
that promote parental care, the prevention of family separation, and family 
reintegration.64 
 
At the centre of prevention of alternative care lies family preservation measures.65 
Simple logic dictates the importance of providing comprehensive, long term family-
focused services as critical if a public policy goal is to enable children who run the risk 
of being deprived of their family environment to remain in their families.66 This is the 
main reason why States Parties are advised to develop, adopt and implement a 
comprehensive national policy on families and children which supports and strengthens 
families.67 This policy should be developed and implemented in collaboration with non-
governmental organisations, communities, families and children.68 In the interest of 
comprehensiveness, apart from State subsidies and material assistance to families, 
there is also a need “to provide families with support in the form of so-called service 
plans, including access to social and health services, child-sensitive family counselling 
services, education and adequate housing”.69 
 
                                                 
64  See, generally, Baglietto, (2007). 
65  Internationally, five core principles underpin family preservation programmes. These are 
strengthening the capacity of families, mobilizing and strengthening community-based responses, 
ensuring access to essential services, strengthening government’s role in protecting the children, 
and raising awareness. See UNAIDS, UNICEF, and USAID, (2002); UNAIDS, UNICEF, and 
USAID. (2004); Beyer, (1996),  311 (arguing that, since most families can meet their children's 
safety and attachment needs, agencies can successfully design family support if they craft 
services with families. However, too little assistance provided too late puts children at risk). 
66  This same argument is deployed in the context of children with disabilities and their out-of-home 
placement. See Tomkins and Weisz, (1995), 942. 
67  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (2005), para. 645 
68  As above. 
69  As above. 
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Once separation of children from their family takes place, when in the best interests of 
the child, family reunification measures should be pursued.70 Family reunification 
programmes assist children to reunite with parents or the extended family.71 
 
The absence of adequate support for families in need in Africa is the rule rather than the 
exception.72 Improved assistance to extended families who care for children deprived of 
their parents care is also often required.73 
 
In sum, if a general hierarchy for child care is to be made within the treaties under 
consideration, it is obvious that the birth and extended family should be given first 
consideration before resort is had to alternative care options such as adoption. The 
importance of supporting birth and extended families cannot be overstated. In other 
words, it is submitted that the subsidiarity principle maintains that the preservation of 
children within the birth or extended family should be a measure of first resort. 
 
5.4.2.2  Domestic adoption  
Domestic adoption is one of the alternative care options available for children 
permanently deprived of their family environment.74 However, as a preliminary point, it 
                                                 
70  Art. 10 of CRC. In addition, “while it has been argued that family reunification is best understood 
as a humanitarian principle and not as a human right”, there is a high level of consensus that 
there is a right to family reunification under international law. For a nuanced discussion of this see 
Jastram and Newland, (2003), 576 and Nessel, (2008), 1277. 
71  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 72. 
72   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mauritania, (June 2009), paras. 42 and 43; Niger 
(advanced unedited version), (June 2009), paras. 41 and 42; Eritrea, (June 2008), paras. 42 and 
43; Sierra Leone, (June 2008) paras. 39 and 40; Mali, (May 2007), para. 42(a); The Republic of 
the Congo, (October 2006), 42 and 43; Swaziland, (October 2006), para. 39.  
73  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mauritania, (June 2009), para. 47; Eritrea (June 
2008), para. 45(a); Mali, (May 2007), para. 42(b); The Republic of the Congo, (October 2006), 
para. 47(a); Swaziland, (October 2006), para. 41(c) 
74  Art. 20(3) of the CRC and Art. 24 of the ACRWC. 
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should be mentioned that while many take it for granted that adoption is one form of 
alternative care, a few authors do take issue with the idea of categorising adoption in 
general as alternative care. In this regard, it is illuminating to recount the position of 
Cantwell and Holzscheiter. According to these writers:  
The inclusion of adoption itself in this [Article 20] listing deserves comment. From many 
standpoints, adoption could in fact be considered more as a potential outcome to be sought 
for a child in alternative care than a form of such care per se. It would therefore be more on 
par with reintegration into the parental home than with foster care in that, once adopted, a 
child once again has parental care. This distinction is reinforced by the fact that alternative 
care placements with, for example, foster families, and in institutions, are to be subject to 
periodic review (Article 25), whereas adoption clearly is not. (insertion mine)75 
 
This position is partly valid in that when adoption is compared to the other alternative 
care options, it could be said that it resembles much closely an end in itself than 
constituting a means to an end. However, part of the validity of the quoted argument 
above depends on the kind of definition that one attaches to alternative care. If one 
subscribes to UNICEF’s definition that alternative care is “care for orphans and other 
vulnerable children who are not under the custody of their biological parents”,76 the 
inclusion of adoption as a form of alternative care would be valid.  
 
In addition, it is true that according to Article 25 of the CRC, alternative care 
placements (in particular foster care and placement in institutions) are to be subjected 
to periodic review.77 Although not backed to the same extent by a clear normative 
                                                 
75  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 52. 
76  UNICEF, (July 2006). 
77  .A closer reading of Article 25 highlights that there is neither the mention of review only 
for foster care and institutions nor the explicit prohibition on the review of adoptions. 
Therefore, arguably, the assertion by Cantwell and Holzscheiter that adoption clearly is 
not subject to periodic review, arguably, betrays a very limited appreciation of the notion 
and scope of “periodic review”. 
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framework, sometimes even adoption is required to be reviewed, for instance, through 
post-adoption placement reports (that are sometimes required by domestic 
legislation).78 Such a requirement might also enjoy the support of the ACRWC. Thus, 
that Article 24(f) of the ACRWC requires States Parties to “establish a machinery to 
monitor the well-being of the adopted child” (emphasis mine) could also be construed to 
mean to require the review of adoptions through various means, including post-
adoption follow-up reports as necessitated by the best interests of the child.79  
 
These issues notwithstanding, the general hierarchy enjoyed by domestic adoption 
amongst the alternative care options available is the least contested one. The fact that 
domestic adoption is a national solution, a permanent placement, and in addition, offers 
a family environment, puts it ahead of other alternatives. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that in countries where adoption is well established,80 there is a demonstrated high level 
of success rate in permanent placement, especially when decisions have been guided 
by the best interests of the child and children are adopted at a young age.81 
 
However, this general preferential position towards domestic adoption needs 
qualification so as to accommodate exceptional circumstances. General preference for 
domestic adoption should not be interpreted to mean that there should be “a general 
                                                 
78  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.3.2 for a discussion on post-adoption follow up. 
79  In this regard, it is helpful to describe the experience of Ethiopia. Ethiopia requires post 
placement reports on Ethiopian orphans at 3 months, 6 months, and one year after the adoption. 
U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia”, (December 2008). For the role of 
post-placement reports (particularly in the context of Madonna’s and Angelina’s adoptions from 
Africa) see Mezmur, (2009a), 165. 
80  It is to be noted that domestic adoption as defined above is not a widely practiced way of 
providing children a family environment in the African context. As discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter, informal kinship care and informal foster care are more widely practiced in 
communities in Africa than formal domestic adoption.  
81  See, generally, Triseliotis et al., (1997).  
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approach that would consider adoption as the best solution whenever parents are not 
able or willing to care for their child”.82 Were such an approach was to be embraced, it 
would stand the potential danger of ill-serving the best interests of some children whose 
rights would better be protected and served under other alternative care options.83 
 
An example here could illustrate this point better. While it is estimated that about three-
fourths of the Tswana people live in South Africa,84 they also constitute the majority 
ethnic group living in Botswana.85  A Tswana orphan from South Africa could be 
adopted by, for argument’s sake, a white South African family from the Free State 
province. Such an adoption would fall within the definition of domestic adoption, and 
hence enjoy general preference under the principle of subsidiarity. If a Tswana orphan 
deprived of his or her family environment from South Africa is adopted by a Tswana 
family in Botswana, the nature of the adoption would automatically change to an 
intercountry one, enjoying less support under the principle of subsidiarity when 
compared to domestic adoption.86 Assuming that all things are equal (between the 
situation of the adoptive family in South Africa and the prospective adoptive family in 
Botswana), as far as culture, language, religion, and continuity in the child’s upbringing 
are concerned, the Tswana family in Botswana might be better equipped to cater for the 
needs of the child. However, a strict application of the principle of subsidiarity that 
                                                 
82  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 25. 
83  For instance, older children who have demonstrated a resistance to adapt to a family environment 
cannot be placed for adoption against their best interests and views.  
84  See <http://www.encounter.co.za/article/94.html>. Some records show that the Tswanas are a 
tribe who migrated from East Africa to Southern Africa during the 14th century. Today there are 59 
different groups in South Africa who now accept the overall name of Tswana.  
85  See <http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/Tswanas>. Only about one-fourth live in Botswana, the 
country named after them. 
86  Art. 21 of the CRC and Art. 24 of the ACRWC. 
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favours domestic adoption over other alternative care options might bar the prospective 
adoptive family in Botswana from having the child placed with them.   This example 
clearly shows that the principle of subsidiarity should only be applicable with some level 
of flexibility which employs as its guidepost the best interests of the child on a case by 
case basis.87  
 
Furthermore, adoption in general should be treated in a more sensitive manner. The 
fact that adoption usually88 results in severing ties with the child’s entire birth and 
extended family, and that it therefore represents an extreme measure of intervention in 
the child’s rights to know and be brought up by his or her own family, should be taken 
into account. In other words, where the child’s deprivation of his or her family 
environment is temporary, for example because of the temporary imprisonment of sole 
custodian parent, options akin to foster care might make domestic adoption subsidiary. 
 
Unfortunately, in Africa, domestic adoption (as defined in Chapter 1) is a little utilised 
alternative means of care for children deprived of their family environment.89 As has 
been found to be the case in parts of South America,90 social analysis in Africa indicates 
that adoption of an unrelated child is not a readily accepted cultural practice.91 Thus, 
                                                 
87  Therefore, despite the general consensus that domestic adoption ranks higher than other 
alternative care options, a scheme that values the subsidiarity principle over the best interests of 
the child is not concordant with the CRC, ACRWC and the Hague Convention. 
88  I consciously use the term “usually”, because open adoptions do not necessarily result in 
severing ties with the child’s entire birth and extended family. 
89  This is the case in Zimbabwe, for instance, where a strong cultural resistance to the concept of 
adoption prevails. See, Powell et al., (2004), v and 6. Even when a similar act of adoption takes 
place, it is informal, unofficial and unregistered and takes place outside of the private and/or 
judicial adoption systems. 
90  For instance, Guatemala. See Families Without Borders, (2003). 
91  See, Powell et al., (2004), v and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
325
since the culture of adopting domestically is lacking, building awareness of the need for 
adoptive families may require a change in public attitudes.92  
 
There is no clear indication from the interpretation of the CRC Committee that “informal 
adoptions” are inherently in violation of the provisions of the CRC. Despite this, on few 
occasions the CRC Committee has called upon States Parties to prevent informal 
adoptions.93 On the majority of occasions, the Committee does not call for its abolition 
but rather for its regulation. The Republic of the Congo, for instance, was requested to 
...conduct a child rights-based assessment of the practice of “informal” adoption, 
involving all stakeholders, in order to ensure that this practise is in full compliance with 
the principles and provisions of the Convention.94  
A similar position was echoed in the context of Samoa.95 After reviewing the report of 
Kiribati, the Committee recommended that the State Party take appropriate measures to 
ensure that the best interests of the child are fully respected in the practice of so-called 
“informal adoption”.96 Similarly, as a result of the large extent of the practice of 
customary adoption within the extended family and the community in Senegal, the CRC 
Committee recommended to the State Party to regulate the practice with a view to 
strengthening the protection of the rights of the adopted child.97 It also requests States 
                                                 
92  In this regard, the experience of India which has managed to significantly increase the number of 
domestic adoptions could be investigated and emulated.  
93  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Niger, (June 2009), paras. 49 and 50. 
94  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: The Republic of the Congo, (October 2006), para. 
49(d). 
95  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Samoa, (October 2006), paras. 39 and 40. 
96  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kiribati, (September 2006), para. 43(a). 
97  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Senegal, (October 2006), paras. 34 and 35(a). 
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Parties to redirect traditional adoptions towards measures of protection of the children 
like legal adoption or other types of guardianship.98  
 
Fleisher furnishes a number of suggestions on how the decline of domestic adoption 
could be countered within the context of the U.S..99 Generally, these suggestions are 
geared towards providing policies and laws that would be fair to biological parents, 
adoptive parents and children alike. They include limiting the rights of birth mothers to 
reclaim adopted children; and removing barriers such as the age, race, sexual 
orientation and marital status of prospective adoptive parents.100 Providing for a 
requirement that calls for the registration in a national paternal registry so that biological 
fathers can oppose the adoption before it takes place is another mechanism advanced 
in order to increase the number of domestic adoptions.101 Whether or not these 
experiences and suggestions could be emulated and followed in the context of Africa, 
though, is highly doubtful.102  
 
When domestic adoptions are not prioritised and many children remain in institutions,103 
a possible violation of the subsidiarity principle could be deduced.104 A strategy to 
                                                 
98   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, (January 2009), 
paras. 48(g) and 45(a); Benin, (October 2006), para. 45(a); The Republic of the Congo, (October 
2006), para. 49(b). 
99  Fleisher, (2003), 171. 
100  Fleisher, (2003), 171. See, too, Manley, (2006), 627 (providing for arguments in which the rights 
of birth parents could be protected. The arguments provided in order to protect the rights of 
biological parents could be transposed for the protection of their rights in domestic adoption too).  
101  Fleisher, (2003), 171; Beck, (2002), 1031; Caswell, (2002), 271. 
102  This is mainly because the socio-economic context of Africa is vastly different from the U.S.  
103   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, (February 2008), para. 54.             
104   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Eritrea, (June 2008), para. 45(a); Dominican    
Republic, (February 2008), para. 54. The presence of a close to equivalent number of 
intercountry adoptions to that of domestic adoptions, has raised the concern of the CRC 
Committee that adequate priority is not given to domestic adoptions. CRC Committee, 
Concluding Observations: El Salvador, (June 2004), para. 39. 
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promote domestic adoptions requires, amongst others, awareness-raising campaigns 
and regulations that facilitate access to adoption, such as free or inexpensive costs for 
documents needed for the adoption process.105 Awareness raising campaigns need to 
emphasise the needs and rights of children to a family.106 In addition, unnecessarily 
restrictive eligibility requirements for prospective adoptive parents also tend to minimise 
children’s chances of being domestically adopted. For instance, in the case of Chile, the 
CRC Committee recommended that the State Party should increase the possibility of 
domestic adoption by considering the introduction of rules allowing unmarried couples 
to adopt a child.107 Research into what factors are inhibiting domestic adoptions in a 
country is crucial. Methods and incentives for encouraging families to adopt 
domestically should be investigated. 
 
5.4.2.3 Foster care 
A working definition (or rather, a description) of foster care is provided by the 
International Organization of Foster Care.108 In its Guidelines for Foster Care109 it is 
provided that foster care: 
… implies temporary care or alternative family care. The period of care can vary in 
different countries to meet the specific needs of a child. It could be pre-adoption care; 
                                                 
105   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: DRC, (January 2009), para, 48(d). 
106   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (June 2009), para. 54. 
107   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chile, (April 2007), para. 47. 
108      In this regard, for a discussion of the terms or concepts often confused with foster care see 
International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates, (January 2008), 2 
(highlighting that foster care is not the same as “pre-adoptive care”, “family placement”, 
“substitute family”, “wardship”, and “transient family”). Accordingly, it is argued that: 
 ...instead, FOSTER CARE is a RIGHT; it is a cooperative, fraternal answer from 
one member of a community to another, from one family to another in need, 
providing a place within a family—for as long as needed—to children and 
adolescents…The key word is COMPLEMENTARY, based on cooperation and 
fraternity.  
   See International Association of Youth and Family Judges and Magistrates, (January 2008), 2. 
109        These Guidelines are based on the 1986 Declaration and on the CRC. 
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weekend care or vacation care; respite care for handicapped children; care of a group of 
children in one family; or long-term care for a child who cannot be adopted.110 
Children can be removed from their parents if they are abused, neglected or 
abandoned. Therefore, even if each child's situation is different, the general purpose of 
foster care is often the same: to return the child to his or her natural family,111 to a 
permanent alternate family, or help towards preparing the child to live independently.112 
 
According to Van Bueren, “[f]oster placement should be regulated by law and there 
should be a competent agency responsible for supervision to ensure the child’s 
welfare”.113 Foster care, which should be temporary, could nevertheless continue until 
adulthood, but should not preclude a child returning to his or her biological parents. It 
also should not preclude adoption.114  
 
Foster care as an alternative means of care has its own advantages. To start with, 
unlike institutionalisation, it offers a family environment. Where potential foster care 
parents are identified and the system works in a well-coordinated way with the ultimate 
goal of promoting the best interests of the child, it would contribute to the financial 
efficacy of child welfare system. Where the biological family of a child is present and 
                                                 
110        IFCO, (1995). In other words, foster care is the placement of child, who requires out-of home 
placement and who is capable of functioning in a family setting, into the custody of a suitable 
family or person willing to be a foster parent. 
111     In this framework, respect for a child’s identity and family attachment are favoured and      
             protected at a time when the child’s family is experiencing a difficult situation. 
112     Press Release, (2003), 2. 
113   Van Bueren, (1998), 103. Amongst other alternative care measures, foster care is one  means of 
care where the CRC Committee has recommended that States Parties ensure that the placement 
of children in foster care “is based on a carefully conducted assessment of the needs and best 
interest of the child by a competent and multidisciplinary group of experts and that a short- and 
long-term plan, including the goals of the placement and the measures to achieve these, is 
available at the time of the placement and is regularly adapted to the development of the child”. 
CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion, (2005), para. 654. 
114         Van Bueren, (1998), 103. 
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contact exists between the foster parents and the biological family, a possibility exists 
for a (trained) foster parent to provide a role model of sensitive and positive parental 
care to the biological family leading to the rehabilitation of the family.115 
 
Assessed against the general preference towards family-based, permanent and national 
(domestic) solutions, foster placement (along with intercountry adoption) is invariably to 
be considered subsidiary to any envisaged solution that corresponds to all three 
principles - for instance, domestic adoption. Preference towards foster care over 
institutionalisation is often expressed by the CRC Committee.116 
 
It is important to recognise that depending on the attendant circumstances of a child, 
foster care could be subsidiary to adoption, intercountry adoption, and very 
exceptionally, institutionalisation. For instance, its non-permanent nature when 
compared to adoption makes it subsidiary to the latter for children who are definitively 
deprived of their family environment.117 However, if deprivation of a family environment 
is temporary, and the possibility of family reunification is present and planned for, 
                                                 
115        See European Commission Daphne Programme, (2007), 15. Other advantages include that, 
unlike adoption and intercountry adoption (closed), foster care does not result in severing ties 
with the child’s entire birth and extended family, and therefore represents a temporary measure of 
intervention. In fact, where present and in the best interests of the child, biological parents/family 
are made part of the overall care plan in which the biological parents / relatives participate as 
partners in the process.  
116        See, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (June 2009), para. 51; Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, (January 2009), para, 37(b); The Netherlands, (January 2009), para. 
41; Republic of Moldova, (January 2009), para. 45(c); Chad, (January 2009), para. 50; Slovak 
Republic, (July 2007), para. 43; Chile, (April 2007), para. 45. 
117         In this regard, note the development within social work of “a diversification of foster care services, 
to include emergency, short-term, long-term, respite and specialist services has been established 
in order to respond to the needs of children who cannot live (either temporarily or permanently) 
with their birth or extended family, but for whom maintaining relationships with the family is 
deemed appropriate”. See European Commission Daphne Programme, (2007), 18 -19. 
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adoption (both domestic and international) should be subsidiary to foster care.118 In 
addition, if a psycho-social analysis of a child determines that a child cannot benefit 
from a family environment, such a situation would make foster care subsidiary to 
institutionalisation. 
 
In Africa, as in most of the less developed world, foster care tends to be informal (often 
called kinship care).119 It is less developed than other alternative care options such as 
institutionalisation, and is highly unregulated by law and policy.120  
 
5.4.2.4 Institutional care 
5.4.2.4.1 Understanding the notion of “institutions” 
In the context of alternative care for children,121 the word “institutions” appears in the 
CRC,122 the ACRWC,123 and the Hague Convention.124 For instance, the CRC speaks 
of the obligation on the part of States Parties to “...render appropriate assistance to 
                                                 
118         This is related to the fact that all alternative care measures should be subsidiairy to family 
reintegration and that the separation of a child from his or her family should be considered as a 
measure of last resort. See section 5.4.2.1 for further details.  
119        George and Oudenhoven, (2005) (providing inputs to the debate and practice of foster care, the 
report contains information on foster care experiences in developing countries, which tends to be 
informal and undocumented).  
120        At times, the CRC Committee seems to encourage the development of traditional foster care 
systems, such as family/community-based alternative care, paying particular attention to the 
rights recognised in the Convention, including the principle of the best interests of the child. See 
CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Maldives, (July 2007), para. 61; Honduras, (May 
2007), para. 48(b). 
121  It is to be noted that the word “institutions” also appears in contexts different from alternative care 
such as educational institutions. See, for instance, Art. 11(7) of the ACRWC. 
122         For instance, see Art. 3(3) of the CRC on the best interests of the child.  
123        Art. 20(2)(b) reads that “States Parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their means 
and national conditions the (sic) all appropriate measures; 
(b) to assist parents and others responsible for the child in the performance of child-rearing and 
ensure the development of institutions responsible for providing care of children;…”. 
124         For instance, Art. 4(c)(1) provides that “[a]n adoption within the scope of the Convention shall 
take place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin –…have ensured that … such 
persons, institutions and authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, 
and expressed or evidenced in writing” (emphasis mine). 
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parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing 
responsibilities...”125 and their duty to “ensure the development of institutions, facilities 
and services for the care of children”.126 The ACRWC also mentions institutions in the 
same context as the CRC.127 
 
Nonetheless, in the context of child care, the reference to the word “institutions” leaves 
unanswered the question of what it is intended to cover.128 It is contended that “ 
‘[r]esidential care’ or ‘institutional care’ refers to group living arrangements in which 
care is provided by paid adults who would otherwise not be regarded as traditional 
caregivers in that particular society”.129 If “institutions” is meant to refer only to 
orphanages,130 the question posed then is what role is to be played by the so-called 
“intermediary care options” such as “group homes”.  
 
Since group homes by definition represent “small, residential facilities located within a 
community and designed to serve children”,131 it could be argued that it is these types 
                                                 
125        Art. 18(2) of the CRC. 
126        Art. 18(2) of the CRC. 
127        Art. 20(2) (b) of the ACRWC. 
128  Cantwell and Holzscheiter, (2008), 53. There is a common tendency to copy the language of 
previous instruments and declarations without a fresh and concrete discussion of the meanings 
and implications of terms. As far as the CRC is concerned, Arts. 20 and 21 are classical 
examples. A number of terms are directly imported either from the 1986 Declaration or the ICCPR 
and the UDHR. The term “institutions” is but one example of this. 
129       UNICEF Innocenti Insight, (2006), 35. It is further provided that the “...form and quality of such 
care vary widely. Arrangements range from large, typically impersonal, public institutions to 
smaller centres, often run by NGOs or faith-based organizations, and ‘children’s villages’, in 
which children are grouped in small family-style units”. UNICEF Innocenti Insight, (2006), 35. 
130        It is to be noted that it is usually residential care institutions for young children that are also often 
referred to as “orphanages”. See European Commission Daphne Programme, (2007), 13. 
131       These homes usually have very few occupants and are often staffed 24 hours a day by trained 
caregivers. For the definition and description of group homes in the context of mental disorder, 
see “Group homes” available at <http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Group-homes.html.>. 
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of homes that both the CRC132 and the ACRWC133 refer to as “suitable institutions”. The 
current tendency is to lump orphanages and group homes of varying sizes under the 
umbrella of “institutional care”.134 Nonetheless, it is submitted that whereas the classical 
orphanages enjoy little support from the international normative standards, those 
resembling a family environment like group homes might withstand a better scrutiny 
under human rights law.135 
 
5.4.2.4.2 The role and place of institutions 
The qualification of institutions with the prefix  
“suitable” in the CRC and the ACRWC finds its motivation from global experiences 
during and before the drafting of the CRC. Since the 1980s, the international community 
has come to progressively realise the detrimental effect of institutionalisation on 
children.136 Thus, the ill-effects of institutionalisation on the emotional, psychological 
and developmental aspects of children are well documented.137  
                                                 
132         Art. 20(3) of the CRC. 
133         Art. 25(2)(a) of the ACRWC. 
134         Dillon, (2008), 40.  
135  See, for instance, the standards in the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care. 
136         See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, (1996). For a review of this work, see Stone, (1996),      
846; Levy and Khan, (1991); Waterhouse, (2000). 
137      See, for instance, Zeanah et al., (2003), 886-88 (summing up previous research on deleterious 
effects of institutional rearing, including recent research on many problems of children adopted 
out of institutions in Eastern Europe, Russia, and other countries, as well as ameliorating effects 
of early intervention. This article describes the Bucharest Early Intervention Project (BEIP), an 
ongoing randomised controlled trial of foster placement as an alternative to institutionalisation 
designed to document scientifically both the effects of institutionalisation and the degree of 
recovery that foster care can provide, and to assist the government of Romania in developing 
alternative forms of care beyond institutionalisation. See, too, Parker and Nelson, (2005) 54; For 
other recent research see the St. Petersburg-USA Orphanage Research Team, (2005), 477 
(giving a comprehensive, empirical description of orphanage environments, describing the most 
salient deficiencies as in social-emotional environment, and describing harmful impact on 
children, all consistent with reports on other countries’ orphanages); Yagmurlu et al., (2005), 521 
(documenting the harmful impact of institutionalisation on “theory of mind” development of 
children in Turkey, relevant to social, cognitive and language development, and psychological 
adjustment, all related to the deprivation of normal adult-child interaction, and all consistent with 
other research findings). 
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Recent studies continue to criticise the institutionalisation (in particular, long term) of 
children who are deprived of their family environment. In a study conducted by 
EveryChild, the state of institutionalised children in the former “Eastern Bloc” has been 
condemned.138 Other studies conducted in Africa reveal similar findings.139 
 
It could be argued that, in the CRC, at least one area of hierarchical consensus that has 
emerged relates to the priority to be accorded to family-based alternative care over 
institutions. Quoting Van Bueren,140 Detrick highlights the fact that the words “or, if 
necessary” between “adoption” and “placement in suitable institutions…” are inserted in 
Article 20(3) to indicate the preference for alternative care by another substitute 
family.141 However, the same cannot be asserted as strongly in connection with Article 
25(2)(a) of the ACRWC because the phrase “or, if necessary” are lacking from the text. 
 
However, the Hague Convention’s policy on institutionalisation is not explicitly spelt out 
in the instrument. Despite this, it is possible to decipher the position of the instrument 
on this issue through interpretation. For instance, paragraph 3 of the Preamble142 to the 
Hague Convention prescribes intercountry adoption for "a child for whom a suitable 
                                                 
138         Apart from the living conditions of children in these institutions, the fact that the proportion of 
institutionalised children in the region increased by 3% since the collapse of Communism has 
been found to be a matter of grave concern. See, generally, EveryChild, (2005). See too ISS/IRC 
Monthly Review, (January 2006), 9.  
139        See, Chinake et al., (2004). In Zimbabwe, the fact that the average age of the institutionalised 
population had increased with a significant number of children remaining institutionalised after the 
statutory age limit of 18 years, has been interpreted as proof that institutions have failed to make 
adequate preparation for the transition of youth to the outside world.  See, Powell, et al., (2004), 
vi. 
140  Van Bueren, (1998), 95. 
141  Detrick, (1999), 336.  
142  Para. 3 of the Preamble to the Hague Convention. Some might question the value to be accorded 
to the notion “permanent care” which, in any case, is part of the Preamble and does not appear in 
the substantive provisions of the treaty. However, it is worth noting that the drafters of the Hague 
Convention have explicitly indicated that the Preamble is “very important for the appropriate 
interpretation of the Convention, in particular of its Article 4”. Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 47. 
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family cannot be found in his or her State of origin" instead of "a child who cannot in 
any suitable manner be cared for in his or her country of origin".143 Pierce labels this “a 
significant shift” in language.144 This is because in the seven years between the 1986 
Declaration and the 1993 Hague Convention, the change in choice of words from 
caring for a child “in a suitable manner” in the 1986 Declaration145 to finding “a suitable 
family” in the Hague Convention is patent.146 This has been interpreted to highlight the 
need to ensure that a child should always be placed in a family rather than in an 
institution.147 A similar position is set forth in Article 4(b) of the Hague Convention. 
Hence, it could be argued that institutionalisation (which is non-family based alternative 
care) under the Hague Convention is a measure of last resort, behind intercountry 
adoption.148  
 
Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Hague Convention also recognises that 
“intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family” (emphasis 
mine). Since institutionalisation is generally not intended to be permanent,149 
alternatives such as intercountry adoption seem to enjoy priority over institutionalisation 
in this respect. The position expounded by the Hague Conference Bureau that “it is, as 
a general rule, not preferable to keep children waiting in institutions when the possibility 
                                                 
143  See too ISS/IRC, (1999a). 
144  Pierce, (1996), 538. 
145  As well as the CRC and the ACRWC. 
146  Pierce, (1996), 538-539. 
147  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 45. 
148  See Vite and Boechat, (2008), 45-46 citing Dillon, (2003), 208-215 and Kaufmann, (undated). 
149  This does not deny the fact that institutionalisation could be considered as “permanent” for some 
children such as those who are labeled as “hard to place”. The Permanent Bureau contends 
correctly that “[i]nstitutionalisation as an option for permanent care, while appropriate in special 
circumstances, is not as a general rule in the best interests of the child”. Permanent Bureau, 
Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 30. 
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exists of a suitable permanent family placement abroad”150 is supported by the text of 
the Hague Convention. 
 
In practice, there is a tendency to misconstrue the position of the relevant instruments 
on the institutionalisation of children. It is not uncommon to witness the systematic 
planning and establishment of new institutions as a priority to cater for children 
deprived of their family environment.151 Sometimes, such developments are justified on 
the basis of Article 18(2) of the CRC.152 However, the reference under Article 18(2) that 
mandates States Parties to “ensure the development of institutions, facilities and 
services for the care of children” does not mean the facilitation of a systematic policy to 
establish orphanages as a priority for the care of children. Rather, there is a need to 
make these institutions secondary and allow them to exist in a support relationship with 
parents.153 Caution should be exercised not to make children “children of the state” 
unnecessarily.154 In this respect, children’s best interests require that literal 
interpretation is avoided. In other words, there is need to interpret the provisions of the 
CRC and the ACRWC purposefully.155 
 
                                                 
150  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 30. 
151  Research conducted in 2006 has found that, in Africa, there is growing concern about the 
burgeoning number of orphanages being established in order to respond to the perceived needs 
of children affected by HIV and AIDS. See, Pinheiro, (2006), 184. See, too, Save the Children, 
(2009), which shares a similar view.   
152  The ACRWC version of this provision, Art. 20(2)(b), provides that:  
States Parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their means and 
national conditions the all appropriate measures; 
... 
(b) to assist parents and others responsible for the child in the performance of 
child-rearing and ensure the development of institutions responsible for providing 
care of children;... 
153  Freeman, (2007a), 71. 
154  As above. 
155  See the VCLT of 1969 in this regard. 
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In Africa, it is documented that the unfortunate lack of developed family-based 
alternative care options has lead to “un-necessary over-use of residential 
placements”.156 In support of this assertion, a joint working paper by ISS and UNICEF 
cites the experience of Zimbabwe.157 Accordingly,   
[t]he average occupancy of Zimbabwean orphanages is 106% overall, and 128% in 
government institutions. Their experience is that one can never build enough orphanages 
to meet demand – those which are built are always full because they attract children, 
although usually for the wrong reasons.… Research shows that the majority of children in 
institutions do not need to be there … – only 25% have no known relatives. 45% have at 
least a mother alive. Most children could be reintegrated into their families with good 
social work.158 
Unfortunately, there is also anecdotal evidence that the move to make institutions the 
primary response and solution for alternative care is susceptible to being counter 
productive. This is because it could weaken a community’s motivation to address 
orphan issues and divert resources away from the family-based solutions that are better 
for children.159 
 
The limited recognition of institutions within the CRC and the ACRWC is indicative of 
the fact that they could (and sometimes should) play some role in child care. One 
aspect of the role of institutions is that they often are central in the domestic and 
intercountry adoption schemes, as well as in the placement of children in foster care. 
When children are deprived of their family environment, there is often a transition period 
between the deprivation of their family environment and the placement of a child in 
                                                 
156  ISS and UNICEF, (August 2004), 7. Parwon, (June 2006). See too UNICEF Sierra Leone, (2008) 
which recommends the need to prioritise community based solutions for caring for orphans in 
order to prevent children from entering into children’s institutions in the first place. 
157  ISS and UNICEF, (August 2004), 7. 
158  Meeting on African Children Without Family Care, (2002), as cited in ISS and UNICEF (August 
2004), 7. 
159  Olson et al., (2006), 3. 
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alternative care such as adoption and foster care. In such circumstances, the role of 
institutions is crucial in keeping children off the streets and within an environment that 
caters for their basic needs such as shelter, clothing, food and health care. 
 
In other words, a proper understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, especially in the 
context of institutionalisation, demands an appreciation of the distinction between the 
long term and short term placement needs of a child.160 If the placement of a child who 
is deprived of a family environment is required for a short period of time (for example, 
due to imprisonment of care giver), the result of what would be in the best interests of 
the child in applying the principle of subsidiarity might be completely different from the 
long term placement needs of a child (for example, due to the death of care givers).161 
 
There is no refuting the fact that in very exceptional circumstances, institutions would 
also serve the long term best interests of the child.162 This is the case for children who 
can neither be reintegrated into their birth or extended family nor be placed in a foster 
                                                 
160  This could also be construed as the “temporary care” and “permanent care” needs of a child 
deprived of a family environment. 
161  It is argued, therefore, for instance, for separated refugee children who have been temporarily 
deprived of their family environment, it might often be in the best interests of these children to 
either be placed in foster care or institutions as opposed to being adopted domestically- which 
would constitute a measure cognisant of their short term best interests. This is because, in this 
circumstance, family reunification could still be a viable option, long term measures such as 
adoption might not be appropriate. 
162        This distinction between the long term and short term placement needs of children is supported by 
the understanding of the long term and short term best interests of the child. Under the principle 
of the best interests of the child, a child’s best interests could vary depending on whether the 
short term or long term interests of the child are in consideration. It is argued that “[i]n certain 
special cases, long term placement in an institution or in a foster family may meet the best 
interests of the child. Indeed, some children, given certain of their personal characteristics 
(adolescence, effective links with birth parents …) or the traumas they have lived through, are 
unable to reinsert themselves in their family of origin or in an adoptive family”. See, generally, 
Cabral, (2004). 
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home or with adoptive families. The reasons for such impossibility may range from 
psychological barriers to developmental, physical and emotional deficiencies.163  
 
Therefore, this fact (exceptional circumstances calling for institutionalisation) might 
change the tone of the arguments advanced by those who categorically criticise the 
existence and role of orphanages in the implementation of child welfare policies. To 
transpose one of the common juvenile justice principles used in the context of 
deprivation of liberty, orphanages could have a meaningful role especially if used as a 
“last resort” and “for the shortest period of time”.  
 
5.4.2.4.3 Standards for the use of institutions 
The CRC Committee welcomes State parties efforts to enhance the provisions and 
capacity of shelters, orphanages, baby homes and similar institutions to accommodate 
more children deprived of their family environment.164 Despite this, there is also often 
the need to make a concerted effort to de-institutionalise children. In the context of 
Romania, for instance, the CRC Committee has commended the State party for closing 
down institutions and replacing them with family type homes,165 and expanding its foster 
care programmes.  
 
                                                 
163  In the mean time, the longer one waits to take this step, the more risk of damage that could be 
done to the developing child. 
164  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Bangladesh, (June 2009), para. 53; Chad, (January 
2009), paras. 47, 48, 50; Eritrea, (June 2008), para. 45(b). 
165  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (June 2009), para. 51. 
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Within the ambit of institutions, the importance of family-type care arrangements is 
strongly emphasised.166 In the context of Malaysia, for instance, the Committee 
welcomed the cottage system children’s homes where these Homes provide an 
innovative alternative to institutional care by placing children in groups of eight to ten in 
specially built homes under the care of married couples selected from the community to 
act as their foster parents.167 In a contrary vein, the Committee has criticised the non-
existence of family-type care arrangements in State parties.168 The Committee also 
encourages the State parties to create small-scale alternative care institutions to be 
used as a last resort when other alternative care options are not possible.169 
 
Younger children are more susceptible to the side-effects of institutionalisation.  The 
CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 7 on “Implementing child rights in early 
childhood” strongly warns against institutionalisation as being particularly inappropriate 
                                                 
166  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chad (CRC/C/TCD/CO/2) (January 2009), paras. 47, 
48, 50; Swaziland, (October 2006), para. 41(d); Djibouti, (October 2008), para. 42. 
167  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Malaysia, (June 2007), para. 52; See too CRC 
Committee, State Party Report: Malaysia, (December 2006), para. 225. 
168  See, for example, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Bangladesh, (June 2009), para. 
53. 
169  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chad, (January 2009), para. 50; Venezuela, 
(October 2007), para. 48. 
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for young children.170 In this respect, laws that put the minimum age for 
institutionalisation of children as an alternative means of care could be necessary.171 
 
Even when institutions are used as a measure of last resort, there is a dire need to 
undertake standard-setting efforts and ensure, including through effective inspections, 
that these standards are fully implemented.172 The General Guidelines for Periodic 
Reports prepared by the CRC Committee are unequivocal in this regard.173 
Accordingly, States Parties must establish (and ensure compliance with) appropriate 
standards for all institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection 
of children.174 
 
These standards should also include the provision of independent (confidential) 
complaints and consultation mechanisms for children in alternative care institutions.175 
In the light of Article 25 of the CRC, there is also a need to ensure the periodic review of 
                                                 
170  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 36. This paragraph in particular 
observes that: 
...research suggests that low quality institutional care is unlikely to promote 
healthy physical and psychological development and can have serious negative 
consequences for long term social adjustment, especially for children under 3 but 
also for children under 5 years old. ... States Parties are encouraged to invest in 
and support forms of alternative care that can ensure security, continuity of care 
and affection, and the opportunity for young children to form long term 
attachments... . 
171  See, for instance, Law No. 272/2004 of Romania which forbids the placement of children under 
the age of 2 in residential care. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (June 
2009), para. 51(d). 
172  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mali, (May 2007), para. 42(c); Suriname, (June 
2007), para. 40; The Republic of the Congo, (October 2006), paras. 44 and 45; Swaziland, 
(October 2006), para. 41(e). 
173  (1996), para. 37. Unfortunately, the Guidelines for Initial Reports of States prepared by the 
African Committee (available at <http://www.africa-
union.org/child/Guidelines%20for%20Initial%20reports%20_%20English.pdf>) are not as clear as 
the CRC counterpart. 
174  CRC Committee, General Guidelines for periodic reports, (1996), para. 37. 
175  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Suriname, (June 2007) para. 41; Honduras, (May 
2007), para. 48(d); Benin, (October 2006), para. 43(d); Oman (September 2006), para. 37(d); The 
Republic of the Congo, (October 2006), para. 46; Swaziland, (October 2006), para. 41(f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
341
the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her 
placement.176 
 
5.4.2.4.4 Concluding remarks 
It is not difficult to envisage that some might argue that institutionalised children are 
more fortunate than street children, of whom there are estimated to be millions.177 
However, the counter argument to this is that, for the purpose of the discussion at hand, 
the question revolves around the subsidiarity principle with a particular focus on 
intercountry adoption versus institutionalisation as a form of alternative care. Therefore, 
a child who is a “street child” by definition is not one that benefits (but should benefit) 
from alternative care. It is invalid to assume that the existence of worse scenarios like 
street children can be used to justify the institutionalisation of other children contrary to 
their best interests.    
 
As shown above, the exceptional use of institutions is justified, and sometimes even 
necessary. However, compared to alternative care options such as foster care and 
domestic adoption, institutionalisation of children should generally be considered 
subsidiary. What is controversial is whether it is institutionalisation or intercountry 
adoption that should generally be considered as a measure of last resort. This issue is 
addressed in detail in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                 
176  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Honduras (May 2007), para. 48(e); Benin, (October 
2006), para. 43(d). 
177  See, generally, Ennew, (2003). 
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5.4.2.5  Intercountry adoption 
Opinions are divided over the necessity and propriety of intercountry adoption. While 
the debate for and against the practice is raging, the operative language that has 
emerged in recent times has been that intercountry adoption should be used as a 
measure of last resort. As already mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, 
whereas, under international law, children who are deprived of their family environment 
should benefit from alternative care, the hierarchy to be followed, and the place to be 
accorded to intercountry adoption amongst these options remains elusive. Therefore, 
while to argue that intercountry adoption should be a measure of last resort has 
become commonplace, what it actually means (or should mean), and what its 
implications are for child welfare policy and law are issues that have not fully been 
researched and about which little knowledge exists. This sub-section is a modest 
attempt to contribute to filling this gap. 
 
5.4.2.5.1 Intercountry adoption as a measure of “last resort”: 
General overview 
 
A range of literature exists that testifies to the tendency to construe intercountry 
adoption as categorically being a measure of “last resort”. A recent report on 
intercountry adoption indicates that “[b]ased on the so-called subsidiarity principle, 
intercountry adoption is a last resort”.178 A 2008 research paper argued that “more 
stringent guidelines for monitoring policy and practice are implemented to ensure that 
international adoption really is used as a last resort”.179 It is also not uncommon to come 
                                                 
178  Committee on Lesbian Parenthood and Intercountry Adoption, (2008), 8. 
179  Research Intelligence, (2008), 5. 
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across scholars who read Article 21 of the CRC as indicating that intercountry adoption 
should be used as a measure of “last resort”.180  
 
Influential organisations concur with this position. UNICEF is one such body,181 while 
UNHCR is another.182 The latter, for instance, shares the position that "placing children 
in an adoptive family in another country . . . may be considered only if the child, in the 
words of the CRC, ‘cannot in any suitable way be cared for' in the country where the 
refugee child lives”.183 In some countries, domestic law is following suit in legislating for 
intercountry adoption as a measure of “last resort”.184  
 
While the CRC provisions do not employ the “last resort” terminology, the ACRWC is 
explicit in this regard. To reiterate, for ease of reference, Article 24(b) of the ACRWC in 
relevant part provides that State parties shall: 
recognize that inter-country adoption in those States who have ratified or adhered to the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child or this Charter, may, as the last resort, 
be considered as an alternative means of a child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a 
                                                 
180   See, for instance, Wittner, (2003),  611, 613, and 625 (writing in three places in one document 
that intercountry adoption, according to article 21, should be a measure of last resort). Van 
Bueren too highlights that “[t]he convention implicitly incorporates the principle that inter-country 
adoptions should only be the last resort…”. See Van Bueren , (1995), 102. 
181  Dillon observes that:  
[t]he idea that intercountry adoption is a "last resort" has been misused 
by international child welfare bodies, notably UNICEF. Although it is true 
that article 21 of the UNCRC sets out a hierarchy of solutions for children 
without their families of origin, a hierarchy clarified to some degree by the 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, the often-repeated phrase 
"last resort" is used disingenuously to imply a defective, inferior child 
welfare solution. 
Dillon, (2003), 198.  
182  Apart from intergovernmental organisations working on children, some regional organisations too 
have adopted a similar position. See, for instance, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 
(December 2007), which states in its preamble that “[t]he Assembly recalls that international 
adoption should constitute the very last option and restates the principle that there should be no 
right to parenthood”. 
183   See generally, UNHCR, (1994), 2 (quoting CRC, Art. 21(b)) as cited in Stark, (2003), 281. 
184  For example, an earlier law in Romania (Law No. 48, amendment to Law No. 11/1990) promoted 
international adoption as a last resort, and only if the child could not be placed domestically. 
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foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's 
country of origin; (emphasis mine)185 
This provision seems to give the impression that there is a need to exhaust all 
alternative care options available for a child deprived of a family environment before 
intercountry adoption is considered. The “last resort” requirement under the ACRWC 
has been interpreted to imply preference for institutionalisation over intercountry 
adoption.186 Even though the CRC provisions do not employ the “last resort” 
terminology, the CRC Committee has occasionally used the terms to describe the place 
of intercountry adoption in the hierarchy of alternative care options. 
 
5.4.2.5.2 “Last resort” through the lens of the CRC Committee: 
Some confusion 
 
Some of the concluding observations of the CRC Committee have used the “last resort” 
terminology in recommending to States Parties what the hierarchy of the practice should 
be amongst the available alternative care options.187 In this respect, for instance, the 
CRC Committee recommended to Brazil that intercountry adoption should be 
                                                 
185  Art. 24(b) of the ACRWC. 
186  Stark, (2003), 435 (arguing that the “preference for institutionalization in the country of origin over 
intercountry adoption is echoed in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. …. 
Under Article 24(b), intercountry adoption is a last resort, considered only if the child cannot be 
placed in a foster or adoptive family or ‘in any suitable manner’--including institutionalization--be 
cared for in the country of origin”). 
187  It is notable that the CRC Committee has used the “last resort” language in other contexts too. 
For instance, in its Concluding Observations to Djibouti, the CRC Committee noted “with concern 
the high numbers of vulnerable and orphaned children that need special attention from the State 
party to ensure upbringing in their families and communities of origin or, as a last resort, in 
alternative care centres”. (emphasis mine) CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Djibouti, 
(October 2008), para. 41. In the context of “abuse and neglect” too, the CRC Committee 
highlighted “the creation of appropriate infrastructure in cases where, as a last resort, children 
have to be separated from their parents due to abuse and neglect and the introduction of 
mandatory reporting of abuse and neglect of children”. (emphasis mine) CRC Committee, 
Concluding Observations, Djibouti, (October 2008), para, 46. In addition, pursuant to Art. 37 of 
the CRC, States Parties are also often reminded to “[t]ake all necessary measures to ensure that 
persons under the age of 18 are only deprived of liberty as a last resort…”. See, for instance, 
CRC Committee, Concluding Observations, Tanzania, (June 2006), para. 70(d); Eritrea, (June 
2008), paras. 78 and 79(e). 
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considered, in the light of Article 21, namely as a measure of last resort.188 It has made 
a similar recommendation to Mexico.189 
 
However, during its 42nd session, the same time it concluded that Mexico should ensure 
that “adoption is used in last resort”,190 the CRC Committee has recommended to 
Colombia,191 Latvia,192 and Uzbekistan193 that institutionalisation should be used as a 
measure of last resort. What is even more confusing is that, in its Concluding 
observations on Brazil’s State party report, the CRC Committee urged the State party to 
“consider the placement of children in institutions as a measure of last resort”.194 
However, just two paragraphs down in the same document, the Committee 
recommended to the State Party to ensure that “intercountry adoption is a measure of 
last resort”.195  
 
Apart from concluding observations, in General Comment No 3 titled “HIV/AIDS and the 
rights of the child”, the same Committee remarked that: 
… any form of institutionalized care for children should only serve as a measure of last 
resort, and that measures must be fully in place to protect the rights of the child and 
guard against all forms of abuse and exploitation.196 
In the context of children with disabilities, the CRC Committee has reiterated a similar 
position that State parties “use the placement in institution only as a measure of last 
                                                 
188  See, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Brazil, (2004), para. 47(a). 
189  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico, (June 2006), para. 42(d). 
190  As above. 
191  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Colombia, (June 2006), para. 55. 
192  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Latvia, (June 2006), para. 33(c). 
193  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, (June 2006), para. 39(d) and (f). 
194  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Brazil, (November 2004), para. 45(c). 
195  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Brazil, (November 2004), para. 47(a). 
196   CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3, (2003), para. 35. 
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resort, when it is absolutely necessary and in the best interests of the child”.197 This 
leaves the CRC Committee’s position as regards the question “is it intercountry 
adoption or institutionalisation that should generally be considered as a measure of last 
resort?” unanswered.198 
 
5.4.2.5.3 “Last resort” through the lens of the CRC Committee: 
Some clarity 
 
Although it is the body with the authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention, as shown above, the CRC Committee has been sending confusing (if not 
contradictory) messages as regards what is to be considered generally a measure of 
last resort in the alternative care scheme for children deprived of their family 
environment. It is important to make sense out of this confusing message, and 
understand it in such a way that conforms to the principle of the best interests of the 
child. 
 
The Committee regards the CRC as a “living instrument, whose interpretation develops 
over time”.199 It is notable that the CRC Committee has not recommended to any State 
Party in the last three years (2007-2009) to use intercountry adoption as a measure of 
last resort. Therefore, on a purely speculative basis, it is submitted that this general 
preference for intercountry adoption over institutionalisation by the CRC Committee may 
have been informed by the overwhelming recent and conclusive research that points out 
that institutionalisation is detrimental for children’s development. 
                                                 
197  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 9, (2007), para. 47. 
198  “Generally”, because it is the conventional (non-exceptional) cases that are being taken into 
account when determining the general preference to be adopted in making decisions between 
alternative care options. 
199  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 8, (2006), para. 8. 
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This position may be corroborated further by the recent Concluding Observations from 
the CRC Committee. In this respect, the evidence from the last three years is 
overwhelming and consistent that, according to the CRC Committee, institutions should 
be used as a measure of last resort,200 and for the shortest possible time. 
 
It could be argued that it is in General Comments on thematic issues that the CRC 
Committee publishes its authoritative interpretation of the content of human rights 
provisions, and that General Comments have more authoritative interpretative weight 
than concluding observations. In this light, there is no General Comment that 
recommends that intercountry adoption should be used as a measure of last resort.  
 
However, as quoted above, there are at least two General Comments (General 
Comments No 3 and 9) from the CRC Committee that urge State parties to use 
institutionalisation as a measure of last resort. From this stems the point that it is 
institutionalisation that should generally be subsidiary to intercountry adoption for 
children who are definitively deprived of their family environment. 
 
Nonetheless, the preceding discussion does not shed light on the meaning to be 
attached to the terms “last resort”. Understanding this meaning is still crucial, for 
instance, in the context of the ACRWC that explicitly refers to intercountry adoption as 
an alternative means to be considered as a measure of last resort. Besides, as shown 
above, the CRC Committee refers to intercountry adoption to be a measure of last 
                                                 
200  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (January 
2009), para. 37(c); Uruguay, (July 2007), para. 41; Chile, (April 2007), para. 45; Honduras, (May 
2007), para. 48(c); Mali, (May 2007), para. 42(c). 
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resort. As a result, it still remains crucial to establish a nuanced understanding of the 
notion of last resort in relation to intercountry adoption. 
 
5.4.2.5.4 Understanding “last resort”: Any lessons from the 
principles of juvenile justice? 
 
One potential effort to understand the meaning of “last resort” is to draw a parallel 
between the use of these terms under juvenile justice and intercountry adoption. In this 
respect, guidance can (rather remotely) be sought from Article 37(b) of the CRC, which 
is the only provision within the CRC that uses this phrase.201 Pursuant to Article 37(b) of 
the CRC:  
No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention 
or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;202 
 
The standard for deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort requires one to 
consider “whether the intended deprivation of liberty is really the last one option (without 
any alternatives less interfering with the child’s right)”.203 In alternative care, therefore, 
this could mean resorting to intercountry adoption because it has been found to be the 
                                                 
201  At the outset, however, it is pertinent to consider some general matters of context. The enquiry 
into the meaning and implications of the last resort requirement in the juvenile justice sphere does 
not assume that the purposes of the search for alternative care, on the one hand, and the 
deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort in the context of juvenile justice, on the other, are 
the same. In light of the so called 3Ps (protection, provision and participation of the CRC and the 
ACRWC), whereas the former is more of a blend of protection and provision, the latter fits mainly 
within the protection mantra. Secondly, more often than not, it is younger children who are 
affected by intercountry adoption while juvenile justice often addresses older children. Thirdly, 
deprivation of liberty is a criminal law measure while intercountry adoption is not. Despite these 
differences, both the search for alternative care for children deprived of a family environment and 
the deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort in the context of juvenile justice, are 
supposed to be undertaken in the best interests of the child. Such a common ground – the 
promotion and protection of the best interests of a child - is assumed to create a logical and 
conducive platform for comparison. 
202  This provision does not have a counterpart within the ACRWC. In general, the ACRWC provision 
pertaining to juvenile justice has been identified by many writers as one of its shortcomings when 
compared to the CRC provisions. See Gose, (2002); Chirwa, (2002); Mezmur, (2008a). 
203  Schabas and Sax, (2006), 84. 
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last suitable alternative care method, as there are no other alternatives that would better 
suit the situation of the individual child. Just recently, in 2008, Lieffard argues that the 
last resort principle does not imply that all alternatives must be pursued first, before 
deprivation of liberty is imposed.204 
 
Thus, the interpretation under juvenile justice that the requirement of last resort does 
not necessarily lend itself to a structured or checklist approach that considers and 
pursues all alternative options before embarking on deprivation of liberty, fits well with 
the best interests of the child. Within an alternative care scheme, too, such an 
interpretation possibly has a better potential to promote the rights of children who are 
deprived of their family environment. If the approach of trying every available alternative 
care option was to be subscribed to in order to comply with the last resort requirement 
in a non-flexible manner before intercountry adoption is considered, it would mean that, 
amongst other things, children would wait unnecessarily for a longer than usual period 
of time before a family environment is found for them. 
 
In addition, if the contention that the last resort requirement under juvenile justice 
implies that imprisonment may not be “imposed without a proper assessment taking 
into account the specific circumstances of the case and the specific needs of the 
                                                 
204  Liefaard, (2008), 195. According to Liefaard, it is imperative that competent authorities exercise 
some level of discretion in accessing different options, and finally deciding which of these options 
is likely to have the intended effect. The intended effect is a result that can be considered as an 
appropriate and adequate response to the child’s criminal behaviour. If “last resort” is to be 
interpreted in a similar fashion with regard to intercountry adoption, namely, that all alternative 
care options must not necessarily be pursued first, and that authorities exercise some level of 
discretion in accessing different options, and finally deciding which of these options is likely to 
have the intended effect, then the use of the term seems to maintain its capacity to promote the 
best interests of children who are deprived of their family environment. Liefaard, (2008), 195. 
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individual child”,205 this may have positive implications for the application of alternative 
care options. Primary amongst these is the connotation for alternative care that a truly 
principled child centred approach requires a close and individualised examination of the 
precise real life situation of the particular child involved. Accordingly, a rule that 
categorically requires that intercountry adoption be made a measure of last resort 
should not be used in such a way that would compromise the best interests of the child. 
 
5.4.2.5.5 Is intercountry adoption a measure of last resort under 
the Hague Convention? 
 
It is evident from the previous discussion that references to “permanent family” and 
“suitable family” in the Hague Convention make institutionalisation subsidiary to 
intercountry adoption. In light of this, it is apposite to investigate what “permanent 
family” care encompasses.  
 
The Guide to Good Practice, which often refers to “national adoption or permanent 
family care”206 seems to give the inference that there are other permanent family care 
options other than adoption. Of course, the first port of call as permanent family care is 
the birth family or extended family.207 However, it is questionable if alternative care 
options such as kafalah, and foster care that take place in-country satisfy the elements 
of “permanent family” care. 
 
                                                 
205  Lieffaard, (2008), 194. 
206  See, Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 67,  
207  See, for instance, Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 29. 
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It may be easy to dismiss foster care outright as being subsidiary to intercountry 
adoption under the Hague Convention. For instance, that is what Pierce does.208 The 
challenge lies in providing the substantiating arguments for such a conclusion based on 
the provisions of the treaty and secondary sources.  
 
In child welfare language, “permanency” implies, amongst others, long term care for the 
child.209 “Permanency planning”, which often leads to permanent family placement, 
involves the policy and practice of securing for children ongoing positive relations with 
caring adults.210 It is contended, often correctly, that central to permanency planning is 
the belief that all children belong in families.211 It is not quite clear whether the notion of 
“permanent” requires the presence of a legal bond which leads to the creation of legally 
created filiations. However, it is argued by this writer that permanency planning 
connotes “the opportunity to establish lifetime relationships”212 and hence the presence 
of a legal bond could be taken to be one of the elements of a “permanent family”.  
 
                                                 
208  Pierce writes that “[t]he Hague Convention places intercountry adoptions before foster and 
institutional care in the child's country of origin”. Pierce, (1996), 540. 
209  For a detailed discussion of permanency see Maluccio et al., (1982). The principles to take into 
account in elaborating a permanent life plan include: the recognition that every child is a unique 
being; responsibility for raising a child, and for ensuring his or her upbringing is initially incumbent 
upon his or her parents; the protection of a child must always be considered from a dynamic 
prospective with the final objective, in principle, of permanent integration in a family capable of 
covering his/her needs independently; the child’s participation is guaranteed; work is done in a 
coordinated fashion so as to guarantee continuity in the course of the child’s life. See ISS/IRC, 
(2005), 7-8 (presenting a set of global policy guidelines for the protection of children without 
parental care. It recommends the need for a global understanding of best practices within the 
legal framework of the CRC). 
210  See American Academy of Pediatrics, (2000), 106.  
211  Kanter, (2008), 2. 
212  Maluccio and Fein defined permanency planning as: 
The systemic process of carrying out, within a brief time-limited period, a set of 
goal-directed activities designed to help children live in families that offer 
continuity of relationships with nurturing parents of caretakers and the 
opportunity to establish lifetime relationships. 
Maluccio and Fein, (1983), 197. 
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According to this understanding, it is possible to discern that, arguably, kafalah, and 
foster care (including institutionalisation) are two alternative care options that would be 
considered subsidiary to intercountry adoption under the Hague Convention. Neither 
kafalah nor foster care create legal filiations whereby the children in these practices are 
given the same status as biological children.  
 
A description of the principle of subsidiarity by the Permanent Bureau, which is quoted 
in full in the introduction to this Chapter, states in part that “[o]nly after due consideration 
has been given to national solutions should intercountry adoption be considered, and 
then only if it is in the child’s best interests”.213 Therefore “due consideration” implies 
that there is no absolute duty to adhere to national solutions or to base alternative care 
decisions solely on the criteria of making international solutions subsidiary to national 
ones all the time. The use of the phrase “due consideration” adds some leverage and 
flexibility in making decisions about available alternative care options.214 
 
From this stems the assertion that there is no assumption under Article 4(b) of the 
Hague Convention that the existence of placement options within a State of origin would 
necessarily guarantee the best interests of a child. In other words, even if possibilities 
such as domestic adoption, foster care and the like might be available as a possibility 
                                                 
213  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 29. 
214  In 1990, before the Hague Convention was adopted, the Special Commission of the Permanent 
Bureau on Intercountry Adoption concluded that: 
[A] child's best interests are in general best served if the child is raised 
by his or her own parents or, alternatively, by a foster or adoptive family 
in the child's own country; intercountry adoption is to be seen as a 
solution of a subsidiary nature for ensuring the welfare of the child. 
See Permanent Bureau, Conclusions of the Special Commission, (1990), 13. However, through 
the adoption of the Hague Convention, and the interpretation of its provisions on subsidiarity, this 
earlier position seems to have faded into the background as foster care does not seem to be 
preferable over intercountry adoption. 
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for placement of the child within the state of origin, other compelling reasons in the best 
interests of the child could override the applicability of these possibilities.  
 
Despite this, there is still some dilemma that Article 4(b) of the Hague Convention does 
not address directly upon first reading. To illustrate this point and sum up, the following 
observation by the ISS is instructive:  
Sometimes, the evaluation criteria contradict each other. What happens, for example, when 
a child without parents has a chance of either being placed with an aunt outside his/her 
own country? Does priority have to be given to the child’s family ties abroad or to the 
continuity of his/her education, as well as ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic origin. 
Consequently should the child be placed with the aunt, running the risk of creating in 
him/her emotional development, or opt for a domestic solution, to the detriment of his/her 
ties?215 
 
5.5 SOME COMPLEX ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF SUBSIDIARITY 
 
5.5.1   The voice of the biological family (including the child) in defining the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity 
 
A point worth highlighting in the context of intercountry adoption (or for that matter, any 
other alternative care option) is the role of child participation.216 In the context of the 
principle of subsidiarity, a child, especially an older one, might express the view that his 
or her best interests would be promoted through an intercountry adoption placement 
rather than a domestic one. In this respect, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that this 
view must be taken into consideration, and may in fact be determinative depending 
                                                 
215  ISS/IRC, (April 2007). 
216  For a discussion of child participation under the CRC and the ACRWC, see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.6. 
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upon the child’s maturity.217 As a result, intercountry adoption as a placement option 
could over-ride other alternatives. 
 
Related to this, and more complicated, is the extent to which the views of birth parents 
might define the application of the principle of subsidiarity. An example that epitomises 
this is evident from the U.S. The final Regulations to implement the Hague Convention, 
as a rule, require an agency to meet the recruitment requirements to the satisfaction of 
a State judge, before a child from the U.S. is placed with an adoptive family abroad.218 
However, the Regulations provide for an exception where reasonable efforts to place a 
child in the U.S. are not required in cases where birth parents have identified 
prospective adoptive parents abroad.219 More often than not, this exception will be 
upheld to ensure that the birth parent's decision is honoured even when domestic 
parents are qualified and interested in the child.220 Commenting on the final 
Regulations, Ethica has argued that:  
The regulations disregard the subsidiarity principle of the Convention in outgoing Hague 
cases by allowing children to be placed outside the country without considering alternatives 
inside the U.S. if the birth parent has identified a person abroad—which will happen in 
virtually every case because agencies or attorneys will locate a person for the birthmother. 
Other provisions already provided judicial discretion for relative placements or those in 
which the parent personally knew someone abroad, making this allowance wholly 
unnecessary.221 
 
                                                 
217   See, CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12, (2009), para. 28-31 for an explanation of what it 
means for a child’s views to be “given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child”. 
218  See Avitan, (2007), 505-506 for a discussion of the notion of “reasonable efforts”. 
219  As above. 
220  Avitan, (2007), 517. 
221   Ethica, (March 2006), 4. 
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It is not within the scope of this study to investigate why birth parents choose to place 
their children abroad rather than in their countries of origin.222 However, it is apposite to 
proffer a few observations about the potential implications of this exceptional practice.  
 
This practice has put the spot light on the potential conflict that might result between 
the views of biological family and the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. For 
instance, it has the potential to undermine the role of the extended family. To elaborate, 
even in situations where there is an equally suitable member of the extended family (for 
instance an uncle or an aunt) who is willing and able to care for the child, the child 
could be placed abroad under the guise of honouring the views of the biological 
parents. 
 
Furthermore, there is merit in making a distinction between a situation where biological 
parents have identified prospective adoptive parents abroad, on the one hand, and 
when they just simply give a general preference for the placement of the child abroad, 
on the other. In the former case, there is a high likelihood that Article 29 of the Hague 
Convention dealing with the “no initial contact rule” would be violated. 
 
In general, the concern raised by Ethica, as quoted above is valid. In particular, in 
countries where poverty is rife, and the regulatory framework for intercountry adoption 
                                                 
222  Some birth parents choose foreign families because they believe their child will experience less 
racism abroad than in the U.S.. Avitan, (2007) 500. For instance, a mother living in a small 
culturally homogenous country, where religion is a dominant force in social life and is supported 
by the institutions of the state, non-marital births can result in the social exclusion of the parents 
and the child. A classical example of this was Ireland in the 1970s. See O’Halloran, (2009), 137. 
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is weak, the possibility that intermediaries would abuse such a practice to circumvent 
the application of the subsidiarity principle is a real one. 
 
In sum, since the practice of allowing birth parents to choose intercountry adoption has 
the potential to thwart some of the main goals the principle of subsidiarity attempts to 
achieve, its implementation and implications should be closely scrutinised. Where this 
practice is embraced by law or practice, it is advisable to keep it as exceptional as 
possible,223 and consider it only on a case by case basis to determine whether it 
promotes the best interests of the child involved.  
 
5.5.2    The scope of application of the principle of subsidiarity on prospective 
adopters 
 
The classification of countries as “sending countries” and “receiving countries” should 
be qualified with the prefix “traditionally”. This is for the obvious reason that even if a 
country is a country of origin for a majority of intercountry adoption cases that it is 
involved in, there might still be few cases where it serves as a receiving country when 
its habitual residents adopt children from abroad, and vice versa. It is not far-fetched to 
forecast that, with economic, social and cultural developments, some countries that are 
traditionally sending countries might also increasingly become receiving countries in the 
medium and long term.   
 
In connection to this, a question has been posed:  
                                                 
223  Keeping the practice as exceptional as possible also entails limiting its application to biological 
parents only, and not expanding it, for instance, to institutions. To illustrate, it should not be 
possible for faith based organisations that have the care of children to circumvent the subsidiarity 
principle under the guise of their need to place children abroad with prospective adoptive parents 
who share the religious background of the child and the organisation. 
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if a receiving country which carries out several thousands of intercountry adoptions each 
year, is also a country of origin for part of ‘its’ children, does this country respect the 
principle of subsidiarity?224  
At the heart of this question, put bluntly, is whether or not a country can oblige its 
citizens to adopt domestically before setting their sights on children abroad. This brings 
with it the question of the scope of application of international treaties, like the CRC, the 
ACRWC, and the Hague Convention, upon individuals. As is clear from the language 
employed in these instruments, the nature of obligations entrenched in the treaties are 
upon States Parties and not upon individuals. As a result, prospective adoptive parents 
do not have a direct obligation to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
Many interrelated factors explain why prospective adoptive parents turn to intercountry 
adoption when adoptable children are available in the country of their habitual 
residence. Taking measures that facilitate domestic adoptions, such as awareness 
raising, provision of various incentives, programmes that encourage adoption of older 
children and groups of siblings, and addressing other social and structural hurdles (for 
instance, racism) remain the obligation of States Parties to the CRC, the ACRWC and 
the Hague Convention to address in their efforts to implement the principle of 
subsidiarity. These measures could promote domestic adoption and further encourage 
prospective adoptive parents to consider the adoption of a child from their country prior 
to looking abroad.225 
 
 
 
                                                 
224  ISS/IRC Monthly Review, (March-April/2009), 1. 
225  ISS/IRC Monthly Review, (March-April/2009), 2. 
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5.5.3  Reconciling the approach to subsidiarity under the CRC and the 
ACRWC, and the Hague Convention 
 
The central question posed here is: How can States Parties to the CRC and the 
ACRWC, and the Hague Convention comply with their obligations on the principle of 
subsidiarity while being States Parties to instruments with slightly different statements 
on one of the most fundamental principles of intercountry adoption?  
 
This question is mainly an issue of treaty interpretation. While there is no generally 
accepted definition of what constitutes a conflict between treaties, a divergence 
between treaties need not always be a conflict.226 A conflict in the strict sense occurs 
when a State party to two treaties cannot simultaneously honour its obligations under 
both treaties.227 This said, recourse to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties dealing with “Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject 
matter” sheds some light on this issue. The main thrust of this provision for the case at 
hand is that, as between parties to one treaty who become parties to a second, the 
general trend is that the second governs any point where it is incompatible with the 
first.228 
 
This general trend in interpretation is validated by the fact that both the CRC and the 
ACRWC explicitly recognise that the standards incorporated in the respective treaties 
are the minimum standards that are to be adhered to by State parties. Article 41 (b) of 
the CRC states that: 
                                                 
226  Borgen, (2005), 575. 
227  See, for instance, Pauwelyn, (2003), 167. 
228  Borgen, (2005), 577. Art. 30(2) of the VCLT states that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject 
to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions 
of that other treaty prevail”. 
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Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in…  
(b) International law in force for that State.  
A similar position is echoed by Article 1(2) of the ACRWC.229 
 
However, Article 41(b) of the CRC, and Article 1(2) of the ACRWC, do not become 
operational automatically. As a preliminary condition for their operation, an 
understanding by States Parties that the manner in which the principle of subsidiarity is 
incorporated in the Hague Convention is more conducive to the realisation of the rights 
of the child is required. If Graff’s argument that “[t]he Hague Convention has clearly 
remedied the textual flaws of the CRC”230 is to be subscribed to, adherence to the 
principle of subsidiarity under the Hague Convention as opposed to under the CRC (and 
the ACRWC) should be considered to be more in keeping with the best interests of the 
child.  
 
This understanding could be reinforced by the fact that, despite its recognition of the 
departure of the Hague Convention’s approach to that from the CRC on the subsidiarity 
principle, the CRC Committee has consistently and systematically recommended to 
States Parties to the CRC to ratify the Hague Convention. It has done this since early 
                                                 
229  Art. 1(2) of the ACRWC states that: 
Nothing in this Charter shall affect any provisions that are more conductive to the 
realization of the rights and welfare of the child contained in the law of a State 
Party or in any other international Convention or agreement in force in that State. 
230  This conclusion is arrived at based on the premises that: 
The Hague Convention does not make the mistake of according the family unit superior 
rights to the child. It further makes intercountry adoption a viable and more readily 
reached option for child care placement. By placing this stamp of legitimization upon 
intercountry adoption, the Hague Convention created in itself the power to regulate and 
control the practice.  
Graff, (2000), 425-426. 
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1994, before the coming into force of the Hague Convention.231 In fact, in its 
recommendations, the CRC Committee’s language has partly shifted with time 
emphasising the increasing importance of ratifying the Hague Convention. This shift in 
emphasis is notable starting from “the hope that the State party will become a party”232 
to recommending that “the State party… [r]atify”,233 to “recommends that the State 
party:… [s]peedily ratify”,234 to the CRC Committee “notes with regret that the State 
party has still not ratified”235 the Hague Convention (emphasis mine).  
 
5.6 CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY IN THE 
COUNTRIES UNDER THE STUDY 
 
5.6.1   Ethiopia  
Mainly as a result of the economic challenge that Government faces, measures to 
promote family preservation are almost non-existent in Ethiopia. There is still a need for 
more focus on community based care, too. The legal framework as entrenched in the 
RFC fails to promote community based care.  
 
Government often uses institutional care as a measure of first resort for children 
deprived of their family environment both permanently and temporarily. The quality of 
service in institutions is compromised due to the lack of budget, the lack of qualified 
                                                 
231  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Belarus, (February 1994), para. 13 and CRC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (February 1994), para. 18 as the first two 
countries to which the CRC Committee expressed its support for the ratification of the Hague 
Convention. The Hague Convention entered into force in May 1995. 
232  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Belarus, (February 1994), para. 13. 
233  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Benin, (October 2006), para. 45(c). 
234  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan, (June 2007), para. 44(a). 
235  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chad, (January 2009), para. 51. 
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staff, lack of supervision and lack of accountability.236 For instance, while Article 36(3) of 
the Constitution of Ethiopia provides that “… children under government fostership, and 
children in public or private orphanages shall be kept separate from adults”, it does not 
provide for the separation of these children from children in conflict with the law. There 
are indications that the increased use of institutions as alternative care has created a 
positive perception on the part of society about institutional care.237 There is anecdotal 
evidence that this in turn is motivating parents to abandon their children to be placed in 
institutional care.238  
 
Informal adoption, which is known locally as Gudifecha is an age old practice239 that 
exists in Ethiopia. It is reported that the practice is “a highly valued and socially 
endorsed act”.240 Children who are a subject of Gudifecha are often “legally and socially 
considered to be on a par with biological offspring”.241 However, domestic adoption is 
almost non-existent and intercountry adoption is prevalent. 
 
The figures submitted by Government to the CRC Committee are telling. Government 
has reported that between 1999/2000 and 2002/2003, a total of 2,760 children have 
been adopted through intercountry adoption while the figure for domestic adoption was 
                                                 
236  See, generally, CIFF, FHI/Ethiopia and UNICEF (December 2008); Interview with Yenealem 
Mersha, Adoption Team Leader, MOWA, (25 September 2009); Biniam Eshetu, Legal Expert, 
MOWA, (25 September 2009); Tsewaye Muluneh, Lawyer (and former judge), (24 September 
2009). 
237  As above. 
238  As above. 
239  See, generally, Beckstrom, (1972), 145-168. 
240  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 121. 
241  As above. 
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130.242 In the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 the figure for intercountry adoption was 1415 
and 1855 respectively.243 
 
Data available on domestic adoptions is highly limited, and the Government reckons 
that this is partly due to the cultural perception that “reporting adopted children to third 
parties as a form of discrimination abominable to God and man”.244 However, it is worth 
noting that as far as domestic adoptions are concerned, there is hardly any awareness 
raising; no financial incentives to encourage domestic adoption; or any form of 
promotion being done either by civil society or Government. There is no domestic 
adoption strategy by the MOWA, too. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that it is 
reported that the adoption of an Ethiopian child by Ethiopians domestically “is practically 
impossible compared to non-Ethiopians”245 or intercountry adoption. 
 
Article 192(2) of the RFC entrenches that “Government or private orphanages may give 
any child under their custody to adopters”. While this provision does not indicate if this is 
also true for intercountry adoption, it at least gives the indication that domestic adoption 
is preferable to institutional care. In addition, of direct relevance is Article 194 (3)(d) of 
the RFC, which indicates that before a court approves the agreement of adoption where 
the adopter is a foreigner, it shall take into consideration “the absence of access to raise 
the child in Ethiopia”. 
 
                                                 
242  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 122. 
243  CRC Committee, Additional information to the Third Periodic Report of Ethiopia, (August 2006), 
11.  
244  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 122. 
245  The Ethiopian Reporter, (27 June 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
363
Section 6(2)(a) of the Guidelines of MOWA indicate that, a child is available for 
intercountry adoption only when: 
…proof confirmed by authorised government organs is adduced to the effect that the 
child cannot benefit from other alternative care options such as foster care, community 
care programmes, institutional care, sponsorship or domestic adoption, and if the child is 
older than ten years, if it is proved that the child does not object to the intercountry 
adoption. 
This position seems slightly different from the response the Government gave to the 
CRC Committee in 2006 by stating that “[c]hildren are given for inter-country adoption 
when there are no opportunities for in-country adoption”.246 Indeed the practice seems 
to conform with this approach expressed by Government.  
 
However, a look at the practice of intercountry adoption in Ethiopia clearly demonstrates 
that preference is given to intercountry adoption than institutionalisation. What is 
problematic is that, in practice, almost every child (except for those whose family of 
origin has expressly objected to intercountry adoption) who is in an institution is 
considered available for intercountry adoption. This has led to instances where children 
who are not deprived of their family environment permanently are adopted 
internationally.247 
 
5.6.2    Kenya 
In Kenya, some measures that promote family preservation are underway. A good 
example of this is a limited social cash transfer scheme that is benefitting poor children 
                                                 
246  CRC Committee, Additional information to the third periodic report of Ethiopia, (August 2006). 
247  Interview with Biniam Eshetu, Legal Expert, MOWA, (25 September 2009); Deresse Bezawork, 
adoption lawyer, (25 September 2009);  
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and their families.248 The number of the target beneficiaries of this cash transfer are 
expected to rise to 100,000 by 2011.249  
 
Despite the continued role the extended family is playing to provide children with a 
family environment, it is criticised that this system was “made invisible” in the Children 
Act.250 The review of the Children Act is expected to address this shortcoming. 
 
The use of institutions cannot be labelled as a measure of last resort. Similar problems 
that are experienced in Ethiopia are present in Kenya, too. Overcrowding of children’s 
homes and lack of trained personnel working in them is also reported.251  
 
It is commendable that the Children Act252 and the Children (CCI) Regulations (2005) 
regulate institutions in detail. However, the challenge remains on the implementation 
side. As a 2009 report vividly portrays, there is a need to put a moratorium on the 
burgeoning CCI’s in the country for proper regulation.253  
 
There is nothing in the Children Act that entrenches the subsidiarity nature of 
intercountry adoption. The only provision entitled “International Adoptions”, which is 
Section 162 of the Children Act is silent on the issue of subsidiarity. However, the 
                                                 
248  See Sloth-Nielsen, (2008c), 14 and sources cited therein (discussing the social cash transfers in 
Kenya). 
249  As above. 
250  See, generally, Zilliox, (2006), 376. 
251  OMCT, (2006), 26. 
252  For instance, Sec. 58 of the Children Act defines a charitable children’s institution; Sec. 68 of the 
Children Act creates the inspection committees that are appointed by the Minister to inspect 
rehabilitation schools, children’s remand home and charitable children’s institutions; Sec. 67 of 
the Children Act enables the Director of the Children’s Services to appoint officers to inspect 
CCIs. 
253  Parry-Williams, J. and Njoka, J. (March 2009) 26, 72, and 76. 
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number of children adopted through domestic adoption and intercountry adoption is very 
close to each other.254  
 
In its report to the CRC Committee, the Government of Kenya has identified a number 
of constraints that characterise the adoption system. These include expenses for 
adoption; lack of clear information about adoption; and the fact that the adoption system 
is monopolised by few adoption agencies as many children’s organisations are “ignorant 
of the fact that they can be registered as adoption agencies”.255 
 
There are, however, measures underway in order to minimise recourse to intercountry 
adoption as an alternative means of care. NGOs are undertaking various campaigns to 
promote domestic adoption.256 Efforts to train prospective adoptive parents (for 
domestic adoption purposes) to represent themselves in court and avoid a lawyer’s fee 
are producing tangible results.257 
 
5.6.3   Malawi 
In Malawi, the principle of subsidiarity finds expression only through case law. The 
Judge in the Infant CJ High Court case emphasised that, in terms of Article 24(b) of the 
ACRWC, “[c]learly inter-country adoption is supposed to be the last resort 
alternative”.258 For the Judge, infant CJ was being cared for in a suitable manner in an 
                                                 
254  Parry-Williams, J. and Njoka, J. (March 2009), 17-18. 
255  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 313. 
256  Interview with Irene Mureithi, Child Welfare Society of Kenya, (22 June 2009); Interview with 
Susan Otuoma, Little Angels Network, (22 June 2009). 
257  See, generally, the findings in Mureithi, I. et al. (2009). 
258  High Court Infant CJ case, 7. 
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orphanage since “‘in any suitable manner’ refers to the style of life of the indigenous or 
as close a life to the one that the child has been leading since birth”.259 
 
This is, indeed, a distorted view of the notion of care in a “suitable manner”. Put bluntly, 
it seems to insinuate that, for instance, if a child was abandoned at birth and has been 
living in an orphanage, institutionalisation constitutes a suitable means of care because, 
in any case, the institutional lifestyle is what the child knows. This approach shows a 
clear disregard to the CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 7 on “Implementing 
child rights in early childhood”, which strongly warns against institutionalisation as being 
particularly inappropriate for young children.260 The fact that the High Court wrongly 
envisaged long-term institutionalisation to be in the best interests of infant CJ is 
apparent from the judgment when the Judge positively noted the lack of evidence to 
indicate Kondanani Orphanage’s “inability or unwillingness … to continue looking after 
CJ” (emphasis mine).261  
 
If the Infant CJ High Court judgment was allowed to stand, it would have set an 
unfortunate precedent (which could have been elevated to a status of rule), privileging 
                                                 
259  High Court Infant CJ case, 7. 
260  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7, (2005), para. 36. This paragraph in particular 
observes that “[r]esearch suggests that low quality institutional care is unlikely to promote healthy 
physical and psychological development and can have serious negative consequences for long 
term social adjustment, especially for children under 3 but also for children under five years old. 
To the extent that alternative care is required, early placement in family based or family like care 
is more likely to produce positive outcomes for young children. States Parties are encouraged to 
invest in and support forms of alternative care that can ensure security, continuity of care and 
affection, and the opportunity for young children to form long term attachments based on mutual 
trust and respect, for example through fostering, adoption and support for members of extended 
families”. 
261  High Court Infant CJ case, 7. 
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long-term institutional care in an unwarranted fashion,262 and in a way which runs 
directly contrary to the “any suitable manner” requirement under both the CRC and the 
ACRWC.263 However, on appeal, the SCA rightly disagreed with the lower court’s 
appreciation of the subsidiarity principle. Under the Adoption Act, the SCA wrote, “we 
do not think that …inter country adoption is a last resort alternative”.264 The SCA 
recognised that neither had there been a single family in Malawi that had come forward 
to adopt infant CJ, nor had there been any attempt by anybody to place infant CJ in a 
foster family.265 This, in the view of the Court, left only two options – the infant “can 
either stay in Kondanani Orphanage and have no family life at all or she can be 
adopted by the Appellant and grow in a family that the Appellant is offering”.266 By 
taking this approach, the SCA displayed the correct appreciation that the application of 
the subsidiarity principle depends on the options that are in actual fact available as 
alternative care.  
 
The SCA found a notable Indian case, Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India: [(1984) 2 
SCC 244; AIR 1984 SC 469], to be instructive. This is a case where, in the absence of 
legislation, the Supreme Court of India framed elaborate guidelines in respect of 
                                                 
262  It is to be noted that the CRC Committee, in its Concluding Observations on the State party report 
of Malawi, raised concern about the increasing number of orphanages and children’s homes, 
recommending to the State party, inter alia to promote and support family-type forms of 
alternative care for children deprived of parental care, including foster care in order to reduce the 
resort to residential care. See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Malawi, (January 
2009), para. 44. 
263  See Art. 21(b) of CRC, and Art. 24(b) of ACRWC.  
264  SCA Infant CJ case, 18. 
265  As above. 
266  As above. 
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adoption.267 The SCA underscored a paragraph from this judgment that read, in part, 
that:  
If it is not possible to find suitable adoptive parents for the child within the country, it may 
become necessary to give the child in adoption to foreign parents rather than allow the 
child to grow up in an orphanage or an institution where it will have no family life and no 
love and affection of parents… (emphasis mine).268 
The phrase “it may become necessary” is indicative of the fact that this is just a general 
rule, and should be approached on a case by case basis.269 The SCA seemed to 
appreciate this reality when it wrote that: 
…the welfare of infant CJ will be better taken care of by having her adopted by the foreign 
parent rather than for her to grow up in an orphanage where she will have no family life, no 
love and affection of parents (emphasis mine).270  
This evinces an approach that displays an appreciation that the principle of subsidiarity 
could be subject to the best interests of the child principle.271 
 
The reasoning of the SCA has also shed some light, albeit obliquely, on the general 
position to be taken when the option of alternative care available is between foster care 
or domestic adoption, on the one hand, and intercountry adoption, on the other. This 
can be deciphered from the SCA’s observation that: 
It is a fact that since the case of infant CJ surfaced itself there has not been a single family 
in Malawi that has come forward to adopt infant CJ neither has there been any attempt by 
anybody to place infant CJ in a foster family.272 
                                                 
267  For a related subsequent case, see Indian Council for Social Welfare v. State of A.P.[(1999) 6 
SCC 365]. 
268  SCA Infant CJ case, 18. 
269  The presence of this phrase, for instance, still leaves room for the role institutionalisation could 
play as a temporary solution in promoting the rights of children deprived of their family 
environment. For instance, institutions can serve as transition places for children awaiting 
adoption. 
270  SCA Infant CJ case, 18. 
271  It is argued that the position the subsidiarity principle assumes is an in itself subsidiary one — 
one subservient to the best interests of the child. See Nicholson, (2000), 248.   
272  SCA Infant CJ case, 18. 
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Reading into this statement, it is implied that domestic adoption and foster placement, 
being family based solutions in the country of origin, would generally enjoy preference 
over intercountry adoption, which is also family based, but not a domestic solution. This 
interpretation is congruent with the current position under international law, and 
generally bodes well for the best interests of the child principle.  
 
5.6.4    South Africa 
The principle of subsidiarity has found its way into South African legal system. Not only 
has it been incorporated (indirectly) in legislation, it has been interrogated by the 
different levels of the South African courts. Since the principle appears in slightly 
different form and method of implementation before and after the promulgation of the 
Children’s Act, the following discussion is divided accordingly. 
 
5.6.4.1  Principle of subsidiarity before the Children’s Act 
As already pointed out above,273 intercountry adoption was not allowed in South Africa 
until the Fitzpatrick case. This is because Section 18(f) of the Child Care Act generally 
excluded non-South African citizens from adopting.274  
                                                 
273  See Chapter 1, section 1.8.2. 
274  Sec. 18(f) of the Child care Act provided that: 
A children’s court to which application for an order of adoption is made in terms 
of subsection (2), shall not grant the application unless it is satisfied- … 
(f) in the case of a child born of any person who is a South African citizen, that 
the applicant, except an applicant referred to in section 17(c), or one of the 
applicants is a South African citizen resident in the Republic, or the applicant has 
or the applicants have otherwise the necessary residential qualifications for the 
grant to him or them under the South African Citizenship Act, 1949 (Act No. 44 of 
1949), of a certificate or certificates of naturalisation as a South African citizen or 
South African citizens and has or have made application for such a certificate or 
certificates.  
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The two central issues in the Fitzpatrick case were whether Section 18(4)(f) of the Child 
Care Act was in conflict with the Constitution, and if so, the form of the order that should 
be made and, in particular, whether an order of invalidity should be suspended.275 One 
of the concerns raised by the Minister and the amicus curiae in relation to the invalidity 
taking immediate effect was the lack of adequate regulation and infrastructure to 
implement the subsidiarity principle.276 It was the submission of the Minister that a 
redrafted Section 18(4)(f) should contain the kind of safeguards and standards, 
including the subsidiarity principle, found in the Hague Convention.277 
 
In this respect, the Court asserted that regardless of the fact that it was not expressly 
provided for in South African law, the subsidiarity principle had to be respected.278 
Article 21(b) of the CRC was mentioned as the relevant provision to be complied with, 
since according to Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, it had to be considered when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. The Court held that: 
[t]he concerns that underlie the principle of subsidiarity are met by the requirement in 
section 40 of the Act that courts are to take into consideration the religious and cultural 
background of the child, on the one hand, and the adoptive parents, on the other.
 
279 
As a result, the Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the Child Care Act enable 
the children’s court to prevent the abuses and meet the concerns expressed by the 
Minister and the amicus curiae.280  
                                                 
275  Fitzpatrick case, para. 13. 
276  Fitzpatrick case, para. 23. 
277  Fitzpatrick case, para. 26. 
278  Fitzpatrick case, para. 32, footnote 33. 
279  Fitzpatrick case, para. 32 
280  Fitzpatrick case, para.  34. In the final analysis, the Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of the 
provision, and concluded that there was no need to suspend the invalidity. 
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This reasoning of the Court betrayed its limited appreciation of what the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity entails. This has been a subject of criticism by some.281 
Louw notes that “section 40 would be of no assistance in deciding, for example, 
between the desirability of an intracountry transracial adoption and an intercountry 
transracial adoption”.282 The Court’s reasoning does not also offer any guidance 
whatsoever on the preferred hierarchy of alternative care options. In conclusion, as 
Couzens notes, “[t]he Court failed to acknowledge the complexities of the practice and 
the highly specialised legal provisions and institutional structure necessary for safely 
engaging in intercountry adoptions”.283  
 
5.6.4.2  Principle of subsidiarity under the Children’s Act 
The word “subsidiarity” does not appear anywhere in Chapters 15 and 16 of the 
Children’s Act. However, mechanisms for the implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity are entrenched in the Children’s Act. 
 
The Children’s Act makes it compulsory that before a child is made available for 
intercountry adoption, the name of the child should have been placed in the Register on 
Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive (RACAP) for at least 60 days.284 In 
addition, within these 60 days, it should be evident that "no fit and proper adoptive 
parent for the child"285 is available in South Africa. In the AD v DW case, the amicus has 
                                                 
281  For a discussion and critical view of the case, see Mosikatsana, (2004), 103. See too, Moodley, 
(2007), 7. 
282  Louw, (2006), 517. See too, Couzens, (2009), 56. 
283  Couzens, (2009), 56. 
284  Secs. 261(5)(g) and 262(5)(g) of the Children’s Act.  
285  Sec. 261(5)(g) of the Children’s Act.   
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rightly submitted that “[s]ubsidiarity is not a passive principle”.286 Therefore, what is 
envisaged in the Children’s Act through the RACAP is a limited time frame within which 
reasonable efforts in South Africa are undertaken to establish whether there are any 
other suitable local placement options for a child.287 In practice, reasonable efforts 
include networking with other agencies that do intercountry adoption in order to find a 
suitable local placement for a child. The RACAP, as a properly managed centralised 
database, fills the gap that existed in the past for establishing the availability of local 
families beyond informal checks by agencies and adoption social workers.288  
 
The fact that the Children’s Act requires the Central Authority to manage the RACAP289 
is advantageous in a number of respects. Amongst other advantages, this arrangement: 
…creates the conditions for the Central Authority to verify whether adequate measures 
have been taken to support the family of origin, to re-integrate the child, to place the child 
within the extended families or find alternative national placements. All of these confer 
control to the Central Authority over the practical application of the subsidiarity principle in 
individual adoption cases.290 
 
In the AD v DW case, the Constitutional Court has examined the principle of subsidiarity 
in some detail. One major point of contention in this case was how to apply the principle 
in the case of Baby R’s situation,291 who had already strongly bonded with the 
Appellants, and was almost reaching her third birthday.  
 
                                                 
286  Amicus brief, AD v DW, para. 106. 
287  See amicus brief, AD V DW, para. 111. 
288  Mosikatsana and Loffell, (2007), 15-10. 
289  Sec. 232(1) of the Children’s Act. 
290  Couzens, (2009), 63. 
291  AD v DW case, para. 38. 
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The Constitutional Court found the view by the majority in the SCA that the principle of 
subsidiarity acted as an insurmountable bar to the granting by the High Court of an 
order of sole custody and sole guardianship in favour of the applicants292 as a 
“proposition … stated in terms that were too bald”.293 The Constitutional Court held that 
the principle of subsidiarity should be adhered to as a “core factor” governing 
intercountry adoptions, but that it is not “the ultimate governing factor in intercountry 
adoptions”.294 While cognisant “that there are powerful considerations favouring 
adopted children growing up in the country and community of their birth”,295 the 
Constitutional Court indicated that “the subsidiarity principle itself must be seen as 
subsidiary to the paramountcy principle”.296 
 
Further alluding to the primacy of the best interests principle, the Court went on to note 
that “[d]etermining the best interests of the child cannot be circumscribed by mechanical 
legal formulae or through rigid hierarchical ranking of care options”.297 It was 
recommended “that a contextualised case–by-case enquiry be conducted ... in order to 
find the solution best adjusted to the child...”.298  
 
The emphasis placed by the Constitutional Court on the best interests of the child being 
the consideration that overrides the subsidiarity principle is very welcome. However, it is 
submitted that, as argued in Section 3.3.3.4, demanding compliance with legal 
requirements should generally not be viewed as circumscribing the paramountancy of 
                                                 
292  AD v DW case, para. 54. 
293  AD v DW case, para. 54. 
294  AD v DW case, para. 49. 
295  AD v DW case, para. 55. 
296  AD v DW case, para. 55. 
297  AD v DW case, para. 50. 
298  AD v DW case, para. 50. 
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children’s best interests to legal necessities. Moreover, the Constitutional Court 
criticised “rigid hierarchal ranking of care options” (emphasis mine) and not “general 
hierarchical ranking of care options” (that, by definition, is open to exceptions), which is 
not only allowed but is also important. 
  
As observed elsewhere,299 it is argued that: 
[t]he AD v DW case leaves one with a niggling uneasiness that the nettle was not 
properly grasped, and future litigants may well, assisted by the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court, find loopholes to bypass the carefully engineered structure, national 
and international, governing inter-country adoptions. 
All stakeholders should be on the watch to safeguard against such abuses. In addition, 
the AD v DW case does not give guidance on the preference to be given amongst other 
alternative care options, for instance, between foster care versus institutionalisation.  
 
In light of the Constitutional Court’s position that the best interests of the child overrides 
the subsidiarity principle, it is argued that the RACAP’s 60 days requirement is subject 
to the best interests principle. In addition, the Children’s Act makes room for a biological 
parent to express any reasonable preference in respect of the child’s placement to be 
taken into account.300 Such a preference, if considered to be in the best interests of the 
child, might be allowed to override the subsidiarity principles. However, as argued in 
section 5.5.1 above, the implementation of such a preference should be closely 
monitored so that children’s best interests are not compromised.   
 
                                                 
299  Sloth-Nielsen, Mezmur, and Van Heerden, (2009), 16. 
300  Sec. 240(1)(b) of the Children’s Act. 
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Finally, what is important to highlight here is the fact that the Children’s Act places the 
principle of subsidiarity within an integrated system of alternative care options. It 
incorporates measures to ensure that national adoptions are prioritised over 
intercountry placements. National adopters may apply for a means-test (adoption) 
grant.301 At the time of writing, an adoption strategy is being developed which further 
promotes the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. The Children’s Act also 
establishes and regulates foster care and institutionalisation of children. More 
importantly, measures that facilitate family preservation are provided by the South 
African government.302  
 
5.7  CONCLUSION 
 
While the principle of subsidiarity traces its roots in the 1986 UN Declaration, it is 
incorporated in the CRC, ACRWC, and explicitly, in the Hague Convention. The 
advantages of the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity include allowing 
children to remain with their family of origin; facilitating the promotion of the cultural 
identity of the child; and also offering an opportunity to the authorities of the child’s 
country to respond to the needs of their children first. It is indeed a central principle for 
the protection of children who are deprived of their family environment. 
 
Whereas, under international law, children who are deprived of their family environment 
should benefit from alternative care, the hierarchy to be followed, and the place to be 
accorded to intercountry adoption amongst these options remains elusive. It was shown 
                                                 
301  See Secs.  231(4) and 231(5) of the Children’s Act.   
302  For instance, the child support grant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
376
that the principle of subsidiarity as incorporated in the Hague Convention (and 
elaborated in its Guide to Good Practice) appears more child-centred and clear than the 
provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. It was also demonstrated that even the general 
policy that family-based solutions are preferable over institutional placements; 
permanent solutions are preferable over inherently temporary ones; and national 
(domestic) solutions over those involving another country has its own inherent 
limitations.  
 
Some general observations, however, were made in regard to the hierarchy of 
alternative care options. The starting point was that, the principle of subsidiarity should 
be interpreted broadly as reinforcing the conventional wisdom that children do best if 
they are brought up by their own family, and preservation of families was emphasised 
as a measure of first resort. It was submitted that there is room for interpretation in the 
CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention that the extended family forms part of 
the definition of “family”. As a result, those children who are being cared for by the 
extended family are generally not in need of alternative care.  
 
While the general hierarchy enjoyed by domestic adoption amongst the alternative care 
options available is the least contested one, examples that might make domestic 
adoption subsidiary to other alternative care options were proffered. Recognising the 
fact that domestic adoption is not well-developed in Africa, various strategies to promote 
domestic adoption have been proposed. An example of good practice from Kenya that 
helps to reduce the cost of lawyers for domestic adoption proceedings was highlighted.  
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Foster care, which might mean different things among cultures and jurisdictions in 
Africa, is another alternative care option. It is important to recognise that depending on 
the attendant circumstances of a child, foster care could be subsidiary to adoption, 
intercountry adoption, and very exceptionally, institutionalisation. 
 
Meanwhile, the point has also been made that instead of trying to impose practices 
(domestic adoption or foster care) which do not enjoy much cultural support as an 
alternative means of care in Africa, it might be more successful to build on alternative 
care options that are acceptable culturally (for instance, kinship care or kafalah). In this 
respect, it has been submitted that the negative approach of the CRC Committee 
towards so-called “informal adoptions” (sometimes going as far as asking African States 
Parties to prevent the practice) that are prevalent in Africa (often in the form of kinship 
care) can be labelled as Eurocentric. 
 
Generally speaking, it has been argued that institutionalisation should be a measure of 
last resort for children who are definitively deprived of their family environment. It was 
also submitted that Article 18(2) of the CRC that mandates States Parties to “ensure the 
development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children” does not 
mean the facilitation of a systematic policy to establish orphanages as a priority for the 
care of children. Rather, there is a need to make these institutions secondary and allow 
them to exist in a support relationship with parents. Unfortunately, making institutions 
the primary response and solution for alternative care, although prevalent in Africa, has 
been found to weaken a community’s motivation to address orphan issues and divert 
resources away from the family-based solutions that are better for children. The Infant 
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CJ High Court case in Malawi which would have privileged long-term institutional care in 
an unwarranted fashion was criticised. Nonetheless, the limited recognition of 
institutions within the CRC and the ACRWC is indicative of the fact that they could (and 
sometimes should) play some role in child care, especially for respite care for children 
whose family is undergoing a temporary difficulty in caring for them. In other words, a 
proper understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, especially in the context of 
institutionalisation, demands an appreciation of the distinction between the long term 
and short term placement needs of a child. 
 
Apart from the range of literature that construes intercountry adoption as categorically 
being a measure of last resort, in Africa, the fact that Article 24 of the ACRWC explicitly 
requires intercountry adoption to be a measure of last resort, might give African states a 
further ground to treat the practice as such. The notion of last resort in the ACRWC 
countries should be interpreted to impose an obligation on States Parties to develop 
other suitable alternative care options that would help them make the practice indeed a 
last resort.  
 
However, a word of caution is required here. No state in Africa should interpret the 
clause “last resort” in Article 24 of the ACRWC as a hurdle to the ratification of the 
Hague Convention (as was recently observed in Namibia303) or as an excuse to bar 
intercountry adoption completely in the face of a number of adoptable children. First, 
Article 24 recognises intercountry adoption as a potential alternative means of care. 
Second, the complementary nature that exists between the CRC and the ACRWC 
                                                 
303  A copy of the presentation (October 2009) made to various stakeholders in Namibia is on file with 
the writer. 
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should be emphasised, which is partly reflected in the Guidelines for Initial Reports of 
States Parties to the ACRWC. These make provision for the re-submission of a report 
made to the CRC Committee to the African Committee (after highlighting the areas of 
rights that are specific to the ACRWC).304 In addition, the report "must specify the action 
taken by the State Party in response to any recommendations made to it by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child".305 This means that (apart from a complementary 
relationship), as far as concluding observations are concerned, the African Committee 
not only supports those made by the CRC Committee, but it also wants to follow-up on 
them. So if the CRC Committee told country X in 2007 to ratify the Hague Convention, 
the African Committee, when considering X's report in 2009, does indeed have the 
mandate to know what the progress has been as far as the ratification of the Hague 
Convention is concerned. 
 
Third, African countries can ratify the Hague Convention without compromising their 
obligations under the ACRWC, provided that, according to Article 1(2) of the ACRWC, 
they view the Hague Convention as “more conductive to the realization of the rights and 
welfare of the child”. These show clear evidence that the phrase “last resort” in Article 
24(b) of the ACRWC should be interpreted in a fashion that promotes children’s rights 
and should not be seen as a bar to the ratification of the Hague Convention. 
Although the CRC Committee’s stance on the notion of “last resort” is to an extent 
confusing, the study explains that this jurisprudence has also shed some light on the 
fact that institutionalisation could be considered as a measure of last resort. There is 
                                                 
304  African Committee, Guidelines for initial reports, (2004), para 24. 
305  African Committee, Guidelines for initial reports, (2004), para 25. 
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nevertheless a need for the CRC Committee to clearly articulate its position on the issue 
(perhaps through a General Comment), and thereby contribute towards State Parties’ 
understanding of the place of intercountry adoption within the alternative care scheme.  
 
It is submitted that the notion of “intercountry adoption as a measure of last resort” 
should be read to mean “intercountry adoption as being generally subsidiary to other 
alternative means of care”, but subject to exceptions. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that the “last resort” language is relative, and depends on what options are 
in fact available as alternative care.  
 
In addition, “last resort” should not mean “when all other possibilities are exhausted”. A 
checklist approach, where all available care options are to be pursued first before 
intercountry adoption is considered, would go contrary to the assumption that the 
permanent placement of children at a very young age is an important goal. An 
understanding of “last resort” that does not hinder legally appropriate early placement 
should be fostered.  
 
If the experience from Ethiopia is of any guidance, the theory and practice of 
implementing the subsidiarity principle is faced with a number of challenges in Africa.  
The risks posed by the practice in Ethiopia through which almost every child in an 
institution is considered as being available for intercountry adoption was highlighted. 
Such practice highlights a failure to look at subsidiarity, as was observed in the context 
of South Africa, as constituting an active principle that requires reasonable efforts to find 
a child suitable domestic placements and make intercountry adoption a measure of last 
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resort. Unfortunately, in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi, the principle of subsidiarity cannot 
be said to have been placed within an integrated system of alternative care options 
(including support to vulnerable families, kinship care, domestic adoption and so forth). 
In South Africa, the limited view in respect to the scope of the principle of subsidiarity 
that was initially patent in the Fitzpatrick case (highlighting the risk of judge made law) is 
worth noting, too.  
 
On a positive note, in Kenya, Efforts to train prospective adoptive parents (for domestic 
adoption purposes) to represent themselves in court and avoid a lawyer’s fee are 
producing tangible results. The creation of the RACAP under the Children’s Act of South 
Africa as a means of implementing the subsidiarity principle may be worth emulating in 
other African countries. The recognition by the Constitutional Court that the principle of 
subsidiarity is itself subsidiary to the best interests of the child is congruent with the 
international legal framework. In all of these respects, the possibility of sharing of good 
practices regionally is patent.   
 
In sum, the lack of a clear-cut formula as far as the hierarchy for alternative care options 
is concerned has its own, rather unintended, positive side too. This argument is 
validated by the fact that to apply a pre-determined inflexible formula for the sake of 
certainty, irrespective of the circumstances, could in fact be contrary to the best 
interests of the individual child concerned. Meanwhile, abusing (the flexibility of) the 
principle of subsidiarity contrary to children’s best interests constitutes an illicit activity, a 
topic discussed in the next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
    PREVENTING AND ADDRESSING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO  
 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN AFRICA: LEGISLATIVE AND  
         INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Generally, intercountry adoption is presented as a heart-warming act of goodwill that 
benefits both a child and an adoptive family.1 Contrasted with the positive face of 
adoption, there have been scandals and irregularities concerning the practice – and at 
its worst, adoption is portrayed as child trafficking or baby selling.2 The best interests of 
the child principle demands that adoptions do not subvert the rights of children through 
illicit practices, such as abducting, selling, and trafficking of children. 
 
Dillon is of the view that it is a cause of frustration that so much writing on the subject 
suggests that intercountry adoption is inherently corrupt, and, therefore, that it must be 
eliminated.3 She contends that there is a tendency to denounce intercountry adoption 
as an institution generally when unethical adoption takes place.4 However, it is 
submitted that the risks posed by illicit activities in respect of intercountry adoption are 
so immense that general denunciation is understandable.  
 
The “illicit activities” in respect of intercountry adoption envisaged in this chapter 
include: child trafficking, child abduction, and child stealing, buying and selling; improper 
financial gain and corruption; private adoption; falsification of documents; and 
                                                 
1   Smolin, (2005), 403. 
2   Smolin, (2004), 281; Smolin, (2005), 404; Van Bueren, (1998), 96. 
3   Dillon, (2003), 207. 
4   Dillon, (2003), 198; Bartholet, (1993), 96. 
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circumventing adoption procedures, for instance, through guardianship orders.5 Smolin, 
who has written extensively on the subject,6 uses the phrase “child laundering”7 to 
collectively describe: child trafficking; child abduction; and child buying, selling and 
stealing. Similar terminology is used in this Chapter. 
 
The international community is becoming more conscious of the ways in which 
intercountry adoption is vulnerable to questionable, illegal, and sometimes criminal 
activities. The presence, and subsequent threats, of illicit activities pertaining to 
intercountry adoption are real. According to Ethica, an organisation that seeks to be an 
impartial voice for ethical adoption practices worldwide,8 between 1988 and 2003, 43% 
of the 40 largest intercountry adoption programs had been temporarily or permanently 
closed because of rampant corruption, including child trafficking and abduction.9 In 
recent times, countries such as, Cambodia,10 Chad, China,11 Ethiopia,12 Ghana,13 
Guatemala,14 India,15 Kenya,16 and Vietnam,17 have experienced instances of illicit 
activities in relation to intercountry adoption.  
 
                                                 
5  Such illicit activities, apart from violating the best interests of the child, have the potential to 
infringe on the rights of biological families and prospective adoptive parents. 
6  See Smolin, (2004); Luo and Smolin, (2004-2005), Smolin (2005); Smolin (2006); Smolin (2007); 
Smolin, (forthcoming 2010). 
7   See, for instance, Smolin, (forthcoming, 2010), 5. 
8   See <http://www.ethicanet.org/about-ethica>. 
9  Ethica, (undated), as cited in Bartholet, (2007), 158. 
10  See, for instance, Wittner, (2003); Smolin, (2006), 125. 
11  See, for instance, Zhang, (2008-2009); Smolin, (2006), 125;  
12  See section 6.2.1.4.1 below for some instances. 
13  See, for instance, 570 News, (04 November 2009). 
14   See, for instance, Daly, (2007), 620; Long, (2009), 641-647; Banks, (2004), 31. 
15  See, for instance, Dohle, (2008-2009); Smolin, (2005); Luo and Smolin, (2004-2005), 605. 
16  See section 6.2.1.4.2 below for some instances. 
17  See, for instance, Worthington, (2009), 578-580; Carlberg, (2007), 144-145; Meier, (2008), 189-
190. 
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The CRC and the ACRWC recognise the potential risk intercountry adoption might pose 
for children’s best interests especially if it is not properly regulated. As a result, 
according to the CRC, States Parties are obligated to “[t]ake all appropriate measures to 
ensure that, in inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in improper 
financial gain for those involved in it”.18 The counterpart provision of the ACRWC is 
more elaborate in that it explicitly mentions “trafficking”: States Parties shall take “…all 
appropriate measures to ensure that in inter-country adoption, the placement does not 
result in trafficking or improper financial gain for those who try to adopt a child” 
(emphasis mine).19  
 
The drafting of the Hague Convention was partly premised on the need to address the 
highly unregulated intercountry adoption system prevailing, which had been 
characterised by child laundering. As a result, one of the three objectives of the Hague 
Convention is “to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to 
ensure that those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale 
of, or traffic in children”.20 
 
For intercountry adoption to be conducted in compliance with the best interests of the 
child, it is important to prevent and address illicit activities that are associated with it. 
Preventing and addressing illicit activities in intercountry adoption requires a multi-
pronged approach which includes legislative and institutional responses. These two 
responses are the main focus of this chapter. 
                                                 
18  Art. 21(d) of the CRC. 
19  Art 24(d) of the ACRWC. 
20  Art 1(b) of the Hague Convention. 
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The adoption and implementation of legislation that prevents and addresses illicit 
activities in intercountry adoption are very crucial for the protection of the best interests 
of the child. For instance, if legislation on trafficking of children is lacking in a country, 
the institutions tasked with implementing intercountry adoption related activities find it 
difficult to play a meaningful role in upholding children’s rights in adoptions.  
 
The absence, or incompetency, of institutional structures might result in the best 
interests of the children involved in intercountry adoption being compromised. After all, 
the implementation of adoptability, the principle of subsidiarity, giving valid consent, 
and, generally, the upholding of the best interests of the child in intercountry adoption 
are dependent on competent authorities that are able to fulfil the task.21 It is this 
recognition of the strong link between competent institutional structures, and their role in 
upholding the best interests of the child, and combating illicit activities, that leads to the 
decision to deal with these issues together in this chapter.  
 
As alluded to in Chapter 3, this chapter provides a more detailed exposition of the 
international legal framework that regulates illicit activities pertaining to intercountry 
adoption. The instruments of focus for this purpose are not limited to the CRC, the 
ACWRC, and the Hague Convention, only. They also include the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography (OPSC), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United 
                                                 
21  Where there is an indication of improper inducement, fraud, misrepresentation, or prohibited 
contact associated with a case of intercountry adoption, adoptability is compromised and 
questioned. 
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Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Protocol). In 
section 6.3, this chapter highlights the necessary institutional structures for preventing 
and addressing illicit activities in intercountry adoption. This section is not intended to be 
a comprehensive guide to the role and responsibilities of the various institutional 
structures, and mainly underscores the crucial role of these institutions in the 
suppression of illicit activities. The experience of the four countries under the study is 
also included in this section. Section 6.4 concludes the Chapter. 
 
Indeed, in the past, African countries had held the view that illegal adoptions and 
trafficking in the context of adoptions were not present in their respective countries.22 
However, now the assumption that Africa is somehow immune from these illicit activities 
represents misplaced optimism. By way of example, illegal adoptions and child 
trafficking (with the involvement of intermediaries) were already detected in Mauritius in 
the 1980s,23 a situation that led to the establishment of the National Adoption Council to 
monitor the practice.24 The Government of Rwanda has also reported incidents of 
Rwandan children trafficked to Europe and adopted illegally.25 In particular, the 
Government has reported the case of “41 Rwandan children ... adopted in this manner 
in the Italian town of Brescia”.26 The implications of these human rights violations are 
immense. With globalisation, the shortage of adoptable children in other parts of the 
world, the shifting focus of intercountry adoption on Africa, increasing poverty in Africa, 
and accompanying weak institutional law enforcement capacity of State institutions, 
                                                 
22  For this view, see, for instance, CRC Committee, State Party Report: Namibia, (1993) para. 206; 
Chad, (2005) para. 294. 
23  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Mauritius, (October 1995), paras. 68-69. 
24  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Mauritius, (October 1995), para. 68. 
25  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Rwanda,(October 2003), para. 209. 
26  As above. 
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there are indications that illicit activities on the African continent are on the rise. As a 
result, addressing illicit activities in respect of intercountry adoption on the African 
continent has become a necessity.  
 
6.2 ESTABLISHING SUBSTANTIVE SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT AND 
ADDRESS CHILD LAUNDERING AND OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
RELATED TO INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
 
Intercountry adoption suffers from bad press. This is often so because illicit activities, 
such as, child trafficking, child buying, child selling, and child stealing mar the practice. 
The kidnapping and selling of children for adoption purposes has been recorded in 
countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and Romania.27 
 
Advocates of intercountry adoption might argue that “…buying or abducting children is 
so rare as to be virtually irrelevant, and hence that regulations aimed at eliminating such 
practices would needlessly slow adoptions, doing more harm than good”.28 However, 
this writer argues that the trend in Africa should be aimed towards a more 
comprehensive policy and legislative response. In fact, ILO Convention 182 classifies 
trafficking as one of the worst forms of child labour – hence, states need to take 
measures for its immediate abolition.29 In addition, so grave are the human rights 
abuses associated with trafficking that the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
includes “enslavement” in its definition of “crimes against humanity”. It further defines 
“enslavement” as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
                                                 
27  Kimball, (2005), 567. 
28  Smolin, (2007), 32 citing Bartholet, (1993), 96. 
29  Art. 3(a) of ILO Convention 182.  
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ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”.30  
 
However, the main instruments that regulate and prohibit child laundering (in the context 
of adoption) are the CRC, ACRWC and the Hague Convention. In addition the OPSC 
and the Palermo Protocol contribute significantly. 
 
6.2.1 Child laundering and intercountry adoption under the international legal 
framework 
 
6.2.1.1 Child buying, child selling, and child stealing, and intercountry 
adoption 
 
Articles 32 - 34 of the CRC cover the specific forms of exploitation of children, such as, 
economic exploitative use of children (in particular child labour), illicit use of narcotic 
drugs, and the use of children for prostitution and pornography.31 What Article 35 of the 
CRC heralds in is “a double protection for children”, as it requires blanket action on the 
abduction, sale or traffic of children.32 Article 35 stipulates that “States Parties shall take 
all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, 
the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form”.33  
 
Article 29(a) of the ACRWC entrenches similar standards by stipulating that: 
States Parties to the present Charter shall take appropriate measures to prevent: 
                                                 
30  See Art. 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute.  
31  For a detailed exposition of Art 34 of the CRC, see Muntarbhorn, (2007).  
32  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 532. One main factor that differentiates Art. 35 of the CRC from Art. 
11 of the CRC is that the latter is focussed on the illicit “transfer or non-return of children abroad” 
(usually undertaken by relatives, not for profit) while the former’s application is wider in scope as 
it also covers the illicit activities within a State Party’s territory. Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 143. 
33  Art. 36 of the CRC entrenches that “States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of 
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare”. 
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(a) the abduction, the sale of, or traffick of children for any purpose or in any form, by any 
person including parents or legal guardians of the child;… 
The phrases “for any purpose” and “in any form” in both the CRC and the ACRWC 
include illegal adoptions. The explicit inclusion of the phrase “by any person including 
parents or legal guardians of the child” in the ACRWC echoes the understanding that, 
with the introduction of the CRC and the ACRWC, the notion of children as their 
parents’ property is contrary to children’s rights discourse. 
 
In the context of the Hague Convention, too, one of the three objectives of the treaty is 
to prevent illicit activities, such as, child laundering. It is notable that the Hague 
Convention does not intend to prevent illicit activities directly.34 Rather, the assumption 
is that “the observance of the Convention’s rules will bring about the avoidance of such 
abuses”.35 The Hague Convention mirrors the view that the decision to place a child for 
adoption should not be “induced by payment or compensation of any kind”.36  
 
Apart from Article 21(e) of the CRC and Article 24(e) of the ACRWC,37 the CRC 
mandates States Parties to “take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or 
in any form”.38 The adoption of the OPSC seems partly the result of this mandate, and 
reinforces Article 35 of the CRC.39 
                                                 
34  Parra-Aranguren, (1994), para. 52. 
35  As above. 
36  Arts. 4(c)(3) and (4)(d)(4). 
37  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.3.3 for further details on bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
38  Art. 35 of the CRC. Para 1 of the Preamble to OPSC stipulates that “Considering that, in order 
further to achieve the purposes of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
implementation of its provisions, especially Arts. 1, 11, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36, it would be 
appropriate to extend the measures that States Parties should undertake in order to guarantee 
the protection of the child from the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography” 
39  Hodgkin and Newell, (2007), 531. 
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Articles 2 and 3 of the OPSC must be considered together. In Article 2, the OPSC 
defines the conduct prohibited in the Protocol, and Article 3 lists acts that, as a 
minimum, should be covered by the criminal laws of States Parties. Of direct relevance 
to this chapter in Article 2 of the OPSC is sub-article (a) which defines “Sale of children” 
to mean “any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of 
persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration”.  
 
Another directly relevant provision of the OPSC is Article 3(1)(a)(ii). It provides that: 
Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the following acts and activities are fully 
covered under its criminal or penal law, whether such offences are committed domestically 
or transnationally or on an individual or organized basis:   
(a) In the context of sale of children as defined in article 2:   
... 
(ii) Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the adoption  
     of a child in violation of applicable international legal instruments on  
     adoption;   
 
In Article 3 of the OPSC, attempt to commit, complicity in, or participation in, acts 
relating to the sale of children should also be criminalised. In addition, punishment by 
appropriate penalties should take into account the "grave nature" of the offence. 
Unfortunately, however, Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the OPSC seems to suggest that States 
Parties are obliged to punish intermediaries only, and that “buyers” and “sellers” of 
children fall beyond its scope. This is premised on the wording of the Article that States 
Parties shall ensure that, “[i]mproperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the 
adoption of a child...” is covered under their criminal law.40 
 
                                                 
40  Art 3(1)(a)(ii) of the OPSC. 
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Fortunately, often the view of the CRC Committee on this matter is that States Parties 
should criminalise and prosecute all actors involved in the sale of children for the 
purpose of adoption.41 This can be inferred from its concluding observations on States 
Parties Reports.42 Furthermore, the Committee’s interpretation gathers support from 
Article 3(5) of the OPSC in terms of which States Parties have to take “measures to 
ensure that all persons involved in the adoption of a child act in conformity with 
applicable international legal instruments” (emphasis mine).43 
 
Unfortunately, it is submitted that there seems to be a tendency by States to assume 
that criminal law provisions on trafficking are sufficient for addressing child buying and 
selling. However, this is not always the case. While child trafficking and the sale of 
children might sometimes overlap, the sale of children is not a necessary element of the 
definition of “child trafficking”.  By way of example, recruitment of a child can take place 
using deceit and with no element of sale involved. Therefore, children who are recruited 
through deceit can be trafficked for, or through, adoption without any element of sale 
occurring throughout the entire process.44 As a result, it is advisable to have legislation 
that explicitly criminalises child selling and buying, as well as the conduct of other 
persons who are involved in such a process in different capacities, for example, as 
intermediaries.  
 
                                                 
41  Innocenti Working Paper, (2009), 7. 
42  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: United States of America, (2008), 
para. 31(d). It is to be noted that while the U.S. is not a State Party to the CRC, it has ratified the 
OPSC. 
43  There seems to be a general understanding that the term “applicable international legal 
instruments” refers to the Hague Convention. See for instance, U.S. Declaration on the issue. 
44  For instance, recruitment can take place using deceit. 
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6.2.1.2  Child trafficking and intercountry adoption 
Intercountry adoption is sometimes associated with child trafficking.45  Cases of child 
trafficking for, and (very exceptionally) through, adoption have been reported in 
countries such as Chad, Greece,46 Romania,47 and Albania.48 
 
It is vital to distinguish systematically between children “trafficked for the purpose of 
adoption”, and those supposedly “trafficked through adoption for subsequent 
exploitation”.49 Cantwell rightly questions the prevalence of the latter form of trafficking 
(trafficking through adoption) because of the alleged total lack of evidence thereof.50 He 
further states that: 
...it is hard to imagine why anyone would take on both the costs and risks involved in 
using a very public judicial process like intercountry adoption to “traffic” children – as 
opposed to kidnapping or smuggling them, for example – in order to remove their 
organs.51  
It is submitted that, since the majority of cases that associate intercountry adoption with 
trafficking relate to “children trafficked for the purpose of adoption”, this section focuses 
on that practice.  
 
                                                 
45  See for instance, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, (February 2009), VII. 
46  Petit, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography: Greece, (2006), para. 14 
47  Petit, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography: Romania, (2005), paras. 21 and 25. 
48  See, generally, Amici dei Bambini, (2005), 7. 
49  ISS/IRC, (November-December/2005), 2. 
50  As above. Other writers who share a similar views include Carro, (1994), 128-31 (documenting 
the history of the rumor that internationally adopted children were being used as organ banks, 
while noting that the U.S. government has extensively investigated such claims and found them 
“baseless”); Carp, (1998), 228 (noting, but dismissing as false, “rumors” of intercountry adoption 
being used to run organ transplant rings). 
51  ISS/IRC, (November-December/2005), 2. While some cases of abuse and rejection of children on 
the part of individual adopters once they have returned home with the child are reported, these 
situations do not really fit within the definition of trafficking provided below. ISS/IRC, (November-
December/2005), 2. 3. 
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By way of example though, the Zoe’s Ark case in Chad that was mentioned in Chapter 
2, 52 epitomises a situation of trafficking for adoption. According to the Reuters News 
Agency, on 25 October 2007 police arrested nine French and seven Spanish nationals 
in Chad, near the Sudanese border, as they prepared to fly 103 African children to 
France.53 Among those detained were six members of the French organisation, Zoe’s 
Ark, which had said it intended to rescue orphans from Sudan’s violent Darfur region 
and take them to France for adoption by families there. While some of those arrested 
and charged were subsequently released, on 21 December 2007 the remaining six 
accused stood trial in N’Djamena charged with kidnapping and fraud. They were 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment.54 Subsequent investigations have revealed that 
the majority of the children were not from Darfur but from Chad.55 In addition, it was 
reported that the majority of the children had parents who were willing and able to care 
for them, but that “the aid workers misled them into believing the youngsters would be 
offered temporary local school places”.56 
 
A definition of “trafficking” is lacking in the CRC, the ACRWC, and the OPSC. In relation 
to the Hague Convention, according to the Permanent Bureau, the term “trafficking” 
connotes the “payment of money or other compensation to facilitate the illegal 
                                                 
52  Section 2.2.2. 
53  Reportedly a number of parents were waiting in an Airport in France in the hope of getting a child 
to adopt. See Reuters, (31 March 2008). 
54  Subsequently, on the basis of a previous bilateral prisoners exchange agreement between Chad 
and France, the six were flown home to France to serve their jail sentences there. On 31 March 
2008, however, Chadian President Idriss Deby granted them an official pardon. 
55  See, for instance, Aljazeera, (07 March 2008); UNICEF Newsline, (19 March 2008). 
56   BBC, (22 December 2007). 
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movement of children for the purposes of illegal adoption”.57 According to the Palermo 
Protocol “trafficking in persons” shall mean: 
...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation.58  
The CRC Committee recommends to States Parties that they ratify the Palermo 
Protocol, and in particular, adequately define and criminalise trafficking of children in 
accordance with this instrument.59 
 
Some hold the view that acts such as the selling, buying, or illegally transferring of 
children for the purpose of adoption, do not constitute trafficking under international law 
- because the ultimate aim is adoption, which by definition is not exploitative 
(exploitation tends to connote labour or sexual exploitation).60 It is argued that this is 
questionable. Instead, as Smolin observes, it is possible to recognise three different 
scenarios in international law: (i) providing no clear distinction between child selling and 
child trafficking; (ii) considering child buying/selling for adoption as one of several 
aggravated forms of child selling/trafficking, based on the premise that such child buying 
is exploitative and harmful; or (iii) leaving open ended the question of whether child 
buying for purposes of adoption is sufficiently exploitative to constitute trafficking or an 
aggravated form of child selling.61 
                                                 
57  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 33. 
58  Art. 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol. 
59  See, for instance, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Spain, (2007), para. 26. 
60  A case in point is the U.S. Department of State. See, generally, for instance, U.S. Department of 
State, (2002); U.S. Department of State, (2006); Kassan, (2007). 
61  Smolin, (2007), 31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
395
The first approach is illustrated by the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention.62 
These instruments name both the sale of children and child trafficking as rights 
deprivations without providing any clear definitions or differentiating between them.63  
 
Here it is important to note that Article 21(d) of the CRC only expressly requires States 
Parties to ensure that “in inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in 
improper financial gain for those involved in it”. The addition that Article 24(d) of the 
ACRWC makes over the CRC explicitly highlights that States Parties have to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure “that in inter-country adoption, the placement does not 
result in trafficking”, too.64 This has various implications. 
 
First, the explicit mention of “trafficking” in Article 24(d) reflects the recognition by the 
drafters that trafficking for, and through, intercountry adoption is a real concern on the 
African continent. Secondly, the reference to “trafficking”, it is argued, should put to rest 
the views of sceptics that the element of exploitation is a necessary requirement for illicit 
activities in intercountry adoption to constitute trafficking. Thirdly, Article 24(d) should be 
read in conjunction with Article 29(a) of the ACRWC which requires States Parties to 
take appropriate measures to prevent “the abduction, the sale of, or traffick of children 
for any purpose or in any form, by any person…”. As a result, irrespective of the 
                                                 
62  See Smolin, (2007), 31. 
63   For instance, see Art. 35 of CRC. 
64  It is further argued that the reference “in inter-country adoption” (emphasis mine) encompasses 
all the processes leading to the placement of a child for intercountry adoption. These processes 
include the stage at which the child is identified; the child’s parent’s or guardian’s give their 
consents, as appropriate; the stage at which the child enters the child care system; the 
identification of the prospective adoptive parents; the matching of the child with the prospective 
adoptive parents, and so forth.  
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intention to exploit a child, the sale or trafficking of a child by anyone, including parents 
and guardians (such as orphanage personnel), amounts to a violation of the ACRWC. 
 
The OPSC illustrates the second approach, in which buying and selling of children for 
purposes of adoption are considered aggravated forms of child selling.65 Under this 
approach, buying children for purposes of adoption is included among the acts which 
are typically deemed exploitative, such as, sexual and labour exploitation.  
 
The Palermo Protocol represents the third approach, in so far as it requires some form 
of “exploitation” in its definition of “trafficking in persons”, but leaves the definition of 
such exploitation open.66 The Palermo Protocol states that “[e]xploitation shall include, 
at a minimum, sexual exploitation, exploitation of the prostitution of others, forced labor, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.67  
 
Contrary to what some68 assert, it is correctly argued that, when a birth family’s child is 
lost to the family through any illicit means, the birth family’s capacity to bear, raise, and 
nurture a child has been exploited.69 In addition, taking a child away from the family in 
an illicit manner could be labelled as exploitation.70  
 
                                                 
65   See Art. 3 of the OPSC. See Smolin, (2007), 32. 
66   See Art. 3 of the Palermo Protocol. See Smolin, (2007), 32. 
67  Article 3(a) of Palermo Protocol. 
68  See, for instance, Kassan, (2007), 18-11 – 18-13. Kassan argues that “[a]n ‘illegal adoption’ 
amounts to an exploitation of the adoption system and laws and not necessarily the exploitation 
of the adopted child”.  
69  Smolin, (2007), 33. For a detailed discussion of the notion of “exploitation”, see Smolin, (2004), 
294-298. 
70  As above. 
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In the context of the Palermo Protocol, too, the list of what constitutes exploitative acts 
provided in Article 3(a) is open ended, and only provides a “minimum”. Since the list is 
not exhaustive, it is argued it would permit the addition of other unnamed forms of 
exploitation, such as purchasing or trafficking children for the purpose of adoption. In a 
paper that regularly refers to the “Interpretative Notes” of the Palermo Protocol, Ollus 
shares the view that “illegal adoption also falls under the scope of the Protocol”.71  
 
Some of the main advantages of including activities, such as child buying and child 
selling for the purpose of adoption, within the definition of the crime of child trafficking, 
relate to prosecutability, and (potential/subsequent) deterrent, purposes. In the Zoe’s 
Ark case described in Chapter 2,72 for instance, the absence of any comprehensive 
trafficking legislation, which, criminalises the practice in particular, has been identified 
as a major shortcoming.73 As a result, the prosecutor in the Zoe’s Ark case could charge 
the accused only with abduction.74  
 
This is unfortunately similar to the prosecutions of Americans operating in Cambodia for 
systematically obtaining children for adoption through purchase and fraud. There, too, 
                                                 
71  Ollus, (undated), 22. 
72  Section 2.2.2. 
73  See for instance IRIN News, (1 November 2007), where Chadian and UN Officials argued that 
the absence of a child trafficking law in Chad would hamper efforts to prosecute members of the 
Zoe’s Ark. 
74  The main difference between “abduction” and “trafficking” as a criminal offence is that the latter 
carries a more severe penalty as it is usually classified as “organised crime”. In addition, in the 
context of the particular case at hand, charges of abduction would not only result in more lenient 
sentences in the case of a conviction but also be harder to convict in the first place. It might be 
easier for an investigator to prove human trafficking than to prove abduction. Although the 
information has not been verified, there was speculation in this case that the children were 
willingly handed over, in which case abduction would have been more difficult to prove. This is in 
contrast to the crime of trafficking where legislation usually encompasses the illegal recruitment of 
children from “vulnerable” parents, who may agree to give up their children because they cannot 
care for them, and whose consent to the recruitment is irrelevant at law. 
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prosecutors have had to rely on statutes criminalising visa fraud and money 
laundering.75 While the prosecutions in Cambodia secured convictions, the inability to 
charge the accused with any form of trafficking violations allowed the principal accused, 
Lauryn Galindo, to characterise her actions as mere regulatory or technical violations.76  
 
Experience from countries in South America substantiates the value of including 
activities such as child buying and child selling for the purpose of adoption, within the 
definition of the crime of child trafficking in order to prevent or address illicit activities in 
intercountry adoption. For instance, in Costa Rica,77 El Salvador,78 and Nicaragua,79 
legislation has recently criminalised trafficking of children for adoption purposes, thereby 
leading to convictions. 
 
In sum, it seems that trafficking in general, and trafficking for adoption purposes in 
particular, have started to strike a resonant chord in the African region with its otherwise 
weak legislation and erratic state enforcement. Therefore, although the Zoe’s Ark 
activities in Chad were made public, it is safe to assume that other facilitators are 
undertaking similar illicit activities on the continent with less or no scrutiny. For instance, 
still within Chad, reports that at least 74 children were kidnapped in Chad and flown to a 
military airport outside Paris on 17 September 2007 are disconcerting.80 One could also 
                                                 
75  Smolin, (2006), 137-138. 
76  See Government Memorandum on Sentencing, (2004), as cited in Smolin, (2006) 138,  arguing 
that the court should reject Galindo’s characterisation of her crime as a visa fraud infraction and 
not the trafficking of children who did not fall under the statutory definition of “orphan”,. 
77  UNODC, (2009), 138. 
78  UNODC, (2009), 142. 
79  UNODC, (2009), 148. 
80  See, for instance, Prauda, (11 August 2007). 
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mention reports of orphanages and adoption agencies involved in child trafficking in 
Liberia.81  
 
6.2.1.3 Child laundering and falsification of documents for 
intercountry adoption 
 
The falsification of documents that are relevant for intercountry adoption is one of the 
illicit activities that is associated with the practice. These documents include birth 
certificates, paternity declarations, passports, identity documents, letters of consent, 
and letters declaring abandonment of a child.  
 
For example, a field investigation in Vietnam by U.S. authorities has revealed incidents 
of serious adoption irregularities, including, forged or altered documentation.82 This had 
subsequently led to the U.S Embassy in Hanoi temporarily suspending the issuance of 
visas until the completion of investigations into almost finalised cases presented before 
the Embassy.83 
 
Recently, a case from Egypt involving child buying and falsification of birth documents 
has been in the spotlight.84 Two U.S. couples have been convicted for illegal adoption. 
A third U.S. couple, believed to be already in the U.S., were tried and convicted in 
absentia for obtaining a forged birth certificate for a child and trying to use it to obtain a 
U.S. visa.85 It is reported that “the [first two] couple[s] agreed with an orphanage worker 
                                                 
81  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Liberia” (December 2008). 
82  See Meir, (2008), 189-190 and the accompanying citations. 
83  As above. 
84  See Associated Press, (17 September 2009); Reuters, (19 February 2009). 
85  Reuters, (17 September 2009).  
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‘to buy two newborn infants, a girl and a boy, in exchange for 26,000 pounds’, or 
$4,673, and received forged papers for the children” [insertion mine].86 In addition to the 
couples, three other defendants including an orphanage worker and a doctor were 
sentenced to five years in jail while two other Egyptians received jail terms of two 
years.87 According to newspaper reports, the case came to light after one of the couples 
approached the U.S. embassy in Cairo to arrange to take two babies out of Egypt using 
forged papers indicating the infants were their biological children.88 
 
Directly associated with the falsification of documents is the notion of “simulated birth”, 
which involves the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a 
person(s) who is(are) not his or her biological parent(s). In the Philippines, it is reported 
that the high cost of adoption proceedings forces many to resort to “simulated birth” to 
avoid the adoption process.89 As a good practice, it could be mentioned that some 
countries explicitly criminalise this act.90 
 
Apart from the usual punishment and deterrence roles that criminal law plays, various 
other measures can be undertaken to prevent or address illicit activities in the form of 
falsification of adoption related documents. In suspicious cases, arranging an interview 
with the child's birth parent/family might be commendable. Where possible, it is 
                                                 
86  As above. 
87  See Associated Press, (17 September 2009); Reuters, (19 February 2009). 
88  As above.  
89  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Philippines, (October 2009), paras. 49-50. 
90  See Art. 347 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 21 (b) of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 
(Republic Act No. 8552) of the Philippines. 
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advisable for competent authorities to require evidence through DNA testing.91 As is the 
current practice in Vietnam, it is also possible to require the verification of documents by 
issuing authorities, and maybe use this in conjunction with primary and 
contemporaneous secondary evidence.92 
 
6.2.1.4  Child laundering in the countries under the study 
6.2.1.4.1 Ethiopia 
 
In Ethiopia, instances of child laundering for adoption purposes have come to light in 
recent years. In one instance, traffickers were allegedly caught transporting a group of 
children from one administrative locality (the authorities of which refused to issue a 
declaration of abandonment letters) to another administrative locality.93 The Federal 
First Instance Court which deals with intercountry adoption cases has recently traced 
the letters of declaration of abandonment of 16 children to one police officer (all written 
at the same time) raising concerns of child laundering.94 A case involving two Ethiopian 
children that were stolen, sold (allegedly for a 100 USD), and adopted by a family in 
Austria through the assistance of false documentation was also put under the spotlight 
in 2007.95 This latter case involved intermediaries, orphanage workers, and relevant 
government administration personnel working at the kebele level (which is the lowest 
administrative level) who played a role in the ultimate adoption of the children. 
                                                 
91  There is an established practice where the costs for DNA testing and interview expenses shall be 
borne by prospective adoptive parents. 
92  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Vietnam”, (October 2008). 
93  Interview with Deresse Bezawork, Adoption lawyer, (25 September 2009; and Biniam Eshetu, 
Legal Expert, MOWA, (25 September 2009). 
94  As above. 
95  Documentation on file with writer. 
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While they are not always reliable, media reports of child laundering in Ethiopia are also 
on the rise.96 Just recently, a Dutch adoption agency stopped adoption from Ethiopia 
pending investigations of illegal activities, such as false documentation.97 These 
included cases where “mothers of the children were still alive, while being listed as 
deceased”.98 A recent detailed ABC News report has highlighted some of the 
irregularities that are happening in Ethiopia, arriving at the conclusion that “[c]orruption, 
fraud and deception are rife” in the adoption system.99 A petition asking for concrete 
measures to stop child trafficking for the purposes of adoption in Ethiopia is circulating 
on the web.100  
 
In the RFC of Ethiopia, there is hardly any mention of provisions that address child 
laundering issues. The only provision that comes close to being related to child 
laundering is Article 194(3)(e). This Article requires the court, before approving an 
agreement of adoption, to consider the “availability of information which will enable the 
court to know that the adopter will handle the adopted child as his own child and will not 
abuse him”. In cases where the adopter is a foreigner, “the court shall take special care 
in investigating the conditions provided in Sub-Art (3)(e)” of Article 194. 
 
Furthermore, while the Revised Penal Code of 2004 has generally improved on the 
provisions of its predecessor, the 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia, in the context of child 
                                                 
96  See for instance, CBC News Canada (19 March 2009) where adoptive parents challenged the 
validity of the documentation and information they have on their adopted children from Ethiopia.  
97  UAI News, (23 September 2009). 
98  UAI News, (23 September 2009). 
99  ABC News, (09 September 2009). 
100  Beyene, (2009). 
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laundering, the relevant provisions also leave much to be desired. Government has 
reported that “child trafficking for any purpose is punishable by a rigorous prison 
term”.101 However, Article 597 of the Revised Penal Code, entitled “Trafficking in 
Women and Children”, limits its scope of application to trafficking “for the purpose of 
forced labour” only. As a result, cases of child laundering for adoption purposes fall 
outside its ambit. Another relevant provision, Article 596(1)(a) entitled “Enslavement”, 
prohibits anyone who “forcibly enslaves another, sells, alienates, pledges or buys him, 
or trades or traffics in or exploits him in any manner”. While child buying and selling 
might fall within this provision, the interpretation of the phrase “exploits” could prove 
controversial.102  
 
Under Section 12 of the MOWA Guidelines, a list of prohibited acts in relation to 
intercountry adoption is provided. These include, giving or receiving bribes or gifts in 
order to give a child for adoption or to have a child given for adoption.103 The use of 
adoption as a trade is also prohibited.104 Furthermore, an adoption conducted by duress 
or without the consent of parents or the Minister’s office responsible for adoptions is 
prohibited.105 However, the MOWA Guidelines do not regulate child laundering in a 
comprehensive manner. In addition, these Guidelines neither have the force of law, nor 
provide for any penalties.  
 
                                                 
101  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Ethiopia, (October 2005), para. 118. 
102  See section 6.2.1.2 above for a discussion of the notion of “exploitation”. 
103  Para. 12(1) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
104  As above. 
105  As above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
404
In Ethiopia, the law pertaining to child laundering is inadequate, thereby making 
prosecution very difficult. Therefore, it is no surprise that this writer could not come 
across a single court case where either individuals or organisations were found guilty of 
child laundering for adoption purposes. The rise in the number of reports of child 
laundering in Ethiopia could partly be attributed to the inadequacy of the legal 
framework. 
 
6.2.1.4.2 Kenya 
Kenya acceded to the Palermo Protocol on 5 January 2005. However, although Kenya 
has signed the OPSC on 8 September 2000, it has not ratified the instrument. 
 
In 2007, the CRC Committee expressed its concern over reports indicating that irregular 
intercountry adoptions and possible trafficking of children for that purpose still exist.106 
Reports of children who disappear from hospitals immediately upon birth persist.107 
Allegations of child trafficking and stealing partly for adoption purposes also came to the 
fore when a Kenyan church evangelist based in the U.K. was found with several young 
children in his home.108 This incident was associated with the disappearance of babies 
from Nairobi's Pumwani Maternity Hospital and involved suspects in Britain, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya.109  
A judge of the High Court has also reported a suspicious instance where a group of 
Italians had been awarded 27 adoption orders by a single Magistrate on a single day 
                                                 
106  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya, (June 2007), para. 40. 
107  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 505; Interview with Jude 
Nalyanya, Advocate, The Cradle, the Children’s Foundation, (13 November 2009). 
108  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 506; BBC, (12 November 2004).  
109         BBC, (12 November 2004).  
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sitting.110 All the children were from one children’s home, and they were all allegedly 
abandoned.111 The High Court judge declared the adoption orders null in suspicion of 
irregularities in the way in which the children came into the child care system, and how 
the adoption orders were secured.112 
In the past the concern has been raised that legislation in Kenya does not expressly 
deal with child trafficking, stealing, and abduction.113 In particular it was reported that: 
…legislation fails to cover the range of ways through which trafficking occurs and does 
not include all persons that actually may be involved in trafficking especially as regards 
transnational trafficking.114 
The Kenyan Government admits that penalties provided under the Children Act115 are 
not severe enough to deter persons who target children for purposes of abduction, 
trafficking and sale, or other forms of exploitation.116 It is also observed by the Kenyan 
Government that the fact that the “legal process of adoption is lengthy and complicated 
... may be a contributing factor to abductions”.117  
The comprehensive human trafficking legislation - the Counter Trafficking in Persons 
Bill - still remains in draft form.118 The Bill provides a definition of the term “exploitation” 
which does not explicitly mention adoption.119 However, as argued above, it remains 
possible to interpret illicit adoptions so as to constitute some form of exploitation. The 
                                                 
110  Koome, (2009). 
111  As above. 
112  As above. 
113  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 507(1); UNODC, (2009), 114. 
114  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 507(2). 
115  Such as Secs. 14, 15 and 16 of the Children Act. 
116  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 6. 
117  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 507(4). 
118  UNODC, (2009), 114; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, (2009), 175. 
119  See ANPPCAN, (2008), 19. 
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Bill also increases the penalty for trafficking.120 In addition, the Bill, in its definition of 
“Trafficking in Persons”, indicates that “[a] person who for the purpose of trafficking 
adopts a child or offers a child for adoption ... commits an offence”.121 It is submitted 
that, while this definition is commendable, it fails to incorporate the main focus of this 
section - which is trafficking for the purpose of adoption. 
Under the Children Act, before making an adoption order, the court shall be satisfied:  
that the applicant has not received or agreed to receive, and that no person had made or 
given or agreed to make or give to the applicant, any payment or other reward in 
consideration of the adoption.122  
Ordinarily, it is not applicants (prospective adoptive parents) that receive or agree to 
receive payments for adoption. This fact makes the capacity of this provision to counter 
child laundering very limited.  
 
On a positive note, however, “[a]ny person who makes or agrees to give to ... any 
parent or guardian of the child any payment or other reward in consideration of the 
adoption of any child” commits an offence under the Act.123 The same is true for any 
person who “makes arrangement for the adoption of a child and receives or makes or 
gives any payment or other reward in connection with the making of the 
arrangements”.124 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the accompanying penalty of 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding one hundred 
                                                 
120  A person who traffics another person, for the purpose of exploitation, commits an offence and is 
liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years or to a fine of not 
less than five million shillings or to both and upon subsequent conviction, to imprisonment for a 
term of not less than twenty years without the option of a fine. 
121  See ANPPCAN, (2008), 20. 
122  Sec. 63(c) of the Children Act. 
123  Sec. 179(1)(b)(i) of the Children Act. 
124  Sec. 179(1)(b)(ii) of the Children Act. 
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thousand shillings, or both,125 seems to fall short of appreciating the grave nature of the 
offence. 
 
6.2.1.4.3 Malawi 
Malawi ratified the OPSC on 7 October 2009, and the Palermo Protocol on 17 March 
2005. However, there is no specific provision or legislation that criminalises trafficking of 
children, child buying, selling, and stealing.126 The Penal Code provisions on abduction 
are sometimes used for prosecution purposes.127  
 
The Child Care, Protection and Justice Bill, while it remains in draft form, defines child 
trafficking and sets a penalty of life imprisonment for traffickers.128 However, offences 
such as child buying and stealing, are not expressly covered in the Bill. Proposed 
amendments to the Penal Code only address the trafficking of women and children for 
prostitution.129 Neither the Issues Paper nor the Discussion Paper prepared by the 
Special Law Commission on the Review of the Adoption of Children Act (2009) identify 
child laundering for the purposes of intercountry adoption as a challenge worthy of 
exploration. The absence of clear provisions on child trafficking and other illicit activities 
pertaining to adoption has hindered prosecutions and convictions.130  
 
                                                 
125  Sec. 179(1)(b) of the Children Act. 
126  UNODC, (2009), 124; Chirwa and Kaime, (2008), 111; CRC Committee, State Party Report: 
Malawi, (July 2008), para. 163. 
127  UNODC, (2009), 124; CRC Committee, State Party Report: Malawi, (July 2008), para. 163. 
128  UNODC, (2009), 124; Malawi Special Law Commission, (2005), 111. 
129  Chirwa and Kaime, (2008), 111; CRC Committee, State Party Report: Malawi, (July 2008), para. 
163. 
130  UNODC, (2009), 124; Chirwa and Kaime, (2008), 111; CRC Committee, State Party Report: 
Malawi, (July 2008), para. 166. 
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Section 10 of the Adoption Act provides for restriction on payments. Accordingly, it shall 
not be lawful for the adopter or guardian, except with the sanction of the court, to 
receive any payment or other reward in consideration of an adoption under the Adoption 
of Children Act. However, no further guidance is provided in the law in respect of the 
consequences of a violation. The position of this provision on indirect payments and 
contributions is also not clear. 
 
6.2.1.4.4 South Africa 
South Africa has had its share of cases of child laundering in respect of adoption.131 In 
South Africa, there is not yet comprehensive legislation which focuses specifically on 
trafficking in persons.132 The Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill 
has been published in the Government Gazette on 8 May 2009 for public comment. 
However, South Africa has ratified both the Palermo Protocol133 and the OPSC.134 
 
On a positive note, the Children’s Act provides a more advanced definition of child 
trafficking as it explicitly includes also the adoption of a child through illegal means.135 
                                                 
131  Human, (2007), 16-29; There are rumours that indicate that children were adopted from South 
Africa and taken abroad even before the Constitutional Court allowed intercountry adoption. 
132  The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007 (Act 
No. 32 of 2007) serves as the basis to fight the trafficking of persons for purposes of sexual 
exploitation, while the Children’s Act can be used to prosecute cases of child trafficking. See 
UNODC, (2009), 127. 
133  On 20 February 2004. 
134  On 30 June 2003. 
135  Trafficking, in relation to a child 
(a) means the recruitment, sale, supply, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of children, within or across the borders of the Republic 
(i) by any means, including the use of threat, force or other forms of coercion, 
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control of a child; 
or 
(ii) due to a position of vulnerability, for the purpose of exploitation; and 
(b) includes the adoption of a child facilitated or secured through illegal means. 
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Child buying, and selling for the purpose of adoptions also fall within this provision. The 
fact that the Children’s Act has extended the definition of trafficking to include “the 
adoption of a child facilitated or secured through illegal means” implies that all the 
relevant provisions on trafficking are applicable to children adopted through illegal 
means. 
 
Both natural and juristic persons who “traffic a child or allow a child to be trafficked” 
could face liability.136 In this regard, Article 284(3) implies that adoption agencies whose 
employees or agents become involved in illegal adoptions could be responsible. The 
possibility of revoking the accreditations of these adoption agencies exists,137 thereby 
serving as a deterrent against child laundering. In order to facilitate the prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators of trafficking, Section 284(1) of the Children’s Act 
disqualifies the consent of the person having control over the child from being raised as 
a defence.138 
 
Section 287 of the Children’s Act allows a court which has reason to believe that the 
parents or the guardians have contributed to the illegal adoption to hold a children's 
court inquiry.139 It is also noteworthy that illegal adoptions are subject to mandatory 
reporting.140 Professionals, such as, police officers, immigration officials, and social 
                                                 
136  Sec. 284(1) of the Children’s Act. 
137   Sec. 284(4) of the Children’s Act. 
138  Sec. 284(2)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
139  Kassan, (2007), 18-19;  
140  Sec. 288 of the Children’s Act. See Couzens, (2009), 60 for further discussions on this. 
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workers, are under a duty to report the cases known to them to a designated social 
worker.141  
 
Despite some criticisms,142 the provisions of the Children’s Act that are intended to 
combat child laundering are laudable. It is submitted that the fact that South Africa is a 
State Party to the OPSC and the Palermo Protocol partly explains why national 
legislation on child trafficking, child selling and child buying in the context of adoption is 
relatively congruent with international law.  
 
6.2.3 Failure to ensure that informed and free consent(s) is(are) given 
 
The requirement to secure informed and free consents to adoption from the appropriate 
persons and organs is a fundamental element for an intercountry adoption regime that 
upholds the best interests of the child, and prevents and combats illicit activities. 
Standards are necessary to prevent consents from being induced by fraud or 
misunderstanding, and to prevent baby buying. Article 21(a) of the CRC requires States 
Parties to ensure that “...if required, the persons concerned have given their informed 
consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary”. Article 
24(a) of the ACRWC uses similar wording, but makes “appropriate counseling” 
compulsory when consent is necessary. Compared to the Hague Convention’s 
provisions, these two provisions do not provide further details on the requirements of 
consent. 
                                                 
141  Sec. 288 of the Children’s Act. See Couzens, (2009), 60 (arguing that “[i]t might have been 
preferable, however, to have included lawyers; with the rider that their duty be subject to the 
reservation of legal privilege where this is invoked”); Kassan, (2007), 18-20. 
142  For a view of some of the shortcomings of the provisions of the Children’s Act in respect of 
trafficking, see Kreston, (2007), 43.  
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According to the Hague Convention, consent must be obtained from “the persons, 
institutions and authorities whose consent is necessary for adoption …”.143 Prior to 
consenting, the party must be counselled and fully informed about a number of issues, 
including, whether adoption will terminate the legal relationship between the child and 
his or her natural family.144 The competent authorities of the State of origin should also 
ensure: that consent is given “in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in 
writing”;145 that there is neither withdrawal nor inducement of consent by payment or 
compensation of any kind;146 and that the consent of the mother has been given only 
after the birth of the child.147  
 
The importance of the views of the child in the adoption process has already been 
argued in Chapter three.148 The Hague Convention explicitly recognises this 
importance, and requires States of origin, after having “regard to the age and degree of 
maturity of the child”,149 to apply the necessary safeguards for consent mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. It is advisable for legislation to explicitly provide for these 
standards. 
 
However, cases exist where consents for adoption were either not secured from the 
relevant persons, or were secured without them being free and informed. To illustrate 
the latter scenario: U.S. embassy officials investigating Romanian adoptions have 
                                                 
143  Art. 4(c)(1) of Hague Convention. 
144  Art. 4 of Hague Convention. Art 4(c)(3) requires that “such persons, institutions and authorities 
have given their consent freely, in the required legal form and expressed or evidenced in writing”. 
145  Art 4(c)(2) of Hague Convention. 
146  Art 4(c) (3) of Hague Convention. 
147  Art 4(c) (4) of Hague Convention. 
148  Section 3.3.6. 
149  Art. 4(d) of Hague Convention. 
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discovered “incidents where Romanian mothers believed that they were merely ‘loaning’ 
their children to foreign parents and not relinquishing them permanently”.150 Instances 
where Romanian nuns coerced single mothers to give consent in relation to their 
children, allowing the nuns to make up to $15,000 profit per child, have also been 
recorded.151 In the Zoe’s Ark case in Chad, the families of the children who were 
involved in the trafficking have reportedly stated that they were misled into giving their 
consent.152  
 
Recent news from Sierra Leone highlights the importance of counselling and securing 
informed consents.153 The news involved a group of parents who accused a charity of 
sending more than 30 children abroad for adoption without their consent during the 
country's civil war.154 On the one hand, the charity - Help a Needy Child International 
(HANCI) - insists that the parents have signed documents giving permission for 
intercountry adoption.155 On the other hand, the parents argue that they have no idea of 
what happened to their children after they were handed over to HANCI.156 Some of the 
parents claim that the “... children were accepted into HANCI in 2004, with the 
understanding that they were incorporated into the welfare home programme and not 
for adoption”.157 
 
                                                 
150  Carro, (1994), 144.  
151  See Kales, (2004), 484;  
152  See, for instance, Spiegel, (27 December 2007). 
153  BBC News, (4 November 2009); Sierra Express Media, (09 November 2009). 
154  As above. 
155  As above. 
156  As above. 
157  Sierra Express Media, (09 November 2009). 
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The law should also attempt to regulate whether to allow the so-called “payment of 
expenses of birth family”. Many Contracting States to the Hague Convention have 
recognised the existence of this practice.158 Such payments have the potential to 
improperly induce or solicit birth family’s consent to the adoption. In other words, such 
payments make it difficult to determine whether consent was given freely.  
 
In the context of the U.S., the CRC Committee has expressed concern at the 
information that, according to the current Regulations, the payment of prenatal and 
other expenses to birth mothers abroad would still be possible.159 The State Party has 
been advised to “[e]xpressly prohibit all forms of possible active solicitation for children, 
including the payment of pre-natal and other expenses”.160 
 
In Ethiopia, Article 191 of the RFC, entitled “Consent of Parents of the Adopted Child” 
indicates that “[b]oth the father and the mother of the adopted child must give their 
consent to the adoption where they are alive and known”.161 In addition, “where one of 
the parents is not willing to give his consent and the child is ten and above years of age, 
the court may approve the adoption upon hearing the opinion of the other parent and of 
the child”.162 These provisions are not further concretised either by other provisions of 
the RFC, or the MOWA Guidelines. For instance, the need to secure free and informed 
consent is not an explicit part of Ethiopian law. Furthermore, a time frame by when 
                                                 
158  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 36. 
159  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: United States of America, (June 2008), para. 30. 
160  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: United States of America, (June 2008), para. 31(c). 
161  Art. 191(1) of the RFC. 
162  Art. 191(3) of the RFC. 
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consent could be withdrawn is not provided. Safeguards to prevent improper 
inducement in obtaining consents are also lacking. 
 
The inadequate nature of the law on consent to adoption has created practical 
problems. For instance, there are mothers who change their minds about their consent 
once an adoption order has been issued.163 This is sometimes because families give 
their consent without appreciating the nature of intercountry adoption. Intercountry 
adoptions that are disrupted as a result of the lack of free and informed consent are also 
present.164 In Ethiopia, reports that adoption agencies making members of the family of 
origin rehearse responses to potential questions before appearing in court, continue to 
characterise the practice.165 Instances of parents approaching the relevant Ministries 
and challenging the adoption of their children are on the rise.166 It is submitted that 
unscrupulous individuals and organisations find it easy to abuse the gap created in the 
law in respect of consent for adoption. 
 
In Malawi, during the initial stages of the Infant DB case, questions of consent were 
raised. This was as a result of reports that “… Mr Banda has flip-flopped in interviews, 
first supporting Madonna, then saying he did not understand what he was doing …” 
when he consented to the adoption.167 However, the letter of the law in Malawi 
governing consent is relatively better than that of Ethiopia. Section 4(a) of the Adoption 
of Children Act requires the court, before making an adoption order, to be satisfied: 
                                                 
163  Interview with Deresse Bezawork, Adoption lawyer, (25 September 2009); and Biniam Eshetu, 
Legal Expert, MOWA, (25 September 2009). 
164  As above. 
165  As above. 
166  As above. 
167  Daily Mail, (26 October 2006). 
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… that every person whose consent is necessary under this Act and whose consent is 
not dispensed with has consented to and understands the nature and effect of the 
adoption order for which application is made, and in particular in the case of any parent 
understands that the effect of the adoption order will be permanently to deprive him or 
her of his or her parental rights. 
 
In Kenya, consents for adoption must be written.168 It is also the explicit obligation of the 
court, before making an adoption order, to be satisfied that every person who has given 
consent “understands the nature and effect of the adoption order”.169 In particular, in the 
case of parents, the court should ensure that they understand “that the effect of an 
adoption order will be permanently to deprive him or her of his or her parental rights”.170 
Provision is also made for the withdrawal of consent prior to, and after, the filing of the 
application for an adoption order.171 In order to minimise manipulation and avoid 
consent given while under stress, mothers can only give consent once the child is at 
least six weeks old.172 A child who has attained the age of 14 should also give his or her 
consent.173 The possibility of an appointment of a guardian ad litem to “safeguard the 
interests of the child pending the determination of the adoption proceedings”174 plays a 
role in ensuring that consents are free and informed. However, there is no explicit 
provision made in the Children Act to address the problem of obtaining consent with an 
inducement, such as, paying prenatal expenses. 
 
                                                 
168  Sec. 158(4) of the Children Act. 
169  Sec. 163(1)(a) of the Children Act. 
170  Sec. 163(1)(a) of the Children Act. 
171  Sec. 159(5) of the Children Act. 
172  Secs. 156(1) and 159(8)(a) of the Children Act. 
173  Sec. 158(4)(f) of the Children Act. 
174  Sec. 160(2)(a) of the Children Act. 
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Section 233 of the Children’s Act of South Africa provides for the consent requirements 
for adoption. Before consenting, parents and a child who is 10 years of age or older175 
should be counselled by an adoption social worker facilitating the adoption.176 This 
mandatory counselling is an improvement on Article 4(c)(1) of the Hague Convention 
which requires counselling only if necessary.177 In addition, not only should a consent 
be written and signed, it should also be made before, and verified by, a presiding officer 
of the children’s court.178 Despite the absence of an explicit provision in chapter 16 of 
the Children’s Act, the incorporation of the Hague Convention into South African law 
makes Article 29 of the Hague Convention on the “no initial contact” rule directly 
applicable.179 Thus, as discussed in section 6.2.7 below, Article 29 prohibits the contact 
between prospective adoptive parents and the biological parents or other carers until 
the necessary consent has been obtained, thereby minimising illicit activities in 
connection with consent. It is submitted that all these requirements contribute towards 
minimising consent secured by inducement, fraud, duress, and solicitation. 
 
While both the sending and receiving countries’ Central Authorities must consent to the 
adoption, provision is made for the South African Authority to withdraw its consent 
within 140 days of the date of consent.180 This withdrawal can only happen if it is found 
to be in the best interests of the child.181 Parents or the child can also withdraw their 
                                                 
175  It is to be noted that, according to Sec. 233(1)(c) of the Children’s Act, a child who is under the 
age of ten years can consent provided that he or she has attained the level of maturity that 
enables him or her to appreciate the implications of such consent. See Mosikatsana and Loffell, 
(2007), 15-12 and Couzens, (2009), 64 for further details on this. 
176  Sec. 233(4) of the Children’s Act; See Couzens, (2009), 64. 
177  See Couzens, (2009), 64. 
178  Sec. 233(6)(a)(i-iii) of the Children’s Act. 
179  Couzens, (2009), 64-65; Human, (2007), 16-27. 
180  Sec. 261(6)(a) of the Children’s Act; Human, (2007), 16-20. 
181  Sec. 261(6)(a) of the Children’s Act; Human, (2007), 16-20. 
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consent within 60 days after they have signed the consent document.182 The 
possibilities for withdrawal of consent provided for in the law can serve to redress 
situations where free and informed consents were not given in the first place. 
 
6.2.4    Improper financial or other gain, and corruption 
 
The financial aspects of intercountry adoption are a cause for serious concern. These 
financial aspects include fees, the costs of certain services or documents, the 
honorarium for the professionals’ services, the donations to institutions, the gifts, the 
tips, and so forth.183 It is acknowledged that even legitimate adoptions may also lead to 
wide-scale profiteering.184 When an unwarranted amount of money is involved in 
intercountry adoption, the possibility that the adoption system might begin to tailor the 
available children to the stated wishes of the would-be adoptive parents is high.185 Even 
worse, as outlined in Chapter 4 (Adoptability), children who do not need intercountry 
adoption would be pumped into the system in the interest of profiteering from the 
practice. 
 
It is often difficult to make a differentiation between what is “proper” and “improper” 
financial gain in intercountry adoption. Smolin captures this challenge eloquently: 
The law and practice regarding money and adoption turn out to be so mired in legal 
fictions and regulatory gaps as to make it extraordinarily difficult to distinguish between 
licit and illicit payments.186 
                                                 
182  Secs. 233(8) and 261(6)(a) of the Children’s Act; Human, (2007), 16-20. 
183  Daily Mail, (26 October 2006). 
184  Dillon, (2003), 197. 
185  As above. 
186  Smolin, (2004), 282. 
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Despite this challenge, it is possible to tease out some guidance from the international 
legal framework and the experience of States.  
 
Both the CRC and the ACRWC require States to address the problem of deriving 
improper financial or other gain from intercountry adoption. Similarly, but in a more 
elaborate manner, the Hague Convention requires that the “Central Authorities” who act 
on behalf of contracting States “shall take … all appropriate measures to prevent 
improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and to deter all practices 
contrary to the objects of the Convention”.187  
 
Apart from prohibiting anyone from deriving “improper financial gain or other gain” from 
intercountry adoption,188 the Hague Convention limits payments to costs, expenses, and 
“reasonable professional fees”.189 It also forbids “directors, administrators and 
employees of bodies involved in adoption” from receiving “remuneration which is 
unreasonably high” for services rendered.190 
 
Experience indicates that structural funding (which involves linking child protection 
programmes with adoption fees) should be avoided as it may exert pressure on public 
servants and create dependency for operating a sufficient number of adoptions per 
year.191 In Romania, despite the presence of law that prioritised national adoptions, 
child-care bodies preferred to place children abroad in order to obtain resources for the 
development of domestic services, which were under-financed by the central 
                                                 
187  Art. 8 of Hague Convention. 
188  Art. 32(1) of Hague Convention. 
189  Art. 32(2) of Hague Convention. 
190  Art. 32(3) of Hague Convention. 
191  ISS/IRC (October 2007), 2. 
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government.192 Government cash incentives for organisations that hit pre-determined 
adoption targets could also prove to be a cause for concern193 – since these incentives 
could work as the main motivation for removing children from their family environments 
unnecessarily.  
 
In Ethiopia, allegations of improper financial gain by adoption agencies are becoming 
increasingly common.194 The fact that the RFC (and the Revised Penal Code too) is 
silent on the issue is a serious shortcoming. Apart from generally prohibiting bribes, 
gifts,195 and the use of adoption as a business,196 the MOWA Guidelines, too, do not 
provide any concrete guidance on the regulation of fees and any financial gains in 
respect of intercountry adoption.  
 
What should be required is that salaries, fees, and wages received by adoption 
agencies in relation to adoptions should not be contingent on the number of children 
placed for adoption. However, at least on one occasion, it has been reported that 
adoption agency workers are paid on the basis of commission,197 which does not 
constitute good practice. In Ethiopia, there is hardly any practice of charging fees on the 
basis of detailed expenses. While there is the practice of asking for donations from 
adoptive parents that exists, there is no obligation that donations are allowed only after 
completion of the adoption procedure and only through an agency.  
                                                 
192  See Couzens, (2009), 70 and sources cited therein. 
193  See, for instance, The Sunday Telegraph, (13 April 2008). 
194  Interview with Deresse Bezawork, Adoption lawyer, (25 September 2009; and Biniam Eshetu, 
Legal Expert, MOWA, (25 September 2009); The Reporter, (17 October 2009); The Reporter, (27 
June 2009). 
195  Para. 12(1) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
196  Para.12(2) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
197  CBC, (19 March 2009). 
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In Kenya, neither an adopter nor any parent or guardian of a child who receives any 
payment or other reward in consideration of the adoption of a child under the Children 
Act commits an offence.198 However, a list of payments, such as court sanctioned 
payments,199 any fees prescribed by the Minister to be paid to an adoption society,200 
payment for an advocate,201 and maintenance related expenses made by or on behalf 
of an adoption society, are allowed. The efforts of the legislator to list some of the 
proper payments in respect of adoption are commendable. However, the fact that “any 
voluntary contribution made by any adopter or any parent or guardian to an adoption 
society”202 is allowed, opens the door to abuse. In the face of the absence of a legal 
scale for fees that provides complete transparency in costs, allowing for contributions 
exacerbates the problem.203 
 
In South Africa, Section 249(1) of the Children’s Act prohibits the giving and receiving of 
any consideration in cash or in kind for the adoption of a child, and the inducement of 
the consent to adoption.204 Section 249(2) also lists permissible payments in cash or in 
kind in respect of adoption. Since the payments mentioned in Section 249(2) refer to 
“prescribed” fees, some level of predictability and transparency is envisaged.  
 
                                                 
198  Sec. 179(1)(a) of the Children Act. 
199  Sec. 179(2)(a) of the Children Act. 
200  Sec. 179(2)(f) of the Children Act. 
201  Sec. 179(2)(d) of the Children Act. 
202  Sec. 179(2)(e) of the Children Act. 
203  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 133. 
204  Sec. 24 of the Child Care Act is also designed to deter the practice of child trafficking. According 
to this provision, unless exceptions exist, no person is allowed to give, undertake to give, receive 
or contract to receive any consideration, in cash or kind in respect of a child. It is a criminal 
offence to contravene this provision.  
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What could prove more controversial and difficult to regulate from the list of permissible 
payments is one made to “the biological mother of a child receiving compensation for… 
reasonable medical expenses incurred in connection with her pregnancy, birth of the 
child and follow-up treatment”.205 It is a reasonable construction to argue that this 
payment can only take place after consent has been given. In addition, the phrase 
“compensation” indicates a backward looking approach whereby a mother has already 
paid the expenses and is reimbursed at a later stage. Couzens also raises valid 
questions such as whether the compensation applies to babies or to older children 
too.206 It is hoped that greater guidance in regulating payments in adoptions would be 
achieved through the regulations promulgated in accordance with Section 253 of the 
Children’s Act.207 
 
In Malawi, Sections 4 and 10 of the Adoption of Children Act prohibit the exchange of 
payment or reward as consideration for the adopted child.  Section 10 provides for 
restriction on payments: it shall not be lawful for the adopter or guardian, except with the 
sanction of the court, to receive any payment or other reward in consideration of the 
adoption under the Adoption of Children Act. However, the Act does not penalise the 
exchange of payments, save for the denial of an adoption order.208 
 
The Infant DB case has in fact helped to shed light on some of the complications that 
may arise pertaining to corruption and improper financial gain in adoptions. These 
                                                 
205  Sec. 249(2)(a) of the Children Act. 
206  Couzens, (2009), 70. 
207  Sec. 253(d) of the Children’s Act; See Mosikatsana and Lofell, (2007), 15-27–15-28. 
208  Malawi Special Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 42. 
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possible complications are illuminated by means of three scenarios. First, human rights 
groups in Malawi argued that Madonna used her celebrity status – and a £1.7 million 
donation to the orphanage where infant DB lived – to bypass laws governing the 
adoption of Malawians by foreigners, thereby implying corruption.209 Secondly, the fact 
that Madonna was reportedly paying for a Malawi Social Welfare Department official to 
study at a British university was placed under the spotlight.210 Thirdly, and more 
importantly, in September 2007, it was reported that “… the senior Malawian child 
welfare official who was to go to London to assess whether Madonna could adopt a little 
boy from the southern African country has been removed from the high-profile case”.211 
It was further reported that “[t]he removal of Penstone Kilembe, the director of Malawi’s 
Child Welfare Services, follows allegations that he solicited money from the singer for 
the trip” and that “Simon Chisale, the country’s chief social welfare officer, said the 
government had gone to court last week to have Kilembe replaced as the assessor in 
the Madonna adoption”.212  
 
These three scenarios draw attention to the fact that any irregular payment or 
contribution usually has the outward appearance of “buying” a baby, which is strictly 
against the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention, and puts all future adoptions 
at risk. In the context of Zambia, the U.S. State Department discourages prospective 
adoptive parents from paying any fees that are not properly receipted, as well as 
                                                 
209  I Am Not Obsessed, (01 August 2007). 
210  Mail and Guardian, (4 September 2007).  
211  Available through News Bank at <http://nl.newsbank.com/nl>. 
212  As above. 
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making “donations” or paying “expediting” fees that may be requested from prospective 
parents.213  
 
In order to ameliorate the problem of improper financial gain and corruption, 
governments could forbid representatives of foreign adoption agencies working in their 
respective countries from “scouting for children” or receiving children directly from birth 
parents, in order to prevent taking of children from needy parents by offering them 
monetary inducement. Adoption agencies should also be called upon to maintain proper 
accounts which should be audited by a chartered accountant at the end of every 
financial year. Finally, it should be pointed out that the institutional and normative 
framework that the Hague Convention puts in place, if implemented properly, addresses 
many of these issues head on. In this regard, the Hague Convention is a commendable 
treaty either to which to become a signatory or from which to borrow standards and 
wording in the drafting of national legislation. 
 
6.2.5 Residency requirement as a sine qua non for an intercountry adoption 
order to prevent illicit activities 
 
Some countries in Africa, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo,214 Mauritius,215 
and Angola, have no residency requirements for prospective adoptive parents. In stark 
contrast to this, there are a number of countries on the continent (for example, 
Botswana,216 Sierra Leone,217 South Sudan,218 Tanzania,219 Uganda,220 Zambia221 and 
                                                 
213  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Zambia”, (October 2009). 
214  As above. 
215  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Mauritius”, (August 2007). 
216  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Botswana”, (June 2006). 
217  Art. 108 of the Child Right Act (No 7 of 2007). 
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Zimbabwe222), that have varied forms of residency requirements. In Zimbabwe, 
prospective adoptive parents must be either citizens or legal residents – although this 
requirement may be waived by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.223  
 
The link between illicit activities and a residency requirement emanates from the 
purpose to be achieved through the latter. Hence, one of the main purposes why States 
provide for a residency requirement before an adoption order is finalised is in order to 
better determine the suitability of prospective adoptive parent(s). In the context of the 
Infant DB case, it was noted that:  
…the real practical way of ensuring the child was safe with the adoptive parents was for 
the State Administration to have known such parents among our society for a while and 
thereby be able to speak for their commitment from personal interaction with them.224 
Thus, “the requirement as to residence … is intended to protect the child and to ensure 
that the adoption is well intended”225 and does not constitute an illicit activity.  
 
The merits of a residency requirement are debatable. Where a country of origin decides 
to have a residency requirement, however, the best interests principle should be central 
in interpreting that notion with regard to intercountry adoption. The period of residency 
required should not be unreasonably long. In this regard, while Zambia226  and Sierra 
                                                                                                                                                             
218  The new Children’s Act of Southern Sudan, Sec. 90 requires not only residence for a period of 
three years prior to a foreigner adopting a Southern Sudanese child, but in addition, fostering for 
a period of one year as well. 
219  Art. 4(5) of Adoption Act of Tanzania, Cap 335 (R.E. 2002); U.S. Department of State, 
“Intercountry adoption: Tanzania”, (March 2009). 
220  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Uganda”, (April 2008). 
221  U.S. Department of State, Intercountry adoption: Zambia, (December 2007). 
222  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Zimbabwe”, (June 2006). 
223  As above. 
224  Infant DB case, 18. 
225  Infant DB case, 17. 
226  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Zambia”, (December 2007). 
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Leone227 require a minimum of one year and six months residency of prospective 
adoptive parents, respectively, the requirement of three years residency in Uganda can 
be labelled unreasonably long. In addition, laws providing for a residency requirement 
may need to be fairly flexible, for instance, to promote the best interests of the child. 
Such is the practice in Sierra Leone where the High Court, in its discretion, would 
sometimes waive the six-month residency requirement.228  
 
A residency requirement has an impact on the application of the Hague Convention. 
The scope of application of the Hague Convention is provided for in Article 2. Article 
2(1) entrenches that: 
The Convention shall apply where a child habitually resident in one Contracting State 
("the State of origin") has been, is being, or is to be moved to another Contracting State 
("the receiving State") either after his or her adoption in the State of origin by spouses or 
a person habitually resident in the receiving State, or for the purposes of such an 
adoption in the receiving State or in the State of origin.229 
As can be gleaned from this provision, it is the habitual residence of the child and the 
habitual residence of prospective adoptive parents which are the connecting factors for 
the application of this Convention.230  
 
A range of case law is available dealing with the issue of habitual residence under the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Parental Abduction.231 While courts have 
                                                 
227  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Sierra Leone”, (December 2007). 
228  As above. 
229  Art. 2(1) of Hague Convention. The Hague Conference first used the term "habitual residence" in 
a 1954 convention dealing with civil procedure. See Convention du Premier, Arts. 21 and 32.  
230  See, Bisignaro, (1994), 142. 
231  See for instance, the website of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law at 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=34&cid=24> for case law 
dealing with habitual residence. See, generally Schwartz, (2004), 691; Schuz, (2001), 101; 
Splagounias, (1995), 823. 
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failed to agree on a single definition,232 there is some degree of consensus that there is 
a need to determine a child's habitual residence based on the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case.233 
 
There is also no definition of “habitual resident” in the Hague (adoption) Convention. 
Despite this, it is patent that the scope of application of the Hague Convention, and, in 
turn, its safeguards, are potentially made irrelevant where both the adopter and the 
adoptee are habitual residents of the same Contracting State. This could mean that, in 
countries that require a residency status before an adoption order is made, a distinction 
between “habitual residence”, on the one hand, and “residence”, on the other, needs to 
made for the application of the Hague Convention to materialise. While this distinction 
will be for the courts or authorities in the relevant State to determine, “habitual 
residence” could be described as “a factual concept denoting the country which has 
become the focus of the individual’s domestic and professional life”.234 However, in 
countries that prescribe an unreasonably long residency requirement, such distinction 
becomes less evident. This in turn might lead to a situation where the Hague 
Convention cannot apply because both the adoptee and the adopter would be 
considered as habitual residents of the same Contracting State. 
 
Neither Ethiopia nor South Africa have a residency requirement. Kenya’s three months 
fostering period before an adoption order is made cannot be equated with residency, 
                                                 
232  Splagounias, (1995), 823 (citing “Application of Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D. Utah 1993); 
Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Kan. 1993); Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 
1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991)”) 
233  Splagounias, (1995), 828. 
234  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 108. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427
too. However, Section 3(5) of the Malawi Adoption Act provides that “[a]n adoption order 
shall not be made in favour of any applicant who is not resident in Malawi”. In the Infant 
CJ High Court case, the requirement of residency was the main reason why Madonna’s 
adoption was rejected.235 In the Infant DB case, the issue of residency was central, 
too.236  
 
The Judge in the Infant CJ High Court case was of the view that, since the notion of 
“residence” implies a degree of permanence and is concerned with something which will 
continue for a considerable time, Madonna’s stay in Malawi was excluded from such 
definition. The SCA took issue with this conclusion.  
 
As a former British colony subscribing to the common law system, Malawian courts 
often refer to English court decisions. The SCA agreed with the approach to residence 
taken in Matalon v Matalon [1952] 1 All ER 1025 and in Keserue v Keserue [1962] 3 All 
E.R. 796.237  The former case concerned a wife’s petition for judicial separation (in 
England), while the husband was domiciled and resident at all material times in 
Jamaica.238  During the time of the petition, the husband had been in England for about 
nine weeks.239 The purpose of his visit was solely for conducting business negotiations 
and for claiming the custody of the child of the marriage.240 This case drove the point 
home for the SCA that neither the limited purpose of the husband’s visit to England nor 
                                                 
235  See Infant CJ High Court case. 
236  See Infant DB case. 
237  SCA Infant CJ case, 16. 
238  SCA Infant CJ case,, 16. 
239  As above. 
240  As above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428
his movement from hotel to hotel prevented a unanimous Court of Appeal decision 
holding him to be resident in that country.241 
 
The SCA applied the approach adopted in these cases to the Infant CJ case, and noted 
that at the date of the hearing of the application Madonna was present in the country, 
not by chance but by design.242 It observed that Madonna specifically came to Malawi 
for the purpose of the application for adoption, and was not in the country by chance or 
as a mere sojourner.243 As a result, it was concluded that, at the time of the application, 
Madonna was resident in Malawi.244   
 
A cursory look at this conclusion would in practical terms mean that, for the purpose of 
intercountry adoption, prospective adoptive parent(s) need only be physically present in 
Malawi at the time of the adoption application to qualify as being resident in the country. 
This is completely different from, for instance, the practice in Tanzania, where a 
prospective adoptive parent is considered as a resident only if he or she “holds a 
Resident Permit (Class A, B, or C), a Dependent’s Pass, or an Exemption Permit and 
lives in Tanzania”.245 Similarly, in Morocco, official residence certificates must be 
produced to prove resident status.246 
 
                                                 
241  As above. 
242        SCA Infant CJ case,, 17. 
243  SCA Infant CJ case,, 16. 
244  SCA Infant CJ case,, 16. 
245  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Tanzania”, (March 2009). 
246  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Morocco”, (February 2007). 
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However, rather creating confusion for future cases, the SCA added further elaboration 
to the grounds for its finding that Madonna’s presence at the time of the adoption 
petition should qualify her as a resident. The SCA added that: 
And on that day she [Madonna] had already adopted another infant known as David 
Banda from Malawi. The Appellant has plans to travel to Malawi frequently with her 
adopted children in order to instill in them a cultural pride and knowledge of their country 
of origin.  The Judge in the court below had evidence before her indicating that the 
Appellant had a project in Malawi which had noble and immediate ideas of investing in 
the improvement of the lives of more disadvantaged children in Malawi.  It is clear from 
this evidence that the Appellant in this case is not a mere sojourner in this country but 
has a targeted long term presence aimed at ameliorating the lives of more disadvantaged 
children in Malawi (insertion mine).247 
 
In this regard, it is far from the truth to suppose that the approach to defining who is a 
resident in respect of intercountry adoption in Malawi is put to rest. Questions abound, 
such as: Does a prospective adoptive parent need further connection to Malawi, like a 
project, for example, to be declared a resident for the purpose of intercountry adoption? 
Does a prospective adoptive parent also need to have plans to bring the adopted child 
back to Malawi in order to qualify as a resident? What does a “targeted long term 
presence” mean? Or is a “targeted long term presence” an additional requirement for 
status as a resident? Only future practice related to the issue will shed light on these 
questions. 
 
As observed above, the treatment of the residency requirement by the SCA, while very 
liberal, still leaves a few questions unanswered. In retrospect, the approach the Judge 
took in the Infant DB case, which viewed the residency requirement as being merely a 
                                                 
247  SCA Infant CJ case, 17. 
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means to an end – the end being the best interests of the child,248 is more instructive, 
and should still carry a lot of weight in approaching the issue in a child-friendly 
fashion.249 
 
From a comparative perspective, it should be noted that the current trend in Africa is to 
regulate intercountry adoption without a residency requirement. Save for the Child 
Rights Act of South Sudan, recent law reform efforts on the African continent do not 
actually prescribe a residency requirement for intercountry adoption.250 If experience in 
Uganda is any guidance, an unreasonably long residency requirement (in this case 
three years) could be counterproductive. It could be a contributing cause for prospective 
adoptive parents’ motivation to circumvent the whole safeguard necessary for 
intercountry adoption – an issue that forms the focus of discussion in the next sub-
section.251 Should a country decide to become a State Party to the Hague Convention, 
a residency requirement has the potential, at least, to complicate the application of the 
Convention (if not to make impossible). In the final analysis, it is submitted that the 
possibility of having a sound and well-regulated intercountry adoption regime without a 
residency requirement is still a viable option for countries of origin in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
248  See Infant DB case, 18. 
249  See Mezmur, (2009a), 161-163. 
250  See, for instance, Children’s Act 38 of 2005 of South Africa and the Child Right Act 7 of 2007 of 
Sierra Leone (which requires 6 months residency, though the courts, by using their discretion, 
often waive this requirement).  
251  ANPPCAN, (2009), 7. 
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6.2.6 Abuse of guardianship orders to circumvent adoption safeguards  
 
Securing a guardianship order for the ultimate purpose of intercountry adoption is a 
method often employed in Muslim countries where intercountry adoption is not allowed. 
To illustrate, this is the case in Morocco, Jordan, and Bangladesh.252 It was reported in 
2004 that, since there is no adoption under Iraqi law, only guardianship is allowed; even 
then, “Iraqi law has not permitted foreigners to obtain legal guardianship of Iraqi 
children”.253 
 
One of the most notable countries where guardianship orders are frequently abused to 
skirt from intercountry adoption procedures, is Uganda.254 This is often done to avoid 
the three year residency requirement prescribed by law.255 A review, conducted by the 
Uganda Chapter of the African Network for the Prevention and Protection Against Child 
Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) in August 2007 on the status of adoption and legal 
guardianship trends in Uganda in the wake of growing concerns about the possible links 
between adoption/ guardianship processes and child trafficking, has confirmed this 
problem.256 
 
The CRC Committee has detected a similar trend. In its consideration of Uganda’s 
Report under the OPSC, the Committee noted the rising number of applications for legal 
                                                 
252  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Morocco”, (September 2009); Bangladesh,  
(November 2006); Jordan, (January 2007).  
253  Olsen, (2004), 503 citing U.S. Department of State, International adoption: Iraq, available at 
<http://0-travel.state.gov.innopac.up.ac.za/adoption_iraq.html>. 
254  ANPPCAN, (2009), 7. 
255  Art. 46(b) of the Children Act of Uganda. 
256  ANPPCAN, (2007). 
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guardianship of children, and the reduced number of applications for adoption.257 It 
viewed such a trend as potentially aimed at circumventing the regulations which apply 
to adoption, and resulting in practices contrary to the OPSC,258 and recommended to 
the State Party to “stringently scrutinize applications for legal guardianship of children in 
order to avoid practices contrary to the Protocol”.259  
 
An attempt to supplant an intercountry adoption procedure with a less stringent 
guardianship order for the ultimate purpose of removing a child from the country of 
origin, and adopting him or her in the receiving State, has real shortcomings. It is also 
not congruent with international law. For instance, a “nude” guardianship order, which 
can be effected merely on an ex parte application, taking place without the knowledge, 
supervision or approval of a designated authority, cannot meet one of the tenets of the 
CRC, the ACRWC,  and the  Hague Convention - that intercountry adoption is a 
legitimate concern of public authorities.260 
 
As regards the policy objective underlying the “mutual recognition” principle of the 
Hague Convention, it is obvious, since adoption necessarily entails a change of legal 
status, that such events must occur in such a way as to permit ratifying states to agree 
upfront about the form and content of the legal consequences in the subsequent country 
of destination of an adoption that has taken place in the sending country. A court faced 
with considering a guardianship order as a prelude to an intercountry transfer of a child 
                                                 
257  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, (October 2008), para. 20. 
258  As above. 
259  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, (October 2008), para. 21. 
260  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007b), 88. 
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has no duty to enquire into the nature and status of any adoption, or adoption-like order, 
in the country of destination. 
 
In addition, in view of children’s identity rights discussed in chapter 3 above, it is also 
argued that a guardianship application takes very little account of the overall rights of a 
child under international law. For instance, being premised, as it is, on an internal 
jurisdictional issue geared only to matters incidental to the exercise of one aspect (albeit 
an important one) of parental responsibility, a guardianship order does not facilitate the 
preservation of information, such as, that relating to the child’s origins, background, 
family, and medical history, which is often done in the case of intercountry adoption.261 
 
A coalition of civil societies in Uganda has recommended that the law on guardianship 
should be amended.262 The law should provide that a guardian can only travel outside 
of Uganda with the child after having obtained a court order authorising such travel, and 
after having satisfied the court of their return (also through depositing sureties).263 
 
To the knowledge of this writer, there has not been any case of the use of guardianship 
orders to circumvent intercountry adoption in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi. However, in 
all these three countries there is nothing explicit in the law that expressly prohibits it. 
 
In Kenya, for instance, while the possibility of a foreigner or non-resident being granted 
a guardianship order is not proscribed by legislation, the High Court has been 
                                                 
261  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007b), 93. 
262  Uganda Child Rights NGO Network, (2007), 13.  
263  As above. 
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consistent enough to treat adoptions with a foreign element as being intercountry 
adoption applications.264 The fact that the DCS must issue a “no objection” letter before 
a child can be allowed to travel out of the country serves as a safeguard, too.265 
 
In South Africa, the AD v DW case has illuminated the various issues that may arise in 
connection with the attempt to use guardianship orders so as to avoid intercountry 
adoption procedures. In this case, an application for sole custody and sole guardianship 
was made to the High Court by citizens of the U.S. who wished to adopt a South African 
child. The applicants were advised (incorrectly) that a policy by the Department of 
Social Development barred citizens of the U.S. from adopting children in South Africa, 
and were encouraged to apply to the High Court for an order granting them sole custody 
and sole guardianship. They had planned to use the guardianship order to enable them 
to take the child to the U.S. where they could then formally adopt her. The High Court 
and the SCA (by majority) held that the matter should have been dealt with by the 
Children’s Court, which is vested with the power and capacity to entertain adoption 
cases.266 The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is only in exceptional circumstances 
(to promote a child’s best interests) that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear 
applications for sole custody and sole guardianship which were intended as a first step 
towards adopting a South African child abroad.267  Since it did not find this case to fall 
within the “exceptional circumstances” threshold, the Constitutional Court referred the 
matter to the Children’s Court where an adoption order was made.268 
                                                 
264  Koome, (2009). 
265  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (2007), para. 504. 
266  See Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007b) for a discussion of the SCA decision of this case. 
267  AD v DW, para. 32 and 34. 
268  As above. 
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In connection to this, it is worth noting that, according to Section 25 of the Children’s 
Act:  
[w]hen application is made in terms of section 24 [guardianship application] by a non-South 
African citizen for guardianship of a child, the application must be regarded as an inter-
country adoption for the purposes of the Hague Convention on Inter-country Adoption and 
Chapter 16 of this Act.  
This provision is commendable, and worthy of imitation in other African jurisdictions, as 
it has the potential to prevent attempts to circumvent intercountry adoption procedures 
through the use of guardianship orders.269 
 
6.2.7   Violating the “no initial contact” rule 
 
One of the central tenets of intercountry adoption is that it is a practice of finding a 
family for a child, rather than a child for a family. This has a number of implications, 
including that the needs of adoptable children in countries of origin should be given 
priority over the requests of prospective adoptive parents in receiving countries.270 
Article 29 of the Hague Convention entrenches the “no initial contact” rule which 
envisages a similar goal of prioritising the needs of children and preventing or 
minimising pressures on families of origin.271 Article 29 of the Hague Convention 
provides that: 
…there shall be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child’s 
parents or any other person who has care of the child [such as orphanages] until the 
requirements [prescribed for intercountry adoptions in Article 4 – notably adoptability, 
fulfilment of the best interests criterion, compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and 
                                                 
269  For a discussion of some of the limitations of this provision, see Couzens, (2009), 60-61. 
270  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 27. 
271  The “no initial contact” rule also has a role to play in minimising “detachment disorder” in cases 
where the child becomes attached to the prospective adoptive parent(s), and ultimately a court 
decides against an adoption. 
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obtaining of the necessary consents – and Article 5 – eligibility and counselling of the 
adoptive parents, and authority for the child to enter the receiving state and reside there 
permanently] have been met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or unless 
the contact is in compliance with the conditions established by the competent authority of 
the state of origin (insertions mine). 
 
There is neither clear legislation nor practice in Ethiopia and Kenya that emulates the 
“no initial contact” rule of Article 29 of the Hague Convention. Actually, in Ethiopia, the 
fact that prospective adoptive parents can travel to meet members of the birth family, 
even before an adoption order is granted, has been reported by the media as 
constituting good practice.272 In South Africa, too, the Children’s Act does not contain a 
provision addressing the “no initial contact” rule. However, as already mentioned above, 
the incorporation of the Hague Convention by way of an annexure to the Children’s Act 
into South African law makes this provision directly applicable in that State.273 
 
Malawi, too, does not have a law enforcing the “no initial contact” rule. Before 
Madonna’s arrival in Malawi in 2006, it was reported that her husband at the time, film 
maker Guy Ritchie, had visited seven orphanages in the country “videoing the most 
doe-eyed children he can find” for his wife.274 It was further reported that, based on the 
video, when Madonna went to Malawi in 2006, she had initially wanted to adopt infant 
CJ (and not infant DB).275 The story locally is that the grandmother of infant CJ stood in 
the way of Madonna, however, and refused to give her consent to the adoption.276 In the 
years that followed, reportedly, the grandmother had to endure pressure from priests, 
                                                 
272  See, for instance, The New York Times, (04 June 2007). 
273   See Human, (2007), 16-27; Couzens, (2009), 65. 
274  The Guardian, (12 June 2009). 
275  As above. 
276  As above. 
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village elders, people from the orphanage, and others whom she had never seen 
before, in an effort to persuade her to let infant CJ go.277 Reportedly, “after years of 
being told that adoption was the right thing for Mercy”, the grandmother “caved in”.278  
 
If these reports are accurate, they describe exactly the same as the improper activities 
that Article 29 of the Hague Convention envisages to eliminate. Assessed against the 
ideals of Article 29 of the Hague Convention, Madonna’s adoptions leave much to be 
desired. In the Infant CJ case it seems that not only was there contact between 
Madonna and the child before consent for adoption was secured,279 but also between 
the biological family of infant CJ and other persons, such as workers at the orphanage 
where infant CJ lived, seemingly “on behalf of” Madonna.  
 
It could be argued, however, that, since Malawi is not a Contracting State to the Hague 
Convention, it is not bound to apply the provisions of the Hague Convention. This 
argument is valid. However, as far as receiving countries that are Contracting States to 
the Hague Convention is concerned, it would constitute a complete disregard of the 
Special Commission Recommendation that calls on countries that are Contracting 
States to the Hague Convention to try and apply, “as far as practicable…the standards 
and safeguards of the Convention to the arrangements for inter-country adoption which 
they make in respect of non-Contracting States”.280  
 
                                                 
277  As above. 
278  As above. 
279  As above. 
280  Permanent Bureau, Recommendations, (2001).  However, the careful choice of words, “as far as 
practicable…”, is indicative of the suggestive nature of the proposal. 
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The practice of prospective adoptive parents visiting an institution to pick out an 
appealing child, or to choose a child from photo lists, is neither congruent with the spirit 
of the Hague Convention,281 nor with the best interests of the child principle in the CRC 
and the ACRWC. Even within the context of the CRC, the CRC Committee has 
expressed concern when “[q]ualified officials do not select the children for adoption and 
allow prospective adoptive parents to make the choice” (emphasis mine).282 A system 
that allows prospective adoptive parents to directly choose children for adoption also 
contains an element of discrimination. For instance, it has the potential to further 
disadvantage “special needs” children, such as, those that are disabled.283 Such a 
practice also facilitates baby buying and selling, inducement of consent, and other 
similar illicit activities. Therefore, domesticating the “no initial contact” rule in a domestic 
law has the potential to prevent illicit activities in connection with adoption. 
 
6.2.8 Eligibility criteria for prospective adoptive parents to prevent illicit 
activities 
 
Both the CRC and the ACRWC are silent on the question of eligibility to adopt.284 Article 
5 of the Hague Convention also does not provide detailed rules concerning eligibility - it 
states, in general terms, that an adoption shall take place “only if the competent 
authorities of the receiving State (a) have determined that the prospective adopters are 
                                                 
281  Permanent Bureau, Recommendations, (2001). 
282  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mozambique, (October 2009), para. 55(d). 
Subsequently, the Committee recommended that the State Party should “[e]nsure that qualified 
officials are responsible for choosing the adoptive family which best responds to the needs of 
children”. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Mozambique, (October 2009), para. 56(d). 
283  See Vite and Boechat, (2008), 27. 
284  In part because they regulate intercountry adoption in a very rudimentary fashion, and also 
because the issue of eligibility is better left for national laws to regulate. 
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eligible and suitable to adopt…”.285 Countries of origin also have established their 
eligibility requirements for prospective adoptive parents in intercountry adoption. 
 
At the centre of almost all eligibility criteria for prospective adoptive parents is the 
intention of those who stipulate the requirements to promote children’s best interests. 
This includes even those eligibility criteria that seem strange, such as, the new criteria 
in China which requires prospective adoptive parent(s) to be below a maximum body 
mass index of 40.286  
 
Some eligibility criteria attempt to prevent the possibility of abuse and illicit activities in 
adoption (for instance, by paedophiles adopting children). To illustrate: almost all 
African countries do not allow homosexuals to adopt children (at least in principle). 
Single applicants are almost never permitted to adopt children from Burkina Faso.287 In 
a similar vein, in Ghana, a single person can only adopt if he or she is a citizen of that 
country.288 Furthermore, prohibiting single males from adopting girls is virtually a rule on 
the African continent.289 
 
In Kenya, eligibility requirements for prospective adoptive parents that are in part 
intended to prevent illicit activities are incorporated in the Children Act. While a sole 
                                                 
285  See, Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 93-96 and 112 for further details on 
suitability and eligibility to adopt. 
286  Children’s Hope International, (2008).  
287  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Burkina Faso”, (August 2008). 
288  U.S. Department of State, “Intercountry adoption: Ghana”, (February 2009). 
289  See for instance, Art.  4(2) (Cap 335) of the Adoption of Children Act of Tanzania. 
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male foreign applicant is not allowed to adopt,290 under special circumstances, a sole 
female foreign applicant may adopt.291 
 
In practice, prohibiting a single woman to adopt a male child is proving 
counterproductive.292 Because the majority of prospective adoptive parents are women, 
this has led to the availability of more male children for adoption in comparison to 
female children. It is also commendable that a person who has been convicted 
previously of a child abuse offence is explicitly precluded from adopting by law.293 
However, the blanket prohibition of homosexuals, joint applicants not married to each 
other, and sole foreign male applicant, to adopt294 is controversial. 
 
In Ethiopia and Malawi, eligibility requirements are less strict. Just recently, however, 
the MOWA in Ethiopia is starting to refuse to accept applications by single applicants.295 
Section 3(c) of the Malawi Adoption of Children Act also provides that “a single male 
applicant cannot adopt a female infant unless the court is satisfied that there are 
exceptional circumstances”. Judging by Madonna’s adoption of infant CJ, coupled with 
a reading of the provisions of the Adoption Act, Malawi could be classified as falling 
within the category of African countries that have very flexible eligibility requirements for 
adoption. Although Section 231 of the South African Children’s Act provides a long and 
                                                 
290  Sec. 158 (3) (a) and (b) of the Children Act. 
291  Sec. 158(2)(d) of the Children Act. 
292  Interview with Irene Mureithi, Child Welfare Society of Kenya, (22 June 2009); Interview with 
Susan Otuoma, Little Angels Network, (22 June 2009). 
293  Sec. 158(3) Children Act. This provision includes persons who have been charged with a child 
abuse offence as being precluded from adopting by law, the merit of which could also be 
controversial. 
294  Sec. 158(3) of the Children’s Act. 
295  See, for instance, Australian Government’s Attorney General’s Department, (September 2009). 
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liberal list of persons who may adopt a child,296 “[a] person unsuitable to work with 
children is not a fit and proper person to adopt a child”.297 
 
A liberal attitude to eligibility to adopt has its own advantages and disadvantages. On 
the positive side, it helps to increase the pool of prospective adoptive parents. This in 
turn has the potential to increase the chances of a child being matched with a suitable 
person or family that meets his or her needs.298 On the other hand, a highly flexible 
eligibility requirement poses a threat to children’s best interests as it could fail to prevent 
illicit activities.  
 
Thus, States have to do a context-specific delicate balancing act: to prevent illicit 
activities by establishing stringent eligibility requirements and the same time not 
compromise the chances for children’s adoptions.299 Though it is a comment made in 
the context of domestic adoption, the CRC Committee has indicated that, by “[t]aking 
into account ... the high number of children in institutions, the Committee recommends 
that the State party increase the possibility of domestic adoption”300 by relaxing its 
eligibility requirements beyond married persons. It is argued that from this flows an 
observation that in the context of intercountry adoption, too, States Parties to the CRC 
and the ACRWC have to take into account the number of children who need adoption 
before establishing stringent eligibility requirements.  
                                                 
296  See Mosikatsana and Lofell, (2007), 15-6 – 15-9 for a detailed discussion of this. 
297  Sec. 231(6) of the Children’s Act. 
298  See for instance, Bartholet, (1996), 182 (describing international adoption as alternative to 
restrictive American adoption processes and highlighting that in the U.S. limitations on age, 
marital status, and economic situations exist in assessing satisfactory adoptive parents which 
forces prospective parents to frequently look toward international adoption instead of domestic 
adoption because of the lower restrictions on parental suitability). 
299  Sec. 231(6) of the Children’s Act. 
300  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Chile, (April 2007), para. 47. 
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6.2.9 Placing moratoria on intercountry adoption to prevent and address illicit 
activities 
 
In Chapter 3 it has been argued that intercountry adoption is not an obligatory 
alternative means of care that States Parties to the CRC and the ACRWC are required 
to undertake.301 The Hague Convention, too, does not oblige Contracting States to 
permit intercountry adoption. Therefore, placing a moratorium on intercountry adoption 
is generally not a violation of the CRC, the ACRWC, or the Hague Convention.302 There 
is sufficient evidence to corroborate this position.303 In fact, imposing a moratorium on 
intercountry adoption is sometimes the only feasible and available measure (after 
exhausting the possibilities of less extreme measures) to prevent illicit activities in 
adoptions.304 
 
In very exceptional circumstances the CRC Committee itself has recommended to 
States Parties to suspend intercountry adoption. This was the case with Guatemala. In 
2001 the CRC Committee recommended to Guatemala that it should “suspend 
adoptions in order to take the adequate legislative and institutional measures to prevent 
the sale and trafficking of children...”.305 The Committee understands the need for 
                                                 
301  Section 3.4.3.2.1. 
302  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 102-103. 
303  State practice surrounding intercountry adoption, for instance, from countries that are emerging 
from or experiencing natural or manmade catastrophes, has recently inclined towards suspension 
of intercountry adoption. To illustrate, this was the case, after 26 December 2004, when an 
underwater earthquake off the coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra caused a tsunami tidal 
wave that devastated countries across Southeast Asia. 
304  For instance, for a discussion of the role of moratorium in the context of refugee children, see 
Chapter 4, section 4.5.5. 
305  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Guatemala, (July 2001), para. 35. 
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moratoria, especially until the regulatory framework for intercountry adoption is put in 
place.306 
 
Where appropriate a blanket moratorium on intercountry adoption should be avoided. In 
some instances a more specific moratorium stand a better chance of promoting 
children’s best interests. While the common practice is to place a moratorium on 
intercountry adoption at the national level, a moratorium could sometimes be local or 
region-specific. For instance, in 2005, after some systematic irregularities were spotted 
by Indian authorities, it was reported that adoptions in New Delhi came to a temporary 
standstill.307 A moratorium could also be placed with respect to specific orphanages that 
undertake intercountry adoption – for instance, on private orphanages as opposed to 
those run by government.308 Exceptionally, moratoria could be age specific and be 
placed on the adoption of a certain age group of adoptable children, too.  
 
However, possibilities exist where a moratorium could be inconsistent with children’s 
rights. Where there are adoptable children in a country who could benefit from 
intercountry adoption in a country, a moratorium imposed for an unjustifiably lengthy 
period of time has the potential to limit these children’s access to growing up in a family 
environment. While Marx has argued that, by placing a moratorium (especially for a 
lengthy period of time) on intercountry adoption,309 Romania was hiding behind the best 
                                                 
306  This was reflected in its Concluding Observations to Kyrgyzstan when it recommended that 
“[w]hen the State party envisages lifting its moratorium on intercountry adoptions” it should 
consider ratifying the Hague Convention. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, 
(August 2000), para. 38. 
307  See Dohle, (2008-2009), 134 (citing two Delhi Newsline newspaper reports). 
308  For instance, see the discussion in this section below in the context of Ethiopia. 
309  Although the Emergency Ordinance of 8 October 2001 imposed the moratorium for 12 months, 
the moratorium has subsequently been maintained by a series of extensions. 
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interests standard and using it to justify its own narcissistic policies,310 others contended 
that the moratorium should not be lifted.311 Ultimately the CRC Committee 
recommended to Romania that, by taking into account its new adoption laws, the State 
Party should “withdraw the existing moratorium as a barrier to the full implementation of 
Art. 21 of the Convention”.312 
 
Transitory cases – those that were already started (and sometimes almost completed) 
before a moratorium is imposed – are more controversial. These cases might leave 
children in a legal limbo. In particular, suspending cases that have reached the 
entrustment level (where the child is physically placed under the care of the prospective 
adoptive parents) of the intercountry adoption process are at a higher risk of violating 
children’s rights.313  
 
It is promising that the experience gained from the Zoe’s Ark case, and the need to 
impose a moratorium on intercountry adoption in instances where a country is affected 
by a catastrophe, seem to be resonating well in Africa. For example, it was reported that 
days after the Zoe’s Ark workers were arrested, the Republic of Congo, part of which is 
still experiencing violence and armed conflict, announced that it was suspending all 
international adoptions because of the events in Chad.314 Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Social Welfare of the Government of Zambia as well as that of the Government of Togo 
                                                 
310  Marx, (2007), 373. 
311  See, for example, Bainham, (2003), 223-236. 
312  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Romania, (June 2009), para. 55; Couzens, (2008). 
313  It is argued that: 
In particular, it may be difficult to justify applying a moratorium to cases in which 
the conditions of Article 17, including agreement between the two Central 
Authorities that the adoption may proceed, have already been met.  
See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 102-103. 
314  International Herald Tribune, (26 December 2007). 
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also suspended adoption after the Zoe’s Ark case.315 The official reasons provided for 
the suspension of intercountry adoption in these three countries were the need to 
undertake the practice in the best interests of the child, and to address dysfunctions in 
the adoption system which had the potential of violating children’s rights.316  
 
 
Moratoria are also being imposed in a number of African countries in order to first 
provide for a proper regulatory framework for intercountry adoption. In this respect, the 
experiences of Liberia317 and Lesotho318 offer good examples. Experience in two of the 
countries under study (South Africa and Ethiopia) further shows the recognition of the 
role of moratoria to prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry adoption.  
 
As far as this writer can establish, there has not been any time in Malawi and Kenya 
where a moratorium has been placed on intercountry adoption. In South Africa, 
however, in the Fitzpatrick case, Government had argued that it needed two years to 
bring legislation up to standard before commencing processing intercountry adoptions. 
The Constitutional Court was of the view that the provisions of the Child Care Act were 
sufficient to prevent illicit activities, and denied the Government’s request to suspend 
intercountry adoption pending a legal review. 
 
In May 2009, the Ethiopian First Instance Court had placed a moratorium on cases 
involving abandoned children from orphanages in Addis Ababa, citing concerns over an 
                                                 
315  ISS/IRC Monthly Review, (March 2008), 3. The Republic of Togo has promulgated the Law No: 
2008-014 of November 2008 for the approval of the Hague Convention. 
316  ISS/IRC Monthly Review, (March 2008), 3. 
317  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Liberia (not yet considered) (July 2009). 
318  The moratorium has now been lifted. See U.S. Department of State “Intercountry adoption: 
Lesotho” (November 2008). 
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inexplicable increase in the number of abandoned children being brought for 
adoption.319 The Court later lifted the moratorium for the three government run 
orphanages in Addis Ababa. It subsequently lifted the moratorium after the investigation 
into the dramatic increase of the number of abandoned children was completed.320 The 
specific nature of the moratorium (targeting abandoned children), and the fact that the 
Court did not waste time in completing its investigation and lifting the moratorium, 
indicate a sound appreciation of children’s best interests by the Court, and this is 
commendable. 
 
There may be sound child protection reasons for the imposition of a moratorium by 
receiving countries, too.321 In the final analysis, whether to impose a moratorium, and 
for how long, should take into account children’s best interests. In other words, the 
presence of adoptable children whose chance of access to a stable family environment 
is only through intercountry adoption should warrant serious consideration of the nature 
and duration of a moratorium. 
6.3 ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT AND 
ADDRESS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION  
6.3.1    Introduction 
 
The CRC and the ACRWC provide limited guidance as to the kind of institutions that are 
required for undertaking intercountry adoption. These instruments make reference to 
“competent authorities”. For instance, the ACRWC speaks of the need to “establish 
                                                 
319  U.S. Department of State, (13 May 2009). 
320  As above. 
321  These kinds of moratoria are often referred to as “restrictions”. See, Permanent Bureau, Guide to 
Good Practice, (2008), 103. 
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competent authorities to determine matters of adoption”.322 According to the CRC, 
States Parties have to “[e]nsure that the adoption of a child is authorised only by 
competent authorities”.323 This has been interpreted to mean that implementation of the 
CRC requires important institutional developments.324 Further details regarding the 
composition, functions, and other aspects of these competent authorities are not spelled 
out, at least in the letter of the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC.325  
 
To borrow the words of Hodgkin and Newell, the notion of “competent authorities” 
encompasses “the judicial and professional authorities charged with vetting the viability 
of the placement in terms of the best interests of the child”.326 This notion has been 
understood to be indicative of the fact that “the handling of a child’s case cannot be left 
to the birth parents, to prospective adoptive parents, to unqualified protagonists or those 
of doubtful ethics”.327 Generally, “competent bodies” have also been understood to be 
“bodies with the appropriate legal competence”.328 In order to display competency, the 
personnel of these authorities should be adequately trained, too.329  
 
The Hague Convention, by comparison, offers a relatively detailed road map for the 
specific institutional structures that should undertake the various responsibilities under 
                                                 
322  Art. 24(a) of the ACRWC. 
323  Art. 21(a) of CRC. 
324  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 29 
325  However, through its concluding observations, the CRC Committee has elaborated the various 
elements a competent authority should have in order to comply with the provisions of the CRC. 
326  Newell and Hodgkin, (2007), 295. 
327  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 29 
328  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, (2003), para. 44. 
329  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Panama, (January 1997), para. 31; Panama, (June 
2004), para. 38; Bulgaria, (June 2008), para. 38. See, too, General Comment No. 5, (2003), 
(para. 53-55) on general training and capacity building requirements necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of the CRC.  
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the Convention. The main institutions that are envisaged under the Hague Convention, 
and which have the potential to prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry 
adoption, are Central Authorities, Accredited Bodies, and Approved (non-accredited) 
Persons and Bodies.330  
 
6.3.2    Central authorities 
One of the added values of the Hague Convention is the requirement to either create, or 
designate, a Central Authority.331 Each Contracting State is expected to designate a 
Central Authority that acts as the point of contact, coordination, and responsibility within 
each country for the implementation of the various duties and activities called for by the 
Hague Convention.332 
 
One of the main tasks of Central Authorities is to “co-operate with each other and 
promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their States to protect 
children and to achieve the other objects of the Convention”.333 And, as already 
highlighted above, one of the objects of the Hague Convention is “to ensure that 
...safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in 
children”. Furthermore, the role of Central Authorities in preventing illicit activities is 
more explicit in Article 8 of the Hague Convention: 
                                                 
330  An independent judiciary is a corner stone for the general promotion and protection of children’s 
rights. Thus the role of courts in preventing and addressing illicit activities in intercountry 
adoptions is crucial. This is clear, for instance, from the experience in Guatemala where many 
intercountry adoption cases where courts were not involved had been tainted with irregularities. 
However, the discussion in this sub-section is limited to institutional frameworks (mainly 
administrative bodies) that have a direct role in intercountry adoptions namely - central 
authorities, accredited bodies and approved (non-accredited) persons. 
331  Art. 6(1) of the Hague Convention. 
332  Art. 6(1) of the Hague Convention. 
333  Art. 7(1) of the Hague Convention. 
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Central Authorities shall take, directly or through public authorities, all appropriate 
measures to prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and 
to deter all practices contrary to the objects of the Convention. 
Since generally, the successful operation of the Hague Convention depends on Central 
Authorities, they should be provided with sufficient powers to effectively undertake their 
obligations. Sufficient powers of Central Authorities should be accompanied with the 
placement of the Central Authority under or within the appropriate State organ or office 
that is closely related to intercountry adoption activities.334 
 
In addition, there is a need to equip a Central Authority with adequate personnel and 
resources. Experience shows that lack of sufficient support in the form of human and 
financial resources generally hampers the role of a Central Authority, including with 
regard to suppressing illicit activities. In relation to Bolivia, for example, the CRC 
Committee appreciated the State Party’s increased control of  the adoption procedures, 
though, it also aired its concern “about the insufficient organizational and human 
resources provided to the central adoption authority in order to fulfill its function”.335 
 
Even where a State is not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention, (and hence 
without an explicit obligation to establish or designate a Central Authority as understood 
in the Hague Convention), the CRC Committee seems to be of the view that there is an 
obligation to establish or designate a body to oversee and coordinate intercountry 
adoption. For instance, in its recommendation to Russia, it stated that “the State party 
                                                 
334  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 47. 
335  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Bulgaria, (June2008), para. 37; Dominican Republic, 
(February 2008), para. 55; Kazakhstan, (June 2007), para. 44(d). 
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establish a system for the accreditation and control of foreign adoption agencies”.336 
The Russian Federation is not yet a Contracting State to the Hague Convention. A 
similar situation can be observed in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Despite the fact that the country is not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention, the 
CRC Committee recommended that it should “[e]stablish a central authority for adoption 
to regulate, train and monitor all actors involved and coordinate with the relevant legal 
authorities”.337  
 
It could then be argued that, by interpretation, the establishment of a central authority is 
also an obligation under the CRC. The same argument can be made in the context of 
the ACRWC as the wording in Article 24(d) is similar to Article 21(d) of the CRC. 
 
The involvement of Central Authorities has the capacity to eliminate or to minimise 
independent adoptions, which, by definition, are adoptions that are conducted strictly or 
directly between prospective adoptive parents and the birth family without State 
involvement.338 As mentioned in Chapter 1,339 where independent adoptions take place, 
the possibility of ascertaining whether adoptability, subsidiarity, and other safeguards for 
intercountry adoption have been complied with, is very difficult. Furthermore, in 
independent adoption, since authorities in both the receiving country and country of 
                                                 
336  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, (November 2005), para. 43. 
337  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, (February 2009), 
para. 48(d). 
338  Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 115-116. 
339  Section 1.3. 
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origin would not have any supervision of the procedure, it is not possible to regulate 
improper financial gain and corruption.340  
 
Concern has been raised in the context of Colombia, where only half of intercountry 
adoptions are administered by its Central Authority, the Colombian Institute for Family 
Welfare.341 The use of private “Adoption Homes” in Colombia, which operate with little 
or no supervision of the Central Authority and place children for intercountry adoption, 
has been found to be in contravention of the CRC.342 “Adoption Homes” increase the 
risk of profit-making contrary to Article 21(d) of the CRC.343  
 
It could be reasonably speculated that the minimal involvement of “Adoption Homes” in 
domestic adoptions (only 10%), and their high involvement in intercountry adoption 
(50%),344 might imply their interest in profit making in intercountry adoption. Legislation 
that prohibits independent adoptions seems to be congruent with, and encouraged by, 
the CRC,345 and the ACRWC. 
 
Central Authorities can undertake a number of other measures that prevent or address 
illicit activities in connection with intercountry adoption. They can, for instance, decide to 
undertake intercountry adoption activities only to the extent that their capabilities, and 
the demands of the best interests of children in their jurisdiction, allow. In this respect 
Central Authorities can limit the number of countries they want to deal with as regards 
                                                 
340  See Permanent Bureau, Guide to Good Practice, (2008), 116.  
341  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Colombia, (June 2006), para. 56. 
342  As above. 
343  As above. 
344  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Colombia, (August 2005), para. 375. 
345  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Georgia, (June 2008), para. 38; Costa Rica, 
(September 2005), para. 36. 
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intercountry adoption. For instance, Estonia allows intercountry adoption only to the 
U.S, Finland and Sweden.346 Similarly, the Government of Lesotho has lifted the 
suspension of intercountry adoptions only for 4 countries: USA, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Canada, and has approved only one adoption agency for each of 
these countries.347 
 
There is anecdotal evidence that an awareness of the importance of the role of Central 
Authorities to prevent or address illicit activities is taking root in Africa. For instance, in 
Liberia, while the outcome of an investigation into alleged irregularities in intercountry 
adoption by a Commission established by the President of the country was still pending, 
an ad hoc Central Adoption Authority was nevertheless established in 2009.348 
 
6.3.3 Accredited bodies and approved (non-accredited) persons and bodies 
 
According to Article 22(1) of the Hague Convention, it is possible for the functions of the 
Central Authority set out in Articles 14-21 to be performed by public authorities. The 
activities in Articles 14-21 are most of the direct, routine activities involved in 
intercountry adoptions, such as the selection and transfer of the child.349 These 
authorities, known as “accredited bodies”, should nonetheless meet the requirements of 
Articles 10, 11, and 32 of the Hague Convention. 
 
                                                 
346  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, 
Najat M’jid Maalla: Report on the Mission to Estonia (10 July 2009) para. 49. 
347  U.S. Department of State “Intercountry Adoption: Lesotho” (November 2009). 
348  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Liberia, (July 2009), para. 160. 
349  Pierce, (1996), 542. 
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In addition, an approved (non-accredited) person might be allowed to perform the 
functions in Articles 15 - 21.350 As a result, it is important to examine accredited bodies 
and approved persons and their role in preventing and suppressing illicit activities in the 
next sub-sections. 
 
The basic standards and requirements for accreditation are established in chapter 3 of 
the Hague Convention. Article 11 of the Hague Convention provides that: 
An accredited body shall - 
a) pursue only non-profit objectives according to such conditions and within such limits as 
may be established by the competent authorities of the State of accreditation; 
b) be directed and staffed by persons qualified by their ethical standards and by training 
or experience to work in the field of intercountry adoption; and 
c) be subject to supervision by competent authorities of that State as to its composition, 
operation and financial situation. 
It has been suggested that a country should consider "past practice, efficiency of 
existing arrangements, or availability of public resources to conduct intercountry 
adoptions" to determine whether or not to use accredited bodies.351 This observation 
has various implications.  
 
First, it implies that if a central authority has the capacity to undertake all intercountry 
related tasks effectively without the need for accredited bodies, it may do so. The 
reference in the above quote to “availability of public resources to conduct intercountry 
adoptions” seems to refer partly to this capacity of central authorities. 
 
                                                 
350  See Art. 22(2) of the Hague Convention. 
351  Permanent Bureau, (August 2005), 6. 
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Secondly, the number and profile of accredited bodies should correspond with a number 
of factors in a country of origin.352 They should first correspond with the number and 
profile of children who are in need of intercountry adoption.353 This of course requires a 
good statistical base of these groups of children. In addition, the number and profile of 
accredited bodies should correspond with the capacity of the competent organ which 
will accredit, supervise, and/or work with accredited bodies.  
 
Thirdly, the decision to use accredited bodies draws Article 10 of the Hague Convention 
into the picture. Article 10 provides that “[a]ccreditation shall only be granted to and 
maintained by bodies demonstrating their competence to carry out properly the tasks 
with which they may be entrusted”. 
 
Here, it is worth quoting the recommendations on accreditation made by the 2000 
Special Commission on the practical operation of the Hague Convention on 
accreditation: 
The following principles should apply to the process by which accreditation is granted 
under Article 10, to the supervision of accredited bodies provided for in Article 11 c), and 
to the process of authorisation provided for in Article 12.  
 
a) The authority or authorities competent to grant accreditation, to supervise accredited 
bodies or to give authorisations should be designated pursuant to clear legal authority 
and should have the legal powers and the personnel and material resources 
necessary to carry out their responsibilities effectively.  
 
b) The legal powers should include the power to conduct any necessary enquiries and, in 
the case of a supervising authority, the power to withdraw, or recommend the 
withdrawal of, an accreditation or authorisation in accordance with law.  
                                                 
352  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 30. 
353  As above. 
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c) The criteria of accreditation should be explicit and should be the outcome of a general 
policy on intercountry adoption.354  
These principles form good practice and are crucial in countering illicit activities related 
to intercountry adoption. It is advisable that they are adhered to by both Contracting and 
non-Contracting States to the Hague Convention, alike. 
 
France’s experience of a “high percentage of intercountry adoptions which are not made 
through the accredited bodies but through individual channels” has been a cause for 
concern.355 In addition, the fact “that intercountry adoptions are facilitated by embassies 
and consulates, including the use of volunteers working with them” has been viewed as 
undermining the work of accredited bodies.356 As a result it has recommended to the 
State Party that “[c]ases of intercountry adoption are dealt with by an accredited 
body”.357  
 
It is important to view accredited bodies as guarantors of children’s rights. With and 
under the control of the State, they ensure the existence of professionalism and a 
multidisciplinary approach in providing information, preparation and support of the child, 
family of origin and the adoptive family.358 As a result, it is crucial to view the decision by 
prospective adoptive parents whether or not to resort to an accredited body as reflecting 
an element of discrimination between children.359 
 
                                                 
354  Permanent Bureau, Conclusions, (April 2001), para. 23.  
355  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France (June 2004), para. 33.  
356  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, (June 2009), para. 63. 
357  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, (June 2009), para. 64(a). 
358  Vite and Boechat, (2008), 51. 
359  As above. 
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Non-accredited persons or bodies too can be allowed to arrange adoptions.360 While 
these persons or bodies are not bound by the requirement of Article 11(a) (“to pursue 
only non-profit objectives”), they should satisfy certain minimum standards. Even when 
non-accredited persons and bodies are allowed to arrange adoptions, however, the 
Central Authority remains responsible for the actions of non-accredited persons or 
bodies.361  
 
It is the U.S. which had vehemently insisted that the Hague Convention should contain 
wording that would offer sufficient flexibility to meet the needs of U.S. private service 
providers.362 Despite the Hague Convention’s flexibility, the idea of non-accredited 
persons being allowed to provide intercountry adoption services while still pursuing for-
profit purposes is challengeable. Thus, the fact that persons acting for-profit may be 
approved to perform central authority functions in the U.S. has been identified as a 
cause for concern.363 The State Party has been advised to ensure that not only the 
accredited agencies, but also the approved (non-accredited) persons pursue only non-
profit objectives.364  
 
It is important to recognise the role of receiving countries in addressing the problem of 
private adoptions to prevent and address illicit activities on the part of accredited bodies, 
too. Receiving countries, such as Italy and Norway require prospective adoptive parents 
to go through an accredited body, except in extremely rare cases (in around 1% of all 
                                                 
360  Art. 22(2) of the Hague Convention. 
361  See Art 11(c) of the Hague Convention; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, 
(June 2009), para. 63. 
362  Pierce, (1996), 547. 
363   CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: United States of America, (June 2008), para. 30. 
364  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: United States of America, (June 2008), para. 31(b). 
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intercountry adoptions).365 These rare cases are adoptions by foreign residents in their 
country of origin where there is no accredited body.366 Unfortunately, the same cannot 
be said of a good number of receiving countries, such as the U.S., Spain, France, and 
Switzerland. The following sections highlight some of the experiences from the 
countries under the study. 
6.3.4  Combating illicit activities through Central Authorities, Accredited Bodies 
and Approved Persons in the countries in the study  
6.3.4.1 Ethiopia 
Currently in Ethiopia, the MOWA is the central body supervising and regulating 
intercountry adoption. Until 2007, the MOLSA played this supervisory role. However, 
while MOLSA had a legislative mandate367 to play this role, the mandate of MOWA does 
not enjoy any clear backing of the law. Despite this, since MOWA is currently dealing 
with almost all issues pertaining to children’s rights and well-being,368 it is appropriate 
that it plays the role of a central authority for intercountry adoption purposes, too. 
 
The adoption team in the Children and Youth Affairs Office (CYAO) operating under 
MOWA is the primary adoption authority in Ethiopia. The team is currently composed of 
a maximum of four professionals and a team leader.369 Given the large amount of work 
                                                 
365  Terre des Hommes International Federation, (2007), 28. 
366  As above. 
367  Through Proclamation Nos. 10/1992, 4/1995, and 283/2002. 
368  The MOWA has responsibility for all activities regarding children in Ethiopia, including welfare, 
foster care, domestic adoption, international adoption and investigation of neglect and abuse.  
369  Interview with Yenealem Mersha, Adoption Team Leader, MOWA, (25 September 2009); Biniam 
Eshetu, Legal Expert, MOWA, (25 September 2009). 
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load, there are preliminary indications that MOWA is planning to recruit more 
professionals for the office.370 
 
The MOWA has decided to work through adoption agencies. Given the limited human 
and financial resources MOWA has, the large area coverage of the country, and the 
magnitude of the problem of children who are deprived of their family environment, 
working with and through adoption agencies seems an effective modus operandi. 
 
Adoption agencies in Ethiopia are registered by the Ministry of Justice. However, before 
engaging in any adoption services, an adoption agency should also provide a project 
document and sign an operational agreement with MOWA to provide child welfare and 
social development activities. It is laudable that the Government requires an operational 
agreement to be signed between MOWA and adoption agencies371 in order to use parts 
of adoption fees to support the national child care and protection system. However, it is 
submitted that the follow-up to the implementation of the operational agreements leaves 
much to be desired. 
 
Unfortunately, the MOWA Guidelines seem to require evidence of human resources, 
annual budget, and the adoption agency’s organisational structure only after the 
adoption agency is registered by the Ministry of Justice.372 This may have contributed to 
the growing number of complaints about mismanagement and incompetency in 
adoption agencies (for instance, country representatives only working on a part time 
                                                 
370  As above. 
371  Para. 6(4)(3) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
372  Para 6(4)(2) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
459
basis, adoption agency personnel not having the pre-requisite qualifications, or adoption 
agencies being mainly staffed by volunteers and interns).373 
 
The total number of adoption agencies in Ethiopia is around 75. This raises a number of 
questions: how can a team of four professionals at MOWA deal with 75 adoption 
agencies in a meaningful manner? How can they scrutinise and verify so many dossier 
to establish the adoptability of a child? How can they give efficient advice to the Federal 
First Instance Court that the adoption is in the best interests of the child (or not)? The 
large number of adoption agencies in Ethiopia has become an obstacle for MOWA’s 
execution of its supervisory role, which therefore continues to contribute to illicit 
activities in intercountry adoption. 
 
With around 25 American adoption agencies in Ethiopia referring children to American 
families, for instance, the American Government warns prospective adoptive parents 
that “[a]ll agencies are not created equal!”.374 It cautions Americans contemplating 
adopting in Ethiopia to take great care in selecting an agency.375 
 
The absence of a Central Authority as understood under the Hague Convention has 
also created a gap in cooperation between Ethiopia and other States in order to 
prevent, but especially to address, illicit activities. In one instance involving two children 
who were bought and subsequently adopted to Austria, cooperation between the 
respective embassies has proved daunting. A series of letter correspondence between 
                                                 
373  Interview with Yenealem Mersha, Adoption Team Leader, MOWA, (25 September 2009). 
374  U.S. Department of State: “Intercountry adoption: Ethiopia” (December 2008). 
375  As above. 
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the embassies did not produce the requested outcome (for example, establishing the 
views of the children). The frustration on the part of the Ethiopian government about the 
gap in cooperation can be deciphered from the phrases used in some of the letters.376 
 
Further fuelling the prevalence of illicit activities in adoptions is the fact that Ethiopian 
law does not prohibit independent and private adoptions.377 This is despite the fact that 
Article 191(1) of the RFC requires the court not to approve the adoption unless MOWA 
“gives its opinion that the agreement is beneficial to the child”. Cognisant of the risks 
that independent and private adoptions pose for children’s rights, some embassies 
strongly urge their citizens to work with an adoption service provider instead of 
arranging a direct adoption through an orphanage or family member.378 
 
On a positive note, however, adoption agencies are explicitly barred from establishing 
or running an orphanage.379 This is in view of the fact that the involvement of 
organisations which care for children in the process of intercountry adoptions might 
affect their objectivity, thereby opening room for illicit activities.380 
 
The MOWA Guidelines also establish complaint procedures.381 Clients who have 
complaints against any of the adoption service providers (including MOWA itself) can 
lodge their complaints. The capacity of such complaints procedures in order to combat 
                                                 
376  Copy on file with writer. 
377  See, for example, para. 5(1)(d) of the MOWA Guidelines allowing adoptive families to apply for 
the approval of an adoption agreement.  
378  See, for instance, U.S. Department of State: Adoption processing at the U.S. Embassy in Addis 
Ababa http://adoption.state.gov/news/ethiopia.html  (15 October 2009) (accessed 16 October 
2009). 
379  Para. 6(4)(4) of the MOWA Guidelines. 
380  For similar comments in the context of South Africa, see Moodley, (2007), 8. 
381  Para. 11 of the MOWA Guidelines. 
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illicit activities in relation to intercountry adoption and address irregularities in the 
adoption system is crucial. 
 
6.3.4.2 Kenya 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1,382 in Kenya, it is the Department of Children’s 
Services (DCS) which is the Government agency mandated to provide services for the 
rights and welfare of children and as stipulated in the Children’s Act. The DCS is also 
the focal organisation for all agencies that work in the children’s sector in Kenya. The 
DCS is the designated Central Authority in Kenya. It is laudable that the DCS is 
positioned within the appropriate State organ that is closely related to intercountry 
adoption activities. 
 
The Adoption Committee, which is the central body governing all adoptions in Kenya 
falls under the DCS, which serves as its Secretariat. Established under Section 155(1) 
of the Children Act, the Adoption Committee has far reaching powers including 
formulating the governing policy in matters of adoption;383 effecting liaison between 
adoption societies, the Government and NGOs;384 and generally monitoring adoption 
activities in the country.385 It is submitted that the composition of the Adoption 
Committee is commendable since it is comprised of representatives of almost all 
important stakeholders in adoptions.386 
                                                 
382  Section 1.8.2. 
383  Sec. 155(2)(a) of the Children Act. 
384  Sec. 155(2)(b) of the Children Act. 
385  Sec. 155(2)(d) of the Children Act. 
386  Schedule nine of the Children Act provides that members of the Adoption Committee shall be the 
Director of DCS; 4 representatives of Charitable Children’s Institutions; 1 representative of 
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The powers of the Adoption Committee are further bolstered by the Adoption 
Regulations.387 Of relevance to this chapter is its mandate to register, renew, or cancel 
registrations of adoption societies.388  
 
The Adoption Committee does not accept an application for the registration of an 
adoption society unless certain stringent conditions are met.389 These conditions include 
that the body must be registered as a non-profit organisation and must have undertaken 
child welfare activities for a period not less than 12 months;390 the body must have 
capacity (such as a qualified administrator, social worker, and support staff, and access 
to the services of a qualified medical doctor391) and adequate resources (such as an 
office, a waiting room, and holding facilities for children offered for adoption392) to carry 
out adoption arrangements. 
 
Section 177(1) of the Children Act prohibits private adoptions by making the placement 
of a child for adoption the preserve of registered adoption societies. This explicit 
prohibition, along with its accompanying penalties in case of  violations, carries the 
potential for preventing illicit activities in adoption.   
 
In contrast to the situation in Ethiopia, there are only five registered local adoption 
societies in Kenya.393 Out of these, only three – Little Angels Network, Kenya Children’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kenyatta National Hospital; 1 representative from a private hospital dealing with children; 1 
representative of Law Society of Kenya; 1 representative of MOFA; and the Attorney General. 
387  See Regs. 5 of the Adoption Regulations. 
388  Regs. 10 of the Adoption Regulations. 
389  See Regs. 10 of the Adoption Regulations. 
390  Regs.10(1)(a-b) of the Adoption Regulations. 
391  Regs.10(2) and (3). of the Adoption Regulations. 
392  Regs.10(1)(c) of the Adoption Regulations. 
393  List on file with writer. 
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Homes, and Child Welfare Society of Kenya - are allowed to facilitate intercountry 
adoption. In addition, as at 5 March 2009, there were 21 approved foreign adoption 
societies/agencies,394 all of whom are approved by the Adoption Committee, and are 
allowed to operate only through an agreement entered with a local adoption society.395  
 
It is interesting to note that the Children Act under Section 177(3)(b)(2) explicitly allows 
the Adoption Committee to refuse the registration application of an adoption society if it 
is “not in the public interest to approve the same, having regard to the number of 
adoption societies already approved and functioning in the particular locality”.396 
However, in 2006, the Kenyan Government has reported that many children’s 
organisations do not have the knowledge that they can be registered as adoption 
agencies.397 This in turn has reportedly led to the monopoly of adoption agency services 
by a few organisations who sometimes abuse the adoption system.398 However, it is 
submitted that this observation by the Kenyan government should be read to highlight 
the need to increase the number of domestic adoption service providers in order to 
minimise reliance on intercountry adoption. 
 
Upon registration, an adoption society is supposed to set up an Adoption Case 
Committee of not less than three and not more than five people, one of whom shall be a 
social worker.399 In order to avoid conflict of interest, employees of the adoption society 
                                                 
394  List on file with writer. 
395  Regs. 24 of the Adoption Regulations. 
396  Sec. 177(3)(b)(2) of the Children Act. 
397  CRC Committee, State Party Report: Kenya, (July 2006), para. 313(2). 
398  As above. 
399  Regs. 16(1) of the Adoption Regulations. 
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shall not be eligible to serve on the case committee.400 Adoption applications must be 
approved by the Adoption Case Committee, leading to an independent, transparent and 
accountable procedure for the determination of adoption cases. 
 
Despite its explicit power to issue adoption fee schedules,401 the Adoption Committee 
can be faulted for not doing so to date. In fact, in Kenya, more focus seems to have 
been placed on lawyers’ fees for representation in adoption proceedings than those 
charged by adoption societies in Kenya. On a purely speculative basis, this could be 
because the fees charged by adoption societies are generally considered to be 
reasonable. Nonetheless, in order to minimise improper financial gains in adoption, the 
Adoption Committee needs to issue fee schedules. 
 
In case of violations of the Adoption Regulations or relevant provisions of the Children 
Act, the Adoption Committee is also conferred with the power to stop ongoing adoption 
arrangements “at any stage”402 which is a power crucial for preventing and addressing 
illicit activities. The Adoption Regulations also carry appropriate penalties, since any 
person convicted of violating the Regulations shall be liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 10 months, or to a fine not exceeding 50,000 Kenyan shillings, or to 
both.403 
 
 
                                                 
400  Regs. 16(2) of the Adoption Regulations. However, concerns have been raised about the 
determination of adoptability by an organisation’s social worker without outside input 
(independent input). Through its work, the case committee is supposed to fill this gap.  
401  Regs. 5(f) of the Adoption Regulations. 
402  Regs. 28(1) and 33 of the Adoption Regulations. 
403  Regs. 36 of the Adoption Regulations. 
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6.3.4.3 Malawi 
 
In Malawi, the Government organ which is currently playing the role of a Central 
Authority is the Ministry of Women and Child Development (Department of Social 
Welfare). It is a competent authority to play such a role, amongst others because it is 
the main Government ministry responsible for children’s affairs.  
 
There are no adoption agencies in Malawi. Therefore, on both occasions Madonna 
adopted from Malawi, the adoptions were processed without the involvement of 
adoption agencies.404 The Draft Bill too does not envisage any roles for adoption 
agencies. However, the Discussion Paper and Issues Paper prepared by the Special 
Law Reform Commission for the review of the Adoption of Children Act identify the 
potential role that adoption agencies could play.405 While the Discussion Paper reckons 
that an adoption service can function without the assistance of adoption agencies, the 
effectiveness of such functioning is questioned.406 This reservation seems to emanate 
from the limited capacity and expertise of the Department of Social Welfare to provide 
effective adoption services. 
 
In recognition of the risks that unregulated adoption agencies could pose to children’s 
best interests, it is proposed that where adoption agencies form part of the adoption 
service, it should be the duty of the responsible State organ to accredit, supervise and 
                                                 
404  However, it is to be noted that in both adoptions, Madonna produced “home study” reports from 
adoption agencies in her place of habitual residence. 
405  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 26-29; Issues Paper, (2009),19-23 
406  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 28. 
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monitor the adoption agencies.407 It is also argued that the State authority in charge of 
children’s affairs should be charged with the statutory duty to ensure cooperation with 
adoption agencies.408 The requisite facilities that a State organ or an adoption agency 
should have in order to provide a child-centred adoption service are also identified.409   
 
6.3.4.4 South Africa 
 
The Children’s Act provides detailed provisions on the designation and functions of a 
Central Authority in South Africa.410 The rules governing the accreditation and regulation 
of adoption service providers is also catered for by the Children’s Act,411 and 
complemented by the Draft Regulations. 
 
The Children’s Act explicitly designates the Director-General of Social Development as 
the Central Authority in South Africa.412 Even though the Children’s Act has not entered 
into force fully, the Department of Social Development has been acting as the Interim 
Central Authority since 2004. However, in the absence of an enabling statute, its 
powers have been considered weak and its role limited to that of “exercising an advisory 
and monitoring role”.413 In accordance with Section 258(1) of the Children Act and the 
relevant provisions of the Hague Convention, South Africa has further designated the 
powers and duties of the Central Authority to the Chief Director of Children, Youth and 
Families, within the Department of Social Development.  
                                                 
407  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 27 
408  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 26. 
409  Malawi Special Law Commission, Discussion Paper, (2009), 27. 
410  Secs. 257-258 of the Children’s Act. 
411  Sec. 259 of the Children’s Act. 
412  Sec. 257(1)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
413  AD v DW para. 27. See too Couzens, (2009), 57. 
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In compliance with the Hague Convention, the Children’s Act confers sufficient powers 
and responsibilities on the Central Authority to effectively undertake its obligations. 
These include the power to delegate certain powers and duties,414 the mandate to 
accredit and regulate child protection organisations, and approving adoption working 
agreements.415 
 
The Director-General of Social Development is expected to perform its functions as a 
Central Authority “after consultation with the Director-General: Justice and 
Constitutional Development”.416 This shows the recognition that issues of intercountry 
adoption cannot be left as the preserve of one department or government office. In this 
particular case, the envisaged consultation is crucial since intercountry adoption orders 
are granted by the children’s courts which are administered by the Ministry of Justice 
and Constitutional Development.417 By using the phrase “after consultation” which is 
less onerous than “in consultation with”, Human argues that effective inter-sectoral 
planning and participation is guaranteed, “while at the same time not causing delays 
due to a constant requirement to consult”.418 It is further submitted that the phrase “after 
consultation” is meant to indicate that the Director-General of Social Development has 
the final say and ultimate responsibility in matters pertaining to the role of the Central 
Authority. 
 
                                                 
414  Sec. 358 of the Children’s Act. 
415  Sec. 260(2)(b) of the Children’s Act. 
416  Sec. 257(2) of the Children’s Act. 
417  Human, (2007), 16-10. 
418  As above. 
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Given the quasi-federal arrangement of South Africa’s governmental structure, and the 
relatively wide area coverage of the Republic, the decision to allow accredited child 
protection organisations to undertake some of the functions of the Central Authority as 
incorporated in the Hague Convention seems to be a pragmatic move. These bodies 
are accredited by the Central Authority after meeting the prescribed requirements.419  
 
An accredited body in South Africa can enter into an adoption working agreement with 
an accredited agency in another country.420 The adoption working agreement requires 
the approval of the Central Authority.421 In order to effectively dispose its duties, the 
Central Authority had indicated in 2005 that it had placed a moratorium on any new 
adoption working agreements.422 Attempts to avoid a single organisation in South Africa 
having too many adoption working agreements with other countries were also 
underway.423 
 
Government has observed instances of improper financial gain by adoption agencies, 
many of which have reportedly led to disciplinary hearings.424 The Central Authority is 
empowered by Section 259(2) of the Children’s Act to accredit a child protection 
organisation “for such period and on such conditions as may be prescribed”. As a result, 
the Central Authority can cancel the accreditation of bodies that engage in improper 
financial gain.425  
 
                                                 
419  Sec. 259(1) and (2) of the Children’s Act. 
420  Sec. 260(1) of the Children’s Act. 
421  Secs. 259(1)(b) and 260(2)(b) of the Children’s Act. 
422  See response of the South African Government to question No. 17, (2005). 
423  As above. 
424  See response of the South African Government to question No. 11(2), (2005). 
425  See, for instance, Sec. 284(4) of the Children’s Act. 
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In 2005, Government had indicated its intention to establish a fee cap to be charged by 
accredited bodies.426 Such a measure would have the support of Section 259(3)(a) of 
the Children’s Act as accredited bodies “may receive the prescribed fees”. As a result, 
Draft Regulations 107 has prescribed the maximum service fees to be charged by 
accredited bodies. The fact that accredited bodies “must annually submit” their audited 
financial statements to the Central Authority on fees received and payments made also 
gives the Central Authority sufficient powers to prevent or address improper financial 
gains.427  
 
Finally, Section 255 of the Children’s Act empowers the President of the Republic to 
enter into international cooperation agreements with both Hague Convention and non-
Hague Convention countries. Cooperation agreements with countries that are not 
Contracting States to the Hague Convention are more crucial in order to prevent and 
address illicit activities such as child trafficking.428 Since these non-Hague countries 
often lack the minimum standards set by the Hague Convention, a framework of 
bilateral cooperation could go a long way in promoting children’s rights in intercountry 
adoption.  
 
One of the shortcomings of the Children’s Act is its failure to explicitly prohibit 
independent adoptions. However, given the detailed provisions outlining the role of the 
Central Authority and accredited bodies, there seems to be no possibility for 
independent adoptions which could hope to be compliant with the provisions of the 
                                                 
426  See response the South African Government to question question No 10(2). 
427  Sec. 259(3)(b) of the Children’s Act. 
428  See Human, (2007), 16-8; Smolin, (2005), 476; Smolin, (2006), 167. 
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Children’s Act. In addition, despite the fact that South Africa failed to make a declaration 
under Article 22(4) to prohibit the involvement of approved (non-accredited) bodies or 
persons in intercountry adoptions, under the Children’s Act, there seems to be no room 
for approved (non-accredited) persons (such as private social workers) to facilitate 
intercountry adoptions.429 The absence of a complaint procedure against agencies 
breaching the Children’s Act and the Hague Convention has also been highlighted as a 
limitation of the Children’s Act.430 Despite these shortcomings, the Children’s Act 
displays the value of ratifying and domesticating the Hague Convention provisions in 
order to prevent and address some illicit activities that pertain to intercountry adoption. 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
Intercountry adoption is sometimes characterised by various forms of scandals and 
irregularities which take on a variety of forms. The main illicit activities involved in the 
practice include child laundering, which is comprised of child buying, child selling, child 
stealing, and falsifying paperwork.  
 
However, as this Chapter has demonstrated, there are also subtle, but equally 
exploitative, illicit activities in respect of intercountry adoption, such as violating the “no 
initial contact” rule and circumventing adoption procedures through guardianship orders, 
that should be regulated by law. 
 
                                                 
429  See Sec. 58(2) of the Children’s Act; Couzens, (2009), 73. For a contrary view on this position, 
see Human, (2007), 16-13. 
430  Couzens, (2009), 72. 
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Various measures that are intended to prevent or address illicit activities in intercountry 
adoption, such as stringent eligibility criteria, the placing of moratoria on the practice, 
and prescribing a residency requirement have also been examined in detail. In the 
interest of space, other measures such as the appointment of a guardian ad litem and 
post-adoption follow up (that are practiced in some of the countries in the study) did not 
feature in the discussion. 
 
The adoption and implementation of legislation that prevents and addresses illicit 
activities in intercountry adoption is very crucial for the protection of the best interests of 
the child. In addition, the absence, or incompetency, of institutional structures might 
result in the best interests of the children involved in intercountry adoption being 
compromised, too. 
 
It is possible to decipher from the foregoing discussion that preventing and addressing 
child laundering in intercountry adoption requires more guidance from the international  
legal framework than that which the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention 
presently offer. The OPSC and the Palermo Protocol seem to be vital instruments for 
the endeavour to prevent and address child laundering. As far as the subtle illicit 
activities, for instance, violating the “no initial contact” rule and securing the necessary 
informed and free consents are concerned, the Hague Convention seems an essential 
point of reference.  
 
Some hold that acts such as the selling, buying, or illegally transferring of children for 
the purpose of adoption, do not constitute trafficking under international law. However, it 
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was submitted that, albeit through interpretation, this view lacks support from the 
international framework, especially in relation to the OPSC. In addition, on the basis of 
Article 24(d) of the ACRWC, it was contended that irrespective of any intention to exploit 
a child, the sale or trafficking of a child by anyone, including parents and guardians 
(such as orphanage personnel), amounts to a violation of the ACRWC. The point that 
States Parties should criminalise and prosecute all actors involved in the selling and 
buying of children for the purpose of adoption was also made. 
 
Almost all the countries in the study do not have a consolidated legislation that 
addresses child trafficking. The fact that penalties for child laundering are not severe 
enough to deter persons who target children for purposes of abduction, trafficking and 
sale, or other forms of exploitation, compounds the problem. 
 
While combating improper financial gain and corruption in intercountry adoption gives 
cause for serious concern, formulating methods of achieving this end are not easy to 
come by. The value of the provisions of the Hague Convention in combating improper 
financial gain and corruption in adoption was highlighted as worthy of note. Allegations 
of improper financial gain are present in all the countries in the study, although the 
provisions of the Children Act of Kenya and the Children’s Act of South Africa offer 
some good examples in addressing the problem to an extent. The Infant DB case was 
used to shed light on some of the complications that may arise pertaining to improper 
financial gain in adoptions. 
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The role of moratoria (restrictions) was also highlighted. It was argued that there may be 
sound child protection reasons for the imposition of a moratorium, and in the final 
analysis, whether to impose a moratorium, and for how long, should take into account 
children’s best interests.  
 
The importance of Central Authorities and/or accredited bodies and the kinds of 
measures they can undertake that prevent or address illicit activities in connection with 
intercountry adoption was also the focus of this Chapter. An argument was formulated 
that even where a State is not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention, the CRC 
Committee seems to be of the view that there is an obligation to establish or designate 
a body to oversee and coordinate intercountry adoption. The risks posed by 
independent and private adoptions were also highlighted. However, one central theme 
that can be distilled from the last sections of Chapter 6 is that, perhaps in Africa more 
than anywhere else, preventing and addressing illicit activities in respect of intercountry 
adoption cannot be achieved without the cooperation of receiving countries. 
 
In the past, African countries had held the view that illegal adoptions and trafficking in 
the context of adoptions were not present in their respective countries. Despite the fact 
that some commentators undermine the magnitude and impact of illicit activities in 
relation to intercountry adoption, it could be distilled from the foregoing discussion that 
illicit activities in respect on intercountry adoption on the African continent pose a great 
danger to the protection and promotion of children’s rights. Some of the examples 
proffered in this Chapter drive the point home that illicit activities in relation to 
intercountry adoption are increasingly occurring in different parts of the continent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
474
Without legislation that proscribes every conceivable loophole, it cannot be asserted 
that the basic safeguards for undertaking intercountry adoption on the African continent 
are in place.  
 
The vulnerability (especially economic) of birth families and the inadequacy of legislative 
and institutional frameworks on the African continent warrants the need for a regulatory 
framework to prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry adoption in more than 
the usual way. The increased and large scale (for instance, the Zoe’s Ark case involving 
around 103 children) reported cases that have come to light in recent years are signs 
that the continent is becoming more and more susceptible to illicit activities in relation to 
intercountry adoption. Ignoring these signs will inevitably be at the cost of the best 
interests of our children. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS AN INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION REGIME THAT PROTECTS THE BEST INTERESTS OF   
    CHILDREN IN AFRICA 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Intercountry adoption started as a North American philanthropic response to the 
devastation of Europe in World War II that resulted in thousands of orphaned children.  
By the 1980s, however, intercountry adoption had begun to be driven as a solution to 
the problem of childless couples. However, currently, intercountry adoption has evolved 
from its roots as a humanitarian act into a widely accepted option for childless persons 
who wish to create a family and is increasingly gaining popularity.1  
 
At present, there can be few who would quibble with the fact that African children are 
attracting increasing attention from prospective adoptive parents living in other parts of 
the world.  As the latest figures and statements from a number of South American, 
Asian and Eastern European countries seem to support the notion that intercountry 
adoption from those quarters is waning, the African continent is getting more and more 
attention as a sending continent. While intercountry adoption from African countries is 
still quite modest compared to adoptions from the top four countries of origin, 2 there are 
concrete reasons to believe that interest in adoption from African countries will continue 
to increase.3 Celebrity adoptions (the adoptions of Angelina Jolie and Madonna) have 
                                            
1  Kleiman, (1997), 333. 
2  Namely China, Russia, Guatemala, and South Korea. 
3   Breuning and Ishiyama, (March 2009), 90. 
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contributed to this increased interest in African children. Thus, Africa is “the new 
frontier” for intercountry adoption - but it is highly questionable if the continent is 
equipped to provide its children with the necessary safeguards in respect of the 
practice.  
 
A central thesis of this study was to explore how the best interests of the African child 
can be upheld in intercountry adoption.  In connection with this thesis, a number of 
related research questions were raised, such as: does the African context present any 
peculiar situations that are relevant to intercountry adoption? Does the ACRWC add any 
value to the provisions of the CRC in addressing African realities relevant for 
intercountry adoption? What are some of the challenges, lessons, and opportunities for 
the regulation of intercountry adoption on the African continent? 
 
In order to answer these and the other related questions, the previous Chapters 
undertook a thematic analysis of certain issues related to intercountry adoption that 
were deemed to be crucial in the African context. The countries in the study (Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi and South Africa) were used additionally to explicate the African context 
further in relation to this thematic analysis. In this Chapter, the main conclusions and 
recommendations that can be distilled from the study are provided. 
 
7.2  THE RELEVANCE OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE AFRICAN CONTEXTS  
 
In Chapter 2, it was argued that context matters. The Chapter provided a broad 
overview of the important African contexts that are relevant for children’s access to a 
family environment, with a focus on intercountry adoption. These included the historical, 
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social, cultural, religious, economic and legal contexts. These contexts have been used 
as cross-cutting themes throughout the study including this Chapter, and it is generally 
submitted that a sound and effective alternative care option, including intercountry 
adoption, must be grounded firmly in an African context, taking African realities into 
account. 
 
7.3 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DISCOURSE 
SURROUNDING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
RELATED TO INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
 
 
The three main international instruments that have a direct bearing on intercountry 
adoption are the CRC, the ACRWC, and the Hague Convention. In addition to the 
general principles of the CRC and the ACRWC,4 a number of provisions within the CRC 
and the ACRWC draw upon, reinforce, integrate and complement a variety of other 
provisions, and cannot be properly understood in isolation from them.5 Indeed, 
examining intercountry adoption without looking at how it has been dealt with at the 
international level and by other countries outside of Africa is to see but a small portion of 
the overall picture.  
 
In the context of intercountry adoption, the definition of a child, and the four cardinal 
principles of the CRC and the ACRWC were highlighted. It was argued that while Article 
3(1) of the CRC and Article 4(1) of the ACRWC are substantially equivalent, the latter 
provides that the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration. As a 
                                            
4  Also referred to as the “four cardinal principles” or the “four pillars”. See Chapter 3, section 3.3 for 
detailed discussion of these principles. 
5  See, for instance, CRC Committee, General Comment No. 1, (2001), para. 6 in the context of the 
right to education. 
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result, it was submitted that African countries that are States Parties to the ACRWC 
have an even greater obligation to promote the best interests of children than non-
States Parties elsewhere.  
 
Based on the premise that it is not uncommon to regard intercountry adoption as a “life 
saving” act for the child, the following question was posed: can not allowing intercountry 
adoption in a specific case lead to the inference that the right to life is violated? In this 
respect, the arguments in the Infant CJ case in Malawi were reiterated, and it was 
concluded that in the absence of more compelling evidence that the denial of an 
intercountry adoption order would truly compromise the right to life of a child, an 
argument invoking the right to life seems untenable. 
 
Reiterating the interconnectedness of children’s rights, particularly the four cardinal 
principles of the CRC and the ACRWC, it was observed that “the ‘best interests’ of the 
child cannot be defined without consideration of the child’s views”.6 In an implicit 
acknowledgment that children’s levels of understanding are not uniformly linked to their 
biological age, the CRC and the ACRWC require that due weight be given to the age 
and maturity of the child. Article 12 of the CRC makes it clear that age alone cannot 
determine the significance of a child’s views. Despite this, a good number of African 
countries provide a minimum age for child participation, including for adoption purposes. 
It was argued that, assessed against the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC, such 
minimum ages risk being non-compliant with the norms related to “the evolving 
capacities of the child”. 
                                            
6  CRC Committee, General Comment No. 12, (2009), para. 56. 
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Other provisions of the ACRWC (than the provisions of the CRC) have been understood 
as recognising the role of the extended family and of communities in the care of African 
children. These provisions have reinforced a wider notion of a “family”, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2. In this respect, it has been argued that the care provided to African 
children by those who fall within the definition of “family” in terms of the ACRWC could 
qualify as constituting care within a “family environment”. In connection with this, the 
importance and implications of the recognition of child-headed households as a family 
environment in the African context were also broached. It was submitted that, generally, 
child-headed households can benefit from financial and supervisory support and can 
form a family environment in the African context.7 However, there still is a need for the 
African Committee to elaborate and concretise the understanding of the notion of 
“family” in the context of the ACRWC.  
 
A fundamental area where clarification was crucial, as far as the international legal 
framework is concerned, was whether there is an international law obligation to provide 
for intercountry adoption as an alternative means of care; and whether there is a “right” 
to adopt and a “right” to be adopted. There are very influential voices, especially in the 
Western world, that would argue that the answer to all three questions is in the positive. 
In the final analysis, however, it has been demonstrated that a close reading of the 
carefully crafted wording of Article 21 of the CRC and Article 24 of the ACRWC reveals 
that no country, by virtue of it being a State Party to the CRC or the ACRWC, is under 
an automatic international obligation to allow intercountry adoption as a means of 
alternative care. The Hague Convention supports a similar interpretation. In addition, 
                                            
7  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3 for a detailed discussion of this. 
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the arguments for a general right to adopt and a right to be adopted have been found to 
lack the backing of international human rights law. It has been asserted that, even in the 
context of efforts to tackle discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in relation to 
adoption, the proper terminology is not “the right to adopt”, but rather “the right to be 
assessed as a prospective adoptive parent”. 
 
Culture, and cultural identity, occupy an elevated place in the majority of African 
societies. Therefore, taking culture into account in intercountry adoption is inevitable in 
order to protect the identity rights of African children. However, it has been argued that 
culture cannot, and should not, be used as a smokescreen to deny children their right to 
grow up in a family environment, when that family can only be found abroad. For 
instance, it has been argued that using the concepts of “continuity” and “background” 
under Article 20(3) of the CRC and Article 25(3) of the ACRWC to support the case for 
the primacy of cultural identity, and serve as a ground for prohibiting or undermining 
intercountry adoptions as an alternative means of care, is not valid. Article 25(3) of the 
ACRWC has been interpreted by this writer to reflect the view that if the best interests of 
the child mean anything at all, let alone being “the paramount consideration”, preserving 
cultural identity should be seen as a means, and not necessarily as an end in itself, in 
considering alternative care for children deprived of their family environment. 
 
Chapter 3 generally emphasised the dynamic character of international human rights 
law and the evolution of rights. In other words, human rights are not static, but rather 
evolve and adapt to new circumstances. It is submitted that it is indisputable that the 
CRC and the ACRWC have benefited from this evolution. However, the need to 
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investigate further the normative content they embody to have a better understanding of 
the scope, nature, and limitations of children’s rights in the context of intercountry 
adoption continues to exist. 
 
7.4  ADOPTING A CLEAR DEFINITION OF ADOPTABILITY 
 
In Chapter 4, an attempt was made to arrive at a clarification of the concept of 
adoptability in order to serve the best interests of the African child. After a brief overview 
of the concept of adoptability, the main reasons why a proper determination of 
adoptability is very important, were investigated. This was followed by an examination of 
the relevant international legal frameworks pertaining to adoptability. Subsequently, 
different themes were discussed including: termination of parental rights including 
through a decision of a competent authority; abandonment; and relinquishment; 
orphanhood and poverty as grounds for adoptability; the adoptability of refugee children, 
special needs/hard-to-place children, and children who have a Muslim background 
formed specific points in this Chapter.  
 
It was emphasised that a clear definition and understanding of who is adoptable is vital 
so that the concept of “adoptable children” is not confused with the category of “children 
currently in out-of-home care”. The general assertion that there are “millions on millions” 
of children awaiting adoptive families in Africa was challenged as misleading.  
 
It was also submitted that, apart from the legal criteria, other factors such as medical, 
psychological and social aspects of adoptability need to be addressed in implementing 
the relevant legislation. In addition, in the determination of adoptability, one of the 
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central elements that the CRC and the ACRWC recognise is the importance of the 
views of the child. 
 
As the discussion in Chapter 4 showed, two issues that proved to be controversial are 
the adoptability of so called “social orphans”, and poverty as a ground for adoptability. 
Domestic legislation in some countries expressly provides that poverty cannot be a 
sufficient ground for declaring a child adoptable. It was argued that poverty alone as a 
ground for adoptability is not considered to be in accordance with the provisions of the 
CRC and the ACRWC. Thus, when poverty is the main reason why parental 
responsibility is terminated or abandonment/relinquishment is chosen, the rule requiring 
family preservation should dictate that families should be offered support in keeping 
their children. 
 
The adoptability of refugee children was identified as an issue that requires a high level 
of caution. Therefore, in general, it was submitted that refugee children are not 
adoptable. And, while some refugee children could benefit from intercountry adoption, 
their adoptability should be determined in a very circumspect manner. The point was 
made that unaccompanied or separated children must not be adopted in haste at the 
height of an emergency.  
 
The general non-adoptability of Muslim children was also underscored, and it was 
argued that such a position would not be in violation of international law. Where Muslim 
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children are deprived of their family environments, they could benefit from the practice 
of kafalah.8 
 
The analysis of adoptability in the countries in the study has highlighted some gaps and 
opportunities. The general observation was that the legislation of the majority of the 
countries in the study did not have clear guidance on adoptability. As a result, the risk 
that those children who are genuinely in need of adoption (for instance, disabled 
children) might be falling between the cracks, while those that fit the expressed 
preference of prospective adoptive parents’ requirements (for instance, girls below the 
age of one) are adopted is real. 
 
7.5  A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY?  
As one of the fundamental principles of intercountry adoption, a Chapter was devoted to 
the principle of subsidiarity (Chapter 5). Despite the limited meaning accorded to the 
principle by the CRC Committee, the discussion in Chapter 5 is indicates that there is a 
need to accord the principle an expansive meaning. This expansive meaning should 
include an interpretation that requires States to strengthen families in the country of 
origin through various interventions, such as cash transfers and social grants. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity, apart from providing children the opportunity to remain with 
their family of origin and facilitating the enjoyment of their cultural identity, offers an 
opportunity to the authorities of the child’s country to respond to the needs of their own 
children first. 
                                            
8 See Chapter 2, section 2.4 for a brief discussion of kafalah in Africa. 
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While the general ranking enjoyed by domestic adoption in the hierarchy of alternative 
care options available is the least contested one, it has also been cautioned that this 
(generally) preferential position of domestic adoption needs qualification so as to 
accommodate exceptional circumstances. The general preference for the adoption of a 
Tswana child by a family from Botswana (which would constitute intercountry adoption) 
over a white family from the Free State in South Africa has been but one example used 
to demonstrate an exceptional circumstance.9 
 
It has been submitted that the negative approach of the CRC Committee towards the 
so- called “informal adoptions” (sometimes going as far as asking African States Parties 
to prevent the practice) that are prevalent in Africa can be labelled Eurocentric. There is 
no clear indication that “informal adoptions” are inherently in violation of the provisions 
of the CRC. This negative approach also loses sight of the fact that the list of alternative 
care options provided for in Article 20 of the CRC is not exhaustive. In fact, the inclusion 
of kafalah in this list by the drafters of the CRC should communicate the message that 
there is a need to accommodate various cultural and religious practices of care that are 
not inherently in violation of the CRC. 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that institutionalisation, especially in the long term, has 
detrimental effects on children’s survival and development. This is the main reason why 
it has been submitted that neither the CRC and the ACRWC nor the Hague Convention 
generally support the use of institutionalisation as a care (especially long term) option. It 
was argued that the Hague Convention makes institutionalisation subsidiary to 
                                            
9  See Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.2 for the details of this example. 
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intercountry adoption. The systematic planning and establishment of new institutions as 
a priority to cater for children deprived of their family environment, instead of supporting 
families or community based care options, was criticised. However, caution was urged, 
since the limited recognition of institutions within the CRC and the ACRWC is indicative 
of the fact that they could (and sometimes should) play some role in child care. Within 
the ambit of institutional care, the importance of family-type care arrangements are 
strongly emphasised, too. 
 
In relation to the debate over the principle of subsidiarity, the operative language that 
has emerged has been that intercountry adoption should be used as a measure of “last 
resort”. It has been underscored that the CRC Committee’s stance on the notion of “last 
resort” is somewhat confusing, and calls for further clarification. Some light was also 
shed on the fact that generally it is institutionalisation that should be considered as a 
measure of last resort. There is a need for the CRC Committee to clearly articulate its 
position on the issue (perhaps through a General Comment), and thereby contribute 
towards States Parties’ understanding of the place of intercountry adoption within the 
alternative care scheme.  
 
It was submitted that the notion of “intercountry adoption as a measure of last resort” 
should be read to mean “intercountry adoption as being generally subsidiary to other 
alternative means of care”, but subject to exceptions. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that the “last resort” language is relative, and depends on what options are 
in fact available as alternative care.  In addition, “last resort” should not mean “when all 
other possibilities are exhausted”. A checklist approach, where all available care options 
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are to be pursued first before intercountry adoption is considered, would be contrary to 
the assumption that the permanent placement of children at a very young age is an 
important goal. An understanding of “last resort” that does not hinder legally appropriate 
early placement should be fostered. In addition, child participation, depending on the 
evolving capacities of the child, should be allowed to play a role. It was also contended 
that a pre-determined inflexible formula for the sake of certainty, irrespective of the 
circumstances, could in fact be contrary to the best interests of the individual child 
concerned. 
 
7.6 ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ARE 
INCREASINGLY KNOCKING ON AFRICA’S DOOR  
 
Some commentators undermine the magnitude and impact of illicit activities in relation 
to intercountry adoption. There is a growing and concerted criticism that sending 
countries do not design their adoption laws to specifically facilitate intercountry 
adoption, and that the resulting laws create significant impediments to intercountry 
adoption.10 However, as was highlighted in Chapter 6, the practices of illicit activities in 
intercountry adoption in Africa is manifested in various forms and degrees, and place 
children’s rights in great jeopardy.  
 
In the context of illicit activities in relation to intercountry adoption, most African 
countries do not even have the basic requirements in place. Trafficking legislation in a 
number of African countries is still in draft form. Institutional frameworks to safeguard 
children’s rights are either not present, or lack the necessary mandates and capacity to 
                                            
10  See, for instance, Bartholet, (1993), 89-103. 
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perform their tasks. As a result, concerns that caution needs to be exercised to avoid 
over-regulation of intercountry adoption in the context of Africa are often not valid.  
 
The question for African countries is not whether to regulate or not to regulate 
intercountry adoption. Rather, the regulation of intercountry adoption should address the 
dire need to fill every conceivable legislative loophole. It is recommended that the failure 
to address every possible legislative gap should be viewed as slippery slope, which 
inevitably leads to a chain which perpetuates of the violation of children’s rights, 
culminating in a generally broken intercountry adoption system that is marred by 
irregularities. It was highlighted that, apart from child laundering, other subtle illicit 
activities such as violating the “no initial contact” rule, overlooking improper financial 
gains and corruption, and allowing independent and private adoptions, should be 
regulated by law. In other words, a failure to regulate intercountry adoption in Africa in a 
more than usually comprehensive way potentially leads to a situation where adoption 
can become a vast, profit-driven, industry with children as the commodity. 
 
As was shown in Chapter 6, the capacity of the Hague Convention to address illicit 
activities, and in particular, child laundering, is limited. This limitation emanates mainly 
from the fact that the Hague Convention is predominantly a procedural treaty and does 
not entrench a great number of substantive rights. As a result, it was identified that in 
order to prevent and address illicit activities in intercountry adoption, the Hague 
Convention needs to be complemented, amongst other treaties, by the ratification and 
implementation of the OPSC and the Palermo Protocol. 
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The instances of illicit activities in Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Mauritius 
detailed in this thesis should be viewed as the tip of the iceberg. Therefore, the issue of 
illicit activities in intercountry adoption from Africa is not only about the cases we know 
of, but also about those of which we do not know. While the lessons from these 
instances have informed debate about the extent of trafficking in intercountry adoption, 
additional investigation by governmental and international bodies would further the 
discussion and knowledge of the extent to which these situations prevail, and more 
importantly, how to eliminate them through precise targeted legal means. 
 
It is recommended that the recognition that the buying and selling of children for 
adoption purposes constitutes a serious form of exploitation, thereby making it 
tantamount to human trafficking, should be given serious consideration by governments. 
The continued perpetuation of illicit activities in intercountry adoption with impunity 
creates a sense of normalcy which might ultimately lead to a completely commercialised 
and profit-centred practice.  
 
7.7 THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF HARMONISATION AND THE NEED FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE CHILD LAWS 
 
7.7.1    Harmonisation and comprehensive child laws 
In Chapter 2 (African context), it was pointed out that law reform in African countries to 
domesticate the CRC and the ACRWC, and to modernise and codify a myriad of 
outdated statutes affecting children, is, in many instances, still ongoing.11 The point was 
made that many African countries come with diverse backgrounds that encompass 
                                            
11  Sloth-Nielsen, (2008b), 1. 
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additional hurdles to ensuring that the legacies of colonial, customary, and sharia laws 
are consistent with the principles and provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. 
 
States Parties are required to undertake a comprehensive legislative reform that 
examines the whole spectrum of legislation and regulations that affect the realisation of 
children’s rights. Indeed, a comprehensive and consultative review of existing legislation 
seems the most common and effective way to begin the harmonisation process. Apart 
from putting the law in place, necessary measures to effectively implement the same – 
such as regulations, institutions, policies, and budget allocations12 should accompany 
law reform.13  
 
A comprehensive child law has various advantages: it is accessible; it facilitates 
certainty; it saves time; and it is usually relatively up to date. These are all 
characteristics that stakeholders, such as the judiciary, the legislator, the executive, civil 
society, academia and children themselves, find helpful in promoting and protecting 
children’s rights.  
 
It is generally considered good practice to explicitly mention the four cardinal principles 
of the CRC and the ACRWC in legislation. It should also be noted that harmonisation 
requires more than just copying the text of the CRC and the ACRWC; each CRC 
provision must be translated into concrete and specific rules within the context of 
national legislation.14 If the opportunity to constitutionalise some rights and principles of 
                                            
12  See Chapter 2, sections 2.5.2 and 2.6.5 for further details on budgeting for children. 
13  UNICEF, (2008c), 2. 
14  ACPF, (2008c).  
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children’s rights exists, it should be seized. A provision that explicitly states that where 
there is conflict between domestic law and the CRC and the ACRWC (or generally 
international law on children’s rights) provisions, the latter prevails, would be highly 
advantageous and progressive. 
 
In the context of child law reform to establish safeguards in intercountry adoption, efforts 
should go beyond domesticating only the CRC and the ACRWC. Other crucial 
instruments such as the OPSC, the Hague Convention, and the Palermo Protocol 
should also be taken into account. As the experience of Kenya shows, even before 
ratifying the Hague Convention, domesticating at least some of its standards pays 
dividends. 
 
It is apparent from Chapter 3 that rights related to intercountry adoption cut across both 
civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic and cultural rights, on the 
other. Indeed, it has been demonstrated in Chapter 3 that children’s rights in 
intercountry adoption provide a classic example epitomising the indivisibility and 
interdependence of children’s rights.   
 
As a result, for instance, the promulgation of separate legislation on adoption and/or 
intercountry adoption in the absence of a children’s act addressing various aspects of 
children’s rights, might be regarded as falling short of promoting and protecting 
children’s rights fully. From the countries under the study, it is possible to discern that 
South Africa and Kenya seem to have improved safeguards for children in relation to 
intercountry adoption, not only because they have ratified the Hague Convention, but 
 
 
 
 
 
 
491
also because each has a comprehensive child statute addressing various aspects of 
children’s rights. 
 
In the context of intercountry adoption (and other themes, too), as the South African 
experience shows,15 the domestication of justiciable socio-economic rights can go a 
long way to addressing the challenges posed by children’s deprivation of their family 
environment. But on their own, social policies to address the economic challenges of 
vulnerable children and their families are not enough. There are indeed instances in a 
number of African countries where various forms of social assistance are provided for 
vulnerable children and families.16 It is, however, crucial to remember that social policies 
alone may be unsustainable in changing deep-rooted conditions, or capricious if aligned 
very strongly with the group in power.17 It is submitted that the incorporation of 
justiciable socio-economic rights in domestic jurisprudence is crucial, because social 
policies deriving from law can have more permanence and sustainability than those 
created by discretionary action within the executive branch of government.18  
 
A consultative and participatory harmonisation process has also been identified as 
constituting good practice. Doek suggests making review of legislation a process in 
which civil society is involved as much as possible. However, he urges a word of 
caution about consultation: “…make sure that the process does not take years or result 
in a watered-down outcome. In an effort to please everybody, it is possible that nobody 
                                            
15  See, for instance, Sloth-Nielsen and Mbazira, (2007). 
16  Cash transfers in Kenya, school feeding schemes in Malawi and food rationing in Ethiopia for 
vulnerable families. 
17  UNICEF, (2008c), 21. 
18  As above. 
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will be satisfied”.19 This is a point worth heeding, especially in light of the large number 
of Bills in a number of African countries that await finalisation. 
 
Indeed, no harmonisation of child law is possible unless it is politically feasible. How to 
get public and political agreement on the underlying issues which will support any 
harmonisation is not easy to facilitate. However, undertaking a consultative and 
participatory child law reform process does not only embed legitimacy upon the final 
outcome, but also serves as an opportunity to raise awareness on the part of the public 
of some important issues, such as the plight of children deprived of their family 
environment, the importance of birth registration, and so forth.  
 
The problem of children deprived of their family environment cannot be addressed 
simply by the promulgation of new standards. In fact, it could be argued that continued 
stress only on legislation on intercountry adoption might actually serve to obfuscate the 
issue.  Since some of the accompanying problems that lead to children’s deprivation of 
their family environment are social, cultural and often man-made (for instance de facto 
discrimination; abandonment; armed conflict etc.), ongoing efforts should be undertaken 
to educate communities, and improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable 
children and their families as a necessary accompaniment to adoption law reform. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
19  ACPF, (2008c), 7. 
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7.7.2    Africanisation of child law 
 
As argued elsewhere,20 African child laws must be carefully crafted to sufficiently 
respond to the needs and socio-economic and cultural circumstances of the people to 
whom they apply. For the purpose of this study, the Africanisation of child law demands 
the domestication of provisions that support positive cultures and practices, as outlined 
in Chapter 2, and that contribute to alleviating children’s deprivation of their family 
environment. These include recognising and supporting the role of the extended family; 
prioritising community based care as a form of alternative care; facilitating kinship care 
and, contrary to the position of the CRC Committee, providing a legal basis for 
supporting so-called “informal adoptions” when they are in the best interests of the child. 
 
Even the domestication of the notion of the duties of the child,21 as incorporated in 
Article 31 of the ACRWC, has a role to play in supporting child care and contributing 
towards reducing the possibilities of children’s deprivation of their family environment. 
For instance, the duties of the child could imply that older children, having regard to 
their capacity and without compromising the rights in the ACRWC, could take care of 
younger children (siblings).22  
 
Therefore, it is recommended that, in their efforts to harmonise child laws, African 
States should make a concerted effort to consult all stakeholders, and capitalise on 
positive African cultures that have a bearing on child care. The result of a culturally 
                                            
20  Sloth-Nielsen et al. (2009), 6-16. 
21  See Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2008c), for a detailed discussion of Art. 31 of the ACRWC on 
the duties of the African child and their various positive implications for children’s rights in Africa. 
22  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3 for a discussion on the role of children in child-headed 
households. 
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sensitive approach to harmonisation of laws could reduce the risk of children being 
deprived of their family environment, and the issue of intercountry adoption would 
therefore not arise often.  
 
7.7.3    Child law reform as a tool for development 
 
The comprehensive role that Sloth-Nielsen envisages for child law reform processes in 
Africa is also instructive.  She contends that child law reform processes in most African 
countries have been accompanied by an implicit understanding that the law is a 
platform or tool for development – there would be no expectation of instant realisation.23 
Citing her previous note made in the context of South Sudan, she submits that: 
…it seems that there is much benefit to be derived from starting with a clear policy 
concerning needs and priorities, captured in statutory form. For a start, establishing a 
birth registration system and introducing a compulsory registration drive may over time 
improve children’s access to health care and education. Addressing parental 
responsibilities through the lens of equality may ultimately lead to enhanced women’s 
rights – under customary law women have no rights to their children. The progressive 
introduction of a minimum age of marriage may slowly increase the exceptionally early 
age at which most girls experience their first pregnancy… .24 
Her contention that child law reform is not only an undertaking to domesticate the CRC 
and ACRWC, but is in fact a key policy planning instrument which is a pre-condition to 
strengthening children’s rights,25 including of those who are deprived of their family 
environment, is valid in the African context. 
 
                                            
23  Sloth-Nielsen, (2007), 104. 
24  Sloth-Nielsen, (2005). 
25  Sloth-Nielsen, (2007), 105. 
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In addition to Sloth-Nielsen’s observations, it is further submitted that the passage of 
legislation serves the purpose of demonstrating at least initial political will on the part of 
government. The presence of such a political will facilitates the creation of a platform for 
non-legal measures (such as, awareness raising and capacity building) that should 
indeed be considered an essential companion of the law in order to ensure that it is 
enforced effectively.  
 
7.8 THE ACRWC, THE AFRICAN COMMITTEE, AND THE NEED AND 
POTENTIAL FOR A REGIONAL CHILD RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
 
One of the theses of this study has been to enquire as to whether the ACRWC ushers in 
any added value for the protection of children’s rights, more particularly in respect of 
intercountry adoption. Based on the discussions in the preceding Chapters, it is possible 
to conclude that the ACRWC entrenches higher normative standards than the CRC that 
are relevant for intercountry adoption, and if domesticated and implemented, it has the 
potential to further promote children’s rights. 
 
It is not original to state that the ACRWC is a potentially powerful tool in enhancing the 
lives of millions of African children. As early as 1995, Van Bueren called it “the most 
progressive of the treaties on the rights of the child”.26 There are only a few areas where 
the CRC offers a higher normative standard than the ACRWC.27 Issues pertaining to 
intercountry adoption are not listed among them. Nevertheless, the provisions of the 
ACRWC, such as definition of a child, the best interests of the child, inclusion of the 
                                            
26  Van Bueren, (1995), 402. 
27  For instance, in the sphere of juvenile justice. 
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phrase “last resort” in Article 24(b),28 the need to find “alternative family care”,29 the 
explicit mention of “trafficking” in Article 24(d), and the requirement to establish a post-
adoption follow-up system, are progressive provisions that are tailored to address 
African realities.   
 
Apart from the ACRWC’s substantive provisions, an examination of the supervision 
machinery that it sets in place through the African Committee (particularly by way of the 
individual complaints mechanism) is even more appealing for promoting and protecting 
children’s rights in Africa.30 Although the actual work of the African Committee is still in 
its infancy, with the necessary financial and technical support, it can prove to be a major 
tool for promoting and protecting children's rights in adoptions in Africa.  
 
One of the cornerstones for a successful reporting procedure is the willingness of 
governments to fulfill their reporting obligations in an accurate way, i.e. in time and via 
submitting a report of good quality. Clearly, the quality of the reports determines the 
quality of the debate between government representatives and the African Committee. 
In the context of intercountry adoption, the starting point for governments to be able to 
submit comprehensive reports is their initial understanding of the normative framework 
of the ACRWC. As a result, it is recommended that a concerted effort needs to be made 
to draw the attention of States Parties to these normative standards that the ACRWC 
entrenches. 
 
                                            
28  See Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.5 for a discussion of this. 
29  See Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.4 for a discussion on the implication of the phrase “alternative family 
care”. 
30  See, Mezmur, (2006), 550. 
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In connection with the African Committee, the role of regional courts for the promotion 
and protection of children's rights is very significant. The practice of the European Court 
and the Inter-American Court testifies to this fact. In Africa, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court Protocol) entered into force on 25 January 
2004. African intergovernmental organisations, including the African Committee, may 
also submit cases to the African Court. By undertaking comparative research with 
regard to other regional courts, it may be possible to find suggestions as to how to 
positively influence the jurisprudence of the African Court for the advancement of 
children's rights in Africa in the intercountry adoption domain. 
 
As it is highlighted in section 7.3 above, in the face of the need for a more concrete child 
rights jurisprudence in relation to intercountry adoption, one struggles to find space to 
infuse relevant African contexts into the international jurisprudence. It is submitted that 
this state of affairs highlights the need to develop an “Africa specific” child rights 
jurisprudence through the work of the African Committee, the African Court as well as 
academic discourses.  
 
7.9 THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF JUDGE-MADE LAW IN RELATION TO 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
 
Chapter 2 has alluded to the absence of comprehensive and up to date laws on 
intercountry adoption in most parts of the African continent. As a result of this, 
inevitably, the judiciary has played, and will continue to play, a significant role in 
intercountry adoption rulings.  
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The risks of judge-made law on fundamental rules and principles of intercountry 
adoption are manifold. To start with, this would certainly lead to divergent judicial 
approaches to intercountry adoption regionally and continentally. The potential for 
inconsistencies (and sometimes incoherence) in the interpretation and application of the 
principles and rules governing intercountry adoptions has already been demonstrated in 
the Infant CJ cases. “Forum shopping” is a risk that cannot be discounted, too. 
 
It is also not possible to assume that members of the judiciary are well versed in 
children’s rights (let alone intercountry adoption). As has been argued elsewhere,31 the 
fact that intercountry adoption is a specialised field within children’s rights (which in itself 
is a specialisation within the general human rights sphere), and even within adoption 
generally, makes it an area that begs for detailed and comprehensive legislative 
guidance and regulation. For instance, the assertion by the SCA in Malawi that the 
Adoption Act of 1968 is sufficient to regulate intercountry adoption is an exaggeration,32 
and betrays a parochial view of the more fundamental safeguards needed to undertake 
the practice. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that retrogressive forces within the judiciary might 
use the law contrary to children’s best interests. This risk is compounded by the fact that 
the subject of intercountry adoption is a sensitive area of child law. It is sometimes 
politicised, and is highly susceptible to a value-laden appraisal. 
                                            
31  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007a), 97. 
32  See CRC Committee, State Party Report: Malawi, (July 2008), para. 45 where the CRC 
Committee “expresses its concern over legislation on adoption which is not in compliance with 
article 21 and other relevant provisions of the Convention”. 
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In addition, even in the presence of progressive members of the judiciary, there cannot 
be a guarantee that its judgments will be respected. Questions of the legitimacy of 
judges encroaching on the mandates of other branches of government; and overturning 
the will of the people without representation might adversely affect the implementation 
of rulings. It is therefore recommended that reliance on judge made law should be 
avoided to the extent possible, and as argued in section 7.7 of this Chapter, domestic 
legislation compliant with international standards should be the preferred regulatory 
context. 
 
Finally, intercountry adoption requires cooperation and mutual recognition (of the effects 
of an adoption) between States. There can be few who would quibble with the assertion 
that this system of cooperation and mutual recognition amongst Contracting States 
helps to ensure that those safeguards upholding the child’s best interests are secured. 
In connection with this, as argued elsewhere,33 the judiciary is not the appropriate organ 
to create comity between States in the sphere of intercountry adoption. Instead of 
attempting to create comity and mutual recognition on an ad hoc basis by courts, it is 
better that it is rather determined definitively in advance by the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Since cooperation and mutual recognition contemplates the 
prospect that Central Authorities might have preferred working relationships, the 
executive and legislative organs of government are better poised to determine these 
preferred working relationships which might be dictated by any number of reasons 
(language, culture, proximity, prior good relationships between government agencies or 
adoption service providers, and so forth). 
                                            
33  Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, (2007b), 89-92. 
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7.10  THE ROLE OF THE PERMANENT BUREAU  
 
The role of the Permanent Bureau for the ratification and implementation of the Hague 
Convention is crucial. In this respect, just recently, the Permanent Bureau has given 
technical assistance to Namibia. In this regard, apart from urging States Parties to ratify 
the Hague Convention, the CRC Committee should also, in a more systematic and 
consistent manner, continue to advise States Parties to seek technical assistance from 
the Permanent Bureau. 
 
The Francophone Seminar on the Hague Convention, which was organised by the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (in partnership with other organisations) 
from 22-26 June 2009 is worthy of mention. This seminar brought together experts and 
judges (mainly from French-speaking African countries which are Contracting States to 
the Hague Convention) in order to promote a good understanding of the Hague 
Convention.34 A similar seminar was organised in 2007.35 In addition, the African 
Judicial Seminar at the Hague (2006) in the context of the Hague Project for 
International Co-operation and the Protection of Children in the Southern and Eastern 
African Region – which explored the role of the Hague Conventions in the practical 
implementation of the CRC and the ACRWC is also notable.36 A planned conference for 
February 2010 for Eastern and Southern Africa on the Hague Children’s Conventions, 
which will focus on the benefits of the Conventions for the Region as a whole, as well as 
practical aspects of implementation, is also exemplary. 
                                            
34  For further details see 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2009&varevent=168>. 
35  See <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2007&varevent=134>. 
36  See <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2006&varevent=119>. 
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The potential of these kinds of events to improve the implementation of the Hague 
Convention in Africa, and attract other States to ratify the treaty, is crucial. These events 
also help to profile the advantages of the Hague Convention; offer a platform for 
networking and dialogue; and assist in identifying regional and sub-regional challenges 
and opportunities to improve the cross-border protection of children. Such events can 
also be seen as capacity building exercises, contributing to the expertise of 
stakeholders (such as judges) on the implementation of the Hague Convention.  
 
All these constitute laudable efforts that need to be sustained in order to maximise the 
ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on the African continent. It is 
recommended that the Permanent Bureau should take further proactive steps, such as 
identifying African countries that are undertaking child law reforms, and offering 
technical assistance in respect of intercountry adoption related laws or provisions.  
 
7.11 CAN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF 
REGULATING INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION? 
 
 
In order to regulate intercountry adoption, one option available to States is to enter into 
bilateral co-operation agreements. As discussed in section 3.4.3.3.3 of Chapter 3, this 
does indeed enjoy legislative support. It is advisable that bilateral agreements should 
preferably reflect the standards of the Hague Convention. This entails using the 
principles, requirements, and wording of the Hague Convention in the texts of such 
bilateral agreement as much as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
502
Generally speaking, bilateral agreements  enable mainly sending countries that are not 
Contracting States to the Hague Convention to attain the Convention’s goals without 
going through all of the burdensome requirements that would inevitably prevent the 
country from being able to fully implement the Hague Convention. Bilateral agreements 
might be a viable solution for under-developed countries that cannot finance the full 
implementation of the Hague Convention. A bilateral agreement has the potential to 
address more appropriately the specific issues of individual nations, and sometimes 
might create an even more efficient process than the Hague Convention. This 
conclusion is premised on the fact that the diversity and country specific aspects of 
intercountry adoption do not lend themselves to overly vague solutions. For instance, 
through a bilateral agreement, African countries might insist on open adoption,37 DNA 
testing,38 or other appropriate measures that they deem fit in the best interests of their 
children.  
 
The fairly limited number of countries with which African countries undertake 
intercountry adoption makes bilateral agreements an even more viable option. To 
illustrate: 85% of adoptions from Burkina Faso are to France; more than 50% of 
adoptions from Ethiopia are to the U.S; and the same can be said for Liberia. From the 
experience of the countries under the study, it is recommended that Ethiopia enters into 
a bilateral agreement with the U.S.. Not only is this supported by the fact that Ethiopia is 
not a party to the Hague Convention but also because it is the top sending country to 
the U.S. (according to 2008 data) in Africa. It would not be untoward to propose that 
                                            
37  See the brief description and advantage of open adoptions in Chapter 1, section 1.3.  
38  See a brief discussion of the advantages of requesting DNA testing in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.3. 
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Malawi should have a similar agreement with the U.K./U.S. if future intercountry 
adoptions are to mainly target these countries as the major receiving countries. 
 
On the one hand, it may be speculated that the proliferation of bilateral agreements 
might tend to undermine, or even discredit, the importance of implementing the Hague 
Convention. On the other hand, it might also prepare and inspire countries involved in 
bilateral agreements to ratify of the Hague Convention in the medium or long term. In 
the final analysis, it is the promotion and protection of the best interests of the child 
which is the ultimate goal. In this regard, if this is achieved through bilateral 
agreements, there would not be a need to focus more on form than on function.  
 
7.12 RELATIVELY WEAK AFRICAN STATES, INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION, RECEIVING COUNTRIES, AND NON-STATE 
ACTORS 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, while many African governments might wield some 
power within the more limited “domestic” sphere, in reality much of their economies and 
scope in designing and implementing social development policies are not necessarily 
within their control.39 The challenges they face, such as the impact of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, are immense too.40 Premised on this point, it is crucial to ask how far are 
African governments able to deliver socio-economic rights to their children and families? 
                                            
39  See, for instance, Banda, 2005, 299. At least there is now some evidence in Africa that the child-
friendliness of a country’s laws and policies are not necessarily dependent on its economy. See 
generally, ACPF, (2008).  Therefore, while the extent of resources are important, the proper 
management of whatever resources are available is more important. 
40  Unlike other developing countries, such as, India and Brazil, African countries largely lack the 
power to refuse patent protection to anti-AIDS medicine by pharmaceuticals, which thereby limits 
their access to life saving/extending generic medicines.  
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How much leverage do they have in developing policies for social development? How 
developed and capable are their institutional frameworks in order to undertake 
intercountry adoption in a child-centred manner? What is their capacity to control their 
own public officials, let alone non-State actors, such as intergovernmental organisations 
and foreign adoption agencies? 
 
7.12.1    International cooperation 
 
International cooperation, which could be comprised of both financial and human 
resources, plays a significant role in the realisation of children’s rights in Africa. The 
CRC is a powerful tool for international cooperation and solidarity between States 
Parties. The CRC repeatedly entrenches that “particular account shall be taken of the 
needs of developing countries”.41 It is recommended that this particular focus on the 
needs of developing countries is worth reiterating to gather support for measures that 
address the deprivation of children of their family environment in Africa. If need be, the 
development of an intercountry adoption system that is compliant with international 
standards could be supported through international cooperation. Hence, it is concluded 
that there is a legal basis to submit that African countries can and should ask for and, as 
much as possible, be provided with international cooperation in order to develop their 
alternative care schemes in general.  
 
However, not all international cooperation or development assistance is necessarily 
conducive to children’s rights in Africa. The negative impact of actions and omissions by 
                                            
41  Arts. 23, 24, and 28 of the CRC. 
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influential financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank on the realisation of 
the rights of children in Africa is potentially a good example.42 In this regard, the CRC 
Committee and the African Committee should devise creative ways to supervise and 
enforce compliance with the CRC and the ACRWC by these institutions. It is 
recommended that one way of achieving this goal could be to encourage alternative 
reports submitted to the treaty bodies to provide comment not just on government’s 
performance and obligations, but also on the behaviour of donor countries, international 
financial institutions and other similarly positioned non-State actors.  
 
7.12.2    Cooperation from receiving countries 
 
Co-operation is central to make the intercountry adoption regime in Africa work for the 
best interests of children.43 In this regard, any intercountry adoption reform that 
considers the role of receiving countries as inconsequential is doomed to fail.  
 
It is submitted that there is a need for recognition on the part of receiving countries that 
it is their demand for adoptable children that drives the intercountry adoption process in 
the main. Therefore, receiving countries should abstain from putting the authorities and 
organisations of countries of origin under unnecessary pressure to provide adoptable 
children.  
 
                                            
42  See, for instance, Rishmawi, (2006), 38-42. For a discussion of the negative impact of IMF 
policies in the context of the right to free and compulsory primary education, see Mezmur and 
Sloth-Nielsen, (2008b). 
43  For further details on the need for administrative and judicial cooperation in intercountry adoption, 
see Duncan, (2001). 
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Receiving countries also have an important role to prevent and address illicit activities in 
adoption. For instance, Chapter 6 has explained the role of receiving countries in 
placing moratoria (restrictions) on adoption from countries where adoption irregularities 
have become rampant. By way of another example, if the U.S. Government was to 
classify trafficking for adoptions in the category of “severe forms of trafficking”, and have 
it proscribed in its Trafficking Victims Protection Act, the Department of State would 
have been able to put pressure on countries of origin to address the problem.44 It is also 
recommended that receiving countries should assist in holding foreign adoption 
agencies registered in their State accountable for the working methods of their 
representatives and partners in Africa. This should be the case especially when these 
representatives and/or partners were involved in illicit activities in Africa with the 
knowledge of the foreign adoption agency (and no preventive or curative measure is 
taken by the agency).  
 
It is also recommended that receiving countries should assist, and where necessary put 
due pressure on, countries of origin in making their laws compliant with international 
standards including the Hague Convention. As underscored in Chapter 6, the emerging 
jurisprudence of the CRC Committee in this respect is worth concretising. As already 
highlighted in Chapter 6 section 6.3.3, in relation to France, the CRC Committee 
recalled: 
...its concern that the majority of intercountry adoptions are mainly carried out with 
countries of origin that have not ratified the Hague Convention of 1993 on Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (two thirds)... .45  
                                            
44  For further discussion on this point, see Meir and Zhang, (2009), 93 and 123. 
45  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, (May 2009), para. 63. 
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Assuming that this view of the CRC Committee gains ground in relation to a number of 
other receiving countries, it might further increase the need to assist and put pressure 
on African non-Contracting States to the Hague Convention to ratify and implement the 
treaty with the necessary infrastructural support. 
 
The role of foreign adoption agencies to ensure safeguards in the adoption processes in 
Africa is important, too. In practical terms, this might mean, for instance, a better 
preparation of the prospective adoptive parents by foreign adoption agencies about the 
potential risks of child buying (or other illicit activities) in Africa, which can contribute 
towards countering illegal adoptions. It is further recommended that foreign adoption 
agency representatives (including their partners and lawyers) who might influence the 
number of children placed for adoption should not be paid on a commission basis. 
 
Foreign adoption agencies’ associations, such as, Euradopt46 represent a good 
example of how foreign adoption agencies can be held accountable to pre-determined 
group ethical rules. Drawing the attention of this and other similar organisations to the 
competent authorities of countries of origin to enable them to report irregularities is 
crucial.  
 
7.12.3    Non-State actors 
 
In relation to child law reform efforts in Africa, the influence of non-State actors is also 
significant. In the majority of African countries, child law reforms are mainly supported, 
                                            
46  Euradopt is an association of adoption organisations in 12 Western European countries. See 
<http://portal.euradopt.org/>. 
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or are at times spearheaded by non-State actors such as UNICEF. As a result, it is 
recommended that the relevant measures outlined in section 7.7 of this Chapter should 
be taken into account by non-State actors involved in law reform efforts in Africa. These 
non-State actors should undertake their interventions in a culturally sensitive, 
participatory, and bottom-up manner.  
 
Non-State actors also play a crucial role in the designing and implementation of child 
rights related policies in Africa. Even if an African country decides that it wants to make 
institutionalisation a measure of last resort, for instance, the influence of non-State 
actors (especially donors) in the realisation of this goal is immense.  By way of example, 
a recent review of alternative care facilities in Southern African countries has found that 
factors such as HIV prevalence rates or poverty did not substantially vary the number of 
children’s homes between countries.47 As a result it was concluded that a good number 
of “children are in homes because people build them”.48 
 
The role of the media (both national and international) in the context of intercountry 
adoption related matters is also worth highlighting. As the most powerful tool of mass 
communication nationally and internationally, the media has the potential to either 
protect or violate children’s rights. While the media’s role in influencing child friendly 
attitudes in society (for instance, to promote domestic adoption) is beyond question,49 
                                            
47  Dunn, (2009).   
48  As above.   
49  CRC Committee, “Day of General Discussion”, (1996), para. 53. 
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Africa’s media still tends to place children at the margins of its work.50 Lack of 
professionalism in the media often leads to sensationalist reporting; overstating or 
understating the provisions of children’s rights laws; failure to provide substantive 
analysis on issues involving children; and more emphasis on protection issues while 
neglecting provision and participation rights of children.51 For instance, as it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, contrary to many international media reports, orphans are 
not necessarily “adoptable” children. The fact that the media often uses the words 
“orphanhood” interchangeably with “adoptability” continues to contribute towards 
existing misconceptions about intercountry adoption. There is also a clear lack of 
knowledge (and sometimes lack of willingness) to safeguard the right to privacy of the 
biological families, adoptive families, as well as the privacy rights of the child. 
Furthermore, the general lack of capacity of African media to undertake investigative 
journalism to uncover issues such as illegal adoptions curtails its role in the promotion 
and protection of children’s rights.  
 
The furtherance of the role of the media in a professional manner to protect children’s 
rights in general, and those involved in intercountry adoption in particular is apposite. It 
is recommended that an extensive education campaign and training to promote ethical 
reporting in the media should be undertaken. 
 
7.13  RESEARCH AND DATA BASED INTERVENTIONS 
 
                                            
50  Resource constraints coupled with lack of awareness (and sometimes limitations imposed on 
freedom of expression) make a State’s general obligation to disseminate information about 
children’s rights in Africa highly limited. 
51  See Tobin, (2004), 143 and the sources provided therein. 
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Research on child rights-related issues is part of the implementation requirement of 
both the CRC and the ACRWC. For instance, in its General Comment No 5 on the 
“General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, the 
CRC Committee states that the “[c]ollection of sufficient and reliable data on children, 
disaggregated to enable identification of discrimination and/or disparities in the 
realisation of rights, is an essential part of implementation”,52 and that thus “states 
should collaborate with appropriate research institutes and aim to build up a complete 
picture of progress towards implementation, with qualitative as well as quantitative 
studies”.53  
 
Disaggregated data on the number of children deprived of their family environment, in 
order to devise age, sex, and developmentally appropriate interventions should be 
taken as a starting point. Knowledge on the number of children in institutional care, and 
further research to identify reasons for entry into care, and monitor the degree to which 
children in care are regularly assessed, is crucial. There is also a need for research into 
adoptees and their life after adoption especially in the culturally disruptive milieu of 
intercountry adoption. Research and data in these and other areas can be used to 
advocate for broader policy change and findings extrapolated to legal contexts.  
 
In accordance with the child participation and best interests of the child principles, the 
involvement of children in research should be given due attention.54 This study 
                                            
52   CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, (2003), para. 48. 
53   As above. 
54  In the context of juvenile justice, the CRC Committee has suggested that children should be 
involved in evaluation and research, `in particular those who have been in contact with parts of 
the juvenile justice system'. See CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10, (2007), para. 99. 
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represents an initial attempt to identify gaps, opportunities, and, to some extent, 
research themes, of special relevance to the furtherance of children's rights in 
intercountry adoption in the African context in order to sharpen and strengthen our 
capacity to promote good practice and promising solutions. 
 
7.14  FINAL REMARKS 
 
Throughout this study, African scholarship on the topic at hand - intercountry adoption in 
an African context - has been in short supply. Lest it be thought that African scholars 
are absent in debates around alternative care in this domain, it must be pointed out that  
one of Africa’s largest NGOs, ANPPCAN,55 also credited as the driving force behind the 
adoption of the ACRWC, took the lead in co-hosting a pan-African workshop on 
intercountry adoption in June 2009. Joined by a range of other NGOs, 
intergovernmental and afro-centric donor organisations, the central themes on the table 
were: the need for co-ordinated response to the increasing phenomenon of Africa as a 
sending continent; the desire for greater understanding of the opportunities presented, 
and the risks and challenges posed, by the practice of intercountry adoption in an 
African context; and the need for mobilisation of other NGOs and child welfare agencies 
around the socio-political complexities thrown up by the practice.  
 
The subjects for discussion throughout this study attempt to make a modest contribution 
to these developing debates, seen from the perspective of an African son. 
                                            
55  Along with the Africa Wide Movement for Children hosted at the main office of the African Child 
Policy Forum. 
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Adoption Cause No. 2 of 2006 In the Matter of the Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 26:01) 
and In the Matter of David Banda (A Male Infant) 
 
AD v DW  (Department of Social Development Intervening; Centre for Child Law, 
Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 183 (CC) 
 
De Gree v Webb  (Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria, Amicus Curiae) 2006 (6) 
SA 51 (W) 
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De Gree v Webb  (Centre for Child Law, University of Pretoria, Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) 
SA 184 (SCA) 
 
Fitzpatrick  v Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions 2000 (3) SA 139 (C)  
 
Family Cause No.81 / 05 in Matter of Adoption of Maria Hodkins an infant by Mark and 
Kate Skidmore (unreported) 
 
Family Cause No 13/06 in the Matter of Jacob Mukisa Meyer-an infant; and Adoption 
cause No 43/06 In the Matter Jesse Bree Mays-an infant (unreported) 
 
Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick  2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC)  
 
M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC) 
 
Re M (Child’s upbringing) (1996) 2 FCR 473. 
 
 
 
 
